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This dissertation is an action-research inquiry into the unique strategic 
management challenge of creating a new market for an altogether new product form. 
The research was conducted over a four-year period while working as a project 
manager and consultant to two “greenfield” corporate ventures whose goal was to 
profitably serve the unmet needs of impoverished slum and village communities in 
Kenya and India. In both ventures, the new product and service offerings that were 
developed and commercialized were ones for which the targeted communities had no 
comparable, much less equivalent, products against which they could benchmark. 
The principle finding from this dissertation concerns the strategic innovation 
processes effective for catalyzing the consumer sense-making necessary for adopting a 
product for which there are no consumption benchmarks. Current management 
innovation strategies for market creation around a new product form leave under-
theorized and un-addressed the issue of personal-level consumer learning in the face 
of “discontinuous products.” This dissertation draws together field learnings and 
experiences from the Kenya and India ventures with theoretical contributions of 
performance theory to demarcate a market creation strategy tailored for this demand-
side challenge. The strategy is based on catalyzing an initial community of practice 
centered on the new product form. Management frameworks for both content and 
 process dimensions of a market creation strategy are developed; they include a 
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It could be said that the year 2002 marked the “discovery” by corporate 
managers of a New World. Yet unlike Columbus’ discovery of the Americas, which 
overcame a vast expanse of un-chartered seas that spatially separated Europe from the 
new continent, the discovery of the Base or Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP)—the 
approximately two-thirds of humanity whose per capita incomes fall below $1,500 
(purchasing power parity)—was occasioned by the bridging of a perceptual chasm.  
That perceptual shift was triggered by the publication in 2002 of The Fortune 
at the Bottom of the Pyramid by C.K. Prahalad and Stuart Hart (Prahalad & Hart, 
2002). The authors argued that low-income consumers presented not only a viable 
consumer market for corporations, but one of potentially enormous size and 
opportunity. Furthermore, by meeting the unmet needs of this segment through 
commercial models, corporations could play a role in alleviating global poverty. That 
core argument was reinforced and extended in subsequent books (Hart, 2005, 2007; 
Prahalad, 2004; Rangan, Quelch, Herrero, & Barton, 2007; Weiser, Kahane, Rochlin, 
& Landis, 2006) and publications (Bruggman & Prahalad, 2007; Gomez & Marquez, 
2006; Hart & Christensen, 2002; Hart & Sharma, 2004; London & Hart, 2004; 
Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). The role of “big-business” in global development 
became a straightforward issue of doing business with a different customer.  
This dissertation began as an action-research inquiry into the unique corporate 
innovation challenge presented by this low-income customer segment. Four years later 
and having spent more than a year’s time on the ground in Kenya and India leading 
the development of new business ventures serving rural villages and slums, my 
research findings ironically speak to an innovation challenge that cuts across 
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organizational size and consumer socio-economic levels. The management issue to 
which this dissertation ultimately speaks is that of new market creation—the 
commercialization of an altogether consumer product offering and value proposition 
for which there are neither current competitors nor customers.  
The purpose of this introduction is twofold. First, I want to set the reader’s 
expectations for the overall flow and pace of the chapters to follow. Second, I explain 
how my key findings landed in such seemingly different territory from where I began, 
and how this shift is a sign of a successful research process. 
This dissertation is the product not only of a non-traditional philosophical lens, 
but also of an unorthodox research method within the context of management 
research. Philosophically, I use a school of thought called post-structuralism. Post-
structuralism—which focuses on the interplay between discourse, knowledge creation, 
and identity—shapes my choice of research approach (e.g., action research) and 
underpins my analysis and extension of the market creation literature. 
Methodologically, I have followed an action research (AR) approach. AR is an overall 
research strategy that shifts the role and position of the researcher from that of 
objective, arm’s length observer to one of active participant in the solving of a 
concrete, real-life management problem.  
This introduction begins with a general background on both the philosophy of 
post-structuralism and the action research method, followed by my specific reasons for 
choosing these frameworks. I then provide an overview of my research timeline and 
conclude with a discussion of the structure and layout of the subsequent chapters in 
my dissertation.  
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Post-Structuralism: An Overview 
This dissertation brings a post-structuralist philosophical perspective into 
conversation with the fields of strategic innovation and entrepreneurship. Post-
structuralism forms the basis for the action research approach I utilize and the lens by 
which I approach the concept of market creation.  
Post-structuralism is a school of thought that emerged in France during the 
political upheavals of the 1960s. Post-structuralism, in name, stands in opposition to 
the structuralist movement of the 1950s and 1960s that sought to analyze critically the 
underlying structures and meanings of cultural systems and products, with a particular 
focus on language. Claude Levi-Strauss and Ferninand de Saussure were central 
figures in the structuralist movement in anthropology and linguistics respectively. The 
work of Sigmund Freud is viewed as the foundation for structuralism’s application in 
the field of psychology. 
Post-structuralism—among whose founding thinkers include Jacques Derrida, 
Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, and Gilles Deleuze—challenges the 
notion that the social world can be truthfully and objectively represented. Rather, all 
knowledge and truth—because they rely on man-made systems of representation, such 
as language—are inevitably culturally-conditioned and historically bounded. Meaning 
is not reflected by language, but produced within language (Storey, 2006). In this 
regard, post-structuralism shares common ground with Thomas Kuhn’s argument that 
scientific research proceeds within the boundaries of a paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). As 
well, post-structuralism shares the same ontological assumption as does a social-
constructionist perspective (Latour & Woolgar, 1979).   
Post-structuralism goes beyond the Kuhnian notion of paradigm and the social 
constructionist perspective to argue that the creation of knowledge and truth is a 
political process that makes possible the social world and people’s experience of it. 
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Power, in the post-structuralist view, is first and foremost a diffuse, productive force 
that operates through knowledge to establish the social identities and norms of 
behavior and thought that enable social life, rather than a repressive force that inhibits 
choice and life. Power, in other words, is an enabling force, rather than a constraining 
force. Because of post-structuralism’s focus on power’s constitutive role in social 
artifacts (e.g., culture), post-structuralism is often considered an offshoot of the 
Frankfurt School of “critical theory.” Critical theory, which advanced a neo-Marxist 
critique of capitalist ideology and mass culture, is associated with the work of 
Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas.  
Knowledge and power are, therefore, inextricably linked in post-structuralism: 
“It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power” (Gordon, 1980a; Rabinow, 1984). Indeed, 
Foucault treats them as a single concept – his so-called power/knowledge couplet 
(Gordon, 1980b). Power shapes the social relationships and discourses that establish 
the conditions of possibility or “regime of truth” of the knowledge creation process. 
However, power is also exerted through the practices, behaviors, and identities made 
thinkable and socially allowable by the newly created knowledge. Foucault referred to 
the latter process as knowledge’s “truth effects.”  
There are two important points I want to highlight about the post-structuralist 
conceptualization of power as they relate to strategic management. One, it does not 
limit or annul individual agency; rather, power’s functioning is dependent upon its 
very existence. Second, while power is a pervasive feature of all human relations—as 
Foucault argued, there is no “exteriority to power”—“power is never a fixed and 
closed regime, but rather an endless and open strategic game” (Burchell, Gordon, & 
Miller, 1991). These tenets of post-structuralism, it is important to note, expand the 
nature and scope of managerial agency beyond the strategic choice framework which 
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has served as the foundation on which the field of strategic management rests (Child, 
1972).  
Of particular relevance to my dissertation are the post-structuralist concepts of 
“subjectivity” and “governmentality,” both of which reflect the “productive” 
conceptualization of power.  Subjectivity is post-structuralism’s unique theorization of 
identity and the individual. The post-structuralist individual is not a stable, internally-
consistent, rational being whose identity is an outward expression of an internal truth, 
essence, or consciousness. Rather, individuals are in a constant struggle to define their 
sense of self by performing (with or against) socially-defined identities, a process that 
David Scott refers to as “self-fashioning” (Scott, 1999) and which political 
philosopher William Connolly labels the “politics of becoming” (Connolly, 1999). In 
post-structuralism, identities—just as all other forms of knowledge—are both effects 
of power and vehicles for exercising power. 
“Subjectivity,” therefore, is a post-structuralist term referring to this particular 
idea of the self in which the individual is simultaneously acted upon or subjected to 
power (because identities are socially defined) and a source of or subject of power (by 
the authority vested in an identity). As Foucault notes, “the individual is an effect of 
power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is an effect, it is the 
elements of its articulation. The individual, which power has constituted, is at the 
same time its vehicle” (Gordon, 1980b). Subjectivity, therefore, is comprised of a 
person’ physical body, his/her mental habits of thought, and his/her bodily practices in 
dynamic relation to other culturally-marked bodies, patterns of thought, and bodily 
practices. 
“Governmentality,” a concept coined and developed in depth by Foucault, 
refers to the particular mode and rationality of modern state governance that emerged 
in the mid 1800s and was defined, in part, by its focus on the management of a 
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population. What makes modern forms of state governance unique, Foucault argued, is 
that they succeed in managing an entire population through activities and practices 
targeted at the health and welfare of the individual subject (Burchell et al., 1991). To 
use post-structuralism’s terminology, they couple “individualization” with 
“totalization.”  
The result of this particular mode of governance is that individuals internalize 
behaviors and forms of discipline desired by the state (e.g., marriage before children) 
in the belief that such behaviors constitute a healthy and desirable life. The population 
is thereby managed through self-policing individuals attending to their own personal 
development. It is for this reason that Foucault refers to governmentality as “the 
conduct of conduct” (Burchell et al., 1991).  
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault uses the 19th century architectural invention 
of the panopticon as a metaphor of governmentality (Foucault, 1977). The panopticon 
was a unique prison design created by Jeremy Bentham in which prison cells on 
multiple levels opened up to a central courtyard. The courtyard contained a glassed 
watch tower made of one-way mirrors that afforded a 360 degree view of all of the 
cells. As such, prison guards in the tower could see out and into each of the cells, but 
prisoners could not see into tower. The magic of the panopticon’s design was that it 
was not necessary to post a guard in the tower. Believing that they were under constant 
surveillance, the prisoners would discipline their own behavior and act appropriately 
at all times.  
 
Post-Structuralism as Method 
As a form of analysis and method, post-structuralist philosophy does not aim 
to judge the correctness or validity of particular knowledge claims. It does not attempt 
to provide a more objective analysis or a higher standard for moral and ethical 
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behavior. Nor does it attempt to explain causal relationships and, thereby, provide 
predictive value. As discussed, post-structuralism is posited as a critique of 
epistemology and what Nietzsche called the “will to knowledge,” not an alternative 
means of establishing truths or facts (Rabinow, 1986b).  
Rather, post-structuralism’s intent is to create a space for new kinds of 
knowledge and, hence, alternative identities and forms of social organization. This is 
achieved by denaturalizing taken-for-granted logics, moralities, and practices and 
highlighting their diverse power effects and consequences. The act of disrupting 
norms in order to give voice and credibility to those deemed “abnormal” is precisely 
where post-structuralism locates the question of ethics. Foucault’s practice of 
genealogy, also known as a “history of the present,” and Derrida’s practice of 
deconstruction are examples of post-structuralist analytical methods used for this 
purpose. Genealogy and deconstruction have been used to historicize the concepts of 
development (Escobar, 1995), empowerment and citizenship (Cruikshank, 1999), 
secularism (Connolly, 1999), religion (Asad, 1993), capitalism (Gibson-Graham, 
1996), economy (Gibson-Graham, 2006), and gender and sexuality (Butler, 1999 
(1991)), among others.  
In addition to this deconstructive approach, post-structuralism has been 
employed as a generative practice and method, the goal being the construction of new 
discourses and new subjectivities. One of the leading examples of this comes from the 
work of feminist scholar Judith Butler, whose “performance theory” incorporates a 
strategy of normalizing alternative forms of sexuality by publicly “performing” and 
acting them out (Butler, 1999 (1991)). More recently, action research conducted in 
Massachusetts and Australia by geographers Kathy Gibson and Julie Graham has 
attempted to invent a discourse of “community economy” as an alternative strategy for 
advancing community economic development (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Creating this 
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new discourse of economy entails a parallel “resubjectivization” process that aims to 
establish new “economic identities” and social relationships that enable and support 
this different way of thinking about and practicing economy.  
 
The Relevance of Post-Structuralism to Strategic Management 
I believe post-structuralism, both as an analytical perspective and as a method, 
opens new opportunities for management practice. Internally, genealogy and 
deconstruction provide practical tools for disrupting what Prahalad and Bettis refer to 
as a corporation’s dominant logic by tracing the historical contingencies of taken-for 
granted practices, routines, metrics, and measures and by illuminating the connections 
between micro-level practices and corporate-level structures (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986). As Prahalad suggests, firm’s dominant logics, much like discourses, shape the 
field of possibilities for innovation and imagination.  
Post-structuralist methods can be used also to actively create and normalize 
new management logics and subjectivities to enable new innovation and management 
opportunities. Clay Christensen, for example, has argued that successful 
commercialization of disruptive innovations is dependent upon establishing an 
innovation space outside of the firm’s core systems and routines (Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003b). Henderson and Clark advance a similar argument 
regarding architectural-level innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990). In short, post-
structuralist methods can both illuminate the current box that shapes management 
innovation and practice, and aid in the creation of a new innovation box that enables 
possibilities outside of current management practice.  
Looking outside of the firm, the post-structuralist concept of power reflected in 
“governmentality” radically extends management opportunities for establishing 
competitive advantage. To date, strategic management trades on what Foucault labels 
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as a “juridical” understanding of power. Juridical power is a form of power that allows 
one actor to impose his/her will over another and to force them to act in a particular 
manner. Competition for juridical power is a zero-sum game, where one actor 
increases his power at the expense of others (an example of such a competition for 
power within a management setting is reflected in William Ocasio’s “Political 
dynamics and the circulation of power. CEO succession in US industrial firms” 
(Ocasio, 1994)).  
Strategic management theory is based largely on such a juridical conception of 
power. Power within Michael Porter’s industrial organization economics framework 
allows a firm to prevent competitors from entering its market, to prevent customers 
from switching to competing products, and to control the price at which customers buy 
and suppliers sell (Porter, 1980, 1985). The same juridical concept of power is present 
in resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991) and the capabilities 
literature that derives from it (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1998). In RBV, competitive 
advantage arises from ownership of rare and non-imitable resources. Possession of 
such resources is a source of power that allows a firm to capture economic rents across 
a value chain and prevents competitors from entering. In the sociology literature, 
Ronald Burt’s structural holes theory of social networks (Burt, 1992) and Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s resource dependence theory rely (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) on the same 
juridical theory of power.  
As described earlier, post-structuralist power as reflected in governmentality is 
a productive force that creates new subjectivities and identities that simultaneously 
advance an organization’s own objectives. Just as states use governmentality to create 
a citizenry in tune with its aims, so too can firms employ post-structuralist power to 
create consumer and stakeholder subjectivities that further a company’s own interests. 
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The application of this particular form of power lies at the heart of my findings on new 
market creation.  
 
Overview of Action Research 
Action Research is a distinct research process that evolved as a critique of and 
response to the separation of thought and action that has arguably become the 
dominant organizing paradigm for the social sciences. Within the Academy of 
Management, there is a repeated concern that the knowledge generated through this 
paradigm provides limited practical utility for managers (Hoffman, 2004; Starkey & 
Madan, 2001; Tushman, O'Reilly, Fenollosa, Kleinbaum, & McGrath, 2007). AR is a 
research strategy designed to address the question of “knowledge relevance” by 
shifting the role and position of the researcher from that of objective, arm’s length 
observer to one of active participant in the solving of a concrete, real-life problem. 
Kurt Lewin’s famous statement, “the best way to try and understand something is to 
try and change it,” captures AR’s practical, hands-on view of knowledge creation. 
John Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism serves as one of the intellectual foundations 
of AR.  
AR also integrates an ethical stance based on the philosophical viewpoint that 
“knowledge generation” is enmeshed with social structures of power and holds 
material consequences for the lives of the people “studied.” This critique is reflected 
in a wide range of philosophical fields, including post-structuralism, critical theory, 
liberation theology, and post-colonial theory, and represented in the works of Richard 
Rorty, Hans Georg Gadamer, Michel Foucault, Paulo Freire, and Homi Bhaba.  
Rather than ignore this question of power and power effects by claiming 
research neutrality and objectivity, AR uses participative methods that attempt to 
position researchers and “problem holders” as equals in the research process, thereby 
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leading to co-generated knowledge and solutions that are owned by all stakeholders. 
Through this participatory approach to knowledge creation, AR builds non-
researchers’ capacity and capabilities. The aspect of knowledge co-generation by 
practitioners together with academics is consistent with Van de Ven et al’s 
recommendation for and approach to an “engaged scholarship” (Van De Ven & 
Johnson, 2006). 
Methodologically, AR begins with the joint definition of a practical problem 
rather than a theoretical gap in the literature. The research process involves a 
collective effort to then solve the problem.  AR’s success is determined by the 
“workability” of the solution, where workability “is a matter of collective social 
judgment by knowledgeable participants about the outcomes of collective social 
action” (Greenwood & Levin, 2007). To move from a contingent, context-specific 
solution to the creation of new knowledge that can move beyond the local project 
context occurs by “subjecting the workable outcomes to a variety of counterfactual 
analyses, to searching the literature and known cases for other approaches that create 
similar outcomes” (Greenwood & Levin, 2007). On this dimension, AR bears 
resemblance to the more commonly practiced case-based grounded-theory building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In summary, through a collective process of “plan-act-observe-
reflect,” (Lewin, 1948) new theoretical insights are generated, and “problem owners” 
build new capabilities that enable them to resolve future challenges.  
 
Why Action Research? 
I chose an AR framework for several practical reasons. As noted in the 
introduction, in this dissertation I bring a post-structuralist philosophical lens into the 
field of strategic management. As post-structuralism forms one of the philosophical 
anchors of AR, using AR establishes methodological fit.  
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From a practical standpoint, I viewed AR as the most effective way at the time 
to ensure corporate investment into the BOP would deliver on the “win-win” 
possibility of combining corporate growth and global sustainability. Action research 
offered a means of actualizing a new business practice that would not only have 
credibility among corporate managers, but would also “bake in” the leading edge 
theories and critiques of sustainable development.  
It is important to note that when this dissertation was undertaken in 2003, the 
BOP concept was largely prospective. Its initial theoretical contours were inferred 
from the successes of social entrepreneurship and non-profit enterprises (e.g., 
Grameen Bank, Honey Care, KickStart), several corporate failures (e.g., Monsanto, 
Nike), and a handful of relatively small, isolated corporate BOP successes (e.g., 
Hindustan Lever, Cemex). Corporations, lacking a clear path and guidance on 
“reaching the BOP,” were hesitant to make the investment. In addition, the companies 
that had attempted to reach the BOP demographic had demonstrated that existing 
corporate business practices could inadvertently cause more harm than good for BOP 
communities. In short, I viewed AR was the most effective and efficient way to get in 




My action research vehicle for this dissertation was the Base of the Pyramid 
Protocol Initiative, an initiative for which I serveed as Co-Director. The intent of the 
BOP Protocol Initiative was to codify a proven corporate innovation process geared 
for the unique challenge of sustainably serving Base of the Pyramid markets. The 
initiative was launched in 2003 as a partnership among Cornell University, University 
of Michigan, William Davidson Institute, World Resources Institute and Johnson 
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Foundation with corporate partners DuPont, SC Johnson, Hewlett-Packard, and Tetra 
Pak.  
Below I discuss in detail the research timeline for the BOP Protocol Initiative, 
tracing the three overlapping and interdependent phases of AR: problem definition, 













FIGURE 1:  BOP Protocol Action Research Phases 
 
Problem Definition 
As noted in the discussion of AR, the AR process begins with the identification 
of a concrete management problem rather than a theoretical gap in the management 
literature. The impetus for undertaking the development of a BOP innovation protocol 
emerged from discussions among corporate members of the Base of the Pyramid 
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Learning Laboratory (BOP-LL), an organization I co-founded in 2000 at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill with Stuart Hart, and for which I served as 
director from 2000 – 2001 prior to beginning doctoral studies.1 The BOP-LL brought 
together companies, non-profit organizations, and academics and practitioners across 
sectors to explore how corporations could profitably and sustainably serve the BOP 
demographic, an idea that was beginning to gather momentum and interest as a result 
of an unpublished manuscript by CK Prahalad and Stuart Hart on the subject matter.2 
The BOP-LL convened twice yearly with attendees representing a wide array 
of corporations (including Dow, DuPont, Ford, Johnson & Johnson, Procter & 
Gamble, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, Coca-Cola, and Tetra-Pak) and non-profit 
organizations (including Grameen Foundation, Tata Energy Resource Institute, CARE, 
and World Resources Institute). Each meeting consisted of presentations that 
highlighted different models and approaches (successful and unsuccessful) for 
engaging and serving the BOP. For example, a faculty member from the School of 
Social Work at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill discussed the 
application of participatory rural appraisal; an anthropologist at Coke shared how 
Coke used anthropological methods to understand how to position and brand a 
nutrition product targeting the BOP; and a project manager for the non-profit CARE 
outlined a novel “public-private partnership” with a global shoe manufacturer that 
resulted in the creation and training of a distribution force comprised of low-income 
people.  In addition, dozens of BOP “case studies” focusing on for-profit and non-
profit ventures were conducted by teams of MBA students and then presented as part 
of the labs.  
                                                
1 The BOP Learning Laboratory was relocated to Cornell University in 2004. 
2 The working paper, which was titled “Raising the Bottom of the Pyramid: Strategies for a Sustainable 
World” was published as “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” in Strategy + Business (2002).  
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In this way, the BOP LL served as an initial “communication arena” for 
reaching a shared understanding of the management problem presented by the BOP.  
In AR, a communication arena “aims to produce learning and open up a process of 
reflection for the involved parties” (Greenwood & Levin, 2007). By 2003, there was a 
general consensus among the lab members that profitably serving the BOP in a 
sustainable, culturally appropriate manner would require re-configuring the entire 
business model based on an intimate understanding of local consumer needs and the 
local institutional setting (please see Chapter 1 for a review of the BOP management 
literature). Traditional marketing and business development approaches, it was 
believed, were inadequate for this task, as they were highly dependent upon the 
presence of modern infrastructure and socio-cultural institutions.  
Rather, an effective corporate innovation process would have to adapt the 
techniques and methods developed in fields and disciplines, such as anthropology and 
social work, which were experienced in working in Third World contexts and with 
socially and economically marginalized populations. Furthermore, partnerships with 
various non-traditional partners—including non-profit organizations and end-users in 
slums and villages—were believed to be central to establishing the necessary trust and 
support for accessing local knowledge.  
With this in mind, in 2003 I formed part of a core three-person team along with 
Stuart Hart and Gordon Enk to scope out and guide a multi-stakeholder initiative to 
codify a process—a protocol—that would enable corporate business development 
targeting the BOP.3 First, a project proposal to secure corporate sponsorship and 
participation was developed. The proposal outlined an initial two-year project horizon 
comprised of three phases: 1) a multi-day, cross-disciplinary workshop of expert 
                                                
3 The BOP Protocol project team consisted of me, Professor Stuart Hart of Cornell University, and 
Gordon Enk, an Executive in Residence at Cornell University. 
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academics and practitioners to develop an initial BOP Protocol framework 2) a field-
test of the Protocol model in partnership with a sponsoring company 3) full-scale 
implementation of the Protocol with additional sponsoring companies. The learnings 
from the field test and full-scale implementation/s would be reflected in an updated 
Protocol that would be made publicly available. By March 2004, four members of the 
BOP LL—DuPont, SC Johnson, Hewlett-Packard, and Tetra-Pak—pledged their 
support. 
 In parallel to scoping the proposal and recruiting partners, I researched 
methodologies and approaches formulated in fields that intersected with the broad 
theme of Development, including anthropology, social work, and human geography. 
Key methodologies identified during this period included the following:  
1) Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) – PRA is a family of development 
approaches and methods that empower the poor to analyze their own needs 
and life conditions, to identify solutions based on local resources, and to 
take action. The methods, which are sensitive to differentials in power, 
status, and education position the development professional as a facilitator 
of the development process, rather than an expert solution provider 
(Chambers, 1983, 1997).   
2) Rapid Assessment Process (RAP) – RAP is a methodology used to quickly 
develop a holistic understanding of a complex issue that lacks clearly 
defined boundaries. RAP relies on a diverse team composition and open-
ended, semi-structured interviews to develop an “insider’s” perspective of 
the issue and to triangulate root cause/s of the problem (Beebe, 2001).  
3) Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) – ABCD is a development 
approach that begins with the premise that poor communities are rich in 
resources, skills, and competencies which can and should form the 
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foundation for advancing change in the community (Kretzmann & 
McNight, 1993). 
Furthermore, I explored in depth the literature on “post-development” (Rist, 
2003; Sachs, 1992) and the “anthropology of development/modernity” (Coronil, 1996; 
Escobar, 1995; Mignolo, 2000; Mohanty, 1991; Said, 1979). These literature streams, 
which approach the concept of development and modernization as cultural constructs, 
critically assess the institutional actors associated with the development sector (e.g., 
World Bank, United Nations Development Project) and the theories, metrics, and 
practices they advocate and employ. The upshot of these literatures is that 
“development” is not a neutral, inherently benevolent practice, but one that embodies 
cultural norms and morals that often undermine and/or displace local cultures and 
forms of knowledge.  
As such, many development efforts—from the construction of roads and dams, 
the dissemination of Green Revolution industrial agriculture practices, to gender 
empowerment programs—unwittingly erode the social bonds and bases of knowledge 
that sustained communities and the local ecology over many generations. Neither of 
these two literatures advocates a particular solution or answer to development. Rather, 
their primary objectives are to advance mutual learning and build solidarity across 
cultural and socio-economic differences through sustained dialogue, thereby enabling 
an ever-increasing array of strategies for sustainable development.  
The findings from this research period helped to further refine the management 
problem that emerged through the BOP LL and were reflected in the framing of the 




In AR, once a practical problem is defined, the research process entails a 
collective effort to then solve the problem. The solution development phase of my 
research spanned four years and included the holding of the BOP Protocol Workshop, 
the pilot test of the BOP Protocol in Kenya with SC Johnson, and then a full-scale 
implementation of the BOP Protocol in India in partnership with the Solae Company, 
a subsidiary of DuPont.  
The BOP Protocol workshop, a four-day event held in October 2004 at the 
Wingspread Conference Center in Racine, convened approximately 40 people drawn 
equally from academia, the non-profit sector, and from the four corporate sponsors. 
The workshop, which was titled “Re-Imagining the Corporation,” reflected a 
conscious attempt to link the management imperative with broader development 
concerns and perspectives unearthed during the research phase. For example, the 
proposal document used to recruit the workshop participants framed the project 
challenge in the following manner:  
 
“Driven by a complex of political, economic and social forces, it is 
suggested that companies can, indeed should, re-imagine the business 
so as to transform the MNC into an entity capable of providing for a 
diverse set of needs, including those at the “base of the pyramid” 
(BoP).  This does not simply mean selling extractive products and 
services to the poor; instead it means learning how to co-develop a 
commercial model aimed at improving the lives of those who have been 
by-passed or actively exploited by globalization” (Hart, Simanis, & 
Enk, 2003).  
 
Workshop participants were tasked with reaching agreement on a protocol that 
would enable companies to “engage the BoP in a manner that fosters a deep 
understanding of local needs and local perspectives” and that would “provide insight 
into the processes by which firms can identify and develop sustainable business 
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models in partnership with BOP customers” (Hart et al., 2003).  I, together with the 
project team, designed and facilitated the workshop, which consisted of small-group 
breakout sessions (five groups of approximately eight people chosen ahead of time to 
reflect the group’s diversity) followed by plenary report-backs. Days one and two 
reached agreement on a three-phase innovation process—Opening Up (Phase I), 
Building the Ecosystem (Phase II), and Enterprise Creation (Phase III). Days three and 
four explored in depth the specific actions to be undertaken in each of the phases. I 
and the project team were also active participants in the breakout sessions. Breakout 
discussions were captured on flip charts. In addition, summaries of each of the break-
out discussions were generated using notes volunteered by participants. The accuracy 
of the summaries was cross-checked with all members of each breakout group. A 
complete review of the BOP Protocol workshop is found in Chapter 2. 
Working from the flipcharts and notes, I led the synthesis and drafting of a 
BOP Protocol process model that, today, is referred to as the 1st Edition of the BOP 
Protocol (see Chapter 3 for a full overview of the BOP Protocol 1st Edition). The draft 
of the three-phase process was circulated to all attendees of the workshop for their 
input and comments. The final version of the BOP Protocol 1st Edition was publicly 
released in Spring 2005.   
At that time, SC Johnson, a US-based fast moving consumer products 
multinational and one of the project’s sponsors, volunteered to field-test the BOP 
Protocol. Two project sites were selected in Kenya: an urban slum in Nairobi, and a 
rural village in Nakuru District. I served as the project manager for the effort, working 
closely with SC Johnson’s US office to select sites and local partners, hire and train a 
field team, develop and manage the budget, generate workplans, and monitor 
performance against milestones.  
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From June through August of 2005, I led a six-person field team that 
implemented Phase I (Opening Up) of the BOP Protocol in the two Kenya sites. While 
efforts in the Nairobi slum generated a business idea that warranted continuation of the 
project into Phase II activities (Building the Ecosystem), the work in the rural site 
failed to generate a business idea of mutual interest to SC Johnson and the local 
community. Upon returning to the US, I continued to serve as project manager through 
the first half of Phase II (April 2006), overseeing the project budget and progress in 
the field through close contact with SC Johnson’s Kenya office and the local non-
profit partner, as well as through two 15-day trips to the field in December of 2005 
and March 2006. In April 2006, due to my involvement in a second BOP Protocol 
project launch taking place in India (see below), I handed project management over to 
SC Johnson and assumed an advisory role to the project, providing regular input and 
guidance through conference calls. I also returned to the field one additional time 
(December 2006) to provide in-field support.    
Based on SC Johnson’s initial success, The Solae Company, a subsidiary of 
DuPont, launched a BOP Protocol project in a rural village and urban slum in India in 
the spring of 2006. DuPont, as noted earlier, was one of the four corporate sponsors of 
the BOP Protocol Initiative. Once again, I served as the overall project manager and 
Phase I field lead, which began in April 2006 and concluded in August, 2006. Phase II 
was launched in both sites, following the successful development of business concepts 
that appealed to Solae and the community partners. 
Upon returning to the US, I continued to serve as the project manager through 
the first half of Phase II (April 2007), holding responsibility for meeting project 
milestones, as well as managing budgetary and logistical aspects of the project. During 
this period, I returned to India on three separate occasions to work with the field team. 
In April 2007, direct project management of the project sites was handed over to 
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Solae, who had established a global business team in India dedicated to BOP market 
development. From April 2007 to March 2009, I played a close advisory role to 
Solae’s project manager in India, participating in regular conference calls and debriefs, 
as well as traveling to India on a quarterly basis for up to a month’s time each visit to 
provide in-field support.  
In total across the SC Johnson and Solae projects, I have spent over one year 
in-field on the ground. Additionally, approximately 1/3 of my time in the US between 
2005 and 2009 (e.g., over one year total) has gone toward actively managing, 
supporting, and advising the projects. A complete review of the SC Johnson and Solae 
Protocol projects are found in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Knowledge Creation 
In AR, knowledge creation is linked directly to problem solving efforts and 
flows from iterative “plan-act-do-reflect” interventions. Creating regular 
communication arenas that allow for reflection and inquiry into additional literature 
streams to address the contingent problems and challenges that arise in the field is, 
therefore, critical to effective AR.  
In my research with the BOP Protocol Initiative, regular opportunities for 
reflection were made possible through four distinct channels: an organized Protocol 
workshop, project debrief meetings with Solae and SC Johnson management teams, 
weekly BOP Protocol conference calls of project team members from multiple sites, 
and regular conference presentations. 
In October 2005, following the Phase I field work in Kenya and prior to 
launching the Solae project in India, I together with the BOP Protocol project team 
designed and facilitated a second BOP Protocol workshop. The stated objective for the 
workshop was to provide an in-depth debrief of the Phase I activities and to then 
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engage the participants in extracting key learnings for the BOP Protocol. The three-
day workshop convened approximately 40 participants. Of those attendees, 
approximately two-thirds had participated in the first workshop. Among the new 
participants were the complete SC Johnson field-team, as well as people affiliated with 
the SC Johnson project in Kenya, such as the country-director of the local non-profit 
partner in Nairobi.  
Structurally, the workshop followed a similar format to the first. Following an 
extensive presentation of the Phase I workplan and outcomes, small breakout groups 
convened (five groups of approximately eight people chosen ahead of time to reflect 
the group’s diversity), followed by plenary report-backs. The breakout sessions 
focused on identifying key issues and concerns related to the field team’s debrief 
presentation, and then outlining the specific changes that should be made to the 
Protocol. Breakout discussions were captured on flip charts and all flip charts were 
photographed. In addition, summaries of each of the break-out discussions were 
generated using notes volunteered by participants. As in the first workshop, the 
accuracy of the summaries was cross-checked with the all members of each breakout 
group. 
It is worth noting that the initial intent of the second workshop was to use the 
insights and learnings to re-draft immediately the BOP Protocol and to release the 
updated version publicly. This re-drafting, however, did not take place for more than a 
year due to two factors. One factor was time. The ongoing management of Phase II of 
the SC Johnson Kenya project, together with preparation for the launch of the Solae 
Protocol project in April 2006, required significant time and attention. Two, and more 
importantly, there was a great degree of interdependence and overlap among the three 
phases of the Protocol. The learnings for Phase I held significant implications for the 
remaining two phases. Indeed, it was becoming clear that the underlying conceptual 
 23 
framework of the Protocol would require amendment. It was necessary, in short, to 
work through Phases II and III to ensure the redrafting of the Protocol produced a 
coherent, integrated process.  
A second important source of collective reflection was made possible through 
project debriefs with SC Johnson and Solae’s senior corporate management teams into 
which the projects reported. The purpose of the debriefs was to provide an overview of 
the actions taken and the learnings to date, and then to reach agreement on next steps. 
These meetings ensured that that field-level processes responded to corporate level 
organizational and strategic concerns. Three such day-long debriefs were held: 
1) SC Johnson, September 2005, Brighton, UK: I and one of the field team 
members from the Phase I project work presented the project results to the 
VP of Emerging Markets (EURAFNE) and the country managers of 
EURAFNE.  
2) Solae, August 2006, St Louis, MO: I and Stuart Hart presented Phase I 
results/next steps to the Solae’s top management team headquartered in St 
Louis, which included the President of the company, senior VP’s of 
emerging markets, and a senior VP of technology development.    
3) Solae, March 2007, St Louis, MO: I and Stuart Hart presented interim Phase 
II results/next steps to the Solae’s top management team headquartered in 
St Louis, which included the President of the company, senior VP’s of 
emerging markets, and a senior VP of technology development.    
In addition to these single-company debriefs, in June 2007 I coordinated and 
facilitated a joint SC Johnson/DuPont debrief, that involved site visits by SC Johnson 
to the Solae India project sites. Following the site visits, a half-day debrief at Solae’s 
India headquarters in Delhi with the SC Johnson Director of Strategic Sustainability 
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and Solae’s Global Lead for the company’s BOP business platform (Nutrition for 
Sustainable Development) took place.  
 A third source for regular reflection was made possible through a weekly 
conference call comprised of BOP Protocol team members from SC Johnson, Solae, 
and two newly launched BOP Protocol projects, one in the US by Ascension Health 
and the second in Mexico by The Water Initiative (the latter two initiatives were 
launched in the late spring of 2008). I led and facilitate these weekly discussions, 
which were commenced in June 2008 and concluded in June 2009. The discussions 
served to update each other on the status of the various projects and to share learnings. 
Notes of the discussions were circulated among the participants.  
Lastly, regular conference presentations and guest presentations to varied 
academic and practitioner audiences have served as a valuable “cross-check” of my 
findings and helped advance theory and practice by highlighting additional gaps and 
opportunities. Following are events at which I have presented on the BOP Protocol: 
• Cornell University (Ithaca, NY), October 2005, Base of the Pyramid 
Learning Laboratory 
• TetraPak (Malmo, Sweden), January 2006, Global R&D Meeting 
• Friesland Foods (Mumbai, India), April 2006, Project Reach 
• Instituto de Estudio para la Sustentabilidad Corporativa (Argentina, via 
video-conference), August 2006, Argentina Base of the Pyramid Learning 
Laboratory 
• Soya Tec Conference (St. Louis, MO), September 2006 
• Columbia University (New York, NY), October 2006, Columbia Social 
Enterprise Conference 
• Business for Social Responsibility (New York, NY), November 2006 
• X-Prize (Los Angeles, CA), February 2007 
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• Inter-American Development Bank (Jamaica), May 2007, Opportunities for 
the Majority Conference 
• Greening of Industry Network Conference (Toronto, Canada), June 2007 
• Academy of Management (Atlanta, GA), August 2007, Market Based 
Poverty Reduction All-Academy Symposium 
• University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI), October 2007, Creating Mutual 
Value at the Base of the Pyramid Conference  
• Mediators Foundation (Bolinas, CA), August 2008, Global Problem 
Solving Initiative 
• Empresas Polar (Caracas, VZ), October 2008 
• Foco Sustentable (Caracas, VZ), October 2008, Strategies for Mutual 
Value Creation at the Base of the Pyramid 
The knowledge generated through the plan-act-observe-reflect cycles during 
the first two years led to a complete overhaul of the three-phase innovation model. I 
led the re-writing of the model and process, which was publicly released in the spring 
of 2008 as the 2nd Edition of the BOP Protocol (Simanis et al., 2008a). Chapter 6 
provides an in-depth overview of the changes in the BOP Protocol model and 
innovation process. Subsequent challenges that arose in-field eclipsed the knowledge 
and understanding contained in the 2nd Edition of the Protocol. The final two chapters 
of my dissertation are efforts to address these latest challenges and learnings.  
 
Dissertation Structure 
In order to illuminate the connections between theory and practice for the 
reader, my dissertation is structured in a chronological manner, tracing the three-phase 
AR process of problem definition, problem solution, and knowledge creation. Chapter 
1 outlines the management problem presented by the Base of the Pyramid as 
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understood in 2003 when the BOP Protocol Initiative was launched. Chapter 2 
describes my role in the organization and facilitation of the BOP Protocol Workshop, 
the first of three problem solution activities and the source for the initial BOP Protocol 
process (the 1st Edition of the BOP Protocol). Chapter 3 outlines the 1st Edition of the 
BOP Protocol that emerged from the workshop, highlighting the underlying rationale 
for the process. It represents the first of two managerial-focused knowledge creation 
outputs.  
Chapters 4 and 5 provide detailed overviews of my involvement in the SC 
Johnson and Solae BOP Protocol projects, respectively. These projects constitute the 
second and third problem solution activities of my research and highlight the key 
strategic challenges that led me to the core theoretical insights of my dissertation. 
Chapter 6 reflects the second management-focused knowledge output from this 
dissertation based on the first two years of my field learnings in Kenya and India. It 
contains the 2nd Edition of the BOP Protocol. Chapters 7 and 8 contain the higher-
order, theoretical insights on new market creation derived from my field work and the 
challenges subsequent to re-writing the BOP Protocol model. Chapter 7 reviews the 
literature on new market creation and highlights a gap in the literature. In Chapter 8, I 
draw on performance theory and the post-structuralist construct of subjectivity to 





PROBLEM DEFINITION  
THE BOP INNOVATION CHALLENGE 
 
The objective of this chapter is to review the management literature that 
shaped the understanding of the BOP innovation challenge leading up to the 2004 
proposal that launched the Kenya BOP Protocol project. Within the broader context of 
this dissertation, this chapter sits in the “problem definition” phase of my action 
research and reflects my own estimation of the BOP management challenge when I 
undertook development of the BOP Protocol. 
In summary, the nature of the business challenge as outlined in the 
management literature was, in retrospect, grounded in the long-standing strategic 
management concept of environmental fit (Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975; 
Duncan, 1972; Jurkovich, 1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1991; Miller, 1992; 
Venkatraman, 1989; Venkatraman & Camillus, 1984; Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000).  
At its foundation, the management literature argued that the BOP presented a highly 
complex, non-routine external environment relative to traditional markets. Because of 
this complexity, systemic-level changes were required in the structure of the firm’s 
business model to create the necessary alignment. This argument is the foundation on 
which the industrial-organization based “strategy formulation school” (Porter, 1981; 
Rumelt, 1974) is built. Fit, in the strategy formulation school, is a question of 
matching strategy to the external environment; fit as a variable moderates the 
relationship between strategy and performance (Venkatraman, 1989; Venkatraman & 
Camillus, 1984).  
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This chapter first defines “base of the pyramid” and “base of the pyramid 
ventures,” as the meanings of these terms have been contested, re-worked, and adapted 
by practitioners and academics across management, development, and policy fields 
(London, 2007 (July)). As such, it is important to make clear my own position in order 
to ensure comparability and to provide justification for bracketing my field of study in 
the manner I chose. The second section focuses on the complex, non-routine nature of 
the BOP environment, while the third on the structural and strategic implications that 
this complexity holds for corporations. I conclude the chapter by demonstrating how 
the proposal for the BOP Protocol project in 2004 reflected the same core assumptions 
as these initial authors. While this literature review is written in the present tense and 
references papers published after 2004, I contend that these later papers refined and 
expanded on the same general understanding that circulated in 2004 and led to the 
launch of the BOP Protocol.  
 
Defining “Base of the Pyramid” and “Base of the Pyramid Ventures”  
The meaning of the term “Base of the Pyramid” has been debated on two 
related fronts: 1) the number of people globally that fall within various income 
brackets and 2) the “true” aggregate market potential of the BOP market (Hammond, 
Kramer, Tran, Katz, & Walker, 2007; Karnani, 2007). From the standpoint of 
corporate strategy at the BOP, I find this debate to hold limited utility. I say this for 
two reasons. One, the very attempt to assess “income” is dependent on the presence of 
both a “modern” infrastructure (e.g., tax returns, census, home ownership), as well as a 
modern ideal of work and economy (e.g., steady wage employment, cash-mediated 
transactions). Income measure of BOP economies will, by definition, fail to capture 
the diverse value creating activities within the largely informal economies of BOP 
communities (De Soto, 2000; Schneider & Enste, 2000).  
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Second, businesses need not be “price-takers” when it comes to economic 
activity. Indeed, neo-classical economics rests on the premise that gains in efficiency 
and productivity can grow and expand total economic activity. Corporate BOP 
strategies that integrate such productivity-enhancing dimensions can, thereby, increase 
the size of the market (Prahalad & Hart, 2002).  
Thus, for the sake of this dissertation, I use the term “Base of the Pyramid” as 
a demographic label that refers to the approximately four billion people globally that 
corporations have historically viewed as a “non-viable” consumer market due to their 
low per-capita incomes. In this manner, my definition is consistent with that put forth 
by London (London, 2007 (July)). 
 
Base of the Pyramid Venture 
The parameters that define a “BOP Venture” have similarly been challenged 
(London, 2007 (July)). Debate has taken place on two interrelated issues: 1) the roles 
and positions of the BOP demographic within a BOP venture and 2) the kinds of 
entities and organizations that can undertake BOP activities. The first issue is an 
outgrowth of different philosophies about the meaning (and therefore, elimination) of 
poverty. In general, the prevailing critique of BOP ventures is that selling products to 
the poor is insufficient in alleviating poverty (Fisher, 2006; Jaiswal, 2008; Karnani, 
2007; Leonard, 2007; Polak, 2008). Poverty alleviation strategies, these and other 
scholars have argued, have to increase incomes of the poor by including them as 
producers and suppliers within a business model and economic system. Thus was born 
what is known as the “BOP as Consumer” versus “BOP as Producer” perspectives 
(Rangan et al., 2007). Jaiswal has further divided the BOP as Consumer category into 
“productive” versus “non-productive” consumption. Simanis, Hart et al (Simanis, 
Hart, & Duke, 2008b) have attempted to contextualize the initial suite of BOP 
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critiques, including “BOP as Producer/Consumer,” within the wider history of 
development theory and practice in which the poverty debate is rooted. 
Additional criticisms and extensions of the initial BOP concept have focused 
on the lead actor. Some have argued that Prahalad and Hart’s initial framing limited 
BOP ventures to corporate-led initiatives. Doing so ignored the potential for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) to effectively serve the poor (Wheeler et al., 2005). As 
well, others noted that non-profit entities could similarly catalyze innovations and 
adopt market-mechanisms into their programmatic activities as a means of tackling 
poverty (Novy-Hildesy, 2006).  
BOP “splinter groups” have formed that embrace both the producer/consumer 
distinction and the role of lead actors other than corporations. The United Nation’s 
Development Programme’s concept of “inclusive business (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2008),” the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development’s concept of “sustainable livelihood business” (World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, 2004), and the World Bank’s concept of “pro-poor 
market development” reflect this broader framing. Within these reformulations, a BOP 
venture is one that simply interfaces with the private sector or integrates cash-
mediated market transactions to create “value” simultaneously for the private sector 
actor and BOP communities.  
While I support the spirit of this conceptual expansion, it has also led to a 
conceptual dilution that spawns a style of broad, generic prescription that fails to 
account for the diverse range of contexts faced by various actors.  Indeed, Prahalad 
and Hart’s initial contention is that it is due to distinct corporate managerial mindsets, 
corporate performance metrics, and corporate control structures that the BOP 
demographic has remained invisible to that sector. Thus, while the use of market-
mechanisms to address issues of poverty may well be a unique approach for NGOs 
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and governments in furthering their social missions, they employ this mechanism 
within an entirely different set of boundary conditions than do corporate managers. 
These conditions, it is important to note, do not include the need to recoup sunk costs 
and capital investment, to meet quarterly profit targets, nor to convince investors that 
they possess a more robust revenue growth pipeline than their current share price 
reflects.  
Similarly, while I agree that corporations can provide value to BOP 
communities by actively including them as suppliers within their value chains, doing 
so constitutes an entirely different kind of business challenge to corporations than that 
of creating a viable business model that serves low-income consumers. Indeed, 
creating “inclusive value chains,” as the strategy has been called, is arguably the kind 
of challenge to which corporations are already pre-disposed, given the rise of export 
processing zones and the maquila industry and an increasing pressure to outsource all 
non-core activities to lower-wage countries.  
For these reasons, in my review of the BOP management literature, I 
purposefully narrow my focus to the following: The creation of innovation strategies 
that enable large corporations to profitably sell goods and services to low-income 
consumers in a manner that builds competitive advantage. It is important to note that 
this focus merely establishes a baseline, not a finish line. In other words, it does not a 
priori exclude from a corporate innovation strategy the participation of other actors 
(e.g., non-profit organizations) or a role for the BOP beyond that of 
consumer/customer.  
 
Nature of the BOP Environment 
The management literature argues that the Base of the Pyramid demographic 
and the context in which they live pose a highly complex, non-routine business 
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environment for corporations, where the environment is defined as “the relevant 
physical and social factors outside the boundary of an organization that are taken into 
consideration in the decision-making behavior of individuals in the organization” 
(Duncan, 1972). Environmental complexity, which represents one of the two main 
axes by which the contingency and management decision-making literatures 
categorizes environments (the other axis being environmental dynamism) (Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1991), deals with the diversity and number of factors relevant to 
management decision-making (Child, 1972; Jurkovich, 1974). Routineness is 
determined by the state of the information problem. Non-routine problems are ones in 
which critical information cannot be accessed, a significant portion of the information 
cannot be trusted, and the kind of information needed for effective decision making is 
itself uncertain (Jurkovich, 1974).  
The high-level of complexity and non-routineness of the BOP environment are 
shaped both by the “task environment,” which consists of external sectors with which 
a company interacts directly, such as customers and suppliers, and in the “general 
environment,” which consists of economic, political, and social sectors which 
indirectly affect organizations (Elenkov, 1997). Below I review in depth the 
characteristics of the task and general environment of the BOP noted in the literature. 
Viewed as a potential customer base, the distinguishing characteristic of the 
BOP demographic is low income. As stated earlier, despite the debates as to per-capita 
income estimates, I stand on solid ground in stating that the bottom four billion 
income earners globally earn less than five dollars a day (Hammond et al., 2007). But 
in addition to annual income levels, the income flows at the BOP differ from the top 
and middle of the pyramids. A significant portion of those in the BOP demographic 
are paid daily wages and have highly variable income (Beshouri, 2006; Dawar & 
Chattopadhyay, 2000). This hampers savings, thereby making larger purchases 
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difficult (Beshouri, 2006), and shapes purchasing habits towards daily purchases of 
small quantities (Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2000; Weiser et al., 2006). These 
purchasing habits (local, daily purchases of small quantities) are further made 
necessary because of a wide-spread lack of refrigeration, small homes that provide 
little storage, and a reliance on non-motorized transportation (Dawar & 
Chattopadhyay, 2000).  
Additionally, the BOP demographic typically has low levels of formal 
education, a factor suggesting to some that BOP consumers may not readily 
understand product benefits (Beshouri, 2006). This is compounded by high rates of 
illiteracy (Sethia, 2005) which render print media and packaging inadequate for 
communicating product information. Communication is further complicated by the 
enormous cultural heterogeneity across the BOP demographic. In India alone, there 
are several hundred languages. Mass media, a central communication platform in 
developed markets, is therefore largely ineffective in reaching the BOP demographic 
(Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2000; Weiser et al., 2006).  
The physical infrastructure on which business models serving middle and 
upper-income consumers depend is largely absent or in relatively poor condition. This 
includes communications networks (e.g., telephone, internet), roads, postal service, 
electricity, piped water, and sewage (Beshouri, 2006; Gómez, Marquez, & Penfold, 
2006; Hammond et al., 2007; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Weiser et al., 2006). The 
absence of physical infrastructure is considered particularly relevant, as the majority 
of the BOP demographic lives in rural, relatively isolated villages.  
Key institutional infrastructure is also absent. This includes property rights (De 
Soto, 2000), the “rule of law” as it applies to the protection of intellectual property and 
contracts (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; London & Hart, 2004), police 
security (Gómez et al., 2006), and social safety nets, including unemployment 
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insurance, retirement and disability benefits (Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2002). Often 
filling the formal institutional void are corrupt intermediaries (Prahalad & Hammond, 
2002) and local “protection services” (Gomez & Marquez, 2006). Dawar and 
Chattopadhay also note that the retail trade that serves the BOP demographic is 
extremely fragmented, with many layers of distribution separating manufacturers from 
the end customer (Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2002). 
Lastly, management authors have highlighted the presence of class-based 
prejudices and social divisions between the educated middle and upper classes and the 
low-income groups. These cleavages result in a general sense of distrust and 
skepticism by BOP communities of “outsiders” from a higher socio-economic class 
(Gómez et al., 2006; Weiser et al., 2006).   
The resulting high complexity and non-routineness of the BOP environment 
impact the cost and effectiveness of management activities across corporations’ value 
chains. At the stage of Research and Development (R&D), the distrust and skepticism 
of “outsiders,” wide-spread illiteracy, hard-to-reach homes due to poor infrastructure, 
and the absence of formal home ownership (which render useless much macro-data 
present in censuses) not only make it difficult to get accurate information about BOP 
consumers’ true needs, but also increase the costs of doing so. Creating small product 
sizes packaged for daily consumption raises packaging costs relative to the product 
itself.  
At the point of production and distribution, production costs increase because 
poor roads and highway banditry raise the costs of raw material sourcing, and 
intermittent electricity disrupts production scheduling and output. The aforementioned 
transportation impediments together with poor connectivity similarly raise the costs of 
distribution.  
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Lastly, at the point of sales and marketing, the absence of effective mass-
marketing communications platforms, low formal education, and high cultural 
heterogeneity raises branding and promotional costs. The fragmented retail trade, 
coupled with the poor connectivity and infrastructure, raise the costs of collections and 
enforcing payments, as well as monitoring and responding to consumer purchasing 
habits.   
“Upgrading” the infrastructural and institutional deficits of the Third World up 
to “Western standards,” a means of reducing complexity and non-routineness, does 
little to help corporations profitably serve the BOP demographic. Why? Because 
current business models premised on a modern infrastructure already price 
corporations’ products beyond what the BOP can afford. To put this cost challenge 
into perspective, Hart notes that the loan processing costs for a bank loan originating 
in the United States exceeds the amount borrowed by low-income micro-finance 
clients of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Hart, 2007). The upshot of this is that 
corporations must learn to work within the complexity and non-routineness of the 
BOP, rather than try and eliminate them.  
 
Strategic Fit with the BOP Environment  
Because of these far-reaching differences between corporations’ traditional 
business environments and those at the BOP, management researchers argue that 
successfully serving BOP consumers requires whole-system innovation grounded in 
the particularities of a BOP community (Beshouri, 2006; Gómez et al., 2006; Hart, 
2007; London, 2005; London & Hart, 2004; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). The corporate 
business challenge, in short, entails the radical localization of the business model to a 
particular BOP environment. I define radical business model localization as the 
development of a value proposition and value chain that harnesses and reflects to the 
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greatest extent possible local knowledge, local resources, local infrastructure, and 
local socio-cultural institutions.  
Conceptually, radical localization is identical to that of “national 
responsiveness” articulated by the international business literature (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1998). National responsiveness refers to the adaptation of products and 
operations to match country-level variation. The difference between national 
responsiveness and radical localization is one of scale, with radical localization 
operating at a much smaller level, presumably at the village or slum level.4  
The important observation is that this radical business model localization 
framing draws on the core strategic logic reflected by what Venkatraman and Camillus 
label the “strategy formulation school” of fit (Venkatraman, 1989). The strategy 
formulation school of fit evolved out of the industrial organizational (IO) economic 
paradigm which considers how the structure of an industry can impede or enable 
extra-normal profit opportunities for companies (Porter, 1981). The IO-based school 
of strategy argues that firm performance is a function of organizations’ ability to 
match their structures and processes to the external environment. The structure of the 
environment drives the conduct of the firm, which then determines performance. The 
radical localization argument put forth in the BOP literature can be read as a business-
level application of this structure-conduct-performance (SCP) perspective (Anderson 
& Zeithaml, 1984; Hofer, 1975).  
The only empirical study of corporate BOP venture performance, to date, is 
framed through this business-level SCP lens. London and Hart find that corporate 
BOP efforts that incrementally adapted existing products and business models (i.e., the 
business structure) when entering the BOP performed poorly, where performance was 
                                                
4 It is worth noting that “the local” remains undefined in the BOP management literature and is often 
used interchangeably with the term “community.”  
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measured as the launch of a viable BOP business (London & Hart, 2004) (London, 
2005). The authors attribute failure, in other words, to poor fit with the local BOP 
environment occasioned by an incremental (i.e., inadequate) change to an existing 
“top of the pyramid” business model. To give some indication of the importance that 
“localization” plays in this paper, the term “local” appears 119 times. Below, I provide 
an in-depth synthesis of the BOP management literature through this lens of strategic 
fit.   
The management literature’s prescriptions for achieving strategic fit for a BOP 
environment through radical localization of the business model can be divided into 
content prescriptions and process prescriptions. These prescriptions can be distilled 
into four main themes or “fit parameters” (see figure below). These fit parameters 
include: 1) culturally-appropriate product functionality to match the poor’s unique 
socio-cultural conditions (Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002); 2) 
radical affordability to match the poor’s purchasing power (Prahalad, 2006; Prahalad 
& Hart, 2002); 3) local legitimacy to dispel customer distrust and skepticism 
(Beshouri, 2006; Gomez & Marquez, 2006; London & Hart, 2004); 4) global 
scalability to aggregate small consumer purchases into a meaningful level of revenue 
(Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). To ensure strategic fit, each 
component of the business model—R&D, Production, Distribution, and Sales and 
Marketing—must be structured so as to address each of the four parameters.  
The management literature identifies a number of features or content 
dimensions of a radically localized business model. At the R&D level, the literature 
points to the inclusion of disruptive and leapfrog technologies (Hart & Christensen, 
2002; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). Disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997) are 
technologies of decentralization that allow less-skilled people to do on their own and 
at lower cost what previously was accomplished by skilled and trained people in 
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centralized locations. With disruptive technology, decentralization and lower cost 
come at the expense of product performance, though in terms only important to the 
more demanding lead customers. Leapfrog technologies, on the other hand, are those 
that obviate the expensive and costly infrastructure (often centralized) associated with 
middle and top of the pyramid environments while providing the same or better level 
of performance (e.g., wireless phone systems, distributed energy generation). The link 
between both of these technology types and the design criteria is evident, as they allow 
for greater localization of the business.  
 
 




The literature also suggests that R&D should focus on the development of 
income-enabling technologies (Development, 2004; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Doing so 
converts a product from a consumer expense into a capital investment, thereby 
addressing the question of affordability. In addition, a product that can spawn micro-
enterprise within BOP communities builds local legitimacy and better ensures the 
resulting service will be provided in a culturally-appropriate manner. Global 
scalability is made more feasible, as the micro-entrepreneur takes care of the necessary 
localization.  Lastly, the creation of product platforms customizable by the end-user 
(London & Hart, 2004) provides a low-cost means of efficiently catering to a diverse 
array of end-consumer preferences while creating a sense of “ownership” of the design 
process.  
Turning to the production level of the business model, leapfrog technologies 
once again obviate the prohibitive cost of “traditional” infrastructure (Prahalad & 
Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Sourcing raw materials locally 
(Development, 2004; London & Hart, 2004; World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, 2004) also addresses all four design constraints. It reduces 
transportation costs and lowers wage expenses (Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2002); 
results in a product more likely to reflect the local culture and consumption habits; and 
builds local support for the business (Beshouri, 2006). Systematizing such a sourcing 
practice allows the business to better serve the diverse, global BOP demographic. 
Increasing the labor intensity of production operations contributes to meeting the four 
design constraints in the exact same manner.  
Similar prescriptions exist for distribution, including labor intensive structures 
(Prahalad & Hart, 2002), fragmented and decentralized distribution channels (London 
& Hart, 2004), and micro-franchising (World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, 2004). The latter two are analogous to local sourcing of raw materials in 
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production, as they are premised on the belief that pushing value addition/creation as 
close to the end consumer as possible—down to the community-level, as Beshouri 
suggests—generates the necessary localization and flexibility for addressing the four 
design constraints. Micro-franchising, as I discussed in regards to income-enabling 
technologies, builds local legitimacy, ensures cultural appropriateness, and offers a 
solution to achieving global scale.  
At the point of sales and marketing, the management literature has suggested 
the inclusion of micro-franchising (World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, 2004), collective accountability structures (Beshouri, 2006), and shared 
asset use (Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). The same benefits accrued from the 
utilization of micro-franchising in upstream value chain activities are present at the 
level of sales and marketing. Collective accountability structures—which entail using 
peer pressure to enforce a desired behavior—eliminate costs associated with legal 
covenants (London & Hart, 2004) and effectively enforce payment in a culturally 
accepted and socially-legitimate manner (Beshouri, 2006). The shared asset concept is 
similar to that of renting a product, as it separates ownership of a product or asset from 
the functionality that it provides. Sales approaches using a shared asset model, such as 
Grameen Phone, enables products that are otherwise beyond the financial means of the 
BOP demographic to be affordable. The shared asset concept implicitly involves the 
establishing of a local micro-entrepreneur that offers the service locally, thereby 
generating the same kinds of positive externalities discussed earlier.  
In addition to these content recommendations for creating a localized business 
model, the management literature also addresses the question of strategic process. 
Here, there is overwhelming agreement that in order to create a business model that 
fits the BOP environment, corporations must engage in “non-traditional” partnerships 
with local organizations (Development, 2004; Gomez & Marquez, 2006; Gómez et al., 
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2006; London & Hart, 2004; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002; 
United Nations Development Programme, 2008; Weiser et al., 2006; World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, 2004). Non-traditional partnerships are 
engagements that corporations undertake with cause-related organizations and actors 
that operate outside of the private sector (London & Rondinelli, 2003; London, 
Rondinelli, & O'Neill, 2005; Moss-Kanter, 1999). They include, but are not limited to, 
non-profit organizations operating at various scale, community-based organizations 
such as churches and parent-teacher organizations, government bodies such as 
agricultural extension agencies, and multi-lateral groups such as the United Nations 
Development Programme. In this case, the term partnership, much like the term 
participation, is used loosely and can denote everything from informal sharing of 
information to contractually-defined joint ventures.  
Before detailing the nature of these non-traditional partnerships, I point out 
that the literature’s emphasis on such partnerships underscores my argument that the 
radical localization strategy advocated by the BOP management challenge is a 
derivative of a business-level SCP logic. With SCP, because the business model 
follows from the structure of the environment, the correctness of the business model is 
a function of how accurately the environmental context and variables have been 
assessed. For this reason, much strategic attention in SCP is devoted to industry 
analysis.  
The correctness of a radical business localization strategy is similarly 
dependent upon an accurate assessment of the local BOP landscape. Successfully 
matching the local BOP environment requires both a deep understanding of that 
environment, as well as access to the local resources and infrastructure from which to 
then build the business model. As London and Hart concluded, “successful ventures 
developed a deep understanding of the local environment, and focused on generating 
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bottom-up business creation based on identifying, leveraging, and building on the 
existing social infrastructure” (London & Hart, 2004).  In a BOP context, because the 
usual channels and methods for conducting environmental analysis (e.g., customer 
surveys) are not viable, coupled with the distrust and cultural barriers between BOP 
communities and the mainstream business sector, non-traditional partnerships provide 
a means for overcoming the information and resource gap.  
Using partnerships to overcome information and resource barriers is not a new 
concept. The international business management literature has long recognized a 
similar information and resource asymmetry confronted by all corporations entering 
foreign markets and has argued that partnerships with local business entities can help 
entrants overcome the “liability of foreignness” associated with their informational 
disadvantages (Chen, 2006; Hymer, 1976; Mezias, 2002; Miller & Parkhe, 2002; 
Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). It is this same notion of “liability of 
foreignness” which is at the root of the BOP management call for partnerships, with 
foreignness and cultural distance driven by socio-economic class rather than national 
culture.  
Because the scale of informational and resource needs vary at different levels 
of a business model, the kinds of local partners recommended in the BOP management 
literature similarly vary across the business model. At the R&D level, the primary 
information gap faced by companies is one of consumer market data regarding the 
unique functionality needs of BOP consumers. To get inside the head of the BOP 
consumer, the literature prescribes partnering and engaging with end-users 
themselves—low-income people who live in the villages and slums—or with local 
non-profit organizations that possess the understanding or local trust to acquire the 
needed insight.  
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Hewlett-Packard’s (HP) research and development field laboratory in Kuppam, 
India is an example of such an end-user partnership. In Kuppam and other so-called “i-
communities,” HP engaged with villagers in designing a digital printing business 
model to make photography available to the rural poor (Hart, 2005, 2007; Weiser et 
al., 2006). In the United States, Fannie Mae partnered with the community 
development lender Self-Help to acquire the necessary consumer understanding 
necessary for developing an appropriate mortgage instrument for low-income 
consumers (Weiser et al., 2006)  
At the point of production, the key information and resource gap is one of local 
raw material and input supply. As noted earlier, local sourcing and/or production is 
important in achieving necessary cost reductions and for enhancing the company’s 
general reputation and trust with target customers. Production and sourcing 
partnerships, because of scale efficiencies in many production processes, involve 
“macro-level” partners (macro in relation to an individual community) such as local 
small-medium enterprises, multilateral organizations such as the UNDP, and 
multinational NGOs such as CARE. For example, Procter & Gamble’s NutriStar 
initiative, a business undertaken to develop a fortified beverage for low-income 
consumers in Venezuela, outsourced production to local small-medium enterprises as 
part of its strategy (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2004).   
Partnerships dealing with the distribution function tend toward micro-level 
partners, such as local government extension agencies, self-help group federations, 
and grass-roots non-profit organizations, which have the necessary trust and social 
capital to cost-effectively reach consumers across a network of communities. 
Monsanto, for example, partnered with local agricultural extension programs in India, 
Mexico, and Kenya to train small holder farmers in the benefits and proper use of their 
hybrid seeds and agrochemicals (Simanis & Hart, 2000). ICICI Bank in India 
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established partnerships with small, Indian micro-finance institutions in making its 
loan products accessible to villages (Weiser et al., 2006).   
Sales and marketing partnerships focus on community-level entities that 
possess deep, personal connections and durable trust with the community built up over 
time. Hindustan Lever’s Shakti program, which seeks to build a door-to-door sales 
network of village-based women, partners with dozens of small non-profit 
organizations that have worked extensively in organizing and building capacity in self-
help groups (i.e., groups of approximately a dozen individuals, often women, that 
collectively receive and guarantee a loan’s repayment) within a village cluster 
(Rangan, 2005; Weiser et al., 2006; World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, 2004).  
In sum, partnerships establish access to local knowledge and local resources, 
tangible and intangible, that fall outside of corporations’ purview but are essential to 
creating a radically localized business model that matches the complex, non-routine 
environment of the BOP.  
 
Radical Localization: Implications for New Management Capability 
The SCP-based radical localization logic can also be discerned in management 
prescriptions regarding new corporate capabilities needed for effectively serving BOP 
consumers. The literature identifies three closely-related capabilities: radical 
transactiveness (Hart & Sharma, 2004), social embeddedness (London & Hart, 2004), 
and native capability (Hart & London, 2005). 
Radical transactiveness is defined as “the ability to continuously acquire and 
combine knowledge from fringe stakeholders with radically differing views in order to 
avoid stakeholder 
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backlash and build the competitive imagination that will be necessary for future 
business success” (Hart & Sharma, 2004). Social embeddedness is defined as the 
“ability to create competitive advantage based on a deep understanding of and 
integration with the local environment” (London & Hart, 2004). Native capability is 
defined as the ability to “develop fully contextualized solutions to real problems in 
ways that respect local culture and natural diversity. (Hart & London, 2005). 
In all three cases, the underlying business rationale for engaging with the Base 
of the Pyramid community—a sector that falls within the fringe stakeholder category 
as defined by Hart and Sharma—is that, because the BOP context is radically different 
from traditional customer contexts, engaging with local entities affords access to 
unique knowledge and/or resources needed to design appropriate products and create 
effective business models. In short, local knowledge and resources are necessary for 
creating fit with the BOP environment. London and Hart, for example, state that 
“MNCs must develop relationships that enable them to better understand the social 
context of an environment that is local, diverse, dynamic, complex, and unpredictable” 
(London & Hart, 2004) [emphasis added].  
Hart and Sharma’s RT capability emphasizes the unique consumer needs of the 
BOP, suggesting that the best way to acquire that understanding is through direct 
engagement. What is at issue here, then, is basic consumer market research. An 
example used by the authors is that of Hindustan Lever, whose managers gained 
insights into the hygiene needs and practices of rural poor in India. That knowledge 
resulted in new products ideas, such as a combined soap and shampoo bar. 
 London and Hart’s social embeddedness capability emphasizes the importance 
of accessing and building on local resources and local informal social institutions as a 
requisite for creating a successful business model:  “…successful ventures developed a 
deep understanding of the local environment, and focused on generating bottom-up 
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business creation based on identifying, leveraging, and building the existing social 
infrastructure (for example, social capital in micro-loan programs; expertise of 
noncorporate partners; entrepreneurship in user communities)” (London & Hart, 
2004). Consistent with the SCP thinking, they equate a “successful business model” 
with a “locally appropriate solution” (London & Hart, 2004) and “responsive 
technology and products” (Hart & London, 2005). 
Native capability, also by London and Hart, re-states the core arguments and 
logic they outlined in their argument regarding social embeddedness. Native 
capability, by integrating local knowledge and resources in a business model, allows 
the firm to fit the local landscape. Creating fit, a condition they label as “embedded” 
(Hart & London, 2005), yields appropriate products and business models.  
 
Radical Localization: Implications for Competitive Advantage 
Interestingly, little discussion in the BOP management literature speaks to the 
issue of competitive advantage. When it is mentioned, the basis for building 
competitive advantage is consistent with a radical localization perspective. With 
radical localization, the ingredient that determines success is access to local 
knowledge and local resources. Competitive advantage at the BOP, then, stems from 
an ability to tap into and access local knowledge and local resources through 
partnerships faster and more effectively than competitors. Expectedly, “local trust” 
and “local social capital” are cited as the basis for a position of long-term competitive 
advantage. Trust and social capital, because they are resources whose tacitness makes 
them difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991), prevents competitors from rapidly entering. 
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The BOP Protocol: Filling a Capability Gap 
Many of these very same observations and arguments emerged in discussions 
among participants of a Base of the Pyramid Learning Laboratory that I co-founded in 
2001 with Stuart Hart at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and which 
was moved to Cornell University in 2004. In fact, it would be accurate to state that the 
learnings from the BOP Learning Lab, through the writing of co-founder Stuart Hart 
and lab director Ted London, were influential in driving the broader management 
discussion about the BOP. As discussed in the Introduction, the Learning Lab was a 
membership-based consortium of corporations and non-profit organizations that met 
twice a year to share learnings and knowledge about how the private sector could 
profitably serve low-income consumers and, in the process, address issues of social 
and environmental sustainability.  
After several meetings that involved analyzing and discussing successful and 
unsuccessful cases, many of which are highlighted in the management literature 
review above, there had emerged the view that successfully reaching the BOP required 
radical business model localization tailored to the unique socio-cultural environment 
of a BOP community. Because traditional management research tools and innovation 
processes were poorly suited to the BOP environment, one of the corporate members 
suggested creating a research Protocol tailored to the BOP.  This suggestion led to the 
development of the BOP Protocol proposal.  
The proposal outlined a three-phase initiative that would create and publish an 
initial “draft” Protocol developed through a workshop of thought leaders, pilot test the 
Protocol in a real-life setting with one of the corporate sponsors, and then revise and 
publish an updated process based on the field learnings. Four corporations stepped 
forward to fund the project: SC Johnson, DuPont, TetraPak, and Hewlett-Packard. 
Institutional funding and in-kind resources were provided by Cornell University, 
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William Davidson Institute, Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, 
World Resources Institute, and Johnson Foundation.   
The issue I wish to highlight is how the proposal for the Protocol reflected the “radical 
localization” strategic logic detailed above. For example, the proposal’s introduction 
states  
 
“Unfortunately, most managers in MNCs have little knowledge or 
understanding of those in the BoP, let alone their views about social 
equity, environmental quality, or what represents a ‘good life.’  Indeed, 
it has been strongly argued that the dominant conceptualizations of 
‘development’ and ‘modernization’ reflect a Western cultural bias and 
a preoccupation with simply raising GDP per capita.  Together, these 
shortcomings significantly hinder efforts to imagine and build healthy 
BOP communities and markets.  The primary purpose of this project is, 
therefore, to create a validated research protocol, which will provide a 
framework for engaging the BoP in a manner that fosters a deep 
understanding of local needs and local perspectives.”  
 
The emphasis is clearly on addressing what is seen as a knowledge gap about the BOP 
environment; similarly, the implicit purpose of the partnership with BOP customers is 
to acquire the deep local knowledge needed to develop an appropriate business model.  
The “Assumptions, Issues and Challenges” section of the proposal also reflects 
a radical localization framing. Of the four main points, points two, three, and four all 
focus on the unique kind of local knowledge needed to create a successful business. 
Point two states “sophisticated local knowledge is required to build successful BoP 
businesses.” Point three states “the knowledge required to build BoP businesses is 
qualitatively different from traditional market information, requiring different 
methodology.” And point four states “many analytical categories and techniques used 
in traditional business analysis reflect a Western cultural bias.”  
Lastly, as the proposal indicates, the initial design workshop at which the draft 
Protocol would be created was envisioned to integrate “techniques developed in fields 
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such as empathy-based design, participatory rural appraisal, quick ethnography, 
rapid assessment process, and economic anthropology.” Each of these methodologies 
is geared toward acquiring knowledge and understanding of another person and his/her 
environment. 
The BOP Protocol project, therefore, was launched with the intent of solving 
the management problem of radical business model localization. As I shall 
demonstrate, the learnings from the field work phase of my research fundamentally 
changed my professional and theoretical understanding of the underlying management 





SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT I  
THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID PROTOCOL WORKSHOP 
 
This chapter begins the iterative Solution Development and Knowledge 
Creation phases of my action research dissertation. In this chapter, I focus on the 
October 2004 BOP Protocol design workshop, the first of three core Solution 
Development activities in my research process. As such, this chapter is 
methodological in nature. It describes the action research process by reviewing the 
organization and facilitation of the BOP Protocol workshop through which an initial 
“solution-framework” was developed.  
 
The BOP Protocol Design Workshop 
Per the BOP Protocol project proposal, I with colleagues Stuart Hart and 
Gordon Enk (who I subsequently refer to as the Core Team) organized a cross-
disciplinary, cross-sector workshop in October 2004 to develop the initial framework 
for the BOP Protocol. The workshop size was limited to approximately 40 people 
(including the Core team and project staff) to enable close interaction and discussion. 
The workshop aimed to integrate within a business development framework 
methodologies and approaches from fields that had experience with 1) operating in 
developing country institutional settings; 2) facilitating discussions and work with 
low-income communities in which sensitivity to status and power differentials were 
vital to ensuring effective communication and learning; 3) acquiring a deep 
understanding of cultural norms and practices. The business gap to be addressed in the 
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workshop was, as I discussed in the previous chapter, the ability to acquire a deep 
understanding of local needs and perceptions of a “good life” and to reflect that in a 
financially viable and sustainable business enterprise.   
Beginning in January 2004, relevant methods and fields were identified and, 
from that, developed an invitee list of academics and practitioners emerged. The 
primary areas selected identified included participatory rural appraisal (PRA), rapid 
assessment process (RAP), asset-based community development (ABCD), 
ethnography, and empathy-based design. PRA is a family of development approaches 
and methods that empower the poor to analyze their own needs and life conditions, to 
identify solutions based on local resources, and to take action. RAP is a methodology 
used to quickly develop a holistic, “insider” understanding of a complex issue that 
lacks clearly defined boundaries. ABCD is a development approach that begins with 
the premise that poor communities are rich in resources, skills, and competencies 
which can and should form the foundation for advancing change in the community. 
Ethnography is a methodology for developing a holistic, highly contextualized 
understanding of a culture, society, or community through field work that involves 
living in and observing a community for an extended period of time, as well as 
participating in daily life. Empathic design, or end-user design, is a form of market 
research that aims to surface latent customer needs by observing consumers in their 
natural environment as they interact with products. At least one representative from 
each of these fields attended the workshop.  
To help ensure that the resulting framework was sensitive to the demands of a 
business audience, each of the four companies was asked to send two representatives. 
DuPont sent three representatives; two representatives came from SC Johnson and 
Hewlett-Packard; and one representative came from TetraPak. In addition, successful 
entrepreneurs from developing countries were recruited and attended. Participants 
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included the general manager of Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh-based organization 
that pioneered micro-finance, and the award-winning founder of a Nigerian enterprise 
that manufactured and sold an electricity-free cooling unit to rural farmers as a way to 
preserve vegetables. Page three of the BOP Protocol (1st Edition), which is reproduced 
in full in Chapter 3, contains the list of workshop attendees and their affiliation.  
The workshop was held at the Johnson Foundation’s Wingspread Conference 
Center in Racine, WI. To help design the workshop and gauge the state-of-mind of the 
participants, we sent out a nine-question survey was sent to attendees well ahead of the 
workshop dates. The survey asked the following: 1) How do you define the Base of 
the Pyramid? 2) What is the appropriate role of a multinational corporation when it 
comes to the BOP? 3) Provide an example and description of what you believe to 
represent one of the most successful interventions at the BOP. 4) Provide an example 
and description of what you believe to be a failed intervention at the BOP. 5) What are 
the critical (new) elements of a protocol for the BOP? 6) What core concepts or ideas 
underlie your organization’s efforts to serve the BOP? 7) What do you see as 
important levers in executing a BOP strategy? 8) Who are the recognized experts both 
inside and outside your organization? 9) Are there any formal theories that you find 
valuable in understanding the nature of the BOP and the means by which to bring 
about sustainable development? The results were summarized and provided back to 
the participants.  
The Core Team structured the workshop as a 3-1/2 day event. The objective 
was for the group to agree on a general structure and process for the Protocol. To help 
prepare for and structure the workshop, a five-step “strawman” model of the Protocol 
was developed ahead of the workshop that was not shared with the participants. The 






FIGURE 3.  BOP Protocol Strawman Model 
Prior to the workshop, all attendees were mailed an information packet 
containing a list of the workshop participants along with a biography, an outline of the 
workshop agenda, the pre-workshop survey and results, the BOP Protocol proposal, 
and two pre-readings. The pre-readings included:  
1) Hart & Sharma, “Engaging Fringe Stakeholders for Competitive 
Imagination”, 2004, Academy of Management Executive.  
2) Simanis, “The Practice and Politics of Stakeholder Engagement,” The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Working Paper (2004). 
Following is a summary of the workshop dynamics and outcomes for each of the four 
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 • Directed conversations – PRA/RAP 
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• Create new innovations 
• Co-create designs/prototypes 
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• Scale “out” 
Commercialization 
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Day 1: Tuesday, October 19, 2005 
Workshop participants arrived at Wingspread Conference Center on Tuesday 
afternoon. That evening, the group gathered in the living room of the Wingspread 
home and was welcomed by the President of the Johnson Foundation and the Core 
Team. Following dinner, the group re-convened in the Main House, the site of the 
workshop sessions. There, I and the Core Team members introduced themselves, 
along with the project staff (Duncan Duke & Allyson Lippert). We presented our 
expectation for the workshop, which was to co-develop a business framework for 
serving the Base of the Pyramid in a culturally appropriate and sustainable manner. 
We then asked each of the participants to briefly introduce themselves and to explain 
their motivations for participation. The general sentiment was one of excitement about 
the diverse backgrounds of participants.  Participants expressed a feeling that the 
contrasting views would add depth and useful perspective to the outcomes.  However, 
there was still ambiguity around what the workshop sought to produce. The group 
adjourned late that evening, with conversations continuing in the living area of the 
Guest house.   
 
Day 2 - Wednesday, October 20 
The day began with participants convening in the plenary room of the Main 
House, where the 34 participants were divided among six tables that reflected the 
group’s cross-functional and cross-sector diversity. Each table contained a mix of 
management academics, academics representing development/social 
work/anthropology, development practitioners, corporate managers and marketers, and 
social entrepreneurs. Our goal for the day was to reach buy-in on a general framework 
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for the BOP Protocol along the lines of our strawman model (see above) and to begin 
drilling down into the details of the process.  
 
Day 2, Plenary Session 1: 
The Core Team gave a brief introductory framing for the workshop to set the 
tone for discussion. Our presentation argued that the profile of multinational 
corporations’ core customers was someone in the top tier of the global income 
pyramid (purchasing power parity greater than $10,000 per year per capita); that 
consumer segment, however, occupied the base of the resource consumption pyramid 
and accounted for more than 80% of global resource consumption (see slides below). 
Modernization, which was driven by the ideals of development, economic growth, and 
production expansion, came with an underside that included cultural imperialism, 
economic inequality, and environmental degradation. Capitalism itself had become 
linked to the logic of growth and consumption and was experiencing increasing 
pushback on a global scale, exemplified by the increasing frequency and size of 
protests against the World Trade Organization and the World Economic Forum. Given 
the increasingly global push-back to this “traditional capitalist” model, we posed the 
following discussion question to the participants:  
“How can the MNC become the driver of an inclusive capitalism?” 
• For serving the base of the (income) pyramid? 
• For fostering cultural diversity and social equity? 
• For reducing the footprint of industrialized countries? 
• For restoring ecological systems? 
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Each table was asked to discuss this question for approximately 20 minutes. The Core 
Team facilitated the report-back, asking each table to summarize the key issues raised. 
Each tables’ comments were captured on flipcharts.  
  
Day 2, Plenary Session 2 
Following a short break, the groups returned to the plenary room.  The Core 
Team opened the session with the following discussion question: 
“What are the perceptions of how companies create products and 
services to serve the top of the pyramid? Describe the current protocol. 
Draw a step-by-step map of the process.” 
Each table was asked to take 20 minutes to discuss this question and to present their 
observations to the group using the flip charts. The word “perception” caused some 
confusion, and many tables relied heavily on their corporate representative to structure 
their responses.   
 
Day 2, Plenary Session 3 
Following each teams’ presentations, the Core Team posed the following 
question to the group: 
 
“How should companies develop new businesses to meet the needs of 
the base of the pyramid? Describe the protocol for inclusive capitalism. 
Draw a step-by-step map of the process” 
Again, each table was asked to take 20 minutes to discuss this question and to then 
present their observations to the group. Some groups tweaked their previous corporate 
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model, some started from scratch, and other others relied on group members with 
experience in BOP ventures to draft their maps.   
Following the presentations, the group adjourned for an extended lunch break 
in Wingspread. During lunch, the Core Team assembled to synthesize the 
presentations from Session 3 and offer to the group a tentative framework for the BOP 
Protocol. We believed that our strawman model that we had developed prior to the 
workshop (see model above) sufficiently reflected the core principles and spirit of the 
approaches articulated by the six groups. 
 
Day 2, Plenary Session 4 
After lunch, the participants reassembled in plenary. The Core Team began the 
session with a Power Point presentation. The presentation began with the project 
vision statement in the project proposal:  
 
“To create an inclusive form of development in which the corporate 
sector engages with marginalized voices, concerns, and interests to 
become a catalyst for social justice, ecological restoration, and 
cultural diversity” 
We then presented the five-step strawman model (e.g., engagement => understand 
needs => design business model => pilot test => commercialization).  
We asked the group whether these five process “buckets” accurately reflected 
the discussions from the preceding session and whether they would agree to this model 
as a suitable organizing framework for the remainder of the workshop. A lengthy 
discussion ensued, with a number of concerns raised by various individuals in the 
group. Some felt that the terminology of the main “buckets” was inappropriate, having 
collapsed the earlier discussion into a tight “business framework.” Some felt that the 
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categories failed to capture necessary steps. For example, one participant suggested 
that educating the MNC was a necessary first step. Others questioned the supporting 
bullets for the categories. For example, it was pointed out that PRA and RAP are not 
based on directed conversations as the first bullet of bucket two indicated. The 
linearity of the model was also challenged.  
The discussion then shifted, with several people questioning the vision 
statement itself, arguing that a corporate board would never support such a vision. 
Some felt that the company simply couldn’t sell this type of a concept inside the 
firm—the project had to be framed as a way to access a new market. These statements 
elicited responses from others, who argued that the workshop had been proposed as an 
opportunity to “re-imagine” the corporation and to incorporate the insights and 
perspectives of different disciplines.  Some participants asserted that they had not 
come to support mainstream corporate business and questioned their alignment with 
the protocol’s goals.  
The level of frustration within the group was quite high, and some 
feared stalemate of the workshop. One participant proposed splitting up into 
“like-minded” groups to give people an opportunity to have a better 
understanding of each other’s particular perspectives and to get “centered.” 
Until this point, tables had been mixed, seating corporate, practitioner, and 
academic representatives together.  After some discussion, however, it was 
agreed upon that everyone would assemble into their designated breakout 
teams (which, similarly, were constituted to maximize diversity) to craft a joint 
vision statement. The participants split up into their five breakout teams and 




Day 2, Plenary Session 5  
Everyone reassembled in the plenary room and sat at the original six tables.  The 
Core Team facilitated the session. Each of the breakout teams was asked to briefly 
present their vision statement and to explain the key dimensions. Below are the five 
vision statements presented by the group: 
 
1) To create an inclusive form of commerce in which the corporate sector and 
local communities can build value and future economic opportunities 
responsibly 
a. Social and ecologically sensitive  
b. Opens up markets by improving the social and economic infrastructure 
2) Develop inclusive forms of commerce that create wealth at the base of the 
pyramid, while respecting & improving local communities and the 
environment. 
3) Inclusive process that creates value for both the MNC and local community 
with whom are interacting. If the process is done right, it will have 
performance on many value dimensions. 
4) Two visions: 
a. MNC – to create an inclusive form of commerce in which the corporate 
sector can build value and future market opportunities through building 
local wealth 
b. Foundation – to create an inclusive form of commerce in which the 
corporate sector can build mutual value and sustainable conditions that 
will drive future opportunities. 
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5) Purpose – The private sector as progenitors of development 
a. Task in not about firm ‘gaining a deep understanding of local context’ 
but about using latent knowledge to enable local capacity 
b. How? Build capacity 
i. Venture spin-off to create entrepreneurial opportunity 
ii. Leverage existing technology in different ways – fit ‘solution’ 
to problem 
iii. Light touch franchising 
iv. Targeted procurement 
v. Relationships and partnerships 
vi. Local sourcing 
c. Characteristics: Mentor, train, share, release 
 
The group noted that there appeared to be significant overlap among the visions. Key 
words and phrases that everyone could agree upon were “mutual value”, “wealth”, and 
“inclusiveness”. That said, some participants pointed out that there remained 
differences among breakout team members around the very meaning of those 
categories. To some extent, the ability to arrive at a team consensus as to the vision 
statement was possible because of the ambiguity of the terms.  The group’s anxiety 
level diminished, however, with the tangible outputs. Participants also stated that they 
were willing to stand behind a consolidated mission statement to guide next-day’s 
discussion of the Protocol. Before adjourning for dinner, each of the breakout teams 
was asked to select one person to be part of a consolidation team that would meet that 
evening to distill the five visions into one. The group adjourned. That evening, the 
consolidation team met to complete their work on the vision statement. 
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Day 3 - Thursday, October 21 
Following breakfast, participants assembled in plenary at their respective 
discussion tables.  The following consolidated vision statement was presented by the 
consolidation team:   
 
“To create inclusive, mutually beneficial business processes through 
which the private sector and local communities build economic, social 
and environmental value” 
Applause followed - an indication of the group’s relief in having weathered the 
conflict. 
The Core Team moved the session forward by stating that the previous 
afternoon’s discussion had taken us away from the workshop’s spirit of imagination 
and creation. Instead of “suspending disbelief” as to what was possible, the litmus test 
for the project’s viability became the most stringent one possible—whether it would 
receive corporate board approval or not. The Core Team reiterated the need to avoid 
the proverbial “tyranny of the tradeoff” and the assumption that the creation of firm 
value would necessarily come at the expense of meeting local community needs. 
Unless we could relax these assumptions and suspend disbelief, the outcome of the 
workshop would, at best, be generic and highly watered-down. There was general 
agreement within the group that this was the appropriate framing moving forward. 
The Core Team then presented a plan for the remainder of the day. The first 
half of the morning would consist of breakout discussions by self-selected affinity 
groups, a request made the prior evening as a way to help people center themselves. 
The remainder of the day would consist of three breakout sessions and report backs 
around three broad “bubbles” of activity involved in creating a BOP enterprise: 
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“opening up”, “building an ecosystem”, and “making it happen/putting it in action”. 
The group agreed to the schedule and discussion structure.  
 
Day 3, Session 1 
The participants proceeded to break into affinity groups. One group coalesced 
around the idea of “fostering innovation at the BoP”, another around “community” and 
a third around “corporate learnings.” The three groups met for approximately 45 
minutes, and then returned to the plenary room to report back the key discussion 
points.  As one participant had suggested, the opportunity for the participants to work 
together with “like-minded” people reflecting their general background and 
perspective centered participants  
 
Day 3, Session 2 
Following the affinity group reports, the participants broke up into the five 
breakout teams to discuss and flesh-out the details of the first main “step” of a BOP 
Protocol: How a company would conduct initial engagement of a BOP community, 
designated in the model as the “Opening Up” step of the process. The breakout groups 
met for 45 minutes, summarizing their discussions on flipcharts. All participants then 
reassembled in plenary and each breakout team gave a short report back, followed by a 
brief question and answer session.  
After the session ended, the group walked over to Wingspread for lunch. 
 
Day 3, Session 3 
Following lunch, the group re-convened in plenary. The Core Team briefly 
framed the focus of the next breakout session: Each breakout team was tasked with 
outlining how a firm would execute the second phase—Building the Ecosystem—of 
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the Protocol model. This phase entailed assembling the necessary ecosystem of 
partners and constituencies to support the BoP venture. Breakout teams met for 45 
minutes and then returned to the plenary room to report back the contents of their 
discussions. 
 
Day 3, Session 4  
After a short break the group reconvened in the plenary room. The Core Team 
outlined the last breakout-group task of the day: Discuss the various factors and 
dimensions involved in getting the BOP enterprise up and going (the “Making it 
Happen” step in the process).  Again, the five breakout teams met for 45 minutes and 
then returned to the plenary room to report back.  
Following the report backs and before heading off to dinner in Wingspread, the 
Core Team asked that each breakout team identify three people willing to participate 
in one of three consolidation teams (one for each of the process steps). Each 
consolidation team would be responsible for synthesizing the information from the 
five separate report-backs and presenting their findings to the group. The three 
consolidation groups decided to meet the following morning to do the synthesis work. 
The group adjourned for dinner. 
 
Day 4 - Friday, October 22 
The last day of the workshop began with the three consolidation teams 
meeting. The full group convened at 9:30 in plenary.  
 
Day 4, Session 1 
The Core Team began by introducing the day’s schedule. Then, each of the three 
consolidation teams presented their synthesized process steps which were written up 
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on flip charts. Group questions were limited to clarification only. Following the three 
presentations, the Core Team facilitated a discussion regarding the group’s 
questions/concerns/observations about the three-step process. A number of issues were 
raised, both in terms of the content of the Protocol, as well as steps going forward. 
Below are some of the main points that were raised:  
 
• Important to think big but to manage expectations, both of the community and 
the corporation 
• Important to capture learnings from failures. However, there should be a 
commitment to always leave behind positive capacity in the community 
• A code of conduct is necessary to ensure MNCs (and even NGOs) use the 
Protocol faithfully and not simply to hide behind 
• What can be done to avoid abuse of the protocol? Perhaps an advisory board or 
watchdog if needed? 
• Important to draft a set of principles to accompany the protocol. 
• What will be the generalizability of a pilot? May be important to create a 
typology of pilot sites. 
• Can this be connected to the global compact? 
• Need to develop a non-income definition of the base of the pyramid.  
• Important to diffuse this to MNCs based in the least-developed countries 
 
The Core Team asked if all the participants could support the “results” of the 
workshop. All participants said yes. The Core team then outlined the next steps and 
timeline for developing a draft of the BOP Protocol process. The Core Team would 
pull together all of the information and findings from the workshop and develop a 
draft for comment by the full group. All of the notes taken during the workshop would 
 65 
be made available on a website.  A conference in December 2004 by the World 
Resources Institute was proposed as the first opportunity to begin to make public the 
group’s work.  
 
Day 4, Session 2 
Following a brief break, the Core Team facilitated the wrap-up session. Each 
participant was given two minutes to express their thoughts and reflections on the 
experience. There was a common sentiment that everyone had learned much from 
having engaged with each other and that the process of working through differences 
and perspectives was among the most valuable. There was a strong desire to maintain 
an ongoing dialogue and community around the effort. The Core Team formally 
closed the workshop.  
 
Capturing Workshop Learnings 
Following the workshop, I led the synthesis and drafting of a BOP Protocol 
process model that, today, is referred to as the 1st Edition of the BOP Protocol.  To 
ensure that the granularity of the five breakout discussions was reflected in the 
process, I developed summary briefs of the three core discussions by the breakout 
group I facilitated. I emailed the summary to all members of the breakout team to 
confirm accuracy. I was provided similar briefs by Core Team and project staff 
assigned to three of the remaining four breakout groups. The breakout briefs, the 
breakout flipcharts, and the consolidation team flipcharts served as the raw material 
from which I develop the BOP Protocol framework.  
I chose the concept of a “mutual value chain” as the overall organizing 
structure for the Protocol. I chose this framework because it graphically linked 
together two key principles embedded in the consolidated vision statement developed 
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by the workshop participants. One principle is that the Protocol should focus on 
processes, not outputs. How companies engaged communities should be the focus, not 
the resulting business. The second principle is that of “mutual value creation”—the 
entire process of creating a business should create value for both the company and the 
community.  
In December 2004, the initial model (i.e., the mutual value chain) of the three-
phase BOP Protocol was presented at the World Resources Institute “Eradicating 
Poverty through Profit” conference. In January 2005, approximately three months 
after the workshop, I circulated a first full draft of the Protocol for comment to Core 
Team members and to two additional people involved in the workshop who expressed 
interest in playing a role in the development of the process. Their feedback was 
incorporated into a final draft that was then circulated to all of the workshop 
participants in February 2005. On the recommendation of the workshop participants, 
the draft included a set of business principles and code of conduct. Participants were 
asked to provide feedback within six weeks. The final document was publicly released 
in April 2005.  
The following chapter analyzes how the BOP Protocol 1st Edition was rooted 






KNOWLEDGE CREATION I  
THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID PROTOCOL, 1ST EDITION 
 
In this chapter, I discuss and reproduce the 1st Edition of the BOP Protocol, the 
first of two managerial-focused Knowledge Creation outputs from my research. It is 
important to present the 1st Edition of the BOP Protocol, as it was the framework that 
initially guided my fieldwork in Kenya and India serves as a reference point for my 
theoretical arguments outlined in Chapters 7 and 8. 
  
BOP Protocol 1st Edition – Radical Business Model Localization 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the general assessment regarding the BOP business 
challenge at the onset of the BOP Protocol project was that business success was a 
function of achieving strategic fit with the highly complex and uncertain BOP 
environment. In order to achieve strategic fit, companies needed to radically localize 
the business model. I defined radical business model localization as “the development 
of a value proposition and value chain that harnesses and reflects to the greatest extent 
possible local knowledge, local resources, local infrastructure, and local socio-cultural 
institutions.” Overcoming knowledge and resource gaps was a key driver of the 
strategic process that shapes radical localization. This same radical localization 
business logic and strategic process underlies the 1st Edition of the BOP Protocol. 
 Before highlighting points in the Protocol that substantiate this view, I do 
want to note that the Protocol process was intended to bridge the practice of business 
with the practice of development. Importantly, the Protocol is grounded in a view of 
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development as a process of local capacity building. However, while the Protocol 
blends business and development goals, my focus in this analysis will be restricted to 
the business assumptions and logic of the process.   
From a business perspective, the Protocol 1st Edition is first and foremost a set 
of activities and approaches designed to fill the knowledge and resource gaps 
necessary to localize a business model to a BOP community. Once the gaps are filled, 
the business is presumed to emerge naturally out of this base of knowledge. The 
following excerpt from the Protocol introduction reflects this overarching view: “The 
Protocol that follows is a process-based framework by which a corporation can 
acquire a deep understanding of local needs and perspectives and then develop 
sustainable business models in partnership with BoP communities.”  
Phase I or the “Opening Up” stage of the Protocol is shaped largely by the 
need to develop a relationship that affords an accurate and deep understanding of local 
needs. For example, the first sub-activity of the “Training and Team Formation” 
activity set states that the MNC team needs to be trained in the use of techniques such 
PRA and ABCD which “build the Team’s skills and capability to engage in peer-to-
peer, 2-way dialogues that are sensitive to differentials of power and wealth among 
the participants.” The business reason for learning these techniques is to ensure that 
managers gain accurate information in conversations and dialogues with low-status, 
potentially skeptical BOP residents. The “selecting community partners” sub-activity 
has a similar objective. By including people reflective of the community’s diversity on 
the MNC team, the MNC team has people who can act as bridges between managers 
and the community, thereby enhancing communication effectiveness.  
“Immersion and Engagement,” the second main activity set in Phase I, is 
similarly “characterized by a number of interrelated and iterative tasks, all of which 
utilize participatory practices to develop a deeper understanding of local ways of life 
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and aspirations.” The first sub activity, “living the local life,” plays a dual role in 
filling the information gaps about the BOP community. On one level, it affords more 
intimate insights into BOP residents’ lives and their view of the world—a kind of 
“radical empathy”—than could be accomplished through arm’s length forms of market 
research (e.g., questionnaires, focus groups). Two, it builds trust. That trust then 
enables a more open, candid sharing between managers and BOP communities, 
thereby improving the accuracy of information. Another sub activity, “building 
multiple access channels to the community,” advises the team to build multiple entry 
points into the community. Doing so “allows the Team to develop a richer 
understanding of local dynamics and conditions” as it affords multiple perspectives.  
“Needs and Asset Identification,” the third core activity set of Opening Up, 
harnesses the relationship of trust established through the previous activities to 
“identify specific needs and aspirations, as well as the socio-economic systems and 
resources already in place.” The goal, in other words, is to drill down from the broad, 
general understanding of a BOP community into an actionable set of needs. In 
accordance with the radical localization argument, the “co-identifying needs” sub-
activity emphasizes the importance of framing “the needs from the perspective(s) of 
the community members and to seek out as many voices as possible.” The “co-
mapping local assets and systems” sub-activity unearths local resources necessary for 
creating a viable business model to address those needs. 
Phase I concludes with a further narrowing down and prioritization of those 
needs in the “Idea Generation and Evaluation” activity set. Per the radical localization 
logic, the business ideas and opportunities ultimately co-created by the MNC 
managers and the community are ones that harness local resources to meet local needs. 
The business value of applying participatory methods and principles to the 
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entrepreneurship process is, therefore, in generating business ideas that reflect 
accurately and fit the local environment.  
Phases II and III, “Building the Ecosystem” and “Enterprise Creation,” 
continue to utilize participatory approaches in developing and evolving the business, 
though the value of doing so is largely to ensure that value creation is distributed 
equitably and that the process builds local capacity. The business value of this 
participative approach is primarily for maintaining legitimacy. Having filled the 
necessary information gaps, the business process of Phases II and III follow a linear 
entrepreneurship model, starting with the development of a vetted business plan (the 
output of Phase II), and culminating with pilot tests and scaling of the business (Phase 
III outputs).   
In sum, the radical aspects of the First Edition of the BOP Protocol were to be 
found in how the process integrated a range of tools and techniques from development 
practice within a business framework. The business logic implicit in the 1st Edition of 
the Protocol, however, was rooted in the traditional logic of strategic fit, which had 
been recast in the BOP management literature under the concept of radical business 
model localization.  
The limits of this strategic logic and business approach were soon realized 
during implementation of the BOP Protocol in Kenya and India in collaboration with 
SC Johnson and The Solae Company, a DuPont subsidiary. Chapters 4 and 5 contain 
summaries of my field experiences and the challenges faced in these two projects. By 
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The Base of the Pyramid Protocol™ 
Introduction 
The Base of the Pyramid Protocol™ working group was guided by the vision of an 
inclusive capitalism, one in which the corporate sector prospers by engaging local 
communities in the co-creation of business models that simultaneously generate 
economic, social and environmental value. The resulting Protocol represents a 
collaborative effort to articulate a radically different approach to business 
development that might better serve the diversity of needs and values of people across 
the globe, in particular, those who have been by-passed or actively exploited by 
globalization. This latter group comprises the Base of the Pyramid (BoP).  
The Protocol that follows is a process-based framework by which a corporation can 
acquire a deep understanding of local needs and perspectives and then develop 
sustainable business models in partnership with BoP communities. The Protocol, 
which is written from the perspective of the corporation, is divided into three 
interdependent phases, each with specific business outcomes:  
♦ Opening Up – Launch non-business specific immersion guided by two-way 
dialogue and humility to co-identify local needs, capabilities and business 
opportunities 
♦ Building the Ecosystem – Generate a diverse network of partners to advance 
ideas for mutual value creation and to support the co-creation of a business 
plan  
♦ Enterprise Creation – Formalize a business venture by pilot testing, evaluating, 
and scaling-out business experiments that generate triple-bottom-line value for 




The concept that unifies the Protocol is that of mutual value creation – each phase is 
designed to simultaneously generate value for the corporation, the local community 
and the other constituencies affected by the project. Therefore, each phase is modeled 
as a set of processes and activities that comprise a mutual value chain in which some 
activities contribute to local value creation while others generate value for the MNC.  
In addition, the key content dimensions for each mutual value chain are given by a “4 
Ps” model at the conclusion of each section. The 4 P’s include: 
♦ People and Preparation – key people within the MNC needed for the project 
and the necessary training and skill-sets that they require 
♦ Partners – key people outside of the MNC and from the local BoP community 
that need to be materially involved in the effort 
♦ Places and Structures – organizational systems and infrastructure that need to 
be put into place  
♦ Performance – dimensions that an MNC might use to evaluate its performance 
in applying the Protocol 
Although the Protocol document is narrated sequentially, beginning with Opening Up 
and ending with Enterprise Creation, a corporation may enter the Protocol process at 
any phase, depending on existing skill sets, capabilities and relationships with the BoP 
community. These pre-requisites are identified in the Overview section for each phase.  
To better ensure that the Protocol achieves its objective of generating mutual benefit, a 
set of business principles is expected to guide the MNC’s engagement with the BoP 
community. These business principles are stated at the beginning of the Protocol in the 





BoP Business Principles 
 
Operating Guidelines 
1) Suspend Disbelief – willingness to admit ignorance 
2) Put the Last First – seek out the voices seldom heard 
3) Show Respect and Humility – all parties have something important to contribute 
4) Accept and Respect Divergent Views – there is no one best way  
5) Recognize the Positive – people that survive on $1 per day must be doing 
something right 
6) Co-Develop Solutions – mutual learning among MNCs, partners and BoP 
members 
7) Create Mutual Value – all parties must benefit in terms important to them 
8) Start Small – begin with small pilot tests and scale out in modular fashion 
9) Be Patient – it takes time to grow the ecosystem and win trust before the business 
takes off 
 
Code of Conduct 
1) Design businesses that increase earning power, remove constraints, and build 
potential in the BoP 
2) Ensure that wealth generated by the business is shared equitably with the local 
community 
3) Use only the most appropriate – and sustainable – technologies 
4) Promote the development of affected communities as broadly as possibly in ways 
defined by the local people themselves 
5) Track the “triple bottom line” impacts associated with the entire BoP business 
system 
6) Monitor and address any unintended negative impacts associated with the business 
model 
7) Share best practices with local partners to the extent possible 
8) Report transparently and involve key stakeholders in an on-going dialogue 
































Opening Up: Overview 
The objective of the “Opening Up” phase is to establish a deep learning process that 
leads to the co-generation of ideas and opportunities that use local capabilities and 
socio-economic systems as basis for creating mutual value. Based on principles of 
community empowerment, humility, and “putting the last first”, this learning process 
can be thought of as a two-way dialogue between the firm and the local community. It 
is a “learning-with” the community rather than a “learning-about” the community.  
 
Through such a dialogue – one which requires the MNC to “suspend disbelief” and to 
think from the perspectives of the community – the MNC opens itself to the possibility 
of competitive imagination: for radically rethinking its own business models and for 
generating innovations with application in the BoP as well as in its current markets.   
 
The process described below is envisioned as ongoing and iterative. It can be 
conceptualized as a mutual value chain comprised of four overlapping tasks that are 
guided by a common vision: 
 
 




Opening-Up: Process Summary 
Though the model above suggests a sequential process, the four sub-processes that 
comprise the Opening-Up phase are, in fact, interdependent and overlapping. Indeed, 
knowledge gained in one “stage” may cause a change in another. For example, having 
gained a deeper understanding of local diversity and needs, it may be necessary to 
alter the Team composition or provide specialized training to the MNC Team. For this 
reason, there is an emphasis on maintaining flexibility within the organizational 
structures created. Below are summaries of each of the four sub-processes:    
1. Core Team Formation & Preparation 
Four primary tasks comprise the creation & preparation of the Core Team: the 
creation and  training of a multi-disciplinary MNC Team, the identification of 
a BoP site, the selection of a representative set of community partners, and the 
creation of a “base camp”. It is important that all members of this Core Team 
be recognized and treated as equals.  
a. Putting together the MNC Team – The firm should assemble a small, 
cross-functional team of people (e.g., R&D, Sales, Manufacturing or 
Service Delivery) with a passion for the idea, an affinity for the culture 
and/or a connection to the area chosen. An example might be someone on 
staff with Peace Corps experience. To prepare the Team for the co-learning 
and immersion process, the MNC Team should be trained in participatory 
techniques such as Rapid Assessment Process (RAP), participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA), and participatory action learning (PAL). These techniques 
build the Team’s skills and capability to engage in peer-to-peer, 2-way 
dialogues that are sensitive to differentials of power and wealth among the 
participants. Appendix 1 provides a number of sources of information on 
these techniques. There should also be a mechanism (reporting or 
otherwise) in place that allows the knowledge and insights gained by the 
Team to flow back to the corporation.  
b. Selecting the Immersion Site – There are two perspectives on the criteria 
for site selection. One argument would suggest that a firm choose a 
location that is generally supportive or convenient. Thus, it might seek to 
find one that is geographically proximate to an in-country HQ or a larger 
metropolitan area, has a supportive local government and populace, has a 
pre-disposition to wanting the firm’s products, and/or has a (relatively) 
good infrastructure. Though this might increase the probability that a 
successful venture may at some point be launched, it also reduces the 
likelihood of more radical innovation and idea generation. An alternative 
argument would be to conduct the “opening up” phase in a location that is 
the most divergent from what the firm is accustomed to and which presents 
the greatest “obstacles”. By locating in an area least apparent to use or 
benefit from the firm’s current products (i.e., umbrella manufacturer going 
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to desert climate), the firm is more likely to “suspend disbelief” and engage 
in non-business specific immersion.  
c. Selecting Community Partners – To help the MNC Team identify and 
select local community team members, the MNC Team should seek out 
individuals or organizations with extensive local experience and expertise 
(e.g., academics, embassy, local NGOs or enterprises). These persons or 
organizations would act as a bridge, helping to assemble a provisional team 
that reflects the local diversity as best as possible. This person or 
organization can also help create a common language and shared vision 
among the various team members. The Team should be viewed as flexible, 
as people will likely be added and others dropped as the process evolves. 
d. Establishing a “Base Camp” – In recognizing that this process of co-
learning is an effort jointly undertaken by the MNC and the local 
community, the process itself as well as the output should be viewed as co-
owned by the community. Therefore, it is necessary that a local office or 
base camp be established that serves as an “open-source” hub where 
information is documented and made available to the community. This 
base camp also increases the transparency of the project, as it provides a 
means by which the broader community can engage with the Core Team 
and report back on the Team’s activities.  
 
  
2. Immersion & Engagement 
An extended period of non-business specific immersion within the local community 
plays a critical role in building trust and developing a deep understanding of how 
people live their lives. This is not just about identifying needs and wants, but about 
coming to truly appreciate the way other people and communities make sense of the 
world and their daily lives. This is particularly important at the BoP for two reasons. 
One, the MNC Team brings with it a set of perspectives and assumptions (e.g., what 
constitutes ‘good health’) that may differ markedly from local conditions. Without 
having a clear understanding of its own biases and assumptions, as well as an 
appreciation of local perspectives and capabilities, a business may fail to meet local 
needs and/or undermine existing economic and social support structures. Second, “the 
local” is highly heterogeneous and dynamic, with no single snapshot in time able to 
represent the “true” community. Recognizing the absence of an “average person”, an 
extended period of immersion and engagement provides a better understanding of 
local contingencies and variation. 
 
The Opening-Up phase is characterized by a number of interrelated and iterative tasks, 
all of which utilize participatory practices to develop a deeper understanding of local 
ways of life and aspirations. Again, although the tasks below are presented 
sequentially, they are highly interdependent and may take place concurrently.  
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a. Living the Local Life – The primary objective of this task is for the Core 
Team (in particular, the MNC Team members) to participate as fully as 
possible (or allowable) in the local way of life, thus fostering empathy and 
appreciation for local values and practices. The MNC Team and its 
partners should spend, at the very least, weeks or months, living within the 
community – eating, drinking, sleeping, cooking, grocery-shopping, 
walking and working alongside people of the community. As much as 
possible, the team members should avoid the trappings of the 
“development tourist” – in place of taxi-cabs and four-wheel drive 
vehicles, the Team should use the most common forms of transportation; 
instead of hotels and restaurants catering to the elite, the Team should seek 
out opportunities to live with local families and eat at local establishments. 
Indeed, the Team should try to live off of the local wage. During this 
period, the Team should be guided by an attitude of openness and humility, 
reserving judgment on the “rationality” of how and why things are 
currently done.  
 
b. Generating Community Profiles – Employing participatory techniques (see 
Appendix 1), the Team should generate ethnographic stories and other 
“thick” representations (e.g., video, oral, written) of local ways of life in 
cooperation with the community. Participatory techniques share the 
common goal of empowering people for social and economic change by 
actively involving them in generating knowledge about their own 
condition. Some of the key practices endorsed by participatory methods 
include:  
• The process, as well as all of the “data” generated through the 
engagement, need to be documented - either by writing, video, voice 
recording, or some other fashion – and made available in a manner that 
is both useful and readily accessible to the community. The data should 
be viewed as co-owned with the local community. 
• All engagements with local people should “reimburse” them for their 
time, as that is one of their most valuable assets. The engagements 
themselves should be understood as mutually benefiting, even 
empowering. 
• The Team should consult not only the “community leaders” but also the 
“troublemakers” and those who may not be immediately visible 
because of physical weakness or marginality within the community. 
This latter group may include the elderly, children, women, ethnic 
minorities, homeless, etc. 
 
The stories (broadly speaking) will be generated from both “open 
observations” by team members and through conversations and interactions 
with community members. All data acquired through “open observation” 
(e.g., written accounts, video) should be viewed and interpreted together 
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with community members, having them comment on the contents. 
Conversations should be open-ended and un-rushed, generating discussions 
that have an organic flow and make use of all the senses (not just 
intellectual). Throughout the process, the Core Team should be open and 
transparent, its members sharing their own “stories” as well as their 
intentions. Analysis should be conducted across levels (individual, family, 
community, region, national, and even transnational), paying particular 
attention to the constitution of and linkages across those levels. 
  
c. Building Multiple Access Channels – Because of local heterogeneity and 
hierarchies, the Team should cultivate multiple and parallel channels for 
engaging with the community, being vigilant to seek out its least visible 
members. Doing so allows the Team to develop a richer understanding of 
local dynamics and conditions. Furthermore, it minimizes the creation of a 
class of “gatekeepers” in the community - people who, by virtue of their 
being “privileged informants” (they may speak English, for example, or are 
in a position of power or authority within the community), come to mediate 
the rest of the community’s interaction and access to the Team.  
 
d. Documenting & Creating Opportunities for Feedback – All video, stories, 
and data should be kept at the local base camp and made readily available 
to the community. Also, throughout the immersion process, there should be 
a provision that allows community members to comment on and intervene 
in how the Team conducts its activities. Doing so helps to ensure that 
participatory methodologies and techniques stay consistent with the 




3. Needs & Asset Identification 
Once a working trust has been established between the Core Team and the 
local community, attention should shift towards identifying specific needs and 
aspirations, as well as the socio-economic systems and resources already in 
place.   
 
Five primary tasks comprise this process: the co-identification of needs, the co-
mapping of local assets and systems, the co-creation of metrics to evaluate 
mutual value creation, a critical assessment of the MNC’s resources, and the 
identification of capability gaps within the MNC. As in the Immersion phase, 
participatory  methodologies and practices constitute the basis for engaging 
with the community. Both the process and the resulting data should be 
documented and made available to the community through the base camp. All 
information is jointly owned. 
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a. Co-identifying Needs – Working in cooperation with the broader 
community and using participatory techniques, the Core Team’s objective 
is to identify the various needs of the community. At this stage, the 
objective is to uncover as many needs as possible, regardless of their 
apparent feasibility. Every effort should be made to frame or articulate the 
needs from the perspective(s) of the community members and to seek out 
as many voices as possible. Again, analysis should be conducted across 
levels (e.g., individual, family, community, region, national, and even 
transnational), paying particular attention to the linkages across levels.  
b. Co-mapping Local Assets & Systems – Using an asset-based community 
development lens – a perspective that starts from the assumption that the 
local community possesses the wherewithal for self-directed change - the 
Core Team’s task is to identify and categorize the various resources, assets 
and capabilities that currently exist within the community. The objective is 
to not only identify resources in isolation, but to understand their 
relationship with one another in forming a larger socio-economic system. 
These resources and systems will provide the foundation for the idea 
generation phase. 
c. Co-creating Metrics – Concurrent with asset and needs mapping, the Core 
Team should begin to co-develop a broad set of metrics that reflect both the 
firm’s needs, as well as local understandings of value and well-being. This 
effort should be as inclusive as possible, being careful to capture the 
perspectives of those who may be disempowered (e.g. women) and/or most 
vulnerable in the community. It is important that the firm be transparent of 
its intentions throughout this process.   
d. Critical Self-Assessment – The Core Team, thinking from the perspective 
of the local community, should begin to identify the assets and resources 
located within the MNC and to relate them to the community’s needs. This 
process requires the MNC Team to “suspend disbelief”, to think outside of 
its traditional categories and to relax assumptions about the firm’s core 
competencies. The objective is to utilize the insights and perspectives of 
the local community to open up new avenues of possibility within the 
corporation.  
e. Identifying Capability Gaps – The MNC Team should also begin to 
identify potential gaps in its current suite of capabilities based on the initial 
needs and resource assessments. These gaps can be used by the MNC as a 
way to target those new capabilities and competencies that it wishes to 
develop through the creation of a BoP enterprise. The Team should assess 
the potential contribution of any new capabilities against the corporation’s 




4. Idea Generation & Selection 
Having gained an understanding of local needs, aspirations, and determinants 
of value and well-being, the Team’s focus shifts towards the generation of 
specific ideas and opportunities to be pursued by the Core Team. During this 
process, it is important that the MNC Team members manage the community’s 
expectations, being careful not to over-promise on what they can do. Indeed, 
the Team should not be looked upon nor represent themselves as possessing 
solutions for the community’s problems, but instead as participants in a 
locally-driven effort for positive change. 
 
Three primary tasks are involved in this phase: the co-generation of ideas, the 
co-evaluation of alternatives, and the retention of knowledge and preservation 
of  options. As before, both the process and the output should be documented 
and made available to the community. 
 
a. Co-generating Ideas – Using participatory methods, the Core Team should 
engage in a process of idea and opportunity generation with the broader 
community. This entails bringing into the discussion the firm’s existing 
resources and capabilities, as well as those new skills and competencies 
that it plans to develop. This task is about imagination, about creatively 
blending the firm’s current and future resource and capability endowment 
with local resources and socio-economic systems.  
b. Co-evaluating Ideas – Having identified various ideas and opportunities for 
meeting local needs, the focus shifts to narrowing down the list to those 
few opportunities to be pursued by the Core Team. Again, a participatory 
process involving the greater community is the means by which this is 
done. The ideas should be assessed against the metrics of mutual value 
creation created earlier. It is critical to know both the possible positive and 
negative effects of an enterprise on the various local constituencies and to 
ensure that the weakest are, at a minimum, not made worse off through the 
intervention. The MNC Team should also consider how the various 
opportunities facilitate the development of new firm capabilities. 
c. Preserving Options & Retaining Knowledge – The Core Team should also 
make arrangements for ideas that are not selected by the Team but for 
which there are interested community members. Support might include the 
provision of resources, technical assistance, or simply establishing a 
network of contacts that may help identify additional resources. An “idea 
bank”, for example, could be established which would serve as a 
knowledge repository for both the Team and the community. In addition, 
the MNC Team should broaden its linkages back to the firm in an effort to 
capture the knowledge and insights gained through the visioning process.    
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Opening-Up: Content Summary 
The key content dimensions of the “Opening Up” process can be summarized in the 
following 4 P’s model: 
 
 
The 4Ps – Opening Up 
 
People & Preparation 
• Cross-functional Team – people 
with a passion 
• Training in participatory 
techniques 
• Training in ethnographic 
methods 





• Core Team diversity 
• Shared vision among Core Team  
• Days lived within community 
• Number & diversity of people 
engaged 
• Number & diversity of needs & 
assets identified 
• Number of existing & “new” firm 
resources identified 
• Number of options generated 
Partners 
• Core community partners  
• Skilled advisors and trainers 
• “Bridging” expert 
• Community Team 
representative of local diversity  
• Additional community members 
based on immersion 
Places & Structures 
• Base camp in local community 
• Knowledge link from MNC Team 
to corporate structure  
• Feedback link from community to 
Team 














MUTUAL VALUE CHAIN 2 
 



















Building the Ecosystem: Overview  
The objective of the “Building the Ecosystem” process is to incubate and advance 
ideas for mutual value creation by catalyzing a diverse network of partnerships among 
the MNC and different actors within the local community. This locally-based, semi-
institutionalized network performs a number of functions, including:  
• serving as a conduit or “clearing-house” for knowledge, capabilities and other 
resources necessary for launching a given enterprise 
• maximizing the effectiveness and impact of both local resources and the 
MNC’s resources 
• spreading the risk involved in bringing ideas to fruition  
• supporting the development of new MNC capabilities and competencies 
• enhancing the transparency and responsiveness of new ventures to the local 
community 
• acting as an ongoing new-venture support network for local community 
members 
 
The “Building the Ecosystem” process can be conceptualized as a mutual value chain 
comprised of four overlapping tasks that are guided by a common vision: 
 
 





Building the Ecosystem: Process Summary 
It is important to note that, to do the Building the Ecosystem process properly, the 
MNC must already possess a deep understanding of local capabilities, values, needs, 
actors, and socio-economic systems, as well as have formed a working trust with the 
local BoP community. In addition, it is expected that the idea or proposed business 
venture has already passed through a number of “filters”, including having received 
broad endorsement from the local community and having been assessed against 
locally-created metrics for well-being and value creation. Internally, the MNC must 
possess team members with experience in a number of methodologies, including 
participatory learning, asset-based community development, and baseline needs 
analysis. Therefore, it is assumed that firms have gone through an “Opening Up”-type 
process in arriving at the current stage. This process is not intended for companies 
with little to no history of working in the local community and/or for incubating 
“externally-conceived” ideas (i.e., ones not arrived at in collaboration with the local 
community through participatory means).    
 
In addition, the Building the Ecosystem process assumes that three structures are 
already in place: a “Core Team”, a local “base camp”, and an organizational or 
“knowledge” link between the MNC Team and the corporation. The Core Team 
should be comprised of a multi-functional MNC Team with extensive exposure to the 
local ways of life, as well as a core set of partners that are representative of the 
community. In beginning the Building the Ecosystem phase, the Core Team will likely 
have taken on additional local partners based on the idea selected (e.g., the originator 
and or key local proponents of the idea). The base camp serves as an interface point 
between the Core Team and the greater community, while the organizational link to 
the corporation allows the MNC Team to share and leverage its learning and 
knowledge throughout the corporation and to deploy firm knowledge to the BoP 
effort.  
 
As with “Opening Up”, the model above suggests a sequential process. However, the 
four sub-processes that comprise the “Building the Ecosystem” phase are highly 
interdependent and overlapping. Indeed, the partner ecosystem should be viewed as a 
fluid entity, one that adapts and evolves as local needs and actors change. Bearing this 
in mind, it is important that both the organizational structure of the network and the 
mechanism by which partners are linked together be flexible.  
 
Following are summaries of each of the four sub-processes:    
2. Resource & Capability Assessment  
The objective of this step is to develop an understanding of the resources 
needed to launch the proposed enterprise and those that are currently available, 
either locally or within the MNC. Through this process, the Core Team begins 
to develop a map of potential partners. This is a highly iterative process, for 
resource forecasts will undoubtedly change as the venture begins to take shape 
and become more concrete. The process and the findings should be 
 88 
documented and made available to the community through the base camp. 
There are four key tasks that comprise this step: 
 
a. Identifying Objectives & Resource Needs – The purpose of this task is for 
the Core Team to articulate the specific objectives of the proposed venture 
for the various constituencies and to then forecast the venture’s resource 
requirements at each stage of the value chain. The stated objectives will 
likely influence the shape of the value chain and the type of resources 
needed by the venture. As stated above, this process will be highly 
iterative, with forecasted resource needs varying as the venture develops.  
b. Co-assessing Local Capabilities and Hidden Assets – Employing 
participatory techniques (see Appendix 1); the Core Team should begin to 
develop a map of the locally-based resources and capabilities that can be 
brought to bear in launching the proposed venture. This step requires that 
the Core Team suspend assumptions of how things should be done, 
recognizing that the local BoP community may possess very different, yet 
effective, socio-economic institutions and norms to facilitate commerce.  
As an example, some banks serving BoP communities have successfully 
utilized trust-based “solidarity” groups instead of formal credit checks and 
collateral requirements in encouraging loan repayment. These “hidden 
assets”– forms of local knowledge hidden by virtue of Western or Top of 
the Pyramid norms of development – may support any number of aspects 
of the venture’s value chain: from the way financing is offered, to how 
distribution is conducted, to the manner in which customers are educated 
about the product. Appendix 2 provides a list of various dimensions along 
which the local community can be segmented in order to better understand 
the diverse social structures and hidden assets in place. 
c. Mapping MNC Capabilities – At this stage, the MNC Team should begin 
to document and map the resources located within the MNC that could 
support the venture. As during the Opening Up phase, this is an 
opportunity for the MNC to challenge its assumptions, as the local BoP 
context simultaneously makes obsolete some of the MNC’s competencies 
while opening up new possibilities. The Core partners can play an 
important role in this critical assessment, using the insights and 
perspectives of the local community to rethink the MNC’s resources and to 
identify its own “hidden” resources.  
d. Staking Out Disruptive Competencies – The context of the BoP venture 
presents the MNC Team with a unique opportunity to develop and incubate 
new competencies and capabilities potentially disruptive of its Top of the 
Pyramid markets. Therefore, at this stage, the MNC Team should identify 
the specific capabilities and competencies that it wishes to develop through 
its involvement in the chosen BoP enterprise, as this decision will influence 
the selection of partners and the business model.  
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3. Partner Selection & Network Formation  
Having outlined the resource requirements and surveyed the local capabilities 
and MNC resources that might be deployed, the focus shifts to formalizing the 
network of partners that will support the enterprise. The process of growing the 
ecosystem should be documented and the “findings” kept in the local 
community. Four primary tasks comprise this process: identifying and 
selecting network partners, formalizing and localizing the network, bridging 
the MNC’s resources, and expanding the MNC’s absorptive capacity. 
a. Identifying and Selecting Partners – Using participatory methodologies, the 
Core Team should engage in a process of mapping potential partners 
against the various tasks and activities that comprise the enterprise’s entire 
value chain. Appendix 3 contains various categories of actors that should be 
explored as potential providers of needed resources and capabilities. 
Appendix 4 provides a matrix useful for analyzing these different 
ecosystem actors and the roles they may play in the enterprise.  
There will likely be multiple actors and solutions for the various tasks 
identified in the enterprise’s value chain. Two criteria would be helpful in 
choosing partners. First, one of the central goals guiding the venture is to 
build community capacity by leveraging and expanding local capabilities to 
fulfill needed functions. Therefore, as much as possible, local partners 
should be emphasized over “foreign” organizations5. Second, choice of 
partners should also be based on the mutually agreed-upon metrics (e.g., 
retaining and expanding wealth in local community, empowerment and 
capacity building, equitable distribution of benefits throughout the 
community, benign or positive impact on ecological systems) against 
which the initiative was originally screened (see “Opening Up”, Needs and 
Asset Identification). Thus, if gender equity was identified as an important 
performance dimension, then one possible selection rule might be women-
run organizations. 
Indeed, as the ecosystem evolves and the venture takes shape, new 
activities and actors will suggest themselves and roles may shift. For this 
reason, the evolution of the network should be constantly monitored in 
order to maintain its diversity and the richness of its ties. In addition, the 
Core Team should periodically review the list of actors in Appendix 2, 
being sure that changes in the stakeholder environment are reflected in the 
network’s composition. 
b. Formalizing & Localizing the Network – As the partners are identified and 
selected, it is important to establish a locally-based “office” which provides 
a common contact point among the partners, as well as between the 
network and the greater community. This local enterprise office helps to 
                                                
5 The local community should make the decision of whether an organization is deemed local or foreign. 
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increase transparency and accountability and can also serve to make 
available the data and documentation relating to the venture – knowledge 
that might be of value to other community members wishing to launch new 
enterprises.  In addition, the members of the network need to be linked 
together in some fashion (perhaps using information communication 
technologies) to foster dialogue and communication. Finally, the Core 
Team should be expanded to reflect the ecosystem partners, with thought 
given to an organizational design that fosters transparency.  
c. Establishing the MNC’s Role – In collaboration with the Core Partners, the 
MNC Team should determine the MNC’s role in the new venture and the 
specific capabilities and resources that it will provide. This decision should 
take into consideration not only what the MNC is currently capable of 
doing, but also the competencies the MNC wants to acquire and the 
implications for the greater community. Indeed, there may be situations 
when it is better for a local partner to provide a skill that the MNC also 
possesses, in order to build local capacity or provide local employment 
opportunities. As a rule of thumb, the enterprise should use and build off of 
locally-based resources and systems as much as possible, being mindful of 
the need to establish a sustainable business enterprise. At this point, the 
MNC team might be expanded to include additional key resource holders 
in the MNC.  
d. Expanding the MNC’s Absorptive Capacity – To facilitate the acquisition 
of new competencies, the MNC Team needs to build a baseline of 
knowledge and skills that act as a scaffolding for higher-order, more tacit 
skills and competencies. Therefore, it is important that the MNC Team 
recruit into the partner network individuals and organizations that possess 
such knowledge and experience. In addition, the MNC Team should make 
sure that the network structure presents opportunities for significant 
engagement and collaboration with these “competency-carrying” partners.   
 
 
4. Business Plan Development 
With the partner network in place, the Team’s efforts shift to outlining a business plan 
for the proposed venture. Five key tasks are involved in this process: co-creating a set 
of metrics for assessing community value creation, co-developing a business plan, 
retaining alternative business models, clarifying the MNC’s strategic intent, and 
creating internal alignment. Participatory methodologies play a critical role throughout 
this process. Both the process and the results should be documented and made 
available to the broader community through the local enterprise office.  
i. Establishing Metrics for Community Value Creation – Though general 
criteria for local well-being have already been generated through the 
Opening Up process, the expanded Core Team’s task is to create specific 
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metrics that link the operation of the proposed venture with these criteria. 
In collaboration with the greater community, the Core Team should create 
a “scorecard” that identifies these various dimensions of performance, 
along with a set of indicators by which to track the venture’s effects. Target 
levels to be achieved by specified dates will help chart the venture’s 
progress and alert the Team to unintended consequences. Care should be 
taken that the scorecard is meaningfully employed even during the early 
stages of the venture’s formation and that people be trained to take and to 
interpret the measurements. This entire cycle of collecting and analyzing 
meaningful performance data will help ensure that the MNC and the new 
venture adhere to the implicit social contract entered into by virtue of 
engaging with the BoP community. 
b. Co-developing the Business Plan – Unlike a “traditional” business plan, the 
business model for the venture needs to be jointly developed with the 
ecosystem partners. Indeed, all of the partners should have “ownership” of 
the business plan and feel that they will meaningfully benefit from the 
partnership. To that end, it is important to explicitly discuss how the 
venture will generate value along the various dimensions – economic, 
social and environmental - identified by the Core Team and the greater 
community. It is important that everyone involved in the venture should 
share in the benefits. In addition, the Team should consider the potential 
negative impacts of the venture on the local community and plan 
accordingly. This process is fundamentally about creating a shared vision 
among the various partners. 
c. Retaining Alternatives and Creating Options – During the co-development 
of the business model, alternative models may be suggested by which the 
same or other products or services can be produced and delivered. The 
Core Team should document all of these models, as they may become 
viable or attractive opportunities in the future. In addition, the Team should 
make some provision for those ideas that it chooses not to pursue but for 
which there are supporters within the community. Support may take a 
variety of forms, from providing access to the partnership network to in-
kind or financial assistance.  
d. Clarifying the MNC’s Strategic Intent – In developing the business plan, 
the MNC Team needs to clearly articulate its strategic intent with the 
enterprise and how the enterprise will advance corporate-level strategic 
objectives. This process entails creating an architecture that maps out the 
specific outcomes desired – financial, competency-based and otherwise – 
and the interim steps that need to be taken in accomplishing each objective. 
Metrics play an important role in this process, as they provide the means by 
which progress against the various goals can be assessed and by which to 
communicate the contribution of the BoP venture to the corporation’s 
strategic position. Care needs to be taken in the choice of metrics, as those 
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traditionally utilized in Top of the Pyramid markets may be ineffective in 
capturing the contribution of BoP enterprises. In particular, due to the high 
uncertainty yet high potential upside at the BoP, a real-options based 
evaluation framework is advised. In addition, given the potential size of the 
BoP market, financial metrics ought to focus on the net marginal impacts 
of the venture (e.g. Return on Capital Employed) in place of gross product 
margins.  
e. Creating Internal Alignment – It is important that the MNC Team establish 
an incentive structure for its own team members that reflects the 
uncertainty of the new venture and can be utilized internally to community 
the Team’s performance. Though short-term profits are possible, it is 
important that financial targets be balanced with longer term, non-financial 
criteria in order to provide the Team with the necessary flexibility in 
adapting to contingencies.  
 
5. Community Engagement 
Having jointly created a business plan, the Core Team needs to re-engage with the 
broader community in an effort to gain broad support and trust for the venture. There 
are four primary tasks involved in this process: presenting the business plan to the 
community, establishing mechanisms for ongoing community input, building the 
MNC brand, and reassessing opportunities for value creation.  
a. Presenting to the Greater Community – The Core Team should vet the 
business plan with a broader constituency of community members, other 
stakeholders, and possibly even competitors. The fundamental objective of 
this task is to listen attentively for overlooked concerns and possible 
alternatives, adopting a stance of humility and respect for different 
perspectives. Changes should be made to the business model as 
appropriate, and additional partners added to the Core Team as necessary. 
The idea is not to get unanimous agreement – since that may not be 
possible, even though it is desirable – but to engage in an open, respectful 
and transparent dialogue with the community that results in broad support 
of the path forward.  
b. Establishing Mechanism for Ongoing Community Input – In the spirit of 
transparency and in recognition of the venture’s responsibility to the local 
community, the Core Team should institute a mechanism that allows for 
the broader community to periodically report-back on the venture’s 
performance and to raise possible concerns. One option might be to include 
community members in the collecting, analyzing and reporting of 
scorecard metrics. The data and the reports would be made public and 
accessible to the community through the local enterprise office. 
Additionally, the Core Team could institute regular “town-hall” sessions 
that provide a forum for raising concerns.  
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c. Building the MNC Brand – Engagements with the community present an 
opportunity for the MNC Team to raise awareness of the MNC’s brand. 
Establishing the MNC brand as reliable, trustworthy, and of high quality 
increases access to valuable resources and capabilities within the 
community, enhances legitimacy, and may generate additional business 
opportunities. To effectively manage this process and to leverage the MNC 
Team’s interactions with the greater community, the MNC Team should 
establish a clear brand strategy. This strategy should make explicit the 
relationship of the local BoP venture to the MNC’s corporate brand.     
 
d. Reassessing Opportunities for Value Creation – The MNC Team should 
also use the feedback from the community in assessing the MNC Team’s 
own strategic plan. In addition to ensuring alignment between the 
community and the MNC’s objectives, the feedback may bring to light 
parallel opportunities to leverage the MNC’s current suite of products and 
services. Additionally, the MNC Team may identify new competencies or 
capabilities that it can develop and deploy locally or in its Top of the 
Pyramid markets.  
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Building the Ecosystem: Content Summary 
The key content dimensions of the “Growing the Ecosystem” process can be 
summarized in the following 4 P’s model: 
 
 
The 4Ps – Building the Ecosystem 
People & Preparation 
• Cross-functional Team 
• Additional corporate resource 
holders relevant to venture 
• Training in participatory 
techniques 
• Training in uncertainty 
management (e.g., real options) 
Performance 
• Shared vision among partners 
• Number of business models 
identified 
• Number of “spin-offs” supported 
• Network diversity  
• Number of “local” partners 
• Hidden local assets identified 
• Hidden MNC assets identified 
• Clear & compelling strategic intent 
• Local embeddedness 
• Brand recognition 
Partners 
• Core Team of local partners 
• Additional local partners related 
to proposed venture 
• Ecosystem partners 
Places & Structures 
• Local enterprise office 
• Knowledge link to MNC 
• Ecosystem communication 
network 
• Ecosystem organizational 
structure 
• Incentive structure within MNC 
Team that aligns efforts 
• Enterprise scorecard 


































Enterprise Creation: Overview  
The objective of the “Enterprise Creation” process is to transition a proposed venture 
from concept stage to going concern by pilot-testing, evaluating, and formalizing the 
enterprise in a collaborative and equitable manner. The end result of this process is a 
sustainable business model that generates value for the MNC and expands wealth and 
capacity in the BoP community by producing goods and services that meet locally-
defined needs. Key principles that guide this process are co-creation, mutual gain, 
transparency, and long-term commitment and responsibility. By engaging in this 
process, the MNC signals an increased level of commitment to the BoP community.  
The “Enterprise Creation” process can be conceptualized as a mutual value chain 
comprised of three overlapping processes that are guided by a common vision: 
 
Mutual Value Chain – Enterprise Creation 
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Enterprise Creation: Process Summary 
The “Enterprise Creation” process is intended for a firm that is materially involved in 
launching a BoP venture designed in collaboration with the local BoP community6. 
The process assumes that the plan has received broad community endorsement and 
that a set of metrics has been co-created for monitoring and evaluating the venture’s 
performance. Organizationally, this phase requires the prior establishment of a number 
of structures, including: 
• a Core Team comprised of a multi-disciplinary MNC Team, local 
partners representative of the community’s diversity, and other key 
resource-holders 
• a formalized network of partners whose resources and capabilities will 
be called upon in supporting the venture  
• a local “enterprise office” that is open and accessible to the local 
community  
• a mechanism that cultivates ongoing community input into the 
venture’s performance 
• an organizational link from the MNC Team to the corporate structure 
that captures and shares learning and knowledge  
Due to the complexity and uncertainty of the local environment, the transition from 
start-up to going concern is best understood as a learning process that incrementally 
expands and formalizes structures through a series of small-scale, iterative 
interventions. As such, the sub-processes that comprise the “Enterprise Creation” 
phase should be viewed as highly interdependent and non-linear in nature.  
Organizational controls should be configured in a manner that recognizes this 
environmental uncertainty and encourages an iterative learning approach. 
 
Following are summaries of each of the three sub-processes:    
6. Pilot Design 
Small-scale, co-designed pilot projects are a critical mechanism for testing the 
proposed business model and for generating real-time learning in a low-risk manner. 
Co-design and co-management of the pilot projects helps build local business 
capacity, aligns the effort with diverse needs, and marshals local resources and 
commitment to the effort. Four primary tasks comprise this process: forming an 
                                                
6 An alternative to a firm’s material involvement in the creation of a BOP venture is for the firm to use 
a venture capital (VC) approach. To do so, the firm would establish a multi-expertise “VC team” in 
charge of investing in BOP projects. The task of the team would be to provide seed money to 
individuals (e.g., sustainable social entrepreneurs, employees within the MNC wanting to establish their 
own businesses) and/or existing ventures (e.g., small and medium enterprises operating at the BoP, 
BoP-based non-governmental organizations, incubators at local universities). 
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Implementation Team, co-designing pilot tests, leveraging the MNC’s network, and 
establishing competency-building channels.  
a. Forming an Implementation Team – The Implementation Team should be 
drawn primarily from the Core Team members involved in the co-
development of the business plan. That said, it is important that the 
Implementation Team include people with the necessary skills and mindset 
for advancing a venture beyond the concept stage. Therefore, depending on 
the talents and experience of the team members, it may be necessary to 
bring onboard additional MNC people and/or NGO personnel with 
experience in new-venture development (particularly within the 
geographical area in question), as well as community members with 
entrepreneurial talents. 
The possibility of successful implementation is enhanced if the team 
members can coalesce and function as one cohesive partnership. Mutual 
respect should be the key element of the team’s culture.   
b. Co-designing Pilots – Relative to top-of-the-pyramid efforts, the pilots 
should be smaller in scale and greater in number in order to manage 
uncertainty and respond to contingencies. Furthermore, the timeline for 
implementation must be flexible and embrace a pace of change that is 
appropriate for the community. Indeed, the timeline must be tied to ‘local’ 
time as compared to ‘corporate’ time. The Implementation Team should be 
prepared to manage and negotiate among the different time horizons and 
expectations of the various constituencies.  
To maximize learning, the pilot sites should be representative of the 
diverse conditions within the BoP community (e.g., ecological, ethnic, 
gender). As with the business plan, the pilot’s design should leverage and 
build off of existing socio-economic structures and local capabilities and 
resources, paying particular attention to mechanisms that help expand local 
business capacity. Community “competitions” organized around specific 
challenges or obstacles confronted by the Implementation Team offer one 
potential mechanism for tapping into the local knowledge.  
The process and the resulting pilot designs should be documented and 
made available to the community through the local enterprise office.  
c. Leveraging the MNC’s Network – In the design of the pilots, the MNC 
Team should explore arrangements with the MNC’s existing businesses 
and operations that could support the pilot’s objectives and expand local 
capacity while generating additional value for the corporation.  For 
example, it may be possible to arrange for another of the MNC’s 
businesses to procure its raw materials from local producers or directly 
from the pilot itself at a lower cost. Other possible arrangements which 
could increase the probability of the new venture’s success by bolstering 
the community’s capacity include:  
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• Spinning-off one of the MNC’s activities (e.g., transportation) as an 
independent business to a local entrepreneur  
• Franchising a business to a local entrepreneur 
• Employing local community members to produce and provide services 
d. Building Competency Channels – The pilot projects present the MNC 
Team with a low-risk opportunity to actively learn and experiment with the 
new skills and capabilities needed in building desired competencies. 
Therefore, the MNC Team should structure the pilots so that its Team is 
best positioned to interact with and acquire the skills and tacit knowledge 
that other partners may possess. In addition, the Team should design the 
pilots so that the MNC has the opportunity to test-out and further refine 
new capabilities and competencies. 
 
 
4. Pilot Test & Assessment 
Maintaining a modest and low profile in the community, the pilot projects 
should be executed in stages in order that interim learnings are captured and 
the pilots reconfigured accordingly. Five primary tasks comprise the “Pilot 
Test and Assessment” process: staging & assessing the pilots, monitoring 
feedback mechanisms, establishing an exit plan, managing a competency 
portfolio, and refining the strategic plan.   
 
a. Staging and Assessing the Pilots – The pilot projects should be structured 
and executed as a series of milestones or stage-gates in order to build-in 
opportunities for periodically assessing the venture’s impacts and for 
responding to contingencies. At the completion of each stage and with the 
help of local community partners, the Implementation Team would 
evaluate each pilot using a scorecard of metrics and indicators that were 
designed in collaboration with the broader community (see “Growing the 
Ecosystem”, Business Plan Development). The results of the assessment 
should be documented, reported back to the community, and then made 
available through the local enterprise office. At this point, the 
Implementation Team would reassess the pilot’s operations and make the 
necessary adjustments to the product or service offering and/or the 
enterprise’s business model. Transparency and honesty are key principles 
that would guide the Team’s actions and decisions throughout this process.  
b.  Monitoring & Adjusting Feedback Mechanisms – It is important that the 
Team monitor the parallel feedback loops that allow individuals within the 
community to express concerns that would otherwise escape the Team’s 
attention (see “Growing the Ecosystem”, Community Consultation). In 
addition, the Team should proactively seek out “marginalized” voices (e.g., 
the poorest members of the community) to ensure that they are, at a 
minimum, not made worse off through the intervention. Doing so allows 
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the Team to respond in a timely manner to potentially negative (as well as 
positive) unintended consequences and to adjust the pilots accordingly. The 
scorecard and its set of metrics and indicators should also be adjusted to 
reflect this feedback.  
c. Establishing an Exit Plan – The possibility exists that the Implementation 
Team may decide to terminate some or all of the pilots based on the pilots’ 
performance or other unforeseen circumstances. In preparing for this 
eventuality, the Team should put into place an exit plan that strives to leave 
the community better off than before the venture was initiated. One 
possibility might be to pledge all of the pilots’ assets (e.g., equipment, 
technology) to the community. The Team should pay particular attention to 
ensuring continuity in the lives of those directly involved in the 
establishment and operation of the pilots.  
d. Managing a Competency Portfolio – As stated earlier, simultaneously 
staging several small-scale pilots allows the Implementation Team to 
experiment with various derivations of a business model, incrementally 
adapting those that appear promising while closing down ones that fail to 
generate the desired results. The MNC Team should approach its 
development of new capabilities and competencies in the same fashion, 
using the pilots as a way to explore in parallel the development of several 
new capabilities and competencies. By maintaining an “options portfolio” 
of new capability development efforts, the MNC Team lowers the risk 
associated with any one effort while expanding the possibility of 
developing new, disruptive capabilities.   
e. Refining the Revenue Model – As the BoP business model begins to take 
shape, the MNC Team should assess the financial and strategic viability of 
its revenue model. This task requires that the MNC Team forecast financial 
flows, identifying the key factors that will shape the profitability of the 
venture. In addition, the MNC Team should identify and gauge potential 
challenges to its ability to deliver customer value and to capture part of this 
value in the form of profits. The revenue model should be refined and 
metrics adjusted to optimize the MNC’s profit potential and to enhance the 
competitive sustainability of its position.   
 
 
5. Enterprise Formalization 
Once a viable business model has evolved and the incremental learning from the pilots 
is nominal, the Implementation Team should formalize the business. At this point, the 
focus turns to establishing the enterprise’s governance structure and building onto the 
insights and achievements of the pilot projects. All decisions should be documented 
and made available to the community through the local enterprise office.  
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The “Enterprise Formalization” process is comprised of five primary tasks: 
formalizing the governance structure, scaling out from local systems, establishing 
contingency plans, launching and leveraging new capabilities, and creating a growth 
trajectory.  
f. Formalizing the Governance Structure – The Implementation Team needs 
to address two key issues when establishing the enterprise’s ownership and 
control structure. First, it must ensure that an equitable portion of the 
venture’s profits is retained within the local community. One option would 
be to establish a Community-Based Organization that receives a dedicated 
percentage of the venture’s annual profits. Second, the governance 
structure should provide some degree of oversight and decision-making 
authority to the local community. Given that the Implementation Team 
itself is comprised of representatives from the local community, one option 
would be to create a Board of Directors that includes each of these team 
members. The same performance assessment and feedback mechanisms 
utilized during the pilot stage (e.g., the scorecard) should be continued 
once the business has been formalized. The principles of transparency and 
equity should guide this process.  
g. Scaling-out from Local Systems – To expand the scale of the pilot projects, 
the Implementation Team should continue to build off of local systems and 
capabilities as much as possible. There should be special sensitivity to the 
uniqueness of each site, and every effort must be made to learn from the 
local situation when broadening the effort to other areas. Thus, this task is 
about transferring the learning processes developed throughout the 
enterprise’s formation, while allowing the local context to guide the 
specific content of the business model.    
h. Establishing Contingency Plans & Structures – The Implementation Team 
should put into place plans and structures for dealing with the possibility 
that the MNC may decide to pull-out of the venture. The Team, guided by 
the principle of long-term responsibility and commitment, should create an 
exit plan that ensures a “soft landing” for the business, as well as the 
community. Again, the intention is to leave the community better off than 
before the venture was started. Options may include establishing a “venture 
transition” fund or pledging to the community any assets that the firm 
contributed to the business.  
i. Launching and Leveraging New Competencies – The BoP enterprise 
should serve as a launching site for the capabilities and competencies 
developed by the MNC over the course of the pilot phase. Indeed, the 
MNC team should strive to integrate these competencies into the core of 
the new enterprise’s value proposition, thereby strengthening its own 
competitive position and expanding the MNC’s opportunities to further 
develop and refine them. In addition, the MNC Team should actively seek 
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out other businesses within the MNC that may be able to deploy these new 
competencies in their particular markets. One of the central objectives of 
this process is to fundamentally redefine or disrupt the mature markets 
currently served by the MNC by using the newly-developed competencies 
to provide new functionality or existing functionality at a far-lower cost.  
j. Creating a BoP Growth Trajectory – The MNC Team’s experience in co-
creating the BoP enterprise should serve as a platform for communicating a 
BoP growth strategy within the corporation and for ultimately expanding 
the MNC’s presence to other BoP markets and communities. Central to this 
process is the creation of an organizational network that brings the MNC’s 
country and product managers into conversation with the MNC Team and 
other Implementation Team members. The focus should be on identifying 
those aspects of the BoP enterprise’s business model and the enterprise 
creation process that can be creatively combined with other resources and 
capabilities in meeting the needs of other BoP markets. The new BoP 
Enterprise could serve as a BoP Center of Excellence for the MNC, 






Enterprise Creation: Content Summary 
The key content dimensions of the “Enterprise Creation” process can be summarized 
in the following 4 P’s model: 
 
 
The 4Ps – Enterprise Creation 
People & Preparation 
• Cross-functional Team 
• Additional MNC members with 
expertise in new business 
development 
• Training in uncertainty 
management and participatory 
techniques 
• Key MNC country and product 
managers 
Performance 
• New opportunities identified 
• Responsiveness to community 
concerns 
• New community stakeholders 
engaged 
• Alignment of project with MNC Team 
incentives  
• Shared vision among 
Implementation Team members 
• Diversity of pilot sites  
• Number of pilots 
• Equitable sharing of profits 
• Community presence on Board of 
Directors 
• Enterprise profitability 
• New MNC competencies developed 
• Number of disruptive possibilities 
identified 
Partners 
• Core Team of local partners 
that reflect community’s 
diversity 
• Key venture network partners 
• Local entrepreneur/s 
• Community Based 
Organization 
Places & Structures 
• Community “capacity-building links” 
to other MNC operations 
• Multiple, small-scale pilots 
• Local enterprise office 
• Enterprise Board of Directors 
• Community feedback mechanism/s 
• Contingency structure 
• MNC-BoP Corporate Team 






SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT II 
SC Johnson BOP Protocol Pilot Project, Kenya 
 
This chapter describes my involvement over a 21-month period in the initial 
pilot test of the BOP Protocol process in Kenya by SC Johnson. This project 
constituted the second Solution Development activity of my action research. My 
practical learnings from this project and a later Protocol project in India in partnership 
with the Solae Company (the focus of Chapter 5) were the basis for a complete 
revision of the BOP Protocol and the release of a 2nd Edition of the process (which is 
reproduced in full in Chapter 6).  In addition, the field challenges and learnings were 
the triggers for the broader theoretical insights I develop in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
SC Johnson & Sons BOP Protocol, Kenya 
Background  
SC Johnson, a privately-held, fast moving consumer products multinational, is 
a global manufacturer and distributor of a broad range of products used for home 
cleaning, air care, pest control, home storage, auto care, and personal care. SC 
Johnson, headquartered in Racine, Wisconsin, has operations in over 72 countries and 
sells its brands—which include such household names as Windex, Glade, OFF!, Raid, 
Saran Wrap, Ziploc, Pledge, and Drano—in more than 110 countries. In 2006 S. C. 
Johnson & Son employed approximately 12,000 and had estimated sales of $7.5 
billion. 
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As noted earlier, SC Johnson was one of the four corporate sponsors of the 
BOP Protocol initiative. The company, led by their Vice President for Global 
Environmental and Safety Affairs (the company’s officer for corporate sustainability), 
had volunteered ahead of the BOP Protocol workshop to test-out the eventual process 
in Kenya. At that time, SC Johnson had an existing sustainability project in Kenya 
working to improve the livelihoods of small holder rural farmers through the 
cultivation of pyrethrum (a flower whose active ingredient is used in SC Johnson’s 
insect repellents, including Raid).  
It is worth highlighting the fact that the SC Johnson project was driven and 
funded by the company’s corporate sustainability division. In fact, the project initially 
had a very loose connection to the company’s Kenya office. The Kenya office, which 
reflected a relatively small percentage of SC Johnson’s revenues and carried a limited 
range of the company’s product lines, operated as a sales office for East Africa and 
faced “profit and loss” (P&L) responsibility as did other country offices. The Kenya 
office’s relationship to our initial project team could be best described as “hosts,” as 
the three-month project had been represented internally as a quasi MBA internship 
project (as I explain below, two of the field team members were in fact 1st year MBA 
students on internship). 
While having the impetus and support for the project come from the corporate 
sustainability office did protect the initiative from near term financial pressures and 
create a safe-space from SCJ’s traditional business development metrics and 
processes, it also left the project without a clear owner and driver on the ground and 
limited access to the company’s core business development (e.g., R&D) capabilities. 
This absence of ownership by the in-country office and connection to the company’s 
core business operations would prove to be significant challenges following our initial 
three-month effort to develop a business concept.  
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Before moving on to describe the field work, I want to note the challenges I 
faced in balancing the demands of “getting the job done” versus documenting and 
recording the process for research purposes. In Kenya, during the first four weeks of 
the in-field project, our six-person team lived together in the same guest house. In the 
evenings, we would debrief on the day’s activities and plan for the next. For the first 
week, we videotaped our evening discussions with the intention that it would serve as 
a way to document the process. After several tries, we found the videotaping to be an 
extremely cumbersome and awkward process (it also forced us to hold meetings in a 
controlled environment without background noise), and one that only added to an 
otherwise hectic schedule. Furthermore, our meetings would often last several hours, 
and the discussion would flow from topic to topic. I recognized that mining the raw 
footage for information at a later date would be akin to finding a needle in a haystack.   
In week five, once the community engagement activities started and the team 
split into two, our work intensified, and our schedules became completely 
unpredictable. We worked late into the nights and through weekends. I found 
documenting and capturing learnings as a separate research activity from doing the 
Protocol as completely impractical. Evenings were spent planning out the facilitation 
and structure of the next day’s workshops and managing internal team conflicts rather 
than “journaling” the day’s events. Furthermore, in Kenya, internet connections—if 
available—were extremely poor (the SC Johnson office, for example, had dial-up 
connections). This rendered valueless the internet site we had used successfully during 
the pre-field training to store documents and capture insights via emails. It is also 
worth noting that my personal notebook containing what amounts to as “field notes” 
was stolen along with my backpack during the last week of the field project.  
As a consequence, my documentation of the Kenya project, by default, took 
the form of meeting agendas that were typed on the computer, photographs taken of 
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flipcharts developed during workshops with the community, PowerPoint presentations 
given to SC Johnson representatives who visited the project site on two occasions, and 
a PowerPoint presentation that I and the team jointly created to share the Kenya 
experience at a BOP Protocol follow-up workshop in October 2005. The only 
traditional “ethnographic” documentation that I generated during the project was in the 
form of a personal reflection on my homestay, something for which I was able to find 
the time given that the team took two days vacation immediately following the 
homestays. This tension between fulfilling project obligations and capturing research 
data was even greater in the DuPont/Solae project in India, as I was working as a paid 
consultant.  
Through the Kenya experience, however, I learned that the best way (perhaps 
the only way) to ensure documentation occurred under the pressure of delivering 
project success was to embed “research” activities into “project management” 
practices and into Protocol activities. This learning resulted in a more rigorous and 
systematic documentation of my involvement in the Solae India project (the focus of 
Chapter 5). The following summary of the SC Johnson project is drawn from various 
project artifacts, including reports, flipchart photographs, workshop and meeting 
agendas, and email communications.  
  
Project Overview  
For the SC Johnson pilot of the BOP Protocol, I served as the project manager 
and field lead for an initial three-month, in-country implementation of Phase I (i.e, 
Opening Up) during the summer months of 2005. I worked closely with SC Johnson’s 
US corporate sustainability office to select sites and local partners, hire and train a 
field team, develop and manage the budget, generate workplans, and lead the team in-
field. Since it was a pilot of an untested idea, the full-time project team was comprised 
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largely of MBA interns and recent MBA graduates rather than SCJ staff members. 
Using a “proxy team” avoided interrupting SC Johnson’s current activities and helped 
expedite the pilot. As the project lead, I was ultimately responsible to SCJ for meeting 
project milestones, as well as for operationalizing the BOP Protocol 1st Edition and 
translating the concepts, theories, and principles into concrete management activities 
and practices.  
The three-month project was launched in the rural village of Nyota Township, 
as well as the urban slum Kibera. While the effort in the rural village did not yield an 
actionable business, the work in the slum succeeded in creating a business concept 
sufficiently compelling to SC Johnson and a group of community partners to merit 
further investment. The challenges that unfolded in the field, however, took the project 
into territory that lay far outside the framework and scope of the Protocol 1st Edition. 
The model, particularly Phases II and III, was of little practical relevance to the 
business development issues and challenges that arose as we attempted to turn the 
business concept generated during Phase I into a viable and sustainable business.  
Upon returning to the US after the three-month period, I continued to serve as 
project manager while a permanent, locally-based SC Johnson team was slowly put 
into place to manage and drive the project. Working from the US, I continued to 
oversee the project budget and progress in the field through contact with SC Johnson’s 
Kenya office and the local non-profit partner, as well as through two 15-day trips to 
the field in December of 2005 and March 2006. In April 2006, due to my involvement 
in a second BOP Protocol project launch taking place in India, I handed management 
over to SC Johnson and assumed an advisory role to the project, providing regular 
input and guidance through conference calls. I also returned to the field one additional 
time (December 2006) to provide in-field support.  
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The following field summary of the SC Johnson project in Kenya is divided 
into three chronological segments. The first segment, which reflects the time period 
January 2005 to May 2005, reviews my and the team’s pre-field preparations for the 
three-month in field component of the pilot project. These activities fell under the 
“Team Formation and Preparation” process step of the first phase of the BOP Protocol 
(see model below). The second segment reflects the three-month in field pilot project 
that takes place from June 2005 to August of 2005. These activities comprised the 
“Immersion and Engagement,” “Needs and Asset Identification,” and “Idea 
Generation and Evaluation” process steps of the first phase of the BOP Protocol. The 
third segment reviews my continued involvement in guiding the development of a 
business concept in the project’s urban site from August 2005 until December 2006. 
These activities ostensibly comprised the second phase of the BOP Protocol, though as 
noted earlier, the experiences in the field during Phase I had already rendered largely 
irrelevant the process steps envisioned for Phases II and III.  
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FIGURE 4: BOP Protocol Phase I 
 
Field Summary: January 2005 – May 2005  
 The period January 2005 to May 2005 entailed preparations for the three-
month, in-field component of the Protocol pilot test. During that time, I focused on a 
series of pre-field activities that included team formation and training, local partner 
selection, and site selection. These three areas of activity were addressed in the first 
process step, or “Team Formation and Preparation,” of Phase I (Opening Up) of the 
Protocol. In addition, I developed a workplan for the team’s in-field activities based on 
the Protocol. 
As noted above, because of the experimental nature of the project, the project 
field team did not contain employees from SCJ’s corporate office or from its Kenya 
country office as specified in the Protocol. Instead, we formed an SC Johnson “proxy” 
team, drawing on current and recent MBA graduates from the academic institutions 
affiliated with the project, including Cornell University, University of Michigan, and 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. By February of 2005, I and members 
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of the Core Team of the BOP Protocol Project7 had successfully recruited and hired 
three MBA graduate students, two of who had completed the first year of their 
programs and would participate as summer interns, while the third was a recent MBA 
graduate.  
In mid-Spring, however, the decision was made to run the process in two sites, 
one urban and one rural (see below for the explanation behind this decision). Because 
of the project’s time constraint (i.e., the field work would need to be completed during 
the MBA’s summer break), the only way to accommodate this was to have two 
separate field teams operating in parallel, one in each site. Because the team only had 
one person who spoke Swahili (the MBA intern from the University of Michigan 
Business School was a native Kenyan from Nairobi) and only one person with 
background in anthropological and development methods (me), we decided to recruit 
two additional people in order that each team have these skills sets, in addition to the 
business skill sets already present. One of the people recruited was a graduating MBA 
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who had worked for two years in 
rural Kenya in community-based wildlife management and was proficient in Swahili. 
The second person recruited had undergraduate and graduate degrees in anthropology 
from Cornell and the London School of Economics, respectively.  
Once the team was finalized, I developed and facilitated an eight-week course 
that ensured the full team had baseline skills and knowledge regarding BoP Protocol 
strategy, BoP concepts, participatory methodologies, and socio-cultural aspects of 
Kenya (please see Appendix 1 for the course readings). This need for baseline team 
preparation and training was consistent with the Protocol. Due to the team’s 
geographical dispersion (two were in North Carolina, two were in New York, one in 
                                                
7 The Core Team for the BOP Protocol project was expanded following the BOP Protocol workshop to 
include - in addition to me, Stuart Hart and Gordon Enk - Duncan Duke and Michael Gordon. 
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Michigan, and one in Rhode Island), the team held weekly three-hour conference calls 
to discuss the readings and field issues. In addition, one member of the team 
established an online bulletin board and mailing list to foster ongoing dialogue, to 
store files and share documents, and to archive communications. In the month of May, 
for example, the team exchanged 340 emails on 108 different topics. Outside of this 
formal curriculum, I and the non-Swahili speaking members conducted self-directed 
Swahili language studies. We also organized two “culture calls” with an American 
friend of one of the team members who had worked in a Nairobi slum.  
Because of the important role that participatory rural appraisal (PRA) 
methodologies played in the Protocol, I organized for a two-day PRA training session 
with Egerton University—a leading PRA center in East Africa that had an affiliation 
with Cornell University—during the fourth week of the in-field work. The first day of 
the training would focus on the philosophy of PRA and the various types of techniques 
and methods that had been used with success in Kenya. During the second day, the 
Egerton faculty person would work with our team to develop a statement of identity 
and purpose articulated in a language appropriate to the communities in which we 
were going to work. In addition to identifying terms that would resonate with the 
community, the focus of the exercise would be on managing the community’s 
expectations.  
Because team members were scattered around the country during the pre-field 
training, most of the team’s interaction prior to the field work was mediated through 
teleconferences and web discussion boards. On two occasions, several of the team 
members were able to meet at conferences held at Cornell University. The entire 
team’s first face-to-face meeting took place on a day-long layover in London en route 
to Kenya. 
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The selection of project sites and local partners were closely linked together. 
At a macro level, the decision to conduct the pilot test in Kenya was based on the fact 
that SC Johnson had an established corporate-level partnership in Kenya with an NGO 
called ApproTEC (the organization has since renamed itself KickStart). The SC 
Johnson-ApproTEC partnership, which was a project managed within SC Johnson’s 
department for sustainable development (i.e., corporate social responsibility), sought 
to stabilize the quality and price of the pyrethrum flower, a natural source for the 
active ingredient found in many of SC Johnson’s insecticides, by promoting the 
adoption and dissemination of ApproTEC’s micro-irrigation technologies among 
pyrethrum farmers. Because of ApproTEC’s extensive experience with Kenyan small 
holder farmers, SC Johnson proposed that our field team work with ApproTEC as the 
key local partner and liaison for the pilot test. ApproTEC agreed to provide our team 
project support and assistance (e.g., transportation, identifying housing, funds access, 
management consultation and advice) and initial exposure to rural areas by 
introducing us to the organization’s customer base and business network. Because of 
this existing SC Johnson-ApproTEC partnership, our initial site focus for the Protocol 
pilot was rural Kenya. 
To narrow down the potential range of pyrethrum-growing sites and identify 
specific rural communities, I also turned to various Cornell faculty and graduate 
students with field expertise in Kenya, as well as to Faye Yoshihara, a former 
employee of and current consultant to SC Johnson who had researched and 
documented the positive impacts of pyrethrum cultivation on smallholder livelihoods. 
Yoshihara and Alice Pell, a Cornell Professor of Animal Science and, at that time, the 
director of the Cornell International Institute for Food, Agriculture, and Development 
(CIIFAD), recommended that our team use Nakuru as its initial base due to the city’s 
proximity to pyrethrum growing areas. Nakuru, a city of approximately 500,000 
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people, is located approximately three hours north of Nairobi. Furthermore, Nakuru 
was home to Egerton University, an institution well-known for its contributions to 
PRA with which Pell was familiar and had worked with in the past. Pell also 
introduced me to David Amudavi, a Cornell doctoral candidate who was to join 
Egerton’s faculty in August of 2005. Amudavi’s research involved participatory action 
research methods among small holder Kenyan farmers, and he was to be affiliated 
with Egerton’s multi-disciplinary PRA program.  
Because of Egerton’s extensive experience working in the surrounding 
communities (the University has an active outreach program), it became our team’s 
primary local rural partner. ApproTEC, while it possessed an extensive network of 
smallholder customers for its pump technology, did not possess deep knowledge of or 
relationships with broader communities. 
The decision on the specific rural community within which the Team would 
live and work was made after the team arrived in Kenya and spent a week learning 
from and working with Egerton faculty. Ultimately, the community of Nyota 
Township was selected, based in part on its relatively close location to Egerton 
(approximately one-hour drive), the support of the Ministry of Agriculture’s local 
extension officer, and the presence of a progressive self-help farmer’s group called the 
Pamoja Pioneers. Nyota Township is a small-holder farming village in the Rift Valley 
of Nakuru District settled in 1973 to provide 2.5 acre farms for black Kenyans.  In the 
early 1990s, Nyota experienced violent tribal clashes between the areas two dominant 
tribes, the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. The driving distance from Nyota to Nairobi was 
approximately four to five hours, depending on weather conditions, as the last five 
kilometers into Nyota consisted of poor dirt roads passable only by a four-wheel drive 
vehicle. 
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In discussing the project plan with SC Johnson’s Kenya office, however, the 
country manager expressed concern about our team’s focus only on rural areas of 
Kenya. SC Johnson’s Kenya business, which is based in Nairobi, is a sales and 
marketing division that operates almost exclusively in urban areas of the country. To 
help ensure that the SCJ Kenya business would derive near-term, actionable outputs 
from the Protocol pilot, I decided to expand the project to include an urban slum in 
Nairobi. As in the case of the rural site, the selection of the specific slum community 
was determined by our choice of a local partner. 
To help understand the landscape of urban slums in Nairobi, I turned to a non-
profit organization called Carolina for Kibera (CFK) that was founded by a graduate 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and administered by the 
University’s Office of International Studies. CFK, as the name suggests, operates in 
the Nairobi slum of Kibera, East Africa’s largest slum with a population of 
approximately 800,000 residents. First settled in 1912 by Muslim soldiers that that 
were part of the British King’s African Rifles unit, Kibera was a multi-tribal 
community with approximately half of its residents under the age of 16. As is the case 
with “squatter communities,” the land on which Kibera sat belonged to the 
government. Because of this, the homes of Kibera were constructed of mud walls and 
tin roofs, as the construction of permanent structures was illegal.  
CFK, founded in 2001 to address tribal violence, operated several 
programmatic initiatives in Kibera, including a youth sports program, a young girls’ 
empowerment program, a health clinic, and a recently launched income-generation 
program with self-help youth groups based on trash collection and recycling in the 
slums. CFK’s office was located in the slum, and its program manager and most of 
staff and volunteers were residents of Kibera. The Protocol Team’s attraction to CFK 
as a local partner was driven by the organization’s commitment to participatory 
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approaches to development and to the income-generation program noted above, which 
was named Taka ni Pato or Trash is Cash. 
In order to recruit CFK as our local urban partner, I met with the organization’s 
Director based in Chapel Hill, NC to discuss the objectives and philosophy of the BoP 
Protocol and how the Protocol Team’s work could help further CFK’s mission, 
particularly with respect to the Trash is Cash program. I also spoke by phone with the 
organization’s founder and Chairman of the Board, who was serving in the United 
States marines and stationed in Iraq at the time. Based on these conversations, CFK 
agreed to serve as the Protocol Team’s local partner in Kibera. CFK’s following roles 
were outlined in a memorandum of understanding:  
• identify a local liaison from Kibera who would be a full-time, paid member of 
our Team  
• help coordinate a seven-day homestay for the 3 urban Team members 
• facilitate the Team’s interaction and engagement with community members 
• participate in the Team’s needs assessment activities    
• participate in the Team’s participatory idea-generation workshop  
• help establish a “base camp” and “idea bank” for storing and sharing 
information and knowledge with the Kibera community developed through the 
Protocol project 
• make available CFK’s office and meeting space in Kibera to the Protocol 
Team for its work  
We agreed to reimburse CFK at the conclusion of the three month project for use 
of its facilities and staff time at a rate deemed appropriate by CFK staff members. A 
similar memorandum of understanding was established with Egerton University once 
we arrived in Kenya.  
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The final area of my pre-field work involved creating an initial workplan for 
implementing Phase 1 of the Protocol. Creating the workplan reflected my first effort 
to translate the Protocol concepts and approach into a structured, on-the-ground 
practice (Appendix 2 contains the main sections of the workplan). In general, my 
workplan did not introduce activities that had not already been noted in the Protocol. 
The one exception to this is my operationalization of the “living the local life” activity 
(one of the four activities in the Immersion and Engagement step of Phase I) in the 
form of a seven-day homestay.     
 
Field Summary: June 2005 – August 2005  
Our six-person pilot team arrived in Nairobi on June 1, 2005 for a twelve-week 
pilot test of Phase I of the Protocol.  Our time was divided among three process steps, 
beginning with “Immersion and Engagement,” moving on to “Needs and Asset 
Identification,” and culminating with “Idea Generation and Evaluation.” Our objective 
was to co-create a business concept between SC Johnson and the local communities 
that would serve the local community and create value for both partners. As noted 
earlier, much of the project work was conducted in two teams of three people in order 
to complete the process in both the rural (Nyota) and urban (Kibera) sites.  
The Immersion and Engagement step of our work required approximately five 
weeks to complete. The first week consisted of acclimatization, checking in at the US 
embassy, scheduling of meetings with our local partners, and fulfilling basic logistics, 
including purchasing cell phones and securing living arrangements in Nairobi for the 
12 week period so as to be within walking-distance of Kibera. Weeks two and three 
entailed meetings and field visits with three core partners, including SC Johnson’s 
Kenya office, with CFK, and with KickStart. Week four involved meeting with 
Egerton University and finalizing project details for the rural site. Week five, which 
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consisted of a seven-day homestay, effectively launched our work with the 
communities themselves.    
Given that there were no SC Johnson employees on the field team, it was vital 
that we acquired a deep understanding of the company’s Kenya business operations 
and capabilities, as our team was, in effect, representing SC Johnson to the 
communities in which we would be working. In order to gain this level of insight, we 
spent a full day at the Nairobi office. The Nairobi office was undergoing a significant 
transition: As part of an SC Johnson restructuring, the Kenya office’s manufacturing 
operations had been closed in the past year, and the East Africa region was being 
converted into a sales and marketing territory. The main consumer product lines 
available in Kenya included insect control (i.e., Raid and Baygon insecticides, 
mosquito coils), air care (i.e., Glade air freshener), home care (i.e., Toilet Duck toilet 
cleaner, Windex cleaner, Pledge furniture polish). The Kenya office had only 12 
employees remaining at the time of our visit.  
Our initial visit to SC Johnson included a presentation by the General Manager 
for East Africa on the strategy and product lines for SC Johnson’s East Africa 
business, as well as separate interviews with the managers for operations, marketing, 
and accounting. We then joined SC Johnson managers on three field visits. One visit 
was to an SC Johnson wholesale distributor based in Nairobi. A second field visit was 
to a start-up enterprise hired by SC Johnson that was using bicycles to market and 
distribute the company’s products to hard to reach mom-and-pop shops (called 
“dukas”) located in slums. Lastly, we visited three residents in the Kibera slum 
together with SC Johnson’s marketing manager. The visit, which was coordinated by a 
consumer marketing agency hired by SC Johnson, was meant to provide our team with 
a deeper understanding of how SC Johnson framed the business challenge and 
opportunity presented by the rapidly growing urban slums in Kenya.  
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Our visit to CFK, whose office was located in Kibera slum within a twenty 
minute walk of where we were living, was my and the team’s first opportunity to meet 
and speak with the organization’s program manager for Kenya. Given that CFK would 
play a central role in facilitating our work in Kibera, we spent an initial full day with 
the program manager discussing the history and intent of the Protocol and our pilot 
test, as well as learning about Kibera and CFK’s history, mission, and programmatic 
activities in the community. We outlined the general workplan and discussed the 
specific kinds of support and guidance that we needed. Our most immediate need was 
help in introducing us to and “immersing” us in Kibera, as well as arranging for the 
team’s homestays. During our first visit, we also met a CFK volunteer who was 
assigned to be our full-time community liaison for the project. The volunteer was a 
young man of 19 years born and raised in Kibera who had completed a course in 
Social Work. 
Over the course of the first two weeks, we spent as much of our free time 
“hanging around” the CFK office in Kibera. The office, we quickly discovered, was a 
source of immersion: It was a hub of constant activity and provided a great 
opportunity to meet people living in Kibera who either worked or volunteered at CFK 
or were clients. To help the team build familiarity with the community, we walked 
extensively around Kibera’s various “neighborhoods” guided by different CFK 
affiliates who lived in the slum. The team also participated in a community-wide trash 
clean up organized by CFK’s Taka ni Pato youth groups.   
Our meetings with ApproTEC, whose headquarters were in Nairobi, fulfilled a 
similar purpose, as ApproTEC had agreed to provide our team with logistical support, 
as well as to introduce us to the rural areas of Kenya through their enterprise which 
manufactured and sold irrigation pumps primarily to Kenyan farmers. In exchange for 
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their support, the team had agreed to provide ApproTEC with an assessment of the 
effectiveness of its marketing campaigns.    
Our interaction with ApproTEC included an initial meeting to discuss our 
goals and objectives and to discuss workplan logistics (e.g., transportation, managing 
project finances). We also conducted interviews with staff in the technology 
development, marketing, and impact assessment teams. We then participated in a 
number of field visits, including a visit to a manufacturer contracted to produce 
ApproTEC’s pumps, to several ApproTEC customers (i.e., farmers) and distributors 
on the outskirts of Nairobi, and to “lead users” who had been provided prototypes of 
ApproTEC’s “deep well” pumps. Our team also attended a joint SC Johnson-
ApproTEC marketing event outside of Nakuru that was a product of their partnership. 
The day-long social marketing event, which had an SC Johnson booth and information 
table on the company’s insect control products such as Raid and Baygon, involved a 
pumping tournament in which two people competed side-by-side to fill a trash-can 
sized vessel with water first. The intent of the event was to encourage local farmers to 
plant pyrethrum (the source of the active ingredient in SC Johnson’s RAID 
insecticide) and to irrigate using ApproTEC’s pumps. 
Week four involved visiting Egerton University for the pre-arranged PRA 
training, meeting with the local liaison recruited by Egerton (he was an Egerton 
graduate student who was fluent in the local Kikuyu language), and meeting with the 
Nakuru-based office for the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture. The Egerton faculty 
person recommended that our team seek out the support of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, both to ensure that they were not “taken by surprise” by our presence in 
the villages, but also because the organization had a vast network of local agricultural 
extension officers who were respected and trusted by the communities (the latter being 
of particular importance, given the corruption scandals that had sown widespread 
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distrust in the Kenyan government).  We met with the head of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Nakuru and explained the objective of our work. The officer was in full 
support and connected us to the local agriculture extension officer for the area who 
would assist us in selecting the specific community, arranging for homestays, and 
facilitating engagement (including translation, as Kikuyu was the primary language 
spoken) with the community.  
Based on our objectives, the extension officer recommended we work in Nyota 
Township, where there was a progressive group of local farmers called the Pamoja 
Pioneers learning organic farming practices. The extension officer introduced our team 
to the approximately dozen Pamoja Pioneers, which included both men and women, at 
a local Farm Fair held that same week. The meeting was very informal, with everyone 
sitting in the grass at the fair grounds. We introduced ourselves and explained our 
goals and objectives with the extension officer translating. The Pamoja Pioneers 
expressed interest and support for our work. The extension officer agreed to find two 
families where the rural team members would begin the homestay activity the 
following week. 
Week five, which consisted of a seven-day homestay for each member of the 
team, is the point at which the team formally split into two. As noted earlier, the team 
was divided into a rural team and an urban team. I placed myself with the urban team, 
believing at the time that the urban site would present a greater degree of difficulty 
and require greater oversight and attention. It was also more intimidating or daunting 
than the rural site, both from the perspective of personal comfort (one often told story 
about Kibera concerned the “flying toilet,” or plastic bags of human waste that were 
thrown from homes at night because of the difficulty of accessing the limited pit 
latrines in the dark) and perceptions of safety (the parents of the Kenyan MBA, for 
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example, objected strongly to the team living in Kibera, saying that we should only 
enter during the daytime and be accompanied by locals at all times).  
The purpose of the homestay, to quote from the BOP Protocol 1st Edition, was 
to “participate as fully as possible (or allowable) in the local way of life, thus fostering 
empathy and appreciation for local values and practices.” As such, in working with 
our local partners to identify homestay hosts (CFK in Kibera and the Nakuru Ministry 
of Agriculture Extension office in Nyota), two of the key specifications we 
emphasized to them were that we stay in different family situations that demonstrated 
the diversity of the community and that our homestay hosts not treat us as guests, but 
instead allow us to experience what they do on a daily basis. The instruction I gave to 
the team members, apart from avoiding falling into the role of “guest,” was to leave 
the week having learned a task from their host. This approach, which comes from 
PRA field methods, reverses roles among low status and high status people, thereby 
helping to foster a relationship of equality and sharing between outsiders and those 
from the community. Given that the objective of the Protocol is to co-create a business 
with the community, learning to engage the community in this manner would be an 
important skill through the remainder of the project.  
For the urban team, CFK selected the people for the homestays based on our 
guidance and then introduced me and my two team members to our hosts the day 
before the homestays began. We met at CFK’s office, and the program manager of 
CFK reiterated to our hosts that they should treat our team members not as guests, but 
as everyday acquaintances. Our hosts would be doing us a service, they were told, by 
letting us experience their daily lives. While CFK had noted to us that we should pay 
our hosts the equivalent of $25 for the week, as well as contribute to some of the daily 
expenditures for food, CFK intentionally did not share this information with our hosts 
for fear that it would taint how our hosts treated us (and potentially leak out and create 
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a safety issue for our hosts). The next evening we showed up at CFK’s offices with a 
small duffel bag of clothing where me met with our hosts and departed to their 
respective homes.  
The selection of the host families in the rural site was less than ideal and 
reflected a gap in alignment between our team and our local rural partners (i.e., 
Egerton University and the Ministry of Agriculture). The extension officer supporting 
the team took the team members to several homes as potential hosts, and then asked 
our team members to choose. Apart from the awkward position of having to choose 
among the families (thereby inadvertently turning the initial meeting into a kind of 
audition), one of the families that was championed by the extension officer and 
eventually chosen turned out to be the extension officer’s own home!  
My homestay host, for example, was a young married Muslim man who lived 
in a sparsely furnished (i.e., a bed and a nightstand), one-room mud home in the 
neighborhood of Makina, a largely Muslim area where several generations of a family 
would be living in close proximity. As this neighborhood was the site of the original 
Nubian settlers of Kibera, there was a more “established” and “permanent” feeling to 
the area (e.g., exterior walls of homes were plastered, concreted “courtyards” outside 
the home), despite the fact that all of the homes were constructed of mud. My host 
wife was working in Saudi Arabia to earn cash; his daughter, who was of primary 
school age, was essentially cared for by my host’s mother, sisters, and cousins who all 
lived in Makina. All meals were taken with various male relatives at the home of his 
sister next door, a home that contained a television, a dining room table, rugs, and a 
sofa. 
Every morning, I would work with my host and two of his “business partners” 
from 6 AM to 10:00 AM cooking and selling “mandazi,” a Kenyan fried bread, by the 
side of the main road bordering Kibera. Afterwards, we would hang around a local 
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water tap where another of my host’s friend would sell water, and I would receive 
Swahili lessons. Afternoons entailed learning to weave a straw mat from my host’s 
mother (a well-known expert in the craft; grooms would purchase the mats as wedding 
gifts for his bride’s parents), cooking and selling chapatti bread in Kibera with my 
host’s sisters, attending soccer practice for a girl’s team in Kibera coached by my host, 
and collecting trash in Kibera and sorting out recyclables. During the night, I peeled 
and fried potatoes to sell to the Kibera residents migrating home from jobs in the 
industrial zone of Nairobi. The last night of my homestay I prepared dinner for and 
served approximately ten members of my host’s family, including the women in the 
family (as it was a conservative Muslim community, the women prepared all of the 
meals and ate separately from the men). 
While each of the homestay experiences was distinct, with team members 
participating in a wide range of chores and daily activities and working through 
differing degrees of communication challenges (e.g., in the rural site, there was much 
less English spoken than in Kibera), the experience proved to be transformative for all 
of the team members and instilled in everyone a sense of confidence and comfort of 
working in the community. As one team member described, the homestay functioned 
as a kind of “accelerator” of the relationship-building process between ourselves and 
the community. It also, we found, gave our team a powerful credibility in the eyes of 
the community, and made our declarations of “working with the community” ring 
true. In that regard, the value of the homestay turned out to be quite different than 
intended. It did not provide “deep ethnographic insights” into local needs and wants. 
In fact, all of the team members discovered how attempting to “think and act 
ethnographically” by taking photographs, notes, and keeping a daily journal created an 
awkward dynamic that turned our hosts into “research subjects,” thereby undermining 
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the very effort to build a relationship. This subtle shift in the underlying intent of the 
community engagement process became more consequential as the process unfolded.    
With the conclusion of the homestays, the Immersion and Engagement phase 
of our work ended, and we turned out attention to the next process step, "Needs and 
Asset Identification.” The Needs and Asset Identification set of activities varied 
significantly between the urban and rural sites, and the two project sites began to 
diverge from this point forward as a consequence. In Kibera, this step required three 
full weeks and involved the creation of what, at the time, we called “participatory 
entrepreneurship development” workshops (today we call it “collective 
entrepreneurship development,”) while in Nyota the team wrapped up their work in 
less than five days and implemented a very traditional participatory rural appraisal 
program. Being based in the urban site, I tried to coordinate with the rural team and 
provide support and coaching. Communication by phone, however, proved extremely 
difficult, as there was no cellular service in Nyota, and I was only able to talk to the 
team when they traveled into the nearby town of Molo (approximately 20 minutes 
from Nyota). Cut-off from the team for days at a time, I was unable to re-direct their 
efforts before they had settled on a traditional PRA path.  
In Nyota, the team (which was down to two people, as the anthropologist 
member on the team could only stay for the first month of the project) decided to 
operationalize the Needs and Asset Identification process as a three-day PRA 
workshop, per the training session at Egerton University during week four. The 
attraction to the PRA approach was driven, in part, by the fact that the rural team was 
very much within the orbit of Egerton University which, as noted earlier, is a hub for 
PRA training across East Africa and has trained Kenyan government officials 
(including agricultural extension officers) in the process. The extension officer 
supporting the team, as well as the local liaison graduate student from Egerton (the 
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primary translators to the community) were both very familiar with and accustomed to 
PRA. The rural communities surrounding Egerton had also been exposed to PRA 
workshops organized by local government officials in collaboration with Egerton.  
To efficiently recruit people to the workshops, the rural team attended a 
Ministry of Agriculture farmers’ meeting where they were given the opportunity to 
address more than 400 hundred local farmers. The team stated to the group that they 
were in Nyota to facilitate business development in the community and would be 
holding a series of workshops at the local primary school later that week, having 
received permission from the local government to do so. The workshops would 
identify the community’s strengths, resources, and problems, as well as determine 
potential income-generating solutions. All interested people were encouraged to 
attend. Approximately two hundred fifty people arrived for the workshops, many 
trickling in throughout the day. There were so many attendees that people were 
standing outside the windows of the school room. Needless to say, this created an 
enormous coordination challenge for the two-person team. 
The team designed the agenda for the three-day workshops to move the group 
towards a “community action plan” that would outline the main leverage points for 
addressing key challenges faced by the community. The first day of the workshop 
combined several exercises, including social mapping, historical timelines, and 
seasonal calendars. The mapping exercises, which were done by groups of people who 
self-organized according to their homes proximity with one another, drew maps 
identifying various physical structures, such as homes/shambas, wells, rivers, foot 
paths, and mobile services. Those drawing timelines were asked to focus on major 
events and changes in Nyota in the post-colonial period (post 1973), including crop 
harvests, disease, and tribal violence. Groups creating seasonal calendars were asked 
to outline the annual cycles around crops, rains, school fees, and illness, among other 
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things. All of the groups used markers and flipcharts to create the maps and timelines. 
The team then synthesized the groups’ output, creating trend lines for household 
income and expenses and for farm production.  
The second day was devoted entirely to a problem ranking exercise. After 
identifying 31 problems in the community, the team used a pair-wise ranking method 
to isolate those that were most important (the top five problems were corruption, 
HIV/AIDS, agricultural product packaging laws, human disease, and absence of 
technical knowledge).  
On the third day, the team asked the attendees to identify the resources flowing 
into the community, the resources created/used/traded within the community, and the 
resources flowing out of the community. Again, the team synthesized the information 
coming from the two groups. The workshops culminated by brainstorming potential 
solutions to problem groupings that the team had simplified and clustered together 
from the second day’s workshop to facilitate the discussion. The team returned to 
Nakuru where they compiled a report outlining the activities and findings. The report 
was given to the extension officer, who the community chose as their point of contact 
and local information hub.  Because the Nyota team completed the Needs and Asset 
Identification work so quickly, the team members traveled back to Nairobi and worked 
with the urban team for almost two weeks until the Idea Generation activities were 
begun in Nyota.  
I reconnected with the rural team when they returned to Nakuru to prepare the 
report. In reviewing our overarching goal of co-creating a business that was valuable 
to both the community and SC Johnson, it became clear that the PRA workshops and 
the resulting community action plan had taken the team off of a “co-creation” path. In 
effect, we would have to “insert” SC Johnson into a pre-set problem/solution 
framework created by the rural community. Furthermore, because of the “mass 
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engagement” of community members, it was unclear who out of the two-hundred plus 
participants was truly committed and motivated to start a new business in partnership 
with SC Johnson and who, therefore, to invite to subsequent business ideation 
sessions.  
In Kibera, by contrast, out of necessity we began the Needs and Asset 
Identification step by first trying to bound the community that was to be SC Johnson’s 
partner and map out how best to reach out to them. Given the hundreds of thousands 
of people in Kibera, as well as the diverse locations in which we conducted the 
homestays, the answer was not readily apparent. We ultimately resolved the issue by 
working through CFK’s existing stakeholder networks (thereby allowing us to trade on 
CFK’s trust and social capital in the community), focusing in particular on the youth 
groups involved in the Taka ni Pato income generation project operated in part by 
CFK. The Taka Ni Pato project was a project launched by four organizations, one of 
which was CFK, which was operating in several slums. CFK was responsible for the 
project in Kibera. There were six youth groups in Kibera chosen for the program by 
CFK through a selection process that began with 12 groups. The youth groups 
amounted to loosely-institutionalized “clubs” that operated within a particular 
neighborhood of Kibera and had typically coalesced around a desire to impact a social 
issue prevalent in the community (e.g., AIDS awareness). The members of the youth 
groups ranged in age from mid-teens to 42 in the case of one group (the majority 
though in their late teens and early 20’s), and included men and women. As part of the 
Taka ni Pato project, CFK provided technical training (e.g., composting methods) and 
marketing support (for the compost and the recyclables) to the groups, as well as 
leadership mentoring. In addition to income generation stemming from the composting 
and selling of recyclable materials collected around the slum, several of the youth 
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groups had established a paying client base in Kibera for direct-to-home trash 
collection service.  
Over the course of a week, the urban team met separately with the leaders of 
each of the six groups in Kibera and discussed whether they would be interested in 
working with SC Johnson to create a business that was valuable to both partners. If the 
group leader was interested (in all six cases they were), we then held a meeting with 
the full youth group to discuss further. In addition, through one of CFK’s partners in 
the Taka ni Pato project called Pamoja Trust, we met with three additional Taka ni 
Pato youth groups operating in two other slums. One group was in a much newer, less 
established slum called Tuff Gong located by the domestic airport; two other groups 
were in the slum of Mathare, a tribally-diverse slum (much as Kibera) of several 
hundred thousand. Our reason for linking up with related groups from other slums was 
to build-in a mechanism for expanding the business to other areas of Nairobi.   
In the course of meeting with the youth groups and inviting them to work with 
SC Johnson, we were struck by one recurring issue: There was an enormous gap 
between what the group envisioned by a “business partnership” and what we had in 
mind. For example, during one of the meetings when we asked whether the youth 
group would be interested in a business partnership with SC Johnson, one of the 
members responded, “Absolutely — if they (SC Johnson) buy us a truck, we will wear 
t-shirts with (their) logo.” Their understanding and vision for a business was 
conditioned by their lives in Kibera and the kinds of “mom and pop shop” enterprises 
(much like the mandazi business my host operated) that dominated the landscape, not 
to mention the ubiquitous non-profit and donor organizations that had come to be 
viewed as wellsprings of money and other resources by the Kibera population. It was 
at that point when we realized that collectively arriving at a new business concept with 
SC Johnson and then launching an entrepreneurial venture as equal partners would 
 130 
require much more than simply identifying needs and assets. Instead, we had to build 
some common business foundation and business language in order for us (as 
representatives of SC Johnson) to be able to effectively co-create business concepts 
and to think and act like business partners.  
Our solution to this was to re-cast the PRA exercises, such as the ones used in 
Nyota, in an entrepreneurial mold. We named our approach “Participatory 
Entrepreneurship Development” (in India, we changed the name to “Collective 
Entrepreneurship Development” (CED) to avoid the tendency for people to fall into a 
PRA mindset, as well as to better reflect the idea that we were developing the capacity 
of the company and the community partners to work together as a unified group of 
entrepreneurs).  
Over the course of the next 10 days, we held four day-long workshops (from 
9:30 AM until 4:00 PM) in CFK’s office hall, interspersing “homework” assignments 
during the off days. Lunch was provided during the workshops, and we paid only for 
transportation costs incurred by participants (this was only the case for youth group 
representatives from a neighboring slum) to help manage expectations of largesse and 
foster commitment. We asked each of the nine participating youth groups to send 
between two and four people, giving us a total daily attendance of around 25 – 35 
people. To avoid creating “gatekeepers” in the groups and to provide exposure to as 
many people as possible, we asked the groups to send at least one new person to each 
of the meetings rather than the same representatives. The participants were told that 
the workshops would prepare them to work effectively with SC Johnson during a 
Business Idea Generation workshop at the end of the project. We tried to make clear to 
the groups that their participation in this “preparatory work” was critical to 
maximizing their time with SC Johnson, and that the workshops would provide 
business skills that would be beneficial to the groups outside of the Protocol project.  
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The general structure of the workshops consisted of a morning breakout 
exercise conducted in mixed teams (i.e., each team was comprised of representatives 
from different youth groups; working in mixed teams was a way to get the youths 
comfortable working with strangers, something they would have to do in working with 
SC Johnson) followed by a “report-back” to the full group. We would then break for 
lunch. In the afternoon, we would have a second breakout exercise followed by a 
report-back. On average, we had four to five breakout teams, with each team having 
five to seven people. Notes from each of the sessions, along with a binder, were 
provided to each of the groups. The groups’ representatives were asked to share the 
day’s learnings and outcomes with their full group, as well as to prep any new 
representatives attending the next workshop. Another binder with the notes was kept at 
CFK’s office, along with all of the flipcharts from the workshops. This practice 
fulfilled the Protocol’s direction to make all materials and learnings available to the 
wider community through a publicly-accessible “base camp.” While CFK’s office was 
not a true “public-space,” the organization was widely respected and recognized in the 
community, and would have gladly opened its doors to anyone interested in seeing the 
materials.  
Following is a brief description of the agendas for each of the four sessions, 
along with the homework assignments: 
• Workshop 1: Breaking the Ice and Creating Alignment  
Following introductions using a “Bicycle Chain Exercise” (a PRA 
technique that has people pair up face to face in two lines and then 
introduce themselves before rotating to the next person in line; the 
approach creates buzz within the group and helps equalize participants of 
different status), we arranged the chairs in a circle and facilitated an hour-
long discussion about the project’s overall purpose, the purpose of these 
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“preparatory meetings,” and participants’ concerns or questions. Our 
objective was to make sure there was general alignment before proceeding. 
After lunch, we formed mixed breakout teams that worked at separate 
tables. The teams were given 45 minutes to discuss the following question; 
“What are the positive and negative changes in your community over the 
past three to five years?” Each breakout team summarized their 
observations on a flipchart and then reported their observations to the entire 
group, followed by a brief question/answer period. The objective of this 
exercise was to get people comfortable working with strangers and to start 
building a common vision about the kind of community they would like to 
see. This was a fairly standard PRA “temporal” technique (much like the 
historical timeline used in Nyota), but we facilitated the discussions to 
serve more as a visioning exercise, rather than a “documentation exercise.” 
We ended the session with a homework assignment. We asked each person 
to come prepared to the next meeting to discuss the following question: 
“What resources, talents and skills do you possess as an individual, as a 
group (youth group), and as a community?” Our goal was to get people to 
start thinking creatively about what resources they could leverage in 
creating new businesses. Our team visited each of the youth groups over 
the next two days to help facilitate the discussion offline.  
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• Workshop 2: Rethinking Resources, Discovering Opportunities 
We started the next morning with a breakout exercise based on the 
homework question given at the conclusion of Workshop 1 (“What 
resources, talents and skills do you possess as an individual, as a 
group (youth group). The exercise was a modification of a PRA 
“card sorting exercise” and involved having each group member 
write down on color-coded cards their individual (yellow card), 
group (green card), and community talents/resources (blue card). 
They then circulated their cards within their group and discussed 
what each person had noted. For the report back, each group was 
asked to create a “resource profile” of their breakout team on a 
flipchart. After lunch, they reconvened in their breakout groups for 
the following task: “Combine two or more resources within your 
team to create a new business idea.” We gave an example based on 
one of the breakout team’s resource profile. We emphasized that 
they should be as creative as possible, not worrying about whether 
the business or idea “made sense.” The groups put their ideas on 
flipcharts and presented them back to the entire group, and our team 
facilitated the discussion. The objective was to have the group think 
creatively about the kinds of resources they have and to practice 
brainstorming. For homework, we handed out an actual solicitation 
for grant proposals involving micro-enterprise projects by youth 
groups (CFK brought this to our attention) and asked them to fill 
out the sections of the proposal asking for information regarding the 
business idea, the impacts, and the resources to be used. To help 
their proposals, and to get them to think creatively, we gave each 
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group a camera (which we later donated to our local partner) and 
asked them to photograph the need, the opportunity, and the 
resources they would use. We gave them two days to come up with 
the idea, take the photographs, and return the film to us so that we 
could have it processed before the next meeting. 
• Workshop 3: Creatively Combining Resources 
We started the session by forming breakout teams along existing 
youth-group membership. Each group was asked to create a poster 
of their grant proposal using the photos they took, indicating what 
their business would do, what value it would create for the groups 
and community, and what resources they would use. Once the 
posters were completed, each group presented its business idea and 
received feedback from the entire group. We concluded by creating 
mixed breakout groups and asking each group to play the role of the 
“Grant Proposal Evaluating Committee.” Each group was asked to 
rate the various proposals in terms of their creativity, uniqueness, 
and sustainability. This proved effective in getting the groups to 
think critically about the proposals and introduced concepts such as 
unique customer value. 
• Workshop 4: Partnering with SC Johnson 
Given that the there were no SC Johnson employees on our team, 
we felt it important that the youth groups have time to get to know 
SC Johnson before the actual idea generation workshop. For the 
morning session, we formed mixed breakout teams and gave each 
team five issues of SC Johnson’s internal corporate magazine. The 
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breakout teams were asked to create profiles of SC Johnson on the 
flipchart posters using pictures and captions cut from the 
magazines, as well as to indicate why they thought SCJ would 
make a good partner. Each team presented their posters to the entire 
group. For the afternoon session, we had SC Johnson’s operations 
manager for Kenya give a brief presentation on what the company 
does (referencing the posters that the groups created, which were 
taped to the wall), followed by a “Question and Answer” session. 
We then formed mixed breakout teams and had the groups fill out 
what is called a “Johari’s Window.” Johari’s Window is a 2 x 2 
matrix where each axis identifies a partner’s knowledge (what they 
know) and their knowledge gaps (what they don’t know). By 
creating a Johari’s window using SC Johnson and the youth groups, 
our goals was to highlight potential complementarities of a 
partnership. In addition, in terms of the Protocol, this exercise 
served as a way of conducting a “critical resource assessment” of 
SC Johnson, one of the activities noted in the Needs and Asset 
Identification section. 
 Our intent behind these workshops was to lay a foundation that would enable 
us to do the business ideation generation work more effectively, where 
“effectiveness,” in our minds, was measured by the uniqueness and creativity (i.e., the 
“cool factor”) of the ideas generated. As with the homestay, we later understood that, 
while extremely valuable, the role of these workshops was less about inciting 
“creativity”, and more about laying the foundation for a new, shared identity, both at 
an organizational and market level, and the capacity to “co-create” a business. This 
understanding resulted in our revamping the structure and treatment of these 
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workshops, in addition to the recruitment process, when we began the project in India 
with Solae.  
The completion of the PRA workshops in Nyota and the CED workshops in 
Kibera marked the end of the Needs and Asset Identification step. Attention in both 
sites turned toward the fourth and final process step of Phase I, “Business Idea 
Generation.” Given the different starting points for the two sites, coupled with the 
“urban bias” of the SC Johnson Kenya office, the outcomes of the final process step 
were very different. Specifically, the efforts in the Nairobi slum generated a business 
idea that warranted continuation of the project into Phase II activities; the work in the 
rural site failed to generate a business idea of mutual interest to SC Johnson and the 
local community.  
Before I move onto describing the Business Idea Generation activities, it is 
important that I note a mid-project debrief occasioned by a three-day visit by SC 
Johnson’s vice-president for corporate sustainability (the project reported to him) that 
took place during Needs and Asset Identification, as it impacted the nature of SC 
Johnson’s later engagement in the two sites. The visit involved a meeting with the 
corporate sustainability manager, SC Johnson’s Kenya management team, and SC 
Johnson’s regional manager responsible for East Africa. As part of the debrief, we 
provided a preliminary recommendation on business opportunities, noting the 
possibility of leveraging the door-to-door trash collection network of the Taka ni Pato 
groups in the slums to create a direct-to-home, service based environmental health and 
cleaning business utilizing SC Johnson products. Given SC Johnson Kenya’s interest 
and current efforts to use bicycle distributors to service small mom-and-pop-shops on 
the outskirts of slums, our suggestion generated excitement and was received 
favorably. Because of the nature of the PRA process in Nyota (which limited close 
interaction with the community), there was no immediately obvious recommendation 
 137 
for business opportunities. In retrospect, this likely confirmed to SC Johnson Kenya’s 
management the limited business value present in the rural site. 
In addition, during this time, I raised with SC Johnson the need to put into 
place a development plan to ensure that, upon the team’s departure, the people and 
resources were in place to sustain momentum and begin testing out the selected 
business concept to “verify the existence of product/service need and the basic 
viability of the business.” Because of the interest in the direct-to-home cleaning 
business concept, I was asked to submit a proposal. Before Business Idea Generation 
had begun, I had circulated and received verbal support for a nine-month proposal for 
Phase II of the BOP Protocol (Building the Ecosystem) in Kibera. The proposal 
outlined the need for a full time community-based liaison, 20% time of one of SC 
Johnson’s Kenya managers to serve as project manager, product test stock, and 
working capital funds for equipment, marketing, and promotions. In addition, the 
proposal requested funds for two field visits to Kenya by a member of the BOP 
Protocol team to maintain continuity and facilitate the project’s hand-over to SC 
Johnson’s Kenya office. I continued working to put this project infrastructure into 
place as we were conducting Idea Generation activities. 
According to our Protocol, the objective of the Idea Generation set of activities 
was to “creatively blend the firm’s current and future resource and capability 
endowment with local resources and socio-economic systems.” Once ideas were 
identified, “the focus shifts to narrowing down the list to those few opportunities to be 
pursued.” The approach and thinking behind our operationalization of idea generation 
was very much in tune with this prescription: Our efforts were, first and foremost, 
designed to generate multiple ideas in the hope that at least one of them would be of 
interest to SC Johnson and the youth groups.  
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As our full team was present in Nairobi at the conclusion of the urban team’s 
CED workshops, we were able to plan out the agenda for Idea Generation together. 
For both sites, we recruited four kinds of participants: community members, SC 
Johnson employees, representatives from our local partners (i.e., Egerton University, 
Ministry of Agriculture, CFK), and representatives from local organizations that we 
believed could contribute valuable resources for idea creation.  
Recruiting community members was relatively straightforward in the urban 
site, as we had the opportunity to vet the different participants during the PED 
workshops and gauge their commitment and capability. At the conclusion of the PED 
workshops, we asked that each youth group choose their two best representatives for 
idea generation. To help ensure that the representatives were indeed those most 
committed and interested (rather than a self-appointed leader), CFK visited each group 
and helped facilitate the selection process. Because the size of the PRA workshops in 
Nyota prevented the rural team from getting to know the community participants, 
community members were selected based on the team’s personal relationships and 
contacts made during the homestays. Invitations were extended to seven community 
members, with five of those able to attend. Given the low level of interest that SC 
Johnson Kenya had in the rural site (see below), the invitation for the idea generation 
focused on the opportunity to explore business partnerships with a range of 
organizations, not only with SC Johnson.  
We asked SC Johnson to send several members to the idea generation 
activities, noting that their presence was critical to ensuring that the resulting business 
ideas reflected their interests. I believe that, for a number of reasons, SC Johnson’s 
expectations for and hence, interest in, the rural site were much lower than they were 
for the urban site. As I discovered during the site selection process, SC Johnson’s 
Kenya business was entirely focused on urban areas. Furthermore, in our mid-project 
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debrief noted above with SC Johnson’s team, we were only able to offer a concrete 
preliminary business recommendation for the urban site. The net result was that SC 
Johnson’s Kenya office sent three representatives to the two-and-a-half day idea 
generation workshop in Kibera. Only one SC Johnson representative attended the two-
day rural idea generation workshop.  
Representatives from our local partners, including CFK, Egerton University, 
and ApproTEC, attended both workshops. In addition, we recruited a number of 
additional representatives from a range of organizations we thought could be valuable 
to conceiving and launching a business. The organizations included two Kenya-based 
micro-finance institutions called Faulu and K-Rep, a technology-based non-profit 
organization called ITDG, an organization called Pamoja Trust that was one of CFK’s 
non-profit partners involved in the Taka ni Pato project, a local social-entrepreneur 
working with self-help youth groups, and the global non profit CARE. We met with 
each of the organizations ahead of the workshop and briefed them on the Protocol and 
the intent of idea generation. In total, there were 13 attendees at the Nyota idea 
generation workshop. In Kibera, there were approximately 25.   
The structure of the workshops in the two sites was similar and built off some 
of the same techniques utilized in the PED workshops in Kibera. Both workshops 
started with some form of “ice breaker,” then developed success criteria against which 
ideas would be evaluated, moved onto identifying resources possessed by the 
participants, and finished by developing business ideas and rough action plans. In both 
locations, we used the metaphor of “building a house” as a way of framing the 
workshop process: the resources were the bricks and materials from which we could 
construct the business ideas. The primary factor that changed the structure of the 
workshops was time: in the urban site, we had two and a half days available to us; in 
the rural site, we only had two days (due to travel time).  
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One final structural element worth noting is that I and the rest of the BOP 
Protocol team played the role of facilitators throughout the process, rather than of SC 
Johnson “spokespersons” as we had done previously. The practical implication of this 
was that we would not be involved in the breakout teams driving the creation of ideas. 
Our reasons for assuming this position was threefold. First and foremost, there would 
be actual SC Johnson employees participating in the workshops. Second, as we 
ourselves did not have authority to commit SC Johnson to a particular path, we did not 
want to fuel community members’ expectations. Third, as our team would be 
departing back to the U.S., it was important to start transitioning SC Johnson Kenya 
into a formal and symbolic project leadership position. As noted, we exerted influence 
on the idea development by sharing our personal views on potential opportunities with 
the SC Johnson team ahead of and during the workhops.  
In Nyota, the out-of town participants stayed in a hotel in Molo the evening 
before the workshop (there were no hotels in Nytota). The workshop began the next 
morning at 10 AM. Upon arriving in Nyota, the SC Johnson representative noted to 
me that he was not expecting to leave with an idea that would make sense for SC 
Johnson. While these words were intended to prevent any disappointment on our 
team’s part, they reflected the state of mind and approach that the SC Johnson 
representative brought with him into the Nyota idea generation, a mindset that became 
a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
Because of the small size of the group, we did introductions standing in a 
circle. Each person was asked to say their name and the organization (if any) they 
represented, to share something interesting about his/herself, and finally to identify a 
resource or skill that they were bringing to the workshop. We wrote the resources 
mentioned on a flip chart to bring to everyone’s attention to the breadth and depth of 
resources available to the group.   
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 After discussing a basic workshop “code of conduct” (e.g., look for the 
positive in people’s ideas, encourage everyone to speak) and “principles” (e.g., all 
partners must benefit) we broke the participants into three groups to discuss the 
question, “What would a successful business opportunity from this workshop look like 
to you/your group?” Our objective was to develop a set of criteria that could be used 
to guide idea generation, as well as to screen and evaluate the ideas. After each group 
presented back their list, we noted some of the similarities among the lists and said 
that we would synthesize them into one comprehensive list to present back the next 
morning. Upon concluding this exercise, we all walked to a nearby “café” for lunch.   
Following lunch, the participants returned to their break-out teams for a 
resource identification exercise similar to one we developed for the PED workshops. 
The objective, as noted to the participants, was to generate the “building blocks” with 
which the groups would create new business ideas the following day.  For the 
breakout, we asked each group to “identify the talents, unique resources, and strengths 
that you possess as an individual and those present in your organization (or 
community)?” Each person in each group was given pink and green index cards and 
asked to list their personal skills, resources, and talents on the pink cards and those of 
their organization/community on the green cards. After writing out the cards, the 
members within a group shared their cards with each other and discussed what each 
had written. Following the sharing, each group was asked to “Create a resource profile 
of their breakout group” that summarized their resources. The three groups presented 
their resource profile to the full group.  Among the resources noted were training 
people in enterprise development; availing credit facilities to registered common 
interest groups; recycling waste for income-generation through selling compost 
fertilizer; growing tree tomato fruit trees in a nursery; educating youth members of 
community about HIV, drugs, and social responsibility; technology for making juice 
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from fruits;  global and local distribution systems for consumer chemical products 
through product wholesalers and agro-vet suppliers; dramatic performances of youth 
theatre group to promote awareness of social issues; farmer training at a university 
location; knowledge of water-harvesting via roof-catchments’ systems; and human-
powered irrigation pumps.  We concluded the day by reviewing the agenda for the 
following day. 
We began the second day of the workshop by posting a consolidated list of the 
success criteria that we had developed the evening prior. The criteria included use of 
local resources (labor, natural resources, knowledge/skills, passion/creativity); 
creation of employment; total sustainability (generate income, be self-funding, 
positive effect on environment and community, recycling waste); provision of 
opportunities for training and learning; utilization of technologies new to the area; 
catalyze additional businesses. In addition, in order to refresh everyone’s memories 
about some of the “business building blocks” identified the day before, we handed out 
to each of the breakout teams a full set of resource cards (we created duplicate sets 
during the evening) which they then reviewed and discussed briefly.   
Due to personal conflicts, as well as a minor traffic accident, three of the 
previous day’s attendees were unable to participate, bringing our total participants 
down to 10. Because of this, we formed only two breakout groups to start the idea 
generation. The breakout task was to “develop two business ideas by combining at 
least three resources (cards), being sure the business addresses the success criteria.” 
For the report-back to the full group, they were asked to describe the business and to 
explain what needs were being met by the business, what value it created for each of 
the partners, and what the challenges/obstacles were to starting the business.  
 Out of the two groups emerged three business ideas. The first group, which 
contained the SC Johnson representative, outlined a community organic farming 
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business. The second group presented two business ideas: one for producing organic 
fertilizer, and the second for fruit farming and processing of the fruit. None of the 
business ideas had a role or business link to SC Johnson. When I asked the SC 
Johnson representative how they would benefit from the organic farming business, his 
response was that the business would, over time, help raise the income level in the 
community, thereby allowing them to afford SC Johnson’s products. This was a clear 
indication that the SC Johnson representative had participated more as a “facilitator” 
of the community’s ideas, rather than attempting to co-create ideas that could yield 
tangible business benefits for the company.  
The full group gave feedback on the ideas and identified additional issues that 
needed further consideration and development. Before breaking for lunch, we asked 
the participants to sign up for one of the business ideas presented to work on 
developing further during the afternoon. Everyone signed up for either the community 
organic farming scheme or the organic fertilizer business idea. 
After lunch, the participants assembled into one of the business groups for the 
second breakout exercise. The breakout task was to create an implementation plan for 
your business that outlined the key activities over the next year, the actions needed to 
address the issues/challenges identified during the feedback, the role of each group 
member in the business, and additional partners/resources (if any) needed to start the 
business. After completing the breakout exercise, each group presented their plans and 
timelines followed by feedback and further discussion by the full group. There was a 
sense of excitement in the room and a genuine interest among all participants.  
In concluding the workshop, we congratulated the group on the successful 
creation of interesting and actionable ideas. Furthermore, we encouraged the Nyota 
community participants to pursue the business ideas and to reach out to the people and 
the organizations at the workshop, as they all were keen to support and enable the 
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business ideas to move forward. We noted that a final report would be drafted and 
provided to the Nyota community through the extension officer.  
As noted, we followed a similar workshop structure in Kibera (i.e., ice-breaker 
=> success criteria => group resources => ideation), the main differences driven by 
the fact that we had two and half days within which to complete the workshop. The 
workshop was held at CFK’s meeting hall in Kibera. On day one, participants began to 
arrive and sign in between 1:00 and 1:30 PM. We then opened the workshop with a 
welcome and thank-you to the participants. We then did introductions using the 
bicycle-chain technique as a way of breaking the ice and building a sense of ease and 
openness among all participants.  
To help ground the idea generation process in the context and realities of the 
slum, as well as to help generate and build dialogue among the participants, the first 
breakout activity consisted of what we called an “Opportunity Walk.” Modeled after a 
PRA technique called “transect walks,” the exercise consisted of creating five mixed 
breakout groups that walked a pre-selected route through one of five distinct 
neighborhood communities in Kibera. During the walk, which lasted approximately 
one and a half hours, the group was instructed “to identify resources, opportunities, 
and challenges for creating new businesses that serve the community.” Each group 
was led by one of the youth group participants who lived in the neighborhood in which 
the opportunity walk would take place. Upon returning to CFK’s meeting hall, each 
group created a flipchart of resources, opportunities, and challenges. Once everyone 
had returned and completed the flipcharts, each group gave a presentation, followed 
by question and answer.  
Among the 37 resources identified were land, population, handicraft skills, 
retail outlets, waste, theatre, railway, and streams. Opportunities included alternative 
advertisement, security, black markets, consumer information, flower gardening, water 
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management, and informal education systems. Challenges noted included black 
markets, access to the area, low incomes, sanitation, congestion, and poor 
infrastructure. One valuable (and predictable) result was that what one group 
identified as a “challenge” (e.g., the numerous small shops in the slum creates high 
competition) another group labeled either an “opportunity” or a “resource” (e.g., the 
numerous shops provides a ready-made means of distributing products). Through our 
facilitation, the group came to the conclusion that the difference in perspectives 
reflected the group’s diversity and was itself a valuable resource.  The participants 
from SC Johnson and the other organizations also noted that walking through the 
community with someone from the community gave them a unique and “fresh” 
perspective on life in the slum. We adjourned for the day over tea and snacks. 
We reconvened the next day at 9:30 AM at CFK’s meeting hall with the 
participants sitting in one of five tables in pre-selected groups chosen to maximize 
diversity. The three SC Johnson representatives were separated, thereby helping to 
ensure that at least three of the groups would be developing business ideas that would 
be relevant to SC Johnson. We began by introducing a few of the new participants 
unable to attend the prior day, handing out everyone’s contact information and the 
notes from the previous day’s breakout session, reflecting on the key takeaways from 
the breakout, and reviewing the schedule for the day, which included developing a 
shared understanding of what success means to the group and then identifying 
potential building blocks for the businesses.  
As part of the set-up for the first breakout exercise, we asked each group to 
take a few minutes to identify a company that they admired and that they considered to 
be a model of success. The companies identified ranged from small stores in Kibera, 
such as Mama Eddies and Mitumba (used clothing), well-known Kenyan brands such 
as Senator (beer), Mumias Sugar, and Unga corn flour, to large retail outlets such as 
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Nakumatt. As they shared their examples, we wrote up onto a flipchart some of the 
qualities that were admired. Using that as a starting point, we laid out the breakout 
task: “Given that our goal is to create new businesses, what for you would a successful 
business look like? What would its qualities be?” After the groups’ had completed 
their discussions and written up their answers on a flipchart (approximately one hour), 
each of the five groups gave a presentation followed by a question and answer session. 
Once all of the report-backs were completed with each of the five flipcharts taped to 
the wall side-by-side, we noted a number of commonalities across group. We then 
facilitated a discussion about how the information could be valuable in the business 
ideation. The general agreement was that it could serve as criteria for evaluating the 
concepts. We then broke for a lunch catered at CFK’s office. 
After reassembling in CFK’s hall into the pre-formed breakout groups, we set 
up the afternoon breakout exercise by using the metaphor of building a house. We 
noted that the kind of house a person can build depends on the building materials 
he/she has available. Our goal with the breakout exercise was to begin to identify the 
resources possessed by the group, as they would be the building materials out of which 
they would create their business concepts. The breakout exercise was identical to the 
one used in Nyota and asked the groups to identify the talents, unique resources, and 
strengths that they possessed as individuals and as organizations/communities, listing 
each on different color index card. Each breakout team reported back to the full group 
their team resource profile.  We adjourned for the day at the completion of the 
exercise.  
 The third and last day of the workshop began at 9:30 in the morning the next 
day. After everyone settled into their breakout tables, we began by sharing the notes 
from the previous day, including a complete set of resource cards for each table. We 
then taped three flipcharts containing the consolidated success criteria developed the 
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previous day. The 10-point criteria included the following: develops trust with the 
community; builds long-term relationships with the community and other partners; 
generates local employment and income creation; stimulates development of other 
businesses and awakens community to new ideas; empowers employees and business 
owners by increasing the self-reliance of employees and owners through training, 
tools, and technologies; creates products and services that are reliable, effective, 
affordable and meet felt needs; builds unity and cohesiveness with the organization 
and community; generates sufficient profit for investment, growth and expansion; 
protects the environment and assists disadvantaged/ vulnerable groups; enhances 
community welfare and standard of living (e.g. health, education, shelter); builds the 
confidence and self-esteem of its employees/owners. In order to get participants to re-
connect with the success criteria, we asked them to place three colored dots next to the 
success criteria most important to them, noting that they should be sure that their 
business ideas reflected these criteria. 
We then proceeded to the morning breakout exercise, which was almost 
identical to the one used in Nyota with only some slight changes to the wording for 
greater clarity. The breakout task was to create one to two business ideas using the 
resources of the group. In addition to a description of the business idea and the value it 
creates, we asked that each team’s report back specify the key success criteria the 
business addresses, the key resources being used and the role of each partner in the 
business, and the challenges and obstacles they would face in starting the business. 
After an hour and half, the groups reported back their business ideas, followed by 
discussion and questions and suggestions from the full group.  
The business ideas proposed by the three groups containing an SC Johnson 
representative included a “Community Based Cleaning and Waste Management 
Company” which would provide a broad range of cleaning services to Kibera’s homes, 
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including trash collection, insect pest control, furniture and carpet cleaning, and latrine 
cleaning, using SC Johnson products; the “Kibera Creative Marketing & Sales 
Company” which would market and sell products across Kibera, including those of SC 
Johnson; and Kibera Plastics company, which would manufacture and sell to Kibera’s 
residents bricks, poles, water tanks, chairs, and household utensils out of recycled 
plastics collected in the slum. The Community Based Cleaning and Waste 
Management Company was consistent with the idea our team had presented to SC 
Johnson during our mid-term debrief. Oddly, the Kibera Plastics idea had no link to 
SC Johnson’s business. In retrospect, we did not provide sufficient guidance to this 
particular SC Johnson representative, who was a sales-person in the company and had 
not been present at many of the discussions and presentations at the SC Johnson 
Kenya office.   
The ideas developed by the remaining two teams included a retail and 
wholesale “green grocer” that would contract with rural farmers as well as supply 
them with inputs and then sell the products in the urban slums; a soft board 
manufacturing company that would make and sell soft boards from waste paper 
collected in the slums to construction companies and interior decorators; and the 
“Community Intermediate Technological Waste Management Company” which would 
do composting, plastic recycling, fuel production (pellets), fertilizers, and egg trays 
and paper boards.  These ideas clearly reflected the interests of the participants from 
the two technology-based NGOs (i.e., ApproTEC and ITDG) in combination with the 
trash/recycling businesses of the Taka ni Pato youth groups.  
Following a lunch break, the participants returned for the final breakout 
session. As in Nyota, we announced that participants were free to move to a different 
group and pursue the business idea that interested them the most. All participants 
chose to remain in their same breakout groups, which was likely due in part to the (in 
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retrospect) poorly designed manner we structured the decision (it put people on the 
spot and would have seemed like he/she was defecting from his/her group). 
Nonetheless, we outlined the breakout exercise which entailed creating a business plan 
for their chosen business opportunity, identifying the next steps over the course of the 
next year, the goals and targets for the year, the roles and tasks performed by each of 
the partners, and the strategies for addressing the challenges identified during the 
presentations to the full group.  After taking an hour and fifteen minutes for the 
breakout exercise, the five groups presented refined business ideas along with their 
plans and timelines. This was followed by feedback and further discussion by the full 
group.  
In concluding the workshop, we emphasized to the participants, particularly 
those from the Taka ni Pato youth groups, that they had established new and valuable 
contacts and were part of a new community. We noted that, over the course of the 
coming week, we would work with SC Johnson in determining whether the company 
was interested in pursuing any of the business ideas that came out of the workshop. In 
addition, we would create notes for the final day’s workshop and disseminate it to all 
of the participants, as well as make all of the flipcharts and photographs available at 
CFK’s office. This practice (as in Nyota) was our conscious effort to follow the 
Protocol’s prescription for preserving options and retaining knowledge that may be 
valuable at a later time and for other people in the community not in attendance at the 
workshop. As in Nyota, there was a sense of strong optimism and interest among the 
community participants. 
During the remaining week of our time in country, we finalized and delivered 
the reports and notes from the idea generation workshop to both the rural and urban 
participants; created and awarded certificates of participation to all of the community 
members taking part in the workshops; met the community partners in both sites to 
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discuss next steps; and facilitated the transition of project management (for the urban 
business) to the SC Johnson Kenya team.  
The Nyota community participants were informed that the ideas developed, 
while promising, were not ones that fit with SC Johnson’s goals. However, the other 
organizations that participated in the creation of the ideas, including K-Rep, ITDG, 
Egerton University, and ApproTEC, were interested in and willing to support and 
mentor them. Because we had de-emphasized the partnership opportunity with SC 
Johnson in framing the idea generation workshop, the community was not 
disappointed but, instead, eager to move forward. 
For the urban site, we assembled the nine youth groups at CFK’s office. We 
congratulated them that SC Johnson was excited to take the next step in developing 
the idea of the Community Based Cleaning and Waste Management Company. In 
what was an awkward situation, we stated that the other ideas, while interesting and 
potentially valuable, were not as good a fit for SC Johnson. Therefore, those that 
wanted to continue to work with SC Johnson would have to join the Community 
Based Cleaning and Waste Management Company team; those that wanted to pursue 
their original ideas were welcome to do so, but would need to work with the other 
organizations involved in the idea generation workshop (e.g., ApproTEC, ITDG, 
Faulu).  
Having received verbal sign-off on the nine-month development phase 
proposal and budget from SC Johnson, I discussed with CFK the prospect of retaining 
the community liaison (who was a CFK volunteer) for the nine-month period as a full-
time hire of SC Johnson. Despite his youth and relative inexperience, the CFK 
manager and I both felt that he had the trust of the youth group members, had provided 
the team valuable support, and proved responsible. Before departing, I developed a job 
description and discussed the position with the community liaison and got his 
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agreement to the position. We secured a laptop for him, as well as working out an 
arrangement with CFK that allowed him use of their office space and internet 
connection. His formal employment contract with SC Johnson in Kenya would still 
need to be finalized. The CFK program manager in Kenya also pledged to remain 
informally involved and supporting the effort, mentoring the community liaison as 
needed.  
Unfortunately, during the last week of our stay, SC Johnson’s general manager 
for Kenya/East Africa was traveling and unable to be reached. In his absence the 
regional manager responsible for East Africa had agreed to provide 20% of an SC 
Johnson manager’s time on the project. 
At the time of departure, I believed we had successfully piloted Phase I of the 
Protocol, following the process outlined while adapting and re-directing our methods 
as we learned, and generated an outcome (a co-created business concept in the urban 
site) that would enable us to continue onto Phase II of the Protocol. Furthermore, we 
had put into place, in a very short period of time, the foundation for a local transition 
team and project structure that would enable SC Johnson to continue the work without 
significant interruption.  
 
Field Summary: September 2005 – December 2006  
Between September 2005 and March 2006, I continued to serve as a point 
person for the project and the project interface among SC Johnson corporate, SC 
Johnson Kenya, and CFK. However, unlike Phase I, I did not have responsibility for 
daily decision making in the field, as the project had, out of necessity, become an “SC 
Johnson” managed project. I returned to Kenya on two occasions, both times for two 
and half weeks. The first field visit was in November 2005, and the second trip was in 
March 2006. Between March 2006 and December 2006 my influence and direct 
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involvement in the field work decreased further due to my primary focus shifting to 
the management of the DuPont/Solae Protocol project in India (we launched the in-
field Phase I activities at the end of March 2006). To help maintain continuity for the 
project, I involved another Cornell PhD student colleague (who had been engaged in 
the initial BOP Protocol workshop and part of the group of authors of the 1st Edition) 
who could play a more regular advisor role. This PhD student traveled with me to 
Kenya in March 2006 to meet the field teams and the communitiesas part of the 
transition. Furthermore, the Cornell MBA student involved in the Phase I pilot project 
had accepted a position with SC Johnson to oversee and lead the company’s BOP 
initiatives and would be joining the company in August 2006 following graduation. 
He too re-engaged the project during the Spring of 2006 in order to stay current with 
the work on the ground. I returned to Kenya again in December 2006 for another two 
weeks to assess the project. The following summary is, therefore, divided into three 
time periods centered on these three field visits.   
 For all intents and purposes, the challenges confronted and the activities 
undertaken during this year and half period entered territory far outside the 
prescriptions of Phases II and III of the BoP Protocol. At a high-level, the project was 
tracking the Protocol’s underlying structure of moving from a co-created business 
concept onto pilot tests and a business plan and concluding with the launch and 
evolution of the business to sustainability. Some of our activities were variations of 
those mentioned in Phases II and III of the Protocol (please see the models below), 
such as training and capability development, small-scale pilots, and development of a 
governance structure. As it turned out, however, it was this underlying process to the 
Protocol (concept => pilot test and business plan => business launch and evolution to 
sustainability) that was fundamentally flawed.  
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BOP Protocol: Phases II and III 
 
FIGURE 5: BOP Protocol Phases II and III 
The period August 2005 until November 2005 was dominated by two main 
issues: in-country project management capacity and group cohesion. Shortly after I 
returned to the US in August 2005, the SC Johnson’s general manager for Kenya/East 
Africa returned to Nairobi and received word regarding the continuation of the urban 
project and the need to allocate local management time to it. We discussed over the 
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phone (despite enormous connection difficulties) the objective of the nine-month 
development phase and the kind of management attention it required. Both the general 
manager and I agreed that the best person to take on this responsibility was the 
manager of operations, who had participated in both the urban and rural idea 
generation workshops (also, he was in the breakout team that developed the concept of 
the Community Based Cleaning and Waste Management Company) and was very 
gifted at communicating and working with the youth. We also discussed the budget, 
including the agreement to hire the community liaison, supply test product, and some 
marketing/operational funds. The full-time community liaison was to be the main 
driver of the project and report to me and the SC Johnson manager.   
 Apart from the difficulty of formally hiring the community liaison onto SC 
Johnson’s Kenya payroll due to the company’s global hiring standards and practices, 
the capacity of this two-person field team was quickly overwhelmed. First and 
foremost, the community liaison was unable to perform the kinds of tasks needed to 
function in what amounted to a project lead role, such as developing action plans, 
coordinating and mobilizing work on the ground, and reporting back to SC Johnson 
and me. From the US, I tried to work closely and mentor the community liaison, 
designing the first three-month action plan with him via email, as phone connections 
were extremely poor. However, the time zone difference, the community liaison’s lack 
of computer skills, and the intermittent availability of internet access extended the 
process to several weeks and required me to essentially develop the work plan. The SC 
Johnson operation’s manager, who only had half a day a week of his time assigned to 
the project, was unable to delegate basic managerial tasks to the community liaison. 
Over the course of two months, little forward progress was made on the business 
concept, creating anxiety for the SC Johnson manager in charge, as the project was 
under the oversight of a senior vice president of the company.   
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 To jump-start the process, the SC Johnson manager turned to the social 
entrepreneur who was involved in the idea generation workshop and convinced him to 
come on board the project. Working under a “gentleman’s agreement,” the social 
entrepreneur (who had a master’s degree in management science) began an extensive 
marketing research effort to assess current insect control measures used in the slums 
(one of the proposed offerings of the business). The social entrepreneur developed an 
in-depth market research plan that involved designing a questionnaire, pre-testing the 
questionnaire, training the youth groups involved in the business to collect data, 
surveying approximately 600 people in each of the three slums, and then evaluating 
the data using regression studies. Because the SC Johnson manager had extremely 
limited time to devote to the project, the social entrepreneur became the de facto 
leader of the project on the ground and began to proceed with the market research 
plan.  
 I returned to Kenya in November 2005 to evaluate the project’s progress and to 
address the capacity issue. Upon arriving, I met with SC Johnson’s general manager 
and the operation’s manager to discuss the team’s capacity. We decided to hire the 
social entrepreneur as a project field lead on a half-time basis, while shifting the 
community liaison into a support role. I drafted revised job descriptions for each. In 
addition, an entry-level SC Johnson intern recently hired by the Kenya office would 
allocate half of his time to the project starting the first of the year (2006). The social 
entrepreneur, the SC Johnson intern, and the community liaison would, therefore, 
become a three-person field team led by the social entrepreneur.  
Lastly, we arranged for CFK to assume a more active project leadership role, 
including daily oversight of the community liaison, as well as to assume many of the 
project administrative functions (e.g., accounting and financial oversight, holding the 
employment contracts for the community liaison and the social entrepreneur) which 
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proved difficult to reconcile in an expedient manner within SC Johnson’s 
administrative structures. CFK’s program manager and SC Johnson’s operations 
manager became a two-person management team for the project. We secured approval 
for the budget increase from SC Johnson’s vice president for sustainability.  
 After discussing the capacity issue, I turned my attention to understanding 
what was happening on the ground. I met with all of the youth groups to assess their 
state of mind, along with CFK’s staff members who worked with the youth groups on 
the Taka ni Pato project. I also debriefed with CFK’s program manager, the social 
entrepreneur, and the community liaison. What quickly became clear was that there 
was no shared understanding of what the partnership with SC Johnson entailed and 
what everyone’s role was in moving the business forward. Exacerbating this was the 
absence of consistent communication among the youth groups, the field team, and the 
management team.  
This lack of clarity was certainly attributable, in part, to the lack of capacity. 
For example, in an effort to get the project moving, the social entrepreneur had 
launched the market research effort in the Mathare slum where he had previous 
experience through a different project. The SC Johnson operations manager had 
conducted some general training in the company’s product lines with this same group. 
Yet none of the other youth groups in the other slums were aware of the research or 
the training, nor clear about what was happening, if anything, to advance the business. 
But the lack of clarity and shared understanding of the project’s forward path was also 
attributable to the fact that, outside of my and the Protocol team’s conveyance to the 
youth groups that SC Johnson was interested in pursuing the one business idea, there 
had never been a formal, organized discussion with SC Johnson and all of the youth 
groups that “sealed the deal” and set out a vision and path for the future. There were 
so many people and organizations interfacing with the project (not to mention that our 
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BOP Protocol team was “mediating” SC Johnson’s relationship to the community) 
that the community partners lost sight of the fact that they were co-creation partners 
with SC Johnson, with everyone else acting as facilitators of that relationship.  
 I regrouped with the SC Johnson manager and the CFK program manager to 
discuss the issue of how to re-align everyone before further actions were taken. I 
proposed, designed, and helped facilitate a “Launching the Partnership” workshop 
during my field visit. The workshop was designed to reinforce the close partnership 
between SC Johnson and the youth groups and to create a sense of shared purpose and 
unity between them. To begin to move forward as business partners, it was noted to 
the youth groups, it was imperative that there be a shared set of core values and 
principles that would serve as a foundation for working together.  
The workshop, which was attended by SC Johnson’s general manager as well 
as the operations manager in charge of the project, focused on creating a shared vision 
and value statement by the two partners. The workshop began by having the youth 
groups translate SC Johnson’s corporate credo (titled “This We Believe”) into Swahili 
and the local “sheng” dialect. This approach, which is consistent with a PRA logic, 
enabled the youth groups to “take ownership” of SC Johnson’s credo and to internalize 
its meaning far more than had SC Johnson simply read it aloud or translated it for the 
youth (while everyone spoke English, there was a much greater ability to express 
nuance in the local language of Swahili). After translating SC Johnson’s credo, each 
youth groups created individual posters that shared their core values. A team of four 
people were then asked to come together the next day to create a consolidated values 
statement for the Community Based Cleaning and Waste Management Company. 
 The second core activity taken to re-align all of the partners was to develop 
and agree on a three-month plan of action. The plan of action consisted of three main 
areas of activity that included youth group training, the creation of a business identity, 
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and business piloting testing and launch. Youth group training focused on creating a 
baseline understanding among all of the youth groups about SC Johnson’s product 
lines (including those of competitors), including such things as active ingredients, 
proper use and handling, and general knowledge regarding insect pests and the 
chemistry behind cleaning products. In addition to ensuring that the products were 
being used properly and effectively, it was agreed that the youth groups would have to 
have a strong understanding of the products in order to effectively engage potential 
customers. The CFK program manager also raised concern about the youth groups’ 
broader organizational capacity to manage a business and, in particular, the inflow of 
money and inventory that would come with the project. We decided that, before 
introducing the youth groups to the challenges of starting a business and the 
temptations presented by money and resources—issues that in previous CFK projects 
had torn groups apart—that there needed to be an assessment of each group’s current 
capacity followed by the necessary training to ensure that a baseline capacity existed 
in each of the nine groups.  
The second set of workplan activities focused on building a business identity 
that included a common marketing message and marketing/branding materials. 
Developing a common marketing message entailed creating the proverbial “elevator 
speech” about the partnership and the business intent: Who is Community-Based 
Cleaning and Waste Management? Who is SC Johnson and Taka ni Pato and how are 
they related to this business? What is our business trying to do? What 
products/services do we offer? In addition to ensuring that initial engagements with 
customers would present a consistent, accurate and professional brand image, the 
process of developing and practicing a common pitch would help build the youth’s 
confidence and professionalism. The focus on marketing/branding materials—such as 
flyers, uniforms (jumpsuit, t-shirts, caps), logo, and business cards—would help 
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motivate and build a sense of unity among the nine youth groups spread across the 
three slums, in addition to enhancing credibility with customers.   
The third part of the business plan was focused on testing and refining the 
business model to the point that it was ready for a formal launch. In the workplan, we 
viewed business development as an iterative process that would begin by translating 
baseline market research into an initial business model and product offering, then 
testing out the offering in the market for a set period of time, followed by feedback 
from customers, and ultimately revising the offering and business model based on the 
feedback. The process would repeat itself until the right value proposition and 
business model were isolated. At that point, a formal business launch would occur. 
The purpose of the launch would be to generate broad awareness in the community 
about the business by using public events and high-profile community-based 
marketing approaches, including street theatre (which some of the youth groups had 
used in their social campaigns regarding HIV Aids). 
Between the time of my departure in November 2005 and my return in mid 
March 2006, I communicated regularly (via email and, occasionally phone) with the 
two person management team on the ground that consisted of the SC Johnson 
operations manager and CFK’s program manager. I also received monthly status 
reports from the field team that consisted of the social entrepreneur, the community 
liaison, and the SC Johnson intern who joined the project in January 2006. It is worth 
re-stating that in January 2006 I assumed the role of project manager for the 
DuPont/Solae Protocol project in India. Between January 2006 and March 2006, I was 
juggling the management and execution of the Solae pre-field work—which included 
site selection, partner selection, team recruitment and training, and work plan 
development—with coaching and advising the SC Johnson Kenya project.  
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Between my November 2005 and March 2006 field visits to Kenya, the 
increased human resource capacity resulted in an acceleration of activity on the 
ground. The attempt to re-position the community liaison into a support role, 
unfortunately, was not successful. The documentation and coordination demands 
continued to outstrip the liaison’s capacity. Starting January 1, 2006, CFK’s program 
manager for Taka ni Pato, an experienced social worker, replaced the community 
liaison, thereby adding further to the groups’ capacity.  
Progress was made in all three of the areas outlined in the work plan. Based on 
assessments of the nine groups by the field team and the youth groups’ own input, the 
team decided to conduct training workshops on basic accounting and book keeping, 
marketing, customer management, and product introduction and accreditation. The 
local SC Johnson accountant conducted the accounting and book keeping training at 
SC Johnson’s office in Nairobi, bringing together three representatives from each of 
the youth groups. Marketing training, which focused on the four P’s of marketing, was 
conducted in CFK’s office by SC Johnson’s operations manager. Five representatives 
from each of the groups attended. Customer management training was conducted by 
the social entrepreneur at CFK’s offices. SC Johnson’s operations manager led 
workshops on SC Johnson’s product line. A follow-up “accreditation workshop” 
tested the youth on their knowledge.   
The baseline marketing survey was completed in the two of the slums (Kibera 
and Mathare) by the youth groups under the guidance and direction of the field team 
(in particular the social entrepreneur, who had training in conducting surveys). The 
process involved an initial field reconnaissance to understand who the survey should 
target. A baseline mapping exercise was done to chart out the areas in which the 
survey would be conducted. The social entrepreneur then trained the group in how to 
administer a questionnaire. The field team together with the youth groups developed a 
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draft questionnaire, which was pre-tested by the groups. The revised survey was 
conducted with several hundred respondents in both communities. The survey 
collected data on the kinds and quantities of insect control products used, methods 
used to control insect pests, and the attitude of the community towards the youth 
groups. The survey sampled small shopkeepers in the slums, in addition to 
households.  
The work to begin developing a business identity in January 2006 brought to 
the forefront a central question: how were the nine distinct youth groups, each with 
varying levels of organizational development and even interests (despite their common 
involvement in Taka ni Pato) to be brought together into a single business structure? 
Who, exactly, was the organization that SC Johnson was partnering with? The 
ultimate resolution of this issue emerged from the findings of the group assessments 
conducted in November and December 2005. At that time, the field team noted the 
nine groups ranged considerably in their degree of organizational capacity and group 
leadership. On one extreme, one of the youth groups operated a successful car wash 
business along with its trash collection and composting activities, generating stable 
money for all group members. The group had an office space in the slum, branded 
uniforms, and a strong book keeping systems (which the SC Johnson accountant 
highlighted and used as a template for the other groups in the accounting training 
session). On the other extreme, another group had no office, no uniforms, and no 
successful revenue generating activities; the members came together informally with 
most of their time together focused on play writing and theatre performance.  
The field team and project management team decided that the youth groups 
should be brought together into a federation with each group represented equally. This 
would create a single interface for SC Johnson while ensuring that the individual 
youth groups would all be strengthened. The youth groups all agreed to this approach, 
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one that would entail harmonizing their organizational structures and building baseline 
leadership capacity in each. The federation was named “The Coalition of Young 
Entrepreneurs” (CYE). It was envisioned that the Community-Based Cleaning and 
Waste Management Business would be the first of many future business partnerships 
that CYE would form with companies other than SC Johnson. I strongly supported the 
decision, as it seemed to expand the opportunities for people to be involved in the 
business, thereby better diffusing entrepreneurship capacity in the community. The 
groups began working on a formal organizational structure for CYE. In addition, work 
began on developing logos and promotional materials for both CYE and the cleaning 
business, which led to re-naming the business “Community Cleaning Services” (CCS) 
in an effort to simplify and sharpen the message to consumers.  
When I arrived in March 2006 for a 2-week assessment, I followed the same 
general schedule as in my previous visit: I began with an initial debrief with the 
project management team at SC Johnson, followed by debriefs with field team 
members individually, and then debriefs with each of the youth groups. We then held 
a full team meeting that included the project team, the field team and the SC Johnson 
general manager to discuss issues, challenges, and the path forward. Additionally, 
during the second week of my visit, a two-person Cornell student team participating in 
a practicum project on the SC Johnson BoP protocol business joined me in the field, as 
did the Cornell PhD student I was transitioning into a more direct role given my 
involvement in the DuPont/Solae project. The two person student practicum team, 
which was composed of a first-year MBA student and a third-year PhD student in 
applied economics, was asked by SC Johnson to help define and quantify the business 
potential of CCS. 
I noted three interrelated issues during my initial assessment: a drift in strategy, 
an inability to systematize an initial product offering, mounting impatience among the 
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youth groups. The strategy drift had occurred on both a process and a business model 
level. At a process level, rather than working as equal partners in co-creating the 
business, the SC Johnson team had shifted into a facilitation role to the youth groups. 
In other words, the SC Johnson team did not take responsibility for and ownership of 
the new business being created; rather, they saw their responsibility as one of 
capacitating the youth groups to create the business. I will explore the implications of 
this further below. 
I think the SC Johnson team shifted into a facilitation role for several reasons. 
First and foremost, the concept of co-creation was unique and one that we had only 
begun to explore during Phase I. Furthermore, once I disengaged from daily project 
management, I was more fearful that SC Johnson would fall into a “business as usual” 
approach and move quickly to drive sales growth; for that reason, I emphasized the 
importance that the project was one of developing a new business organization and 
capacitating the youth groups to manage the business independently. SC Johnson’s 
hesitancy to act as a driver of the business reflected, I believe, a genuine attentiveness 
to and concern for over-imposing and disempowering the youth groups. Lastly, CFK 
had assumed an important role in the project, both at a field and management level. 
CFK as an institution is focused on capacity building through facilitation. As the 
program manager stated to me, CFK’s objective is to obsolete itself from oversight 
and management of projects. The CFK managers involved in the CCS business were 
simply doing what they did best. 
One consequence of assuming a facilitator role was that SC Johnson 
disempowered itself from shaping and directing the business in a manner that reflected 
its needs and interests, as well as in the business interests of CCS. For example, I 
learned upon arriving that one of the strong, better organized youth groups was 
attempting to offer insect control services using RAID to wealthier neighborhoods 
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around Kibera and even selling cans of RAID at prices that undercut the retail dealers. 
SC Johnson was conflicted on how to address this, as they felt it was inappropriate to 
dictate to the youth groups how to manage their CCS business. Ironically, there was 
agreement among the project and field managers that these kinds of actions were not 
only detrimental to SC Johnson, but also to the prospects of CCS. As a business, CCS 
had absolutely no competitive advantage (nor credibility) selling readily available 
consumer products to the wealthier demographic. Yet, by acting and framing their role 
as facilitators, SC Johnson’s team de-legitimized their right to say “yes” and “no” to 
the actions of CCS.  
The second consequence of the shift to a facilitator role was to essentially put 
the onus of business development onto youth groups that lacked experience and 
understanding of business management and entrepreneurship. Nothing in the youth 
groups’ experience had prepared them for envisioning the path to transform a business 
concept into a viable business, not to mention doing so within the complex 
organizational structure of a federation. The field team certainly provided general 
guidance and coaching and motivated the youth groups to take action; but they felt it 
inappropriate to prescribe and dictate actions. Forward progress on the business was 
proceeding very slowly. Coupled with the intent to ensure all youth groups progressed 
and developed, the youth most energized to lead and drive the process were feeling 
held back.  
Strategic drift also had occurred at the level of the business concept itself. The 
initial business concept was essentially providing “home-health” and “home-beauty” 
cleaning services direct-to-the home in the slums using SC Johnson’s wide range of 
applicable products (e.g., insecticides, air fresheners, surfactants for glass and 
ceramics, wood polish). The business would promote the SC Johnson brand, rather 
than individual product brands, in order to build a strong association between SC 
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Johnson the company and the slum communities (an issue I felt was critical for 
preventing competitors from entering which was of great concern to SC Johnson). 
This approach would also create the opportunity to add additional services to CCS’s 
offering at a later date using SC Johnson products currently not available in East 
Africa. In March 2006, the focus of the youth groups and the field teams was 
exclusively on insecticides, with initial mock-ups of marketing materials highlighting 
RAID and BAYGON (SC Johnson’s insecticides in East Africa).  
I believed the shift in the business concept in the field team’s mind was largely 
a function of churn—the SC Johnson intern and the CFK community lead both joined 
in January. The lack of alignment among the youth groups, however, was likely a 
carry-over effect from the manner we structured ideation, where separate groups 
developed distinct ideas. The CCS idea that was ultimately “chosen” was only well 
known to five members of the breakout group that created it (and even for them at a 
very high, abstract level, given that they created the idea within a day’s time). Apart 
from the flipcharts and descriptions this group had developed during the final day of 
the idea generation workshop, there were no other written descriptions or models of 
the business, nor efforts to solidify a shared understanding of the business concept 
once other group members signed on. It is also worth recalling that the business 
concept was something for which there was no analogue or existing example in the 
community. In retrospect, the majority of the youth groups involved probably had 
little idea or understanding of what business they were actually pursuing. 
The other challenge the team and youth groups struggled to overcome was that 
of systematizing an initial product offering in order to start the iteration of small-scale 
pilots. As noted above, when I arrived, the field team and youth groups were narrowly 
focused on providing insect extermination services. Yet even within that narrow 
framing of the business concept the field team and youth groups struggled to figure 
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out how to start and what to do. There had been no thought and effort put into 
formalizing and routinizing the service. There were, admittedly, issues that 
complicated development of the service, most notable among them being the product 
configuration of SC Johnson’s aerosols. The aerosol cans, which were designed for 
casual home use where metering the amount of spray used was of minimal concern, 
were a poor fit for a service business in which the amount of product applied affected 
costs significantly. For example, the youth had been practicing spraying the 
insecticides in the homes of their friends, family, and neighbors. The records they kept 
regarding the amount of product used per home by different groups varied by a factor 
of three. Creating a consistent spray routine that enabled the field team and youth 
groups to track costs and determine pricing became more complicated than had bulk 
product been available.   
Apart from these challenges, there was a mounting impatience among the 
youth groups to “start selling.” Part of this impatience stemmed from the fact that the 
youth groups had been involved in the project for almost eight months and had yet to 
receive any income. They had been advancing the work based on their sweat equity, 
something that I had emphasized from the project’s inception to ensure true 
commitment from the participating community members. Recognizing this, the SC 
Johnson general manager for East Africa arranged for the youth groups to re-package 
product that had been damaged in transit, a service for which they were paid.  
Impatience was also fueled by the initial business planning process itself. Following 
the market research and the accounting training, each youth group had been asked to 
forecast its sales and profits over the next few years. Perhaps expectedly, the forecasts 
were very aggressive, with thousands of dollars of profits coming to each of the youth 
groups. Lastly, the sense of impatience and urgency to “start selling” was also a result 
of the lack of shared vision of what the business idea actually was, coupled with the 
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office-based workshops and trainings. Starting sales and getting out into the 
community would make the business feel real to the youth. 
 Prior to my departure, we discussed these issues in a full team debrief. The key 
next steps to be taken before the business launch included shifting the business’s focus 
to a broader orientation on home cleaning, systematizing a cleaning routine (including 
how much product should be sprayed), finalizing costs and pricing, and developing 
and practicing sales scripts. CYE and CCS would also be formalized as legal entities. 
Developing the routines by practicing the service “out in the field” (i.e., providing a 
“test cleaning” to a school) would also address the issue of impatience and shared 
vision. 
 
April 2006 – Dec 2006 
Due to my work on the DuPont/Solae project in India, my ability to remain 
closely involved in the SC Johnson project decreased sharply. Between April 2006 and 
August 2006, I was intermittently in contact with the SC Johnson project and field 
teams, as I was in India leading the Phase I of the DuPont/Solae Protocol project in 
India during that time period. Upon returning from India in July 2006, my primary 
focus and contractual responsibilities until Spring 2007 continued to be to the 
DuPont/Solae project. With SC Johnson’s hiring of the Cornell MBA involved in 
Phase I of the project to lead the company’s BOP efforts and with my Cornell PhD 
colleague playing a more active advising role, my involvement in the SC Johnson 
project for the remainder of 2006 was in the form of advisor to these two individuals. I 
returned to Nairobi for two weeks in December with these two individuals to assess 
the project and provide my insights. 
During April and May of 2006, the field team and the youth groups continued 
work to develop an initial service offering, though with little progress. Instead, the 
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youth group’s central focus turned to the issue of CYE’s governance structure. In 
order to legally register CYE, the organization needed to submit by-laws that detailed 
decision-making authority and ownership. A lengthy process ensued that resulted in 
political posturing within and between the nine groups, as the federated structure 
required having a board consisting of representatives from each of the youth groups in 
addition to a leadership structure for the board. Discussions also ensued regarding how 
revenues generated by one of the youth groups through the CCS business would be 
split among the other members of the youth groups as well as with all of the youth 
groups involved in CYE.  
It is important to note that within each youth group, only a few of the dozen or 
so members were actively involved in CYE and CCS; however, because the youth 
group was the entity involved in the CCS business, the entire group membership 
would vote on issues pertaining to CCS. Meetings and elections and politicking 
regarding profit distribution and term-lengths of leadership positions dominated 
everyone’s attention. In retrospect, the leadership vacuum and slow forward progress 
created by SC Johnson’s adoption of a facilitator role vis-à-vis the business together 
with the office-based workshops that did not get the youth actively working in the 
field to develop the business created the conditions for this diversion.  
Because of the difficulty the field team and the youth groups were 
experiencing with getting beyond the growing impasse for registering CYE and 
systematizing an initial service offering, we (using funds from the BOP Protocol 
Initiative) hired the third-year PhD student involved in the practicum (whose research 
was on bed net usage in East Africa) to return to Nairobi for the summer of 2006 to 
assist. Over the course of the summer, this person worked with the field team with the 
goal of formally launching the business before summer’s end.  
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Between June and August, elections were held in each of the nine youth groups 
to elect representatives to CYE’s board. A CYE election was also held to elect the 
chairman of the board. CYE was formally registered. In terms of the business identity, 
logos were finalized for both CYE and CCS. Uniforms (jumpsuits) and t-shirts were 
created with these logos. Additional field-based exercises were done (in the homes and 
family of the youth groups) to systematize insect spraying and cleaning services. An 
SC Johnson employee in the company’s R&D division (in entomology) in Racine, WI 
was connected up to the field team and the youth groups to help guide the groups in 
providing an integrated pest control service effective in dealing with the nature of the 
insect infestation in the slums. The field team and youth groups outlined three initial 
cleaning service offerings of increasing scope and price. The offerings included 
combinations of spraying for insects, trash removal and home cleaning, cleaning of 
solid surfaces, latrine cleaning, and rug cleaning among others.  
In July, high-profile business launches were conducted in each of the three 
slums. The launches entailed a procession through the heart of the slum with puppets 
and music and CCS members wearing their uniforms and t-shirts. At the end of the 
procession, music and skits were performed to involve the gathered crowds. The 
brochures explaining the business were handed out. Over the course of the next two 
weeks, with energy and excitement at a high among the group with the business 
formally started, the CCS youth groups went door to door in their respective 
neighborhoods in search of customers. To the dismay of everyone, the CCS 
representatives not only were unable to find paying customers, but essentially had the 
door closed in their faces as they went from home to home. After going two weeks 
with almost no customer interest, morale plunged and the number of committed 
members to the CCS business fell dramatically. Those that had successful trash and 
recycling-related income generation activities stemming from Taka ni Pato re-focused 
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their attention back on those efforts. Significant turnover occurred within CYE and 
CCS (some of which was also due to members leaving for college or taking a job).  
The initial assessment was that building interest and awareness for the business 
would take time and persistent marketing. Also, many of the CCS members were 
young men, and the women answering the door during the day were skeptical of them 
– not a single business in the slums provided direct-to-home services slum, much less 
a “cleaning service.”  
To help build the sales and marketing skills of the youth groups, the field team 
decided to focus their efforts on one group at a time. Working across three slums, in 
addition to addressing the idiosyncratic organizational issues and leadership gaps 
within each of the nine groups, diluted the team’s effectiveness. Between November 
and my arrival in December 2006, the field team worked intensively on marketing and 
business management for a full two to three weeks with a single youth group before 
proceeding to the next group. The team started with the stronger groups in the hopes 
of demonstrating short-term success and re-building momentum. The other groups 
continued to work largely on their own, with short status check-ups by the field team 
several times a week to maintain communication.  
When working with a group, the field team would conduct joint sales calls, 
help develop daily sales routines, identify potential revenue opportunities (e.g., carpet 
cleaning), and discuss branding and marketing strategies. The three-tiered offering that 
outlined the CCS service was essentially shelved, and each group was pursuing 
different opportunities in its neighborhood. During this time, the newly-hired MBA 
graduate had assumed his position at SC Johnson to oversee the company’s BOP 
work, including the CCS business. He was based in the company’s UK headquarters 
and traveled to Nairobi every couple of months.  
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When I arrived in December 2006, the field team had experienced some 
success with the focused strategy: two of the youth groups on which they had 
concentrated their energy were consistently going out on sales calls and periodically 
turning up new needs—such as rug cleaning (many of the Muslim homes in the slums 
had rugs), furniture polishing, and even rodent control—and then attempting to 
generate business around those needs. In this regard, the team was following the 
iterative pilot testing model we had outlined in the work plan in November 2005. 
Occasionally, customers were identified through this process; but revenues and 
particularly repeat customers failed to grow in proportion to the added effort. Without 
the motivation of sustained, much less growing, income, the “bump” in the youth 
group’s intensity and marketing activities would begin to erode once the intensive 
support and intervention of the field team shifted to another group.  
In addition to this overarching dynamic, the other main issue that I noted 
following debriefs and visits with the field team and a number of the youth groups was 
the continued positioning of SC Johnson as either a facilitator or supplier to CCS, 
rather than an equal business partner with joint responsibility for the development of 
CCS. For example, one of the youth groups that had recently been the focus of the 
field team’s attention was recommending that CCS calendars be created and handed 
out as a marketing tool. The response from SC Johnson was that the youth group 
needed to present the equivalent of a business proposal to SC Johnson that outlined 
how the costs of the calendars would be recouped through sales. While the intention of 
the SC Johnson lead was to empower the youth group and instill disciplined business 
thinking, the onus on developing the business, again, rested invariably on the 
shoulders of the youth groups, a responsibility they were ill-equipped to take on 
(again, the field team was working intensively with the groups, though on building the 
capacity and capability of the youth groups to lead and run the business). The sense of 
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frustration stemming from this was palpable in this particular youth group. Ironically, 
this approach was also steering the business into areas that would not generate revenue 
or value for SC Johnson: SC Johnson had no products related to carpet cleaning and 
rodent control, though those were the business opportunities that were highlighted and 
being actively pursued by the youth groups following the intensive intervention by the 
field team.   
On a second occasion, when I asked one of the new CCS members that had 
recently joined the business and become a strong leader of one of the youth groups 
how he described to potential customers SC Johnsons’ role in CCS, he responded that 
SC Johnson provided CCS with the products it uses. In talking more with this person, 
he was largely unaware of the past year of effort on behalf of SC Johnson to create 
CCS. Coupled with CCS’s diversification into service lines for which SC Johnson did 
not have relevant products, CCS was morphing into a business that provided little 
discernible value to SC Johnson from either revenue or branding perspectives.  
The December 2006 visit to Nairobi turned out to be my last. My engagement 
and support of the Protocol project there remained limited, as the SC Johnson BOP 
lead assumed full responsibilities for guiding the project. While the project continues 
today, little remains the same. CCS is no longer a project of CYE, nor does it involve 
the Taka ni Pato youth groups. Rather, it is an entity managed by a two-person SC 
Johnson field team that supports independent micro-entrepreneurs that number 
approximately 30. The CCS business today is focused strictly on latrine cleaning using 
SC Johnson’s toilet duck product, a service niche that was surfaced in Mathare during 
2007 and for which there remained sufficient demand to sustain a small group of 
dedicated youth group members. CCS entrepreneurs operate in Mathare and have 
expanded to four new slums; no operations exist in Kibera or Tuff Gong.  
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Because the DuPont/Solae project lagged the SC Johnson project by 
approximately nine months, I was afforded the luxury of “a second chance” and able 
to adapt the Protocol based on the learnings and experiences in Kenya. The core 
insights and theoretical developments I outline in Chapters 7 and 8 only came about 







SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT III 
SOLAE BOP PROTOCOL PROJECT, INDIA  
 
This chapter describes my involvement over a period of three-years in a second 
BOP Protocol project. This project was launched in India by The Solae Company, a 
subsidiary of DuPont. This project constituted the third and final Solution 
Development activity of my action research.  
 
DuPont/Solae BOP Protocol, India 
Background  
Based on SC Johnson’s initial Phase I success in co-creating a business 
concept, the Solae Company, a majority-owned joint venture of DuPont, launched a 
BOP Protocol project in a rural village and urban slum in India in 2006. DuPont, as 
noted earlier, was one of the four corporate sponsors of the BOP Protocol Initiative. 
The Solae Company, which is headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, is a business-to-
business company that produces a range of soy ingredients—such as such protein 
isolate, soy lecithin, and soy protein concentrates—used by food manufacturers. Solae 
employs about 2,700 people in manufacturing operations in the USA, Brazil, 
Denmark, France and the PRC and generates revenues of approximately $1 billion. 
The company’s Indian office, which is headquartered Delhi, was established in the 
1980s. Despite India’s population and the prevalence of vegetarianism (soy protein is 
the only non-animal source for the eight essential amino acids that comprise protein), 
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Solae had minimal success in India; 2006 India sales for Solae were approximately $5 
million.  
Whereas the SC Johnson project was driven out of the company’s corporate 
sustainability office and championed by the company’s Vice-President for Global 
Environmental Affairs, the Solae project was a business development initiative 
championed by the President of the company and driven (initially) by Solae’s Director 
of Global Accounts. Solae’s interest and investment in serving the BOP demographic 
was in response to a call to action by DuPont’s then CEO for the company’s various 
business units to explore BOP opportunities as a source of growth.   
 Prior to the BOP Protocol initiative, Solae had attempted to reach Latin 
America’s low-income segment by creating a low-cost soy protein product that could 
be added into ground meat to serve as a “meat extender.” While the product succeeded 
in generating sales, the consumer base that Solae reached through this lower-cost 
product was of a decidedly higher income level than that of the Base of the Pyramid 
demographic. The failure of this venture to reach the BOP consumer segment 
bolstered Solae’s interest in the BOP Protocol and, at least in the mind of Solae’s 
President, signaled the need for a business model and approach that was radically 
different from the company’s core processes and models.  
As noted in the prior chapter, because the Solae project lagged the work in 
Kenya by approximately four months, my and colleagues’ work was informed by a 
number of the learnings that continued to emerge from Kenya. However, because of 
the short time between concluding Phase I in Kenya and starting intensive pre-field 
work for the Solae India project (and the ongoing management focus in Kenya), there 
was no time to fully flesh out the learnings and to re-write the Protocol. Rather, I and 
my project partners simply translated the learnings from Kenya “on the fly,” 
implementing them directly into our actions plans for India. Not having a revised and 
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up-to-date document for the Protocol process to share with Solae and with the field 
team and project partners on the ground in India made considerably difficult the task 
of creating and maintaining alignment as to the project purpose and approach. The 
revised, 2nd Edition of the BOP Protocol was not completed until December 2007 – 
two years after the Solae India project began.  
Lastly, an important difference with the Solae project that I noted in Chapter 4 
was the nature of my relationship with Solae. For the pre-field phase, Phase I, and the 
first half of Phase II, Solae hired me and other members of the BOP Protocol initiative 
as project consultants. Our role was to direct, manage, and execute the Protocol 
process and to ensure a smooth hand-off to a Solae management team; our deliverable 
to Solae in the contract was a co-created business model for each of two project sites. 
Post hand-off, I was contracted to play an ongoing coaching role to Solae leadership. 
Working under a consulting arrangement where the deliverable was the creation of a 
viable BOP business for Solae meant that my research objectives (including 
documentation) had to be embedded within my consulting work. Reports and debriefs 
to management became my field notes. Integrating and testing out new theories had to 
be presented and accomplished in a manner that made business sense to Solae’s 
management and advanced the work on the ground. These operating conditions forced 
my research to maintain a strong grounding in management realities and practice. 
 
Project Overview  
Solae learned about the SC Johnson BOP Protocol pilot project in a September 
2005 meeting of the Base of the Pyramid Learning Laboratory at Cornell University, 
less than two months after my team’s return from Kenya. At the meeting, which was 
attended by representatives of Solae, I and team-mates presented the experience and 
learnings from the pilot. Over the next two months, while I was attempting to manage 
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and guide the Kenya effort from a distance, I led the development of a proposal to 
Solae to manage and lead a Protocol project in India similar to what was done in 
Kenya. It is important to note that, at the time of writing that proposal, our key 
learnings from Kenya regarding business and market co-creation had not yet occurred. 
Our primary insights were in terms of initial project set-up (e.g., partner, team, and site 
selection), effective community recruitment and idea co-creation (e.g., participatory 
entrepreneurship development), and ensuring continuity into Phase II of the Protocol.  
We secured Solae’s approval at the end of November 2005 for a nine-month 
project that entailed Phase I pre-field and in-field activities leading to the co-creation 
of business ideas. I was the project director and would, as in Kenya, serve as the 
overall project manager and lead in the field. In that capacity, I worked closely with 
Solae’s corporate lead to recruit an all-Indian field team, identify and select local 
partners, and select community sites. The project was launched in both a rural village 
and an urban slum community in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Two adjacent villages in 
Parvathagiri Mandal in the district of Warangal constituted our rural project site; the 
urban site was in the slum of Rasul Pura in the city of Hyderabad. The sites were 
separated by a distance of approximately three and a half hours. Over the course of 
this contract period, I traveled to India on two occasions; the first visit consisted of a 
two-week scoping visit in January 2006, and the second consisted of the core twelve-
weeks of field work from April to July 2006.   
The in-field work of Phase I, which was restructured based on learnings from 
Kenya, resulted in the successful co-creation of business concepts in both sites. I 
returned home to the US in July 2006 to further refine the business concepts in 
preparation for a debrief meeting with Solae’s President and top management team in 
St Louis in August 2006. At the meeting, the project was given a green light to 
continue. To create a corporate “home” for the company’s BOP efforts that could 
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provide the necessary enabling environment, the President revealed his plan to create a 
new platform in the company called “Nutrition for Sustainable Development” 
(NFSD). The platform was to be headed by a manager in charge of the company’s 
South Africa operations, who would relocate to Solae’s India office in Delhi where 
NFSD would be headquartered.  
Because of the transition time involved in defining the structure of this new 
platform and relocating the Solae manager who would assume leadership of NFSD 
and the Protocol project, work in the field was put into a two-month state of 
suspension. Eventually, I and project colleagues were re-contracted for an additional 
five months time to continue leading and guiding the field work as a way of helping 
transition the new Solae corporate lead into his role. This five-month period equated to 
the first half of Phase II activities of the BOP Protocol. I continued to occupy the role 
of project lead, managing the project budgets and supervising the field team’s action 
plans. From the US, I communicated approximately 10 hours per week via skype with 
a field lead hired to oversee both project sites; this field lead also provided monthly 
field reports. Over the course of this contract period, I returned to India on two 
occasions (October 2006, and January 2007) for a combined total of 28 days. By this 
time, the more fundamental learnings from Kenya had materialized, thereby leading to 
on-the-fly adaptation of the process. As in Kenya, Phases II and III of the Protocol as 
initially drafted provided no direction. 
The project was formally handed-off to Solae in April 2007 at the conclusion 
of this second, five-month contract. As noted above, both project sites were in the 
middle of Phase II activities at the time of hand-off. Between April 2007 and March 
2009, the end point of my action research, I/Cornell was hired to play a coaching role 
to the Solae NFSD team, though my de facto involvement increased significantly with 
the unexpected resignation of the project field lead in August 2007. I remained in 
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contact with the project through emails, bi-weekly update calls with the project field 
lead, and was copied on all correspondence from the field team to Solae management. 
I traveled to India on seven additional occasions for a combined 110 days to assess 
progress on the ground and assist the field teams in developing the businesses.  
The following field summary of the Solae India Protocol project is divided into 
five main chronological time periods delineated by key transition periods in the 
project—these transition periods ended up becoming the milestones around which the 
revised BOP Protocol model was constructed. The first segment, which reflects the 
time period December 2005 to March 2006, deals with pre-field activities I led to 
establish and train a local project team, select sites, and form partnerships with local 
organizations. The second segment, which takes place over the time period April 2006 
to September of 2006, reflected my and team members’ in-field efforts to implement a 
revised Phase I of the Protocol and to then gain buy-in from Solae’s top-management 
team to continue the project. The third segment, which reviews the time period 
October 2006 to March 2007, reflects what, in retrospect, consisted of the first half of 
Phase II of the BOP Protocol as outlined in the revised, 2nd Edition (which was 
publicly released in March of 2008). At the end of this period, I handed over primary 
project management responsibility to Solae’s India office. The fourth segment, which 
spans from April 2007 through December 2007, reviews activities that culminated 
with the formal launch of an initial set of products and services by both businesses—
the milestone which today marks completion of Phase II in the 2nd Edition of the BOP 
Protocol. The fifth and final segment spans 15 months from January 2008 through 
March 2009 and consists of activities geared toward evolving the complete business 
models in both sites and growing sales and local management capacity to the point 
that the two businesses would be financially self-sustaining. These activities fall under 




Field Summary: December 2005 – March 2006  
Per our contract with Solae, the period December 2005 to March 2006 
consisted of four main activities that included the formation of a core team, the 
training of the core team, site/community selection, and local partner identification. 
These activities feel under the “Pre-Departure Preparation” phase of our project 
timeline (see below). 
 
 
FIGURE 6:  Full-scale Protocol Implementation 
 
Before discussing the four activities (team selection and training have been 
compressed into one bullet in the timeline above), it is important to note the nature of 
the relationship with the Solae lead that had begun to form during the proposal stage 
and the focus of our discussions and negotiations throughout the proposal stage and 
pre-field process. Two interrelated issues became the source of significant discussion 
and, eventually, disagreement once the field work began. The first issue concerned the 
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output of Phase I for which we were being contracted. In the Protocol and in our 
proposal, we stated that the output of Phase I was a “business model.” We discussed at 
length, over phone calls and at a face-to-face meeting at Cornell, what kind of 
information could be expected in the business model. For Solae (and managers in 
general), “business model” implied a clear revenue model and specific product set 
supported by baseline market research, a defined supply chain, and an estimation of 
the larger opportunity presented by the target population. A business model was 
sufficiently specified that one could pilot test the model and, if successful, scale it up. 
In one meeting, the Solae lead even presented to us the Six-Sigma based market 
research process the company used internally to generate the kind of data and insights 
needed to vet new product opportunities.  
Phase I of the Protocol, we argued, would generate a high-level business 
model—we would identify general product categories and could sketch out the supply 
chain, but we would not have specific products and costs. In retrospect, using the term 
“business model” was an error on our part, as our use of the term was inconsistent 
with general management practice. It resulted in our having highly abstract debates 
over degrees of specificity. A pictorial drawing of Solae’s business operations became 
an agreed upon reference point for the kind of business model we would deliver 
(please see Appendix 4). Yet, even this failed to bridge the gap, as our interpretations 
of the level of detail captured in the drawing diverged from that of the Solae lead. In 
the end we started the project without clear alignment of the Phase I output.  
The second issue—which was implicit to our discussions with the Solae lead 
and is something that I only fully appreciated in retrospect—concerned the business 
logic of the Protocol. From my vantage point today, it is clear that the Solae lead’s 
interpretation of the Protocol (based on the presentation of the Phase I work in Kenya) 
was that it was a form of consumer and market research—the relationship-building 
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aspect of the Protocol’s co-creation approach was valuable in as much as it established 
trust with the community, thereby ensuring the community felt empowered and 
comfortable enough to share their opinions and insights. As proof of this, an internal 
pitch document that the Solae lead had developed to describe the project to the 
company’s President (to who he reported) labeled Phase I of the Protocol as “Market 
Understanding.” He saw the Protocol process, therefore, as a complementary tool with 
what Solae currently used (i.e., the Six-Sigma process noted above). The kind of data 
he expected to see from Phase I of the Protocol was of the same kind that Solae 
generated for its other new market initiatives. In addition, once Phase I was 
completed, the belief was that Phases II and III of the Protocol were traditional pilot 
testing, though done on a small scale and with the continued support of the 
community.  
To be fair, this latter interpretation of the business logic behind the Protocol 
was, as I suggested in Chapter 3, actually consistent with the 1st Edition of the BOP 
Protocol. The Protocol mainly emphasizes the community development aspects of the 
co-creation—the business reason for using the Protocol is that co-creation would yield 
radical insights and new ideas that traditional approaches couldn’t deliver under the 
unique socio-cultural and institutional contexts in BOP communities. And Phases II 
and III were, in fact, framed as small-scale pilot testing followed by scale out. At the 
time the Solae work was initiated, there was nothing distinct about Phases II and III. 
Given that the Solae lead was anticipating and preparing to go into pilot-test mode at 
the completion of Phase I became an additional point of disconnect as the learnings in 
Kenya regarding the futility of a “market research + pilot test approach” surfaced.  
The pre-field work was formally initiated on December 1, 2005 once Solae 
approved our proposal. Given that field work was to start in March 2006, we had a 
very short timeframe within which to complete all of our pre-field activities. Also, I 
  
183 
and the Solae corporate lead planned to do a two-week trip to India during the end of 
January 2006 to visit with potential partners and sites and to interview team 
candidates.  
Solae asked that the project take place in India with the caveat that we were not 
to disrupt or unduly distract the India country office which was based in Delhi—a fact 
that impacted the team formation process. I worked with the Solae corporate lead over 
a period of several weeks to narrow the site focus down to the state level. The Solae 
lead insisted that we use a rating matrix to ensure rigor in the selection process. The 
ten weighted criteria included such things as protein malnutrition rates, non-meat 
protein substitutes, the presence of NGOs, Solae presence, DuPont presence, and the 
presence of a local business school. Ultimately, the decision to start in Andhra Pradesh 
(AP) was based largely on the fact that DuPont’s Pioneer Hybrid business unit was 
headquartered there, which gave us access to their offices if needed. Also, Pioneer had 
an existing relationship with the global NGO, CARE, in AP that involved a micro-
loan program with small holder farmers. This would give us an initial point of contact 
to begin the search for local partners and community sites. The lead person for Pioneer 
involved in the CARE work was also the company’s head of sustainability and among 
the participants at the BOP Protocol design workshop. So choosing AP helped build 
and sustain a link to DuPont’s broader sustainability network. The matrix ended up 
“confirming” the logic of starting the project in AP and Hyderabad.  
Concurrent with the selection of the state, I reached out across Cornell to start 
to identify potential local partners, to select specific communities, and to recruit a 
team. I began by connecting with Cornell faculty across departments that were 
involved in projects and/or conducting research in India. I met with faculty from Food 
Science, Anthropology, City and Regional Planning, and Government. In the process, 
I was connected to a woman who was on a one-year graduate fellowship program at 
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Cornell. She was a mid-level government employee of AP and was a key person in the 
state government’s program that organized women self-help groups. This person 
proved to be an enormously valuable contact and introduced me via email to several 
key organizations and people in AP. The people/organizations included the CEO of 
APMAS, a well-known micro-finance organization; the Director of Velegu, a World-
Bank funded program administered by the AP government that operated an extensive 
network of women’s rural self-help groups throughout the state; the South Asia 
Director of Aide-et-Action and one of India’s leading experts on participatory rural 
appraisal; and the Department for International Development’s (DFID) India office. 
Through the BOP Learning Laboratory at Cornell, I also contacted two faculty 
members at SP Jain University in Mumbai, a leading business school in India. An 
additional colleague connected me to the Director of the Wadhwani Center for 
Entrepreneurship at the Indian School of Business (ISB) in Hyderabad.  
Through email and/or skype, I contacted each of these individuals and 
organizations. I introduced the project and asked for help in identifying local partners, 
community sites, and potential team candidates. Once AP was selected as the state and 
we knew what local language skills would be needed (the mother tongue in AP is 
Telegu), I also circulated a job description (please see Appendix 5) to these contacts. 
One of them operated a well-know Indian development blog and agreed to post the job 
description there. Several of the contacts expressed support and agreed to meet with 
me during the January trip.  
Per our proposal to Solae, the field team would consist of myself, a colleague 
who participated in the Kenya Protocol project, and four local Indians. The intention 
was—as in Kenya—to run the urban and rural sites in parallel. Each site team would 
consist of a person that had prior experience in Kenya as a project field lead (me in 
one site, and my former Kenya Protocol team colleague the in the second) along with 
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two Indians, one with business experience and one with development experience. 
Despite wide circulation of the job description and receiving more than fifty resumes 
through the blog posting, finding suitable Indian candidates to interview during the 
January 2006 trip proved difficult for a number of reasons.  
One challenge in team recruitment was language—few of the applicants were 
fluent in Telegu. The second challenge was timing. Many of the applicants were 
completing Master degree programs in the US and would not be available until June 
2006; others were working outside of India and could not transition quickly. The third 
issue was the length of the contract position. The Solae corporate lead, wanting to 
maximize flexibility and have the option to continue or discontinue the project based 
on the results of Phase I, required us to hire the team on four month contracts (April 
through July 2006).  The cultural norm in India, particularly among MBA graduates, is 
to take full-time positions—a short term position was viewed very unfavorably and 
with significant skepticism. This policy was further complicated by the fact that the 
job market in India during this time was very strong and high-quality candidates 
completing degrees had several positions to choose from. When I and the Solae 
corporate lead departed for India in January, we only had one candidate scheduled for 
an interview.  
I departed for the 16-day pre-field trip to India on January 26, 2006. The Solae 
corporate lead joined me for half of that time. During the trip, I/we met with both 
business schools that I had contacted: SP Jain in Mumbai and ISB in Hyderabad. At 
SP Jain, we met with several faculty members interested and involved in social 
enterprise. Unfortunately, they did not have graduating or former students from any of 
their degree programs that fit the project requirements. Instead, they offered to arrange 
and supervise a team of 1st year MBAs that were required to take part in an 8-week 
project (starting in mid March) as part of the school’s Developing Corporate 
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Citizenship Program. The MBAs could implement Phase I of the Protocol in a 
Mumbai slum. The Solae corporate lead was excited to have this happen, as it would 
require minimal funds and would provide additional market research that could be 
relevant and helpful for the AP work. We also felt it would expose the MBAs to the 
Protocol and create a talent pool from which to draw should Solae require additional 
people in Hyderabad when the MBAs graduated. 
In Hyderabad, we met with ISB’s Director of the Wadhwani Center for 
Entrepreneurship, in addition to other faculty interested in the Base of the Pyramid 
concept. ISB, who was interested in starting an India BOP Learning Lab, agreed to 
assist with team formation by identifying graduating students at ISB who would have 
a strong interest in the project. They also agreed to provide us with use of their 
facilities during Phase I as needed.  
Before arriving in India, I had also arranged to meet with DFID, Velegu, Aide 
et Action, and CARE. All of them had offices in Hyderabad. In discussing our project 
needs with the DFID India Director, he emphasized the importance of selecting an 
“implementing NGO” rather than what he called a “funding agency”—implementing 
NGOs were those that were on-the-ground and in the communities. He noted that there 
were few organizations that worked in slums, as most of the government and NGO 
focus directed at rural development. In Hyderabad, he recommended that I meet with 
the Founder/Director of an organization called Society for the Integrated Development 
of Urban and Rural Areas (SIDUR). I arranged to meet with SIDUR the following 
day.  
The meeting with SIDUR involved both the Founder/Director and his wife, 
who led the organizations efforts in the slums, much of which focused on issues of 
healthcare. I explained the project intent and the role we would hope SIDUR could 
fill, including identifying and selecting a community, assisting the team in logistical 
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matters (i.e., local housing), facilitating the team’s entry into the community, 
identifying a community liaison from among SIDUR’s field staff that could support 
the team, and housing and administering the project funds. SIDUR was very 
supportive of the work and agreed to be our local partner in Hyderabad. We discussed 
different community options in Hyderabad and arranged to visit several slum 
communities where SIDUR was working to determine what would be the best fit.  
The next day, we traveled to three different slums where SIDUR operated, 
settling on the Begumpet slum cluster called Rasul Pura which was located by the 
airport. In comparison to the SC Johnson project in Nairobi, the slums in Hyderabad 
were considerably more developed and established—many of the homes were made of 
block and tin (rather than mud) and had greater amenities (e.g., television, 
cookstoves), and some of the alleyways and walkways had stones inlaid. The main 
reasons for choosing Rasul Pura were that the slum community was designated by the 
government as a “recently notified” slum, meaning it had been officially recognized 
by the government and was therefore eligible to receive government infrastructure 
investment in the future (and, thus, safe from being bulldozed or relocated, as had 
happened to other slums); the population was 80/20 Hindu to Muslim, making it more 
representative of the general population; SIDUR had a physical structure in the slum 
by way of its “Healthy Hut,” which was a small office/clinic where they provided 
medical care; and the women from the community that I met during an informal 
meeting were open to “outsiders,” something that SIDUR indicated wasn’t the case for 
other slums, particularly those that had a predominately conservative Muslim 
population.     
During the following days I met with Velugu, CARE, and Aide et Action. 
Velugu, as noted above, was a state-administered effort that had organized thousands 
of self-help women’s group throughout the rural areas of AP. They too were very 
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interested and supportive and suggested that we work in a rural community in the far 
northeast of the state where they were sponsoring a project. Because of the need to 
coordinate the two sites, the distance proved too far (it was approximately seven hours 
from Hyderabad). Velugu recommended the District of Warangal—some three hours 
drive from Hyderabad—and one of their implementing organizations called Modern 
Architects for Rural India (MARI). During my meeting with CARE India, after 
describing the project and our needs, they too suggested Warangal District and the 
organization MARI, an organization that was one of their implementing agencies for a 
community-based micro-finance project. Lastly, during my visit with the South Asia 
Director of Aide et Action, he too singled out the work of MARI and its 
Founder/Director, as MARI was also an implementing organization for one of its 
programs! Aide et Action contacted MARI on my behalf, explaining the project and 
coordinating a trip for me and an Aide et Action senior staff member to meet them in 
Warangal and visit potential community sites.  
Before visiting Warangal, I and the Solae corporate lead met with AeA to 
discuss their interest in playing a larger role in the project. AeA, aware of the 
difficulty we were having in recruiting team members on short-term contracts, 
proposed to hire the team through AeA, as the organization was expanding its 
Hyderabad office and was actively recruiting new graduates from prestigious Indian 
educational institutions. Because AeA was a highly regarded global non-profit, it was 
able to attract top-level talent. AeA’s Director offered to extend full-time employment 
to the people we wanted for the project; in the event that Solae did not continue 
beyond Phase I, AeA would simply move them into a different AeA project. Given the 
difficulty we were having in attracting talented people on a short-term contract and 
had only two months to go before our targeted launch date, this seemed like a viable 
alternative. For Solae, it also meant that they didn’t have to handle and manage any of 
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the administrative burdens associated with hiring a team of independent contractors. 
Both I and the Solae corporate lead supported this. 
In addition to the role in hiring the team, the AeA Director expressed an 
interest in playing a more significant project support and advisory role. He offered us 
use of the AeA office as our team headquarters, field support and access to AeA staff 
members experience in PRA, and any other kind of project management support that 
was needed. The AeA Director was very interested in working with companies and 
using business-based approaches to address issues of poverty—one of the 
organization’s newest programs involved a training/apprenticeship program that 
prepared for low-income people for jobs with companies contracted by AeA. As such, 
he saw this as an investment in building AeA’s experience and exposure in an 
important future programmatic area for AeA. In discussing this with the Solae 
corporate lead, we both felt that AeA’s connections and capacity could be valuable 
and important not only in the Phase I work, but even more so later on if/when the time 
came to scale and replicate the businesses to new communities. We reached mutual 
agreement that AeA would be an “implementing partner” in the effort. 
Two days before the end of my trip, I traveled with a senior staff member of 
Aide et Action to Warangal to meet with MARI’s Founder/Director. As with SIDUR, I 
explained the goal and intent of the project and the kind of local partner support we 
were hoping MARI could play. Because of my connection with AeA—an organization 
that MARI had worked with in the past—I believe there was a higher level of 
receptivity to the idea. The Director offered his full support.  
Afterwards, we traveled to three villages in a county of Warangal called 
Parvathagiri Mandal. There were approximately two dozen villages in the county 
within a 12 kilometer radius. MARI had worked in Parvathagiri Mandal for more than 
a decade. At one of the villages called Chowtapally, we met with a farmer’s group 
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associated with an integrated pest management program MARI was operating in 
partnership with Oxfam. After a thirty minute drive, we arrived in two other villages 
that were located a few miles from one another: Parvathagiri (the village had the same 
name as the county) and Annaram Sharif. In both villages, I met with women’s self 
help groups that MARI had helped form and institutionalized as part of its work with 
CARE and Velugu. The Director thought that these three villages would all be 
excellent places to launch, as they were among the most progressive locations and 
where MARI had excellent results in its prior projects. I noted that starting in all three 
would be difficult, due to the distance from Chowtapally to the others, but that we 
could launch in both Paravathagiri and Annaram Sharif.   
When I returned to the US, I worked closely with the AeA Director to hire the 
team. Even with the ability to offer full-time employment, recruitment on short notice 
proved difficult and necessitated delaying the start date from mid March as initially 
targeted to April 17, 2006. Recruitment for the four-person team was completed two 
weeks before I was to depart to India to begin Phase I field activities. The business 
professionals were eventually sourced through ISB. ISB collected approximately half 
a dozen resumes from 2nd year MBA students interested in the position. None of them, 
however, spoke Telegu. The AeA Director met with each of them, and he and I 
debriefed on the phone. We extended offers to three of the candidates, of which two 
accepted. One of the two, however, had accepted a full-time position in the US that 
would start in September, 2006 and, therefore, would be unavailable to the project 
beyond Phase I.  
To fill the two development-professional positions on the team, I and Solae 
ultimately turned to AeA. AeA offered to assign two of its senior members to the 
project, with the understanding that they would remain available to the project beyond 
Phase I if needed. Both were Telegu speakers and had extensive field experience, one 
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in the area of health and nutrition and the other in micro-finance. The four team 
members were finalized less than two weeks before the April launch of the in-field 
project. 
Having only two weeks before Phase I field work was to commence, combined 
with the fact that the two ISB team members were in their final exams period, we 
decided to add a week to the field schedule and to compress the training into the first 
full week that the team was together in India. For that week, I also arranged to have 
AeA provide training to the team on participatory rural appraisal methods that the 
Director and his colleagues had used successfully in their work in India. We were able 
to hold one group conference call via skype with the full team, though the quality of 
the connection was poor and confirmed the decision to do any training on site. The 
call essentially served as an ice-breaker; each team member introduced themselves and 
explained their interest in the project. We also covered basic logistical issues, such as 
who was bringing a laptop.  
Upon returning from the India trip, I also finalized the contractual arrangement 
with SIDUR and MARI as our community partners in the effort, arranged to have the 
field project funds wired to them, and worked with each of them and AeA to secure 
housing/logistics in both of the project sites. Initially, my intent was for the team to 
stay in “team housing” in both Hyderabad and Parvathagiri. However, given that all of 
the team members lived in or outside Hyderabad, AeA felt that it was asking too much 
to have the team live together throughout the entire process. In addition, SIDUR was 
reluctant to locate housing for the team inside the slum due to lack of amenities; they 
also said that it would be difficult to find housing on short notice We decided, 
therefore, to allow team members participating in the Hyderabad site to remain in their 
current housing. I and my Protocol colleague would stay in the AeA office, which was 
being remodeled to include a few guest rooms. Additionally, I arranged to have the 
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anthropologist that participated in the Kenya project to support the 8-week Protocol-
based effort with SP Jain in Mumbai. I participated in several conference calls with 
her and the SP Jain team to discuss the process and how they could best apply it in 
their case.  
In discussions with AeA, we also decided that it would be valuable to engage 
the field team during the first training week in the creation of the workplan. Doing so 
would help them better understand the process and to develop a sense of ownership for 
it. Also, it would allow for their experiences and insights to be built into the process. 
Rather than develop a week-by-week workplan, I therefore drafted a project overview 
document that explained the core tenets of the process and the general flow of events 
that could be expected. This document (please see Appendix 6) was provided to 
MARI and SIDUR and to the team. This document clearly demonstrates the learnings 
from Phase I in Kenya (particularly with respect to recruiting a project team and 
training the team and the company to be partners) and outlines a more defined and 
structured flow of activities, beginning with low-intensity community activities, 
followed by deep immersion and homestays, then on to a community recruitment 
stage, then to a local needs and assets analysis that simultaneously develops 
partnership skills, and culminating with idea generation workshops and opportunity 
evaluation. That said, the process as outlined continued to invoke the “radical 
localization” business logic described earlier. The insights regarding this issue had not 
yet occurred in the Kenya project.  
 
Field Summary: April 2006 – September 2006  
I departed for India on April 9, 2006. I arrived in Mumbai where I spent 
several days advising the SP Jain team and my anthropology colleague who was 
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assisting them in implementing Phase I of the Protocol. From there I traveled to 
Hyderabad to begin the 12-week fieldwork portion of Phase I of the project.  
Because of the delay in recruiting, the first week was dedicated to team 
building, training in Protocol concepts and methods, and workplan development. For 
the training, the participants throughout the week included me and my Protocol 
colleague, the four Indian recruits, and the Director and senior manager of AeA, given 
that AeA was positioned as an “implementing partner” in the project. As had been 
arranged, our team used AeA’s newly renovated office space in Hyderabad as the 
team office. The four Indian team members returned home in the evenings, and I and 
my Protocol colleague stayed at a nearby hotel as the construction of the guest housing 
in AeA’s office was running behind schedule and was not completed.  
Day 1 began with welcomes and introductions using a PRA technique 
(recommended by AeA) that involved forming into pairs and having one person draw 
a caricature of the other. Once the group reassembled, the person would introduce 
their partner to the full group using the caricature. Introductions were followed by a 
discussion of the project objectives and deliverables (an immersion report, a business 
concept report, and a development phase plan) and my Protocol colleague gave an 
extensive power point presentation that provided a history to the Protocol’s 
development and debriefed our experience in Kenya. In the afternoon, we held a 
conference call with the Solae corporate lead to help cement the feeling that we were 
part of a “Solae” team and to start building a relationship between the team and the 
Solae lead. Lastly, I handed out a list of seven topics along with their associated 
readings that we would discuss over the following two days as part of the team 
training; the four Indian team members chose 1-2 concepts for which they would lead 
the discussion. The topics included: 
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1) Development – What is meant by development and how has this concept been 
traditionally practiced? What is the Protocol approach to “development.” What 
does it define it, implicitly or explicitly? How are “health” and “nutrition” 
related concepts and discourses? 
2) The BoP – What is meant by the concept “Base of the Pyramid”? How does 
the Protocol talk about the BoP? What is the strategic logic for serving the 
BoP? What opportunities exist from the corporate perspective? The 
development perspective? 
3) Native Capability – What is “native capability”? Why does an MNC need it? 
How does the Protocol relate to it? 
4) What is “Radical Transactiveness” – What is meant by the concepts of 
“marginalized” or “fringe” stakeholders? What is the strategic logic behind 
RT? How is it relevant to the Protocol? 
5) Co-Creation – What does the Protocol mean by co-creation? How does it 
relate to mutual value creation? What makes co-creation different from 
“traditional” business development? How do companies have to think and act 
differently? 
6) PRA/Participatory Methods – What is PRA or Participatory Methods? Why 
does the Protocol emphasize them (i.e., why are they important to new 
business development in the BoP)? How are they reflected in the Protocol 
process?  
7) Community – What constitutes a community? How do you identify one? 
What do PRA and the Protocol suggest about working with communities? Can 
a company truly become a part of the community?   
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The next three days were used to discuss and debate the topics. I summarized 
our discussion and the key implications of each topic on the Protocol. Please see 
Appendix 7 for the concept summaries. 
A significant shift occurred mid-week. I was informed by the AeA Director 
that the team member who was on secondment from AeA and had extensive 
experience in micro-finance decided to remove himself from the project. The Director 
said that he had asked an experienced AeA employee based in Chennai to join the 
team immediately and would try to recruit a new candidate that week, as he was 
continuing to hire new people for AeA’s needs. The new AeA person arrived from 
Chennai the next day; he had extensive experience working with post-disaster relief 
efforts and possessed basic Telegu language skills. I tried to catch him up on where 
the team was and what the project goals were. In addition, AeA invited for an 
interview a former Ashoka fellow who was a fluent Telegu speaker, who was 
experienced in facilitating enterprise development in poor communities using an 
approach that was closely aligned with the Protocol. We literally hired him on the 
spot. Our team now consisted of five local Indians, two of which were fluent Telegu 
speakers and a third which had basic language skills. Also, two of the five were 
women, and we had a balanced between business and development skills. 
We resumed the training by spending almost a full day investigating specific 
PRA methods and techniques, and then comparing those to the PED techniques we 
had evolved in Kenya. The AeA Director led a half-day session providing an overview 
of different categories of PRA techniques and his personal experience using them in 
the field. I and my Protocol colleague then discussed the PED techniques we 
developed in Kenya that had adapted PRA. Our intent was to ensure the team 
understood how the PRA techniques had to be adapted to fit the objectives of the 
Protocol and to avoid the experience in the rural site in Kenya. We ended the day with 
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a meeting that brought the team together with the various organizations that had 
expressed support for the project. The attending organizations included MARI, 
SIDUR, ISB, and Velegu. The meeting was designed to start building a sense of 
community among the partners (and between the two sites), to ensure we were all 
aligned on the goals of the project, and to plan out the initial visits to the rural and 
urban sites with our local partners in the following week. We concluded with a group 
dinner.   
The last two tasks we completed as part of the training and team preparation 
period were outlining a workplan and creating a concise statement about the project 
and the team that would be shared with the community. The main structural element of 
the workplan was reaching agreement to run the urban and rural projects in parallel. 
Because the rural site consisted of two separate villages and was deemed to be a more 
challenging business context (the Solae corporate lead was more interested in the 
urban site and was skeptical that a viable business could be created for the rural 
context), we planned to have four people on the rural team, and three on the urban 
team. The slums in India were also considerably less intimidating than those in Kenya. 
Taking this into consideration, I decided to attach myself primarily to the rural site, 
and my Protocol colleague would lead the urban group. The timeline consisted of one 
week of homestays, one week of vacation, three weeks of partner recruiting, two 
weeks of PED workshops, and concluding with two weeks of idea generation.    
To develop a concise statement about the project and project team, we focused 
on addressing three questions: Who are we? Why are we here? What is the benefit of 
our work to your community? Who is Solae? To reach a unified statement, we iterated 
between working in pairs and then reconvening in the full group. One issue that 
emerged concerned the team representation: There was reluctance on the part of the 
AeA members to represent themselves as being from Solae; nor did the ISB graduates, 
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who were hired by AeA, view themselves as Solae employees. We eventually 
converged on a framing that allowed people to retain their organizational affiliations 
while creating a sense of shared mission. In retrospect, not framing the team as a 
“Solae team” from the start was a mistake, as it created role ambiguity both for the 
community as well as for the partners. I’ll speak later to this issue in greater depth.  
The second and third weeks constituted the “Community Immersion” segment 
of our work. Week two consisted of visits by the full team to each of the two local 
community partners to gain alignment on roles responsibilities, to have initial 
exposure in the communities, and to finalize homestay hosts. Bringing the full team to 
each of the sites was also done to help “cross-train” the team and have the community 
and partners comfortable with any of the team member’s presence.  
 Due to scheduling, we started with a two-day visit to MARI and the rural site. 
Our first stop was at the MARI office in Warangal (a two hour train ride from 
Hyderabad) and then traveled an additional hour by car to the two sites. The MARI 
visit included MARI’s Director, the Director of Finance, approximately ten field staff 
across programmatic efforts, and two women from the communities of Parvathagiri 
and Annaram Sharif who worked for MARI to coordinate loan disbursement and 
repayment to the approximately dozen women’s self-help groups (SHGs) operating in 
the communities. Anticipating that news of the project would spread to villages across 
the county, the Director wanted to be sure that there was alignment across his staff to 
ensure that everyone spoke consistently and accurately about the project. During the 
meeting, we discussed and reached agreement on the roles and responsibilities of 
MARI, the team, and Solae in relation to the community. The statement of project 
intent that was collectively developed read as follows:  
 
“Solae and the community will work together to find and create new 
mutual business opportunities for the poor by combining the 
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knowledge, skills, and experience that each of them has. MARI will 
facilitate this process. All of us together will build the people’s 
knowledge and skill so they better their economic and physical health 
and opportunities around business and development.” 
 At that time, the MARI Director also indicated that three of his people present 
would support us as community liaisons. The three people consisted of a field staff 
person experienced in maternal and child health and two women supporting their 
community’s SHGs. The field staff and one of the community women spoke basic 
English, while the third had minimal English comprehension. We also discussed the 
purpose of the homestay and our hope to participate in a range of life situations. The 
MARI Director and our liaisons said that they would work with the community to 
identify two homestay hosts in Parvathagiri and two in Annaram Sharif. 
Following the meeting, we traveled to the villages of Parvathagiri and 
Annaram Sharif. In Parvathagiri, MARI had organized for us to meet with one of the 
women’s SHGs that they had established and mentored. The meeting, which was 
conducted on the ground outside of the home of the group’s leader, gave us an 
opportunity to practice introducing ourselves and our project, as well as establishing 
rapport. The women shared their experience in forming an SHG and the business 
lessons they had learned through farming and petty trade. They also, much to our 
surprise, told a story of a recently failed business venture led by MARI in which they 
had participated and still had outstanding personal loans. This failed business 
experience, which we later learned from MARI entailed the creation of a chili-
processing factory in Parvathagiri owned collectively by many of the SHGs in the 
area, was a sensitive issue that we had to constantly keep in mind as the project 
progressed. We departed with the promise that we would be back the next week to 
start our homestays and the project work.  
From there we visited the local “anganwadi”—a government-operated crèche 
that provides a free meal and the equivalent of pre-school education for poor children 
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under the age of five—and conducted another informal discussion with a group of 
young mother’s served by the anganwadi. The anganwadi was located in a part of the 
village where mostly “Scheduled Caste” (SC) residents live. SCs are the lowest caste 
group. By contrast, the SHG members we had met were mostly of the “backward 
caste” (BC). BC is considered a higher caste status than SC. Both BC and SC are 
considered as the “untouchable classes” and have the equivalent of affirmative action 
status in India.    
We had dinner at MARI’s sparse field office in Parvathagiri, and our team 
slept there on the floor. The next day we drove to Annaram Sharif, a village of 
approximately 1,000 residents approximately five kilometers from Parvathagiri, and 
visited two SHG groups there. Our conversations and discussions were of the same 
flavor and had the same objective as those in which we had participated in 
Parvathagiri. It is worth noting that Annaram Sharif is a unique village, as it is home 
to a famous shrine that draws approximately 5,000 visitors per week for the shrine’s 
healing powers. Because of this influx, there are a lot of small shops and businesses 
that cater to the tourists. In the late afternoon, we returned to Warangal and caught the 
evening train back to Hyderabad to meet with SIDUR and visit the urban community 
the following day. 
As with MARI, we first met in SIDUR’s Hyderabad office. The meeting 
consisted of our full team, SIDUR’s senior program manager who oversaw the 
organization’s work in the slums, and approximately six of SIDUR’s field workers. As 
in the MARI meeting, we shared our project objectives, discussed and reached 
agreement about the kind of support and assistance we were looking for from SIDUR, 
and then talked about the setting up of the home stays for the next week. One of the 
field workers present, who had worked in the Rasul Pura slum, was to be our 
community liaison. SIDUR said that it was important that we hold initial introductory 
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meetings in the community to ensure that our team is accepted and that the 
community’s expectations are managed. Specifically, SIDUR wanted to be sure that 
the community understood that our team was not focused on people of a particular 
religion, caste, or political party; that we were not going to build a factory and hire 
people; and that we weren’t going to be giving out money in any form, be it grants or 
loans. 
To that end, the next day SIDUR organized two community sessions for us in 
public spots—one under a tent in the Indiramanagar neighborhood of the slum and 
another at a temple in the bordering Krishnanagar neighborhood. In both sessions, 
SIDUR had set up rows of folding chairs for community members and chairs up front 
for us to sit on. Our community liaison from SIDUR went around the neighborhood 
encouraging attendance. In both locations, there were approximately 50-75 people in 
attendance, though men occupied all of the seats up front and dominated the 
discussion. The women were largely silent. SIDUR’s program manager played a 
master’s of ceremony role, introducing who we were and our intentions. The two 
members of our team who were fluent Telegu speakers provided further description of 
our project goals and our desire to engage with the community broadly. In our team 
debrief, we decided not to replicate such engagements, as they invited a formality that 
distanced us from the community and gave voice to those in dominant positions. 
Following the two community meetings, the SIDUR program manager and the 
community liaison guided our team around the slum to various residents who had 
expressed a willingness to serve as homestays hosts. Reminiscent of our experience in 
rural Kenya, our three team members who would be doing their homestays in the 
community were asked to evaluate and choose the host/home they preferred. As in 
Kenya, this created a very awkward situation for both our team members and the hosts 
and established the wrong dynamic and expectation for the host. Once this became 
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clear after the first visit to a potential host, we intervened and asked that the visits not 
be presented or structured as “interviews,” but rather as introductions to our team and 
further explanation of why we were interested in doing a homestay. SIDUR would 
then reconnect with the hosts to determine if they were still interested in being hosts.  
The week ended with two team challenges. One, the team members hired 
through AeA were receiving different levels of remuneration for expenses—some 
were able to expense travel, phone, and group meals; some had per diems; others 
received no form of reimbursement. This was making it difficult to function as a team. 
I raised this issue with AeA, and we tried to work out a solution; but the issue surfaced 
tension, as AeA felt that issues pertaining to team employment were within its 
purview.  
The second issue concerned a team member’s discomfort with her site. After 
the visits to Parvathagiri, Annaram Sharif, and Rasul Pura slum, one of the business-
trained team members slated to be stationed in the rural site noted that she felt 
uncomfortable with the environment there and was not willing to stay in the village; 
instead, she preferred Rasul Pura where she could communicate using Hindi (there 
was little Hindi spoken outside of urban areas of Andhra Pradesh). This created 
difficulty, as the other Indian team member with business skills needed to be in the 
urban area to be close to his wife who was in the early stages of pregnancy. In 
addition, because of language skills, we weren’t able to shift the other urban team 
member with development experience to the rural team, as that would leave the urban 
team without a Telegu speaker. In the end, we had no choice but to have four of the 
seven team members staying in Rasul Pura; this also resulted in the urban team having 
both of the team’s women, and both of the members with business training.  
All of week three was dedicated to a seven day, six night homestay by each of 
the team members. As noted above, our team split into two groups with three of us, 
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including me, stationed in Parvathagiri and Annaram Sharif and the remaining four in 
Rasul Pura, Hyderabad. As we learned from Kenya, the purpose of the homestay was 
not to gain ethnographic insights into people’s lives, but to help accelerate the 
relationship-building process with the community and to demonstrate our 
commitment. And as in Kenya, team members were instructed to participate fully in 
house chores and livelihood activities and to learn a task from their host, rather than 
assuming the role of “guest.”  
As noted earlier, MARI had agreed to select the homestay hosts for our team 
during our meeting with them the prior week. I and my two teammates arrived at 
MARI’s office in Warangal the day our homestays were to begin. From there, we 
traveled together with the three community liaisons from MARI. En route, the liaisons 
explained that I would be staying in Parvathagiri with a four-person family whose 
father operated a small health clinic; the home was next-door to one of our liaisons. 
My two teammates would stay in Annaram Sharif.  
We arrived during the evening hours first at the home of my homestay host. 
My host family consisted of the father, his wife, a teen-age daughter and son, though 
their son was attending school in a city several hours away (the practice of sending 
children, particularly sons, to attend urban schools was common in the village). The 
family lived in a two-room, roofed block home behind the small clinic where the 
father provided basic medical care to the community. One room contained a television 
and a small bench; the other room, which had only just been constructed, contained 
the kitchen that contained a gas cookplate and a set of metal dishes. In the backyard 
were a well and an outhouse. The family was of the Backward (BC) caste and was 
better off than then scheduled or SC caste families in the village whose homes had 
thatched roofs (and, in the case of the poorest, thatched walls).  
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  Once our liaisons were secure in the idea that I could be left alone, they 
departed with my two teammates for their homestay families in Annaram Sharif. Soon 
after they departed, teen-age friends of the family who had received word of my 
arrival showed up at the home. Two of them spoke some broken English. Given that 
none of my homestay family members spoke English, my hunch was that they had 
been summoned in order to help the family communicate with me. Based on my 
experience in Kenya, I had brought my laptop, which contained photos of my family 
and where I live; I also carried a digital camera. A combination of hand-gesturing, 
pointing, and frequent consultation of my Telegu-English dictionary allowed us to 
communicate and have a lively first evening.  
The MARI community liaison that lived next door and spoke rudimentary 
English dropped by to inquire how I was doing. We ate dinner on the floor in the front 
room, with me and the father eating together and being served by the daughter and 
mother. After the first night, I was allowed to wash my dishes; dish washing was 
performed outside by the well using ash.  
The first few nights I slept on the floor of the “gold store” next-door where the 
local gold-smith worked and made jewelry. I slept on the floor of the store along with 
the store owner and the next-door neighbor’s son; I presume they thought I would feel 
safer in their company, though sleeping in a closed metal building without ventilation 
when the day-time temperature was 115 degrees and the nighttime temperature was in 
the 80s made for long-nights. Without explanation (though the neighbor’s son 
indicated I snored a lot), I slept the remaining nights outside on the ground in the 
backyard, which was welcome in terms of the cooler temperatures but made difficult 
by mosquitoes.  
The family woke early in the mornings (around 5:00 AM), and the mother did 
a ritual cleaning and decoration of the entry to the home with chalk patterns on the 
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ground (the daily Hindu ritual was called a “pooja”) before preparing breakfast. The 
father saw patients in the clinic in front of the house.  
My days were filled with a variety of activities, though not necessarily with my 
host family. This was so for several reasons. One, it was difficult for me to participate 
in any meaningful way in the father’s work; two, I wasn’t able to inject myself freely 
into the mother’s housework, as I could sense very clearly the boundaries between 
men and women and did not want to create an even greater feeling of unease regarding 
my presence; and three, I wanted to be sure to participate in the work lives of SC 
caste. I explained this to my neighboring liaison, and she arranged for me to work in a 
variety of settings during the week. As I was in the rural area where the majority of 
people lived through small-scale farming, I felt it was important that I work in the 
fields.  
The liaison arranged for me to work in one field that belonged to a BC farmer 
and on another field belonging to an SC farmer. With the mid-day temperatures 
reaching 115 degrees, work in the fields began at daybreak. It was harvesting time for 
the rice. Upon arriving at the fields with others who had been hired as day-laborers by 
the farmer, I was provided a scythe and warned to watch out for snakes, as cobras 
were commonplace in the fields. I watched and imitated the farmers’ routine (the 
majority of who were women): cut an armful of the rice stalks, bundle and tie them up 
with twine, and then carry the bundle on your head over to a large pile and stack 
uniformly. The rice would later be threshed to release the grains.  
Apart from my time spent harvesting rice. I also spent an afternoon at the 
anganwadi center (i.e., crèche for low-income children) located in the SC side of 
Parvathagiri. I was accompanied by the liaison, who introduced me to the anganwadi 
“mother” and helped translate for me when she was able. I helped the anganwadi 
mother cook the mid-day meal over an outside fire for the approximately forty 
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children in attendance. I served the food and helped clean up. My liaison also took me 
around to all of the shops and vendors in town, introducing me to her friends and 
acquaintances. On another day, I spent the afternoon with the neighbor’s son at a 
computer class he attended twice a week at the local primary school. Several evenings, 
friends of my host family pulled me away after dinner to various festivities and 
celebrations, including a wedding, and to drink the local brew under the “toddy trees” 
from which it was extracted. During my last day of my homestay, the mother invited 
me to cook with her, allowing me to cut vegetables and combines and stir ingredients 
going into the curry (meanwhile, her husband took several photos of me in action 
using the digital camera I brought). Given that the kitchen and the act of cooking are 
considered the domain of the mother and an area that men are not supposed to enter, I 
felt that this invitation was a sign that my homestay was successful in building a solid 
relationship with the family and their friends and neighbors.  
It is important to note that mid-way through my homestay I received a call 
from my Protocol colleague regarding issues that had surfaced in the Hyderabad site. 
All three of the Indian team members were not adjusting well to the homestays. One 
of the business team members was unable to tolerate the heat and returned home. He 
continued to visit the slum during the day. One of the senior development people 
stated that she had back pain and also could not stay in the slum. She too visited 
during the day. During a later debrief, I learned that this person—though she was in 
her mid 30’s with a Master’s degree from a U.S. university—felt that her parents 
would not agree to her living in the slum. The third person—the business lead 
previously slated to stay in the village—suspected that her homestay host was a sex 
worker and would not continue to stay in her home. I and my colleague held an 
emergency conference call and discussed the importance and objective of the 
homestay. Though the two who left for health reasons did not resume overnight stays, 
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they tried to remain in the slum and with their host family through dinner. Working 
with SIDUR, we were also able to shift the third team member to a different homestay 
host, though her poor handling of the issue created a disruption in the community, was 
taken as an affront against SIDUR, and undermined a core principle of our work. 
Despite the debacle, I and my colleague in consultation with SIDUR and AeA decided 
to keep the person on the team, as we agreed it was due to her inexperience working in 
low-income communities and that she needed stronger mentorship. 
 At the conclusion of the homestay week, the full team re-assembled in 
Hyderabad. Our first order of duty was to meet and debrief with the Solae corporate 
lead who had timed his travel to India to visit us for a day. Indicative of the ongoing 
misalignment, he insisted that we spend half the day reviewing the basics of Six-
Sigma and how Solae applies it in their new product development efforts. During the 
group discussion, I and my colleague tried to create a discussion with the team and the 
corporate lead regarding the objectives of our work and if/how the six-sigma could be 
used. I and the team noted that the process would fit better in the later stages of the 
process once an initial business had been scoped out. The corporate lead, however, 
stated that he didn’t believe we had a process and that it was important that we applied 
some structure to ensure rigor. The Indian team members, though hesitant to voice 
their opinions during the meeting, were concerned about the misalignment.  
After the Solae corporate lead’s departure, our remaining objectives for the 
week were to solidify the workplans for each site and to purchase thank-you gifts for 
our homestay families. A major team issue, however, forced a significant shift in 
plans. A contractual dispute between the social entrepreneur we had hired during the 
first week of the project and AeA resulted in his deciding to quit immediately the 
team. This created a significant capacity gap for us, as the social entrepreneur was one 
of two members fluent in the local language. Without two fluent team members, we 
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would be unable to run the sites in parallel, given the importance of effective 
facilitation and translation to our success. 
We discussed the issue with AeA. They had just hired a young, recently-
graduated Telegu speaker with internship-level experience in the development field. 
Given her inexperience and complete newness to the project, we did not feel that she 
would be capable of playing a leadership role at one of the sites. To compensate for 
the gap in the team, we decided to run the sites sequentially with a small overlap, 
beginning in the rural area. This would give us effectively five weeks in each of the 
community sites, with approximately one week devoted to recruiting local community 
partners (a process step we called “building a sub-community”), two weeks of 
participatory entrepreneurship development and reaching out to other local 
institutions, and two weeks of concept ideation. Our hope was that having all seven 
team members in one location would give us the increased capacity necessary to 
execute an accelerated timeline.  I developed a timeline and workplan that reflected 
this new approach (please see Appendices 5 and 6).   
To ensure that the Hyderabad community did not lose confidence and trust in 
us during out absence, the members of the initial Hyderabad team returned to the 
community and distributed a one-page flyer explaining the plan and the dates of the 
team’s return, along with our contact information and that of SIDUR’s local liaison. 
The full team then traveled to Parvathagiri where we had rented out and furnished two 
residences in the village.  
Weeks five and six consisted of our efforts to build a sub-community of 
partners and to prepare for the PED workshops. To recruit people from the community 
to serve as Solae’s business partners, we conducted small-group meetings with 11 
women’s self-help groups (SHG’s) across Parvathagiri and Annaram Sharif, as well as 
with a group of youths. The SHG’s were ones that our local liaisons worked with as 
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part of their jobs for MARI, so the members were often friends and acquaintances of 
the liaisons. The meetings, which had approximately a dozen people present along 
with their children, were always held in the evening and at the home of one of the 
SHG members. The meetings typically lasted two hours. Our team member fluent in 
Telegu led the sessions, and the two team members with Telegu understanding helped 
translate to our team while taking notes. Our objectives for each of the meetings was 
four-pronged: 1) to build a sense of energy and enthusiasm about the opportunity of 
starting a business with Solae; 2) to build the attendees confidence and have them 
understand that we believe they possess valuable and unique knowledge for starting a 
business; 3) to communicate the dates of our PED sessions and the initial commitment 
required; 4) to set a day and time when our liaisons would return to get the names of 
those people interested in pursuing the opportunity. Approximately 45 people “signed 
up” to come to the PED workshops.  
As a team we would debrief the meetings the next day and discuss how to 
improve the effectiveness of our message and our responses to different questions and 
concerns raised. As we experienced in Kenya, the recurring themes, mis-
understandings, and doubts in the SHG meetings included: 1) Tell us what you want 
us to do. You are hiding something from us. 2) Will we need to leave our current jobs 
to participate? 3)  “Partnership” involves Solae pooling money with our money. 4) 
Why are you not including all of the SHGs? 5) Will Solae take our ideas and go? 
Appendix 10 contains an example of the field notes from one of the meetings with the 
SHGs.  
During the same week and in parallel with these meetings, we also organized a 
series of community interactions using participatory rural appraisal techniques. The 
three techniques we chose to use included a social map, an institutional linkages map, 
and a food map. Given the experience in the rural Kenya site, we attempted to be 
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deliberate in our use of these approaches and to link them clearly to our project’s 
objectives. The objective of the social map was to identify who are the weaker 
members of the community, so as to try and engage them in the project and to ensure 
that the eventual business idea addressed this segment. The objective of the 
institutional linkages map was to identify which types of resources are currently not 
available in the community to help guide us in inviting other organizations to the idea 
generation. The purpose of the food map was to identify where and what is produced 
and consumed, given that “food consumption” would somehow have to figure into any 
business concept involving Solae. Each of these techniques—which is conducted 
outside, on the ground, and in a visible, well-trafficked location in the community 
using chalk and other locally-available materials so as to encourage widespread 
participation—was conducted in both the Backward Caste and Schedules Caste 
neighborhoods of Parvathagiri, as well as in Annaram Sharif.  
Our liaisons and team members from AeA spearheaded the sessions, given that 
they had extensive experience with PRA methods. From the perspective of our 
objective, however, the results of these sessions were mixed. The locations that were 
centrally located did attract the interest and attention of some 80 members (though 
only a dozen people were actively involved across all of the locations), thereby 
generating awareness. In terms of data, however, the output was of a very high-level 
and provided minimal input to our work. Also, in Parvathagiri, the perception that we 
were collecting data inadvertently raised the concern that we had ulterior political 
motives. Furthermore, one of the SHG members we had met with during a recruiting 
meeting and who attended the social map session remarked that it was inconsistent 
with our claim to be there to work as partners, which would entail us sharing and 
combining our resources and knowledge. In debriefing with the team, we decide at a 
minimum that future uses of PRA would need to state more clearly how the PRA fits 
  
210 
into the process and demands of building a new business. The main value from the 
sessions, I felt, was the ability to generate enthusiasm and discussion about the project 
with a large number of people in the community; in addition, it created an opportunity 
for a number of informal conversations with those participants who were present and 
mingling around but not actively engaged. Leveraging these initial connections to 
sustain the broader dialogue and participation among the wider community would 
require shifting from a view of the PRA sessions as one-off events to simply 
conversation starters.  
As our recruiting and PRA sessions wound to a close, we developed a list of 
topics of interest that we felt would be valuable input to our development of a business 
concept with the community partners. The topics included: farmers and food 
consumption in the fields, the nature of restaurants in the villages, the history of the 
failed Chili Factory by MARI, recreation and socializing in the villages, the history of 
a women’s catering business started by a members of one of the SHGs in Parvathagiri, 
and food and lodging needs for the visitors to Annaram Sharif’s shrine. To develop 
insights into these topics, we divided ourselves into two teams and assigned each team 
half of the topics. We then used rapid assessment process (RAP) methodology, which 
involves the use of informal, semi-structured interviews by a diverse team. Appendix 
11 contains notes from one such RAP session with a group of women regarding 
recreation. It is important to note that the team’s ability to use RAP effectively 
stemmed in part from the use of liaisons and the interest and credibility generated by 
the homestays. It was common for the respondents to mention their contact with or 
knowledge of a team member involved in a homestay. While there were some insights 
that came from the RAP, once again it wasn’t clear how helpful the actual data were. 
The act of getting out in the community and initiating informal discussions itself 
seemed to be the core value, as it helped build the team’s comfort-level of engaging 
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and discussing with community members. It also provided some “stories” that we 
were able to draw on in discussing issues about the business concept, particularly 
branding.  
Week seven consisted mostly of the PED set of activities in Parvathagiri. 
Based on our experience in Kenya and the kinds of issues around which we needed 
alignment to effectively discuss potential business ideas, I and my Protocol colleague 
outlined four main topic areas to be addressed in a series of participatory workshops: 
successful partnerships, unique customer value, focused business concept, and 
rethinking resources and capabilities. Furthermore, as we learned in Kenya, the 
primary objective of the workshops wasn’t to teach the participants about these 
concepts. Rather, it was to use the workshops and the discussions about these topics as 
a way to start building a collective identity and co-creation capacity among Solae and 
the community partners. As such, we required that participants attend all four 
workshops in order to be able to participate in the concept ideation process. This too 
was a departure from our Kenya approach, where we encouraged the youth groups to 
send different people to the workshops.  
Each of the workshops was scheduled to run from 11 – 5:30 PM so that the 
women attendees had time to return home and prepare dinner. All of the workshops 
were held in a large room of the elementary school in Parvathagiri. As in Kenya, the 
attendees were not paid, though those traveling from Annaram Sharif by bus were 
reimbursed for the travel expense. Lunch and snacks were provided.  
The general structure of the workshops consisted of a welcome and overview 
of the days’s agenda, a re-cap and consolidation of the learnings from the previous 
session, a fifteen minute set-up of the day’s topic, a two-hour breakout group exercise 
(five breakout groups), lunch, a two-hour report back by the breakout groups followed 
by question and answer (approximately 25 minutes per group), and a 15-minute 
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debrief and summary of the day by the Solae team. We used successfully the metaphor 
that building a business is like building a house (home construction was something 
everyone was familiar with), and related each of the business topic discussions to its 
house-building analogue (i.e., business partners were the entire construction crew, 
unique customer value was equivalent to the home’s foundation, the focused business 
concept was the architectural plan, and the bricks and materials were the resources and 
capabilities). After each meeting, I and Solae team would review the discussions and 
create a tool that summarized the learnings and concrete experiences shared in the 
discussions. Creating a tool was a new addition to our approach. Our plan for the 
tools, which was shared with the community at the following meeting, was to help 
capture the learnings so that they could be drawn on throughout the idea generation 
and into the business development phases. As expected, attendance at the workshops 
started at around 45 but dropped to approximately 30 by the fourth workshop. 
Unfortunately, many of those who did not continue throughout the workshops were of 
the SC caste—it turned out that, because they relied on day labor and had 
unpredictable schedules, they simply couldn’t commit to the four full days. The loss of 
SC participants was something we addressed in Phase II of the project.  
Following are brief summaries of the four PED sessions: 
1) Workshop 1: Successful Partnerships – As we had learned in Kenya, it was 
important that the community partners understood the kind of business 
partnership Solae wanted to establish with them. In our initial meetings 
with the SHG meetings, we often heard the view that a Solae partnership 
entailed simply pooling Solae’ money with that of the community. To 
ground the discussion of partnership in the realities and experiences of the 
participants, we broke the participants into five breakout groups. Each 
group was provided flipcharts, 3x5 note cards, and color pens. The 
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breakout teams were asked to write down on a note card an example of a 
partnership in which they had been involved; on the reverse side, they were 
to indicate why that partnership failed or succeeded. Each team was asked 
to discuss the cards as a group, and to then create a flipchart that 
summarized the keys to success and causes of failure. One of our Solae 
team members was assigned to each group to help facilitate and participate 
in the discussion. The teams were given approximately two hours to 
complete the task. A representative of each breakout team then presented 
their flipchart. I and the Solae team then facilitated a discussion about their 
particular insights, pushing them to link the learnings (e.g., success 
requires unity among partners) with concrete actions and steps that we 
(Solae) and they would need to take. Based on the discussions and 
examples, I and the Solae team consolidated the learnings (after the 
workshop) into a tool. In this case, the tool was a “partnership star” (see 
image below) that outlined six keys to a successful partnership (trust, unity 
and commitment, communication and transparency, mutual respect, 
interdependence, and equality and fairness). For each key, we noted two to 
three concrete steps that we should take (e.g., start taking small risks 
together and share leadership as ways to build trust).  
2) Workshop 2: Unique Customer Value – In reflecting on the idea generation 
efforts in Kenya, the community members often suggested simply 
replicating what other businesses were already providing. When asked why 
customers would buy from them and not from the competitors, the pat 
response was that that they would sell their product at a lower cost than 
competitors or provide better quality. We noted a similar thinking process 
when we informally asked women during the SHG meetings what kind of 
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business would they start. As such, I and my colleague felt a discussion 
about unique customer value would improve the effectiveness of our 
ideation process. To address this concept through the workshop, we 
assigned breakout groups (with a Solae representative on each group) the 
task of listing the various needs and wants (as individuals, families) on 
note cards. On the reverse of the card, they were to indicate the best current 
provider for each of those needs and a short explanation for why they 
believed this to be the case. To present back, they were asked to cluster the 
cards that had similar explanations. During the report-back, I and Solae 
team members pushed the discussion to highlight explicit sources of value 
and how that value could be created at different stages of the product user 
cycle. After the workshop, we synthesized the discussions and created a 
“unique value matrix” identifying seven categories of customer value (i.e., 
convenience, variety, customer productivity, peace of mind, comfort, and 
cost savings) at both the purchase and usage stages of a product. We placed 
the examples provided by the community in one of the 14 cells. 
3) Workshop 3: Focused Business Concept – One of the difficulties we noted 
during idea generation in Kenya was that the act of creating a business 
concept was difficult because we provided no guidance on what exactly a 
business concept includes and how to structure the thinking process. As 
well, given the community’s tendency to limit their imaginations about 
businesses (as noted in the discussion above), we felt it was important to 
give the community practice coming up with ideas that exceeded their 
experience (something that was going to be necessary in order for us to 
create a business integrating Solae’s soy protein). The third workshop 
accomplished both objectives through a brainstorming exercise in which 
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we provided breakout teams with a half dozen magazines full of images, 
scissors, glue sticks, markers, and flipcharts. The breakout teams were 
asked to “use cut-out photos to create a unique and exciting business idea 
that combines as many of the following categories: education, 
entertainment, personal care & lifestyle, food and food preparation, health, 
and public services.” Their posters should use photos to identify who the 
customers of the business were and the kind of products and services it 
would offer. The poster should also specify the unique customer value the 
business would provide. We offered the added incentive that the group who 
could create a business concept that addressed the most number of 
categories would win a prize. Our instructions ended up back-firing, as 
several of the groups created what we dubbed the “kitchen sink 
business”—one that simply aggregated all kinds of unrelated products and 
services under one roof as would a mall. The unintended consequence 
ended up providing a valuable discussion, as it led to discussion about 
complementary products and services and the importance of focusing on a 
concrete customer segment. The tool we developed from this workshop 
was a “focused business concept pyramid.” The three dimensions that a 
business concept had to identify were complementary products and 
services, a clear customer segment, and unique customer value.  
4) Workshop 4: Rethinking Resources and Capabilities – Based on our 
successful workshops in Kenya exploring the resources of SC Johnson and 
the community, we repeated the workshop in India. The one change we felt 
important to make was to use the session to get people thinking creatively 
about alternative uses for the same resource. Because of time pressure, we 
were forced to combine a workshop exploring Solae’s resources with one 
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exploring the community’s resources. To do so, we arranged to have a 
local caterer prepare a variety of dishes using Solae’s soy protein. We also 
brought soy milk and soy bars produced by a company supplied by Solae. 
During the tasting session, we gave a short Powerpoint presentation on 
Solae, using as many photos of the company’s operations, facilities, and 
products. When asked what they felt were the resources Solae could bring 
to the partnership, the group identified the following: manufacturing 
nutritious food, manufacturing good tasty food with good flavor and 
texture, food with health benefits, meat replacement, new technology, 
focus on children, global company, variety of customers and knowledge of 
different partners, good image, good packaging and product design. 
Because of the time required to discuss Solae, we did not have time to do a 
“resource transect” as we had hoped. The resource transect, a PRA 
technique, has the community walk through pre-set routes in the 
community to identify resources. Instead, we used another card-sorting 
approach. Breakout teams were given three colors of note cards. Individual 
resources were to be written on pink cards, group resources on green cards, 
and community resources on yellow cards. They would then cluster the 
cards and report back to the group the resource profile of their breakout 
team. We facilitated the discussion in order to push people to deconstruct 
and re-combine resources in order to find new ways to use them. The tool 
we developed to consolidate the learnings was a resource ladder. The 
ladder could be used to come up with new ways of using a resource (new 
resource functions) through a three-step process that explored the 




In general, we felt the workshops were effective and had created a foundation 
on which we could do idea generation. The intensity of the work and frequency of 
contact also created a palpable connection. However, squeezing the four full-day 
workshops into a seven day period had worn people down (including us) and 
furthermore, it turned out, had aroused the worry of some husbands who were 
concerned that the housewives were not fulfilling their other duties. We would see the 
consequences of this at the idea generation workshops the coming week. 
It is worth noting that in-between the PED workshops, we sent two people 
back to Hyderabad (two members who had conducted their homestays there) to begin 
the creation of the sub-community and recruitment of community partners. They met 
with two women’s self-help groups, as well as a youth association, and re-connected 
with people they met during the homestays to re-assure them of our return. One 
valuable outcome from this 2-day excursion was that we learned that the community 
liaison assigned to the team by SIDUR was not an effective mobilizer and lacked the 
ability to get residents to attend. We discussed this with SIDUR, and SIDUR provided 
with a second, more experienced person, to support us.  
In week eight we began the business concept ideation process in Parvathagiri 
with the full Solae team. Based on our learning in Kenya, the ideation process in India 
differed on two main dimensions. One, we announced to the community participants 
that while we would initially start working in breakout groups (as we had in the PED 
workshops), our goal was to converge everyone onto one core business concept. 
Doing so would both ensure that everyone would have a genuine interest in learning 
from each other and sharing ideas (rather than feeling they were competing) and have 
a sense of ownership of the ultimate idea. Together these dynamics were essential for 
creating the beginnings of a new organizational identity.  
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Second, we extended the time period over which ideation would take place to 
allow for significant iteration. In Kenya, ideation was completed in three days; in 
India, we held an initial two full days of ideation, followed by three 2-day concept 
refinement sessions over the course of four weeks. This allowed us as a team to reflect 
on and shape the ideas offline before re-engaging with the community partners. The 
offline “shaping” work by our team was effective in ensuring forward progress on the 
concepts and that the general direction would indeed yield something valuable to 
Solae. However, it also required careful facilitation and discussion with the 
community partners so that they could see how any changes and additions emanated 
directly from or built onto their own ideas and insights. This was critical to having full 
buy-in among the partners and overcoming the “not invented here” sentiments.  
The initial concept ideation workshops started two days after the last PED 
workshops and consisted of two sequential full-day sessions (10:30 – 5:00) at MARI’s 
field office in Parvathagiri. We chose the field office rather than continuing in the 
school because we felt the change of venue would be refreshing and provide greater 
privacy (the school room often had curious children hovering around). The agenda for 
day one consisted of creating assessment criteria for the business concepts in the 
morning; the afternoon had a three hour initial brainstorm session in breakout groups 
followed by a short report out to the full group. The second day consisted of further 
brainstorming in the morning along with drawing the concepts on flipcharts; the 
afternoon consisted of 30 minute presentations and question/answer with the full 
group.  
 As I foreshadowed above, we started day one of concept ideation 
inauspiciously: fewer than 10 people showed up for the 10:30 AM start time. Our 
three community liaisons immediately began an inquiry process to see what the issue 
was. They discovered that the husbands of many of the women had intervened and 
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prevented them from attending, arguing that they were neglecting their housework and 
that they were wasting their time. Some husbands (and some of the participants from 
the PED workshops) also felt that they should receive some compensation for 
attending the sessions; many NGOs, it turned out (including MARI), provided a daily 
allowance when attending training sessions. A few more of the women showed up 
after our liaisons met up with them to discuss the issues.  
By noon, in respect of the community residents who had arrived, our team 
decided to begin with the ideation process and to use the evening to resolve the 
husband issue. After introducing the goal (converge on one idea) and setting the 
expectation that the ideation would not be completed in the first two days, we broke 
into groups representing the four entities in the room: Solae, MARI, AeA, and the 
Community. Each group was asked to identify the kinds of outputs and outcomes that 
they wanted the business to provide for them; in other words, what did each group 
consider as success criteria. Each group was given 30 minutes to discuss and to write 
up their results on a flipchart. Each group reported back. There was some confusion 
though in the translation/interpretation of the question: the community residents 
reported back on what would make a business successful, rather than the kinds of 
benefits they wanted to see the business provide them. That evening, after the session, 
we summarized the criteria onto one list. The criteria included the following:  
• Profitable 
• Long lasting business 
• Use resources of Solae and community 
• Use capabilities of partners 
• Lead to development of the entire family 
• Employ at least 10 members 
• Improve the reputation of Solae and partners 
  
220 
• Lead to good health across the community 
• Lead to gender equity  
• Create jobs for local people 
• Have a good leadership 
• Meet local needs and provide special care to customers 
 
After a lunch break, we formed into four mixed breakout groups and began 
ideation. Unlike Kenya, our team members were active participants in the groups 
(three groups had two Solae team members, and one had one member). In my group, 
simply starting the discussion required considerable prodding and facilitation. I began 
by simply asking if anyone had anything that interested them or that they had thought 
about over the course of the PED sessions. One person brought up the idea of 
“bakery” (the term “bakery” in India is different from US usage; bakeries are closer to 
our idea of delis, and sell things that range from snack foods and appetizers to sodas 
and fruit juices and some sweet foods) that offered nutritious protein fortified foods 
and beverages. I found that focusing them on the feelings, emotions, and environment 
associated with the business ideas was helpful in creating a more lively discussion and 
helped them connect the business to their current lives. The bakery was envisioned as 
a respite, a place for women to connect and socialize, with a garden-like atmosphere 
complete with flowers and trees and a fountain.  
We had anticipated, however, that the ideas would naturally move in the 
direction of a restaurant of some sort—an idea that, from a Solae perspective, was not 
particularly appealing as it was capital-intensive to scale and would have limited reach 
in the community. After letting the group build some momentum around the bakery 
idea and the ethos of the business concept, I raised the question of reach and how 
much we could realistically influence the diets and health of the community. 
  
221 
Eventually, our discussion migrated to exploring ways to expand the distribution of 
the protein-fortified goods without having to build additional bakeries. The bakery 
morphed into a quasi retail point and production center whose goods would be taken 
to surrounding villages and sold at various mobile points. In trying to connect the 
atmosphere of the bakery facility to the mobile points, I asked where in the 
communities they felt this same sense of respite. One person brought up how women 
often socialize under a tree in the village; we began to explore how mobile points 
could also build on this existing social institution. We ended the day by discussing the 
idea of a “Chetla Kinda Bakery” which was Telegu for “Bakery Under the Trees.”  
That evening, our team debriefed on the ideation sessions. As expected, there 
were a lot of frustrations and the ideas mostly circled around some form of “food 
facility.” We encouraged our team members to push their respective breakout groups 
to consider the issue of scale and reach and to ensure that Solae remained central to 
the concept. The other task for the evening consisted of addressing the husband issue. 
Two of the team members (one a woman, the other a man) went accompanied by our 
community liaisons to meet with the husbands of the women who were not allowed to 
attend. Our team members used a combination of shaming and lecturing to convince 
the husbands that they should fully support and encourage their wives to attend. The 
two were quite persuasive, to the point that the husbands not only apologized but 
invited them to stay for dinner. 
The next day, we had approximately 20 people show up for the second ideation 
workshop. We reviewed the consolidated success criteria and then formed into our 
breakout groups. Some of the new attendees merged into existing groups; others came 
together to form a fifth group.  During the morning session, the groups started to 
sketch out the ideas under development on the flipcharts. My group continued to 
pursue and evolve the Chetla Kinda Bakery concept. In the afternoon, each of the five 
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groups presented the drawings of their business concepts and we collectively 
discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the concepts. The five concepts consisted of 
the Chetla Kinda bakery, a school that provided an array of health care and 
entertainment services, a child day care center providing healthy food, a healthy-food 
restaurant catering to the visitors of the Annaram Sharif shrine, and a women’s center 
combined with a women’s only eatery.  
We concluded the session stating that we had made tremendous progress and that 
our team would meet and pull the ideas together based on the discussions. We would 
then come back later that week to continue discussing and refining the ideas in 
preparation for another two-day workshop the following week (week nine of the 
project) at which the Solae corporate lead would be present. The Solae corporate lead 
was visiting the project for 10 days to assess our progress.  
To start the shaping process, I and the other Solae team members took two days 
to draft two-page business concept papers that described the concept, explained how it 
related to unmet needs and wants in the community, and outlined the core set of 
products and services of the business. In drafting the concepts, we ourselves focused 
the description in a way that we believed would create a compelling concept (see 
Appendix 12 for the initial concept paper). We then collectively discussed the 
concepts. We agreed that neither the school concept nor the restaurant concept were 
ones of interest or value to Solae--in the case of the former, Solae’s role and 
contribution to the value proposition (and consequently, the value Solae would derive) 
was very low; in the case of the latter, the restaurant model was hampered by limited 
reach in the community and costly expansion. Please see Appendix 12 for the initial 
concept papers of these three business ideas.   
I and two team members remained in the village to meet with the community 
members later that week to gain alignment on our decisions, to further evolve the 
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concepts, and to prepare for the formal two-day concept development workshop at 
which the Solae corporate lead would be present. The remaining four members of the 
team relocated to Hyderabad to get a jumpstart on building the sub-community and 
recruiting interested members, as well as conducting the PRA sessions. When I and 
team members met with the Parvathagiri community, there was widespread agreement 
that the school concept didn’t make business sense; there was also an understanding 
that a stand-alone restaurant would have limited reach. Also, the bakery and the 
women’s center and eatery contained elements of the restaurant. In reviewing the 
remaining three concepts, there was general agreement that we had captured what was 
discussed. To ensure we were aligned, we asked the groups to sketch out the concepts 
on flipcharts using markers. Their drawings were mostly consistent with our concept 
briefs, though they clearly emphasized different elements. For example, the retail shop 
dimension of the bakery concept figured large in their minds and much attention was 
given to how the foods would be displayed. The women’s center focused on various 
social activities (like yoga) and the women’s only eatery, rather than the joint cooking. 
We asked the community participants to continue to think about the concepts in 
preparation for next-weeks workshop with the Solae corporate lead.  
The objectives for the next two-day workshop in Parvathagiri were three-fold. 
One, I wanted to build the relationship between the Solae corporate lead and the 
community partners in the effort, as this was the first occasion for them to meet. 
Second, we wanted to further advance and refine the business concepts while 
sustaining the community’s motivation and enthusiasm by injecting new voices and 
minds into the process who understood the aim of the project. Third, I wanted to use 
this as an opportunity to re-connect the various partners (i.e., AeA, MARI, SIDUR) 
and to create linkages with other people and organizations that could be supporters of 
the effort. To that end, I invited not only the leadership of all three partner 
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organizations to the workshop, but I also extended invitations to a number of 
people/organizations that MARI and AeA believed could add value. The organizations 
included the Poverty Learning Foundation, the Byrraju Foundation, the RASS 
Capacity Building Insitute, Deccan Development Society, and Development 
Alternatives.  
The planned agenda for the first day of the workshop was to have the Solae 
corporate lead introduce himself followed by a question and answer session with the 
community participants about Solae. Next, we planned to have the community 
participants present the three concepts, using their sketches. We would facilitate a 
discussion after each presentation to identify key challenges and opportunities 
presented by each of the concepts. We would then form three breakout groups 
comprised of the community participants and the various representatives to discuss 
how to address the challenges and to look for synergies across the three concepts. Day 
two would consist of three extended report backs by each of the groups on their 
respective business concept followed by group discussion. Ideally, next day, we would 
present back the findings, take further Q&A, and then to another breakout session to 
work further. Unfortunately, the lack of alignment with the Solae corporate lead that 
existed from the beginning of the project, together with a simmering partnership mis-
alignment with AeA, shifted the tenor and output of the workshop. 
The day prior to the workshop, I and my Protocol colleague shared the three 
business concept briefs with the corporate lead and discussed our goals for the 
workshops. The Solae lead expressed a high concern for a lack of market research and 
data, such as the cost of alternate sources of protein and the volumes and price points 
of food items sold in the village. We explained that our focus at that point in time was 
on building a compelling business concept that would galvanize community 
participants’ interest and have Solae’s protein occupying a central position in the 
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business; our time in the village and the various PRA events provided sufficient 
understanding of the environment to accomplish that aim. The formal market research 
would be valuable later. The Solae lead was clearly unsatisfied with our response and 
turned privately to the Director of AeA with his concerns. The AeA Director 
supported the Solae lead, arguing that I and my Protocol colleague were not giving 
them sufficient voice in the field work and that they could have generated extensive 
market research data through various PRA techniques.  
The day of the workshop, the Solae lead and AeA Director (who were staying in 
a hotel in the city of Warangal) arrived almost an hour late to the session. They 
immediately walked over the sketches on the wall and began to point out their various 
flaws. We called the meeting to order, and I provided an overview to all the 
participants of the work that had led to the business concepts. The Solae corporate lead 
gave his presentation. After lunch, the community participants presented their 
concepts. As I tried to facilitate a discussion about the key challenges and 
opportunities around each concept, the Solae corporate lead and the AeA Director 
turned the discussion to the issue of data, their perception that we lacked a process, 
and the way different PRA techniques could be utilized. To prove his point, the AeA 
Director requested that our community liaisons bring him chalk and then proceeded to 
draw a matrix on the floor with which to rank the three business concepts, much like 
the Kenya rural team had done to rank the different problem solutions they had 
identified. Given the level of tension in the room and our desire not to create further 
distress for the already puzzled community participants, we allowed the ranking 
exercise to proceed.  
We ended the day after the AeA Director had identified the various dimensions 
along which to rank the concepts. Everyone dispersed for dinner after a difficult day. 
The next day we allowed the ranking exercise to be resumed, as the community 
  
226 
participants had already invested considerable time. The exercise consumed the full 
day. As one would expect, community participants largely voted “party lines,” 
favoring the concepts they had developed. Based on our Kenya experience, this 
ranking approach was counter-productive to building the sense of shared 
organizational unity and vision needed to turn the business idea into a functioning 
business. We concluded the meeting stating to the community residents that we would 
relocate to Hyderabad to focus attention on the urban site but would continue to work 
through the community liaisons to continue refining and converging the business 
concepts. 
I and my two team mates returned to Hyderabad for the remainder of week nine 
where we remained based for the rest of the 12-week project. Before rejoining the rest 
of our teammates, who had completed the same set of PRA workshops (i.e., social 
map, institutional map, food map) in the slum and were half-way through the small 
group meetings to recruit interested members to the PED workshop, I and my Protocol 
colleague met with the Solae corporate lead and the AeA Director to regain alignment. 
We were joined in our discussion by two project colleagues from the US (Co-
Directors of the BOP Protocol Initiative, Stuart Hart and Gordon Enk) had also arrived 
that week to India to visit the project sites. We reached agreement that it was in the 
best interest of the project to continue to use the Protocol process and to reserve the 
rush for data collection until we had completed the cycle of ideation. I and my 
Protocol did agree to try and communicate more consistently with the AeA Director 
and to create greater opportunities for him to participate.  
At that point, we re-grouped the full team and planned out the remaining three 
weeks of the workplan. For the Hyderabad site, that entailed the completion of four 
small group recruitment meetings, four PED workshops, and three idea generation 
workshops. We also scheduled another full-day of ideation with the Parvathagiri 
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community members to converge the group on one concept. Needless to say, it was 
going to be a tight squeeze and even more hurried than our rural site schedule  
In Hyderabad, we actively sought to engage a broader diversity of people in 
the small group meetings than we did in Parvathagiri. In total, our team engaged 
eleven different groups, that included several women’s SHGs and savings groups, two 
youth associations, local “basti” leaders (akin to neighborhood heads), a group of men 
cooks operating small food stalls, and  laborer groups that included drivers, plumbers 
and mechanics, This was both a conscious decision, as well as out of necessity. In 
Parvathagiri, MARI’s close relationship with the women’s SHG channeled us in the 
direction of women’s groups—we attempted to reach out to youth, but weren’t able to 
sustain their interest. In the slum of Rasul Pura, SIDUR did not have close ties to a 
particular constituency, so we didn’t have the ability (or the restriction) of using their 
social network. Also, SHGs were much less prominent in slums. But we also felt that 
recruiting a mix of men, women, and youth would be helpful from a business 
perspective and enable a wider range of business possibilities. Culturally, there were 
things that men could do and go that women simply could not. As in Parvathagiri, we 
received verbal commitments from approximately 40 people to attend the PED 
sessions and explore business partnership opportunities. 
We organized to do our four PED sessions within the space of a week in a 
small community room (approximately 20 feet by 15 feet) in one of the two main 
neighborhoods of Rasul Pura slum. This would make it possible for the participants to 
walk to the site. The room also had electricity service and a ceiling fan, an important 
factor given that the day-time temperatures were above 100 degrees Fahrenheit.  
Of the four workshops, only the first differed substantially from what we did in 
Parvathagiri. Unlike Parvathagiri, the attendees invited to the Hyderabad workshops 
were people who did not know one another: Rasul Pura slum has approximately 
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50,000 residents. As such, we felt it critical to hold an initial session that allowed the 
community participants to become familiar with one another. Also, since I and two of 
my colleagues had been completing the ideation work in Parvathagiri while the rest of 
our team was conducting the recruiting meetings, it would also provide the community 
participants a chance to meet the entire Solae team and ensure we were all aligned on 
the purpose of the project 
This first workshop was scheduled to run from 11 AM until three PM. By 
11:30, however, only a few people had showed up. Our SIDUR community liaisons 
had to go the homes of the people who had stated the intent to participate and politely 
encourage them to come at once. This lack of mobilizing capacity of our community 
liaisons in Hyderabad was in start contrast to that of our community liaisons in 
Parvathagiri. The difference was largely attributable, it seemed, to the fact that the 
liaisons in Parvathagiri were residents of the community; in Hyderabad, the liaisons 
had simply worked previously in the Rasul Pura slum community on other SIDUR 
projects. 
We succeeded in starting at noon with 43 people present, of which five were 
male youths. Not a single adult man attended though they had expressed a strong 
interest. We found out later that day after the meeting that the men were not willing to 
work with the women. Another challenging dynamic that presented itself was that the 
youth, who were mostly conservative Muslims, would not enter into the room with the 
women. They remained just outside the room in the narrow alleyway where they could 
hear and be heard.  
The agenda for the first workshop was designed to create interaction and build 
familiarity. To do this, we created five-person breakout groups. Within each group, the 
members shared their name, the number of people in their family, their work, hobbies, 
the length of time they had lived in the community, and their favorite Bollywood actor 
  
229 
and actress. The information was written up on a flipchart. During report-backs, one 
person from each group was asked to introduce the members in their group to 
everyone else.  
Following this exercise, which was successful in breaking the ice and getting 
everyone comfortable with each other, we discussed project objectives. We did this by 
first asking the participants to share what they learned about the project from the 
initial meetings and the PRA sessions. We listed all of their comments on a flipchart. 
We clarified those that were inaccurate. For example, one person said that they came 
because she thought she could get support for her sari shop. We also emphasized key 
points: we were there to create a new business to serve the community that benefited 
them and Solae, and there was no guarantee of jobs or money—just a commitment on 
Solae’s part to engage faithfully and not take their ideas and leave. We then shared the 
workshop schedule for the PED sessions and ideation. 
The final agenda item on the day was to provide a presentation about Solae and 
to introduce them to the company. The Solae corporate lead, who was still in town and 
attended the session, gave a short presentation (we set up a projector and he showed 
different stock photos of Solae’s manufacturing facilities and the products customers 
made from their soy protein) and then engaged in a question and answer session. He 
emphasized to them, on our urging and based on our experience with ideation in 
Parvathagiri, that the business ideas they were looking for could be focused on a wide 
range of things, not just food. The business did have to create value for Solae. 
We concluded the meeting by referring the participants to poster-sized 
sketches of the social maps created in the community the preceding two weeks. Each 
participant was given a colored dot to stick onto the map indicating where they lived. 
The purpose of this was both to create a common understanding of the work that had 
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taken place and to see the geographic dispersion of the participants across the 
community.  
The remaining three workshops addressed unique customer value, focused 
business concept, and repurposing resources and capabilities. Again, we used the idea 
of building a house as a metaphor for building a business. Due to our time constraint, 
we had to skip the workshop on Successful Partnerships. The three workshops 
followed the same general structure and pattern as those in Parvathagiri, though we 
modified them somewhat based on the experience in Parvathagiri.  For the focused 
business concept exercise, for example, we tried to avoid the group falling into a 
“kitchen sink business concept” by offering a prize to the group whose business 
concept was voted the most creative (rather than the concept that could span the most 
number of industry categories).  
Also, given the tedious nature of the card-sorting approach to identifying and 
discussing community resources, we used a resource-transect technique (one we had 
used in Kenya during ideation) combined with photography. The approach involved 
creating five breakout groups. Each group, which contained a Solae person, was led by 
one of the community members on a route through the slum. On the route, the group 
was tasked with taking photographs of individual, group, and community resources; in 
addition, they were asked to look for both tangible and intangible resources. When 
they returned from their routes, we downloaded the photos and projected them on the 
wall. A representative of the group discussed the resource’s current use as well as an 
alternative use. A prize was given to the most creative resource identified—the prize 
went to the group that identified the rooftops of buildings in the slum as a place for 
entertainment and “getaway” (they could watch planes from the bordering airport 
takeoff and land). The changes to both of the exercises were effective. 
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An additional point to note is that over the course of the workshops, the male 
youths stopped their participation on our suggestion. We noted to them that it was 
going to be difficult for us to work on creating a business together if we could not all 
be working in the same room. We offered that they return once the business was 
moving forward to see whether there would be a way to involve them. Also, as 
expected, the number of attendees declined to approximately 25.  
There were also some interesting differences in the group character between 
the rural site and the slum. The women participants in the rural site were very 
disciplined in their approach to the project; they arrived on time, stayed late to discuss 
issues, and seemed “hungry” to participate. We attributed this to the women’s 
participation in the SHG’s. In the slum, the women participants were creative and 
extraordinarily insightful—they grasped business concepts quickly. They showed, 
however, much less discipline and demonstrated commitment—meetings started 
almost an hour late and they were also very impatient, ready to leave at the originally 
scheduled hour (despite arriving late).  
In the middle of the PED sessions in the Hyderabad slum, we also squeezed in 
a full day meeting with the Parvathagiri community participants to converge onto one 
business concept. Rather than hold the session in Parvathagiri, we decided have the 
women travel to Hyderabad and hold the meeting at a retreat center. We discussed this 
with the MARI Director, as having women travel on their own to a large city like 
Hyderabad and stay there overnight was very much an out-of-the-ordinary experience. 
The MARI Director felt that the experience would be a tremendous confidence-boost 
for the women and would demonstrate Solae’s interest in working with them as 
business partners. The Parvathagiri liaisons worked with the community participants 
to identify ten women to represent the group in the meeting. They traveled 
accompanied by the community liaisons, arriving in the late afternoon. We organized 
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a group dinner at a popular Hyderabad restaurant among the locals to re-acquaint 
ourselves and to smooth the transition into our work. 
The focus on the next day’s meeting was to converge the group onto one 
concept. To do this, I and the Solae team worked ahead of time to tailor the three 
concepts that were on the table (the bakery, the women’s center, and the crèche) in a 
way that we felt would be of interest to Solae and highlight synergies across the 
concepts. We also identified what we saw as key challenges each concept faced and 
the issues they needed to address and potential avenues for merging them together. In 
our re-working of the concepts, we made the most significant changes to the crèche 
concept and the women’s center concept.  
For the crèche concept, we proposed having a central office and kitchen center 
that would certify and oversee home-based day-care businesses run by grandparents 
(grandparents did not have the physical strength to work in the fields and were often 
seen as “burdens” because of their inability to contribute to the family’s livelihood). 
The central office would also prepare the protein-fortified foods provided to the 
children. Our reason for shifting the business concept in this manner was to increase 
its scalability (and interest to Solae) by eliminating the need for constructing daycare 
centers. We also re-positioned the women’s center into a cooking center that would 
provide hands-on cooking instruction and access to higher-end, higher-capacity 
cooking facilities on some pay-per-use or memberships basis. The reason for this shift 
was based on our growing recognition that the real “pay-day” for Solae would come 
from getting women to integrate Solae’s protein into their daily cooking habits. 
Getting them to make the necessary behavioral changes associated with that would be 
best done through an environment that linked socializing with the learning of those 
new behaviors. The Curves fitness chain which designed its women’s gym based on 
this concept was the model we had in mind.  
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We left the bakery concept largely in tact, though we noted that it needed to 
address the key challenge of influencing daily consumption more significantly—the 
baked goods provided by the bakery comprised a small part of people’s diet and, 
consequently, would have little impact on overall health. We noted that one way of 
addressing this is by using the bakery kitchen to also serve as the women’s cooking 
center (and even to produce the food in the home-based crèche concept). Thus, the 
way we presented the concepts was done to help seed the convergence among the 
three ideas. Appendix 13 contains our sketches of the re-framed business concepts.  
We opened the meeting with us presenting the re-positioned concepts along 
with our view (i.e., Solae’s view) of the key challenges and outstanding questions. We 
asked whether the core proposition of each of the concepts was something for which 
there would be demand. There was close to unanimous agreement that there would be 
only limited value in a crèche—there was already a government crèche system serving 
low-income children. We therefore dropped the day-care concept altogether—in 
reality, we saw little value to Solae of such a business and were happy that the women 
reached the same conclusion. There was a widespread belief that there would be a 
demand for baked goods in the villages, as existing bakeries (there was one in 
Parvathagiri) had limited variety and, according to the community, of relatively low 
quality (e.g., it didn’t use the high-quality butter called “ghee”). There was less 
unanimous support for the cooking center—people believed that the tourists coming to 
Annaram Sharif would pay to rent a cooking facility, but that the locals would be less 
likely to do so. There was the belief that the women might value cooking training 
classes and a women’s only space around food. We, however, felt that the cooking 
center, though it was outside of the community’s current realm of imagination and 
experience, was where there was significant opportunity for Solae as compared with 
the bakery.  
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This issue highlights a key tension, one might even say a paradox, of trying to 
co-create a concept with the community: in order to create a viable business around 
company’s products and capabilities, the value proposition and business model will 
likely take the form of something that has no precedent; community participants, 
however, are no more likely than anyone else (maybe even less likely) to think that 
something completely new and out of their realm of experience is something people 
would value. If we were to listen to the community residents and follow what they 
believe would be of value, the resulting business ideas would simply replicate what 
already exists. And the businesses that already exist are, by definition, not ones whose 
models will provide value to the company or the company would have already have 
tapped them. In retrospect of the ideation, my Protocol colleague and I came to realize 
that discussing and choosing concepts based on whether the community partners felt 
that there would be demand was the wrong framing.  
To converge the two concepts, we divided the meeting participants into two 
breakout groups and tasked them specifically with figuring out how the concepts could 
be effectively combined into one business. My breakout group struggled with the task, 
despite my efforts to highlight points of synergy. Numerous arguments were made as 
to why they couldn’t be merged: the kind of equipment needed for bakery goods was 
different for what would be useful as a cooking center; it would be impossible to 
maintain appropriate hygiene standards for bakery foods if the kitchen was also be 
used for cooking classes; there wouldn’t be enough down-time between producing 
baked goods to allow for the kitchen to be used for other purposes; it would take 
greater capital investment.  
In the end, both groups developed similar representations of a concept that 
combined the bakery retail point and baked goods distribution with cooking training 
and kitchen rental (please see Exhibit 11). To reach consensus about which business 
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concept was the right way forward, we asked all of the participants to rate the three 
options on the table (the bakery, the cooking center, and the joint bakery-cooking 
center) as to the value it created for the community and the value it created for Solae 
(please see Appendix 15). The merged concept was rated as providing the most value 
for Solae; interestingly, the baked goods business ranked slightly higher than the 
merged concept in terms of value to the community. I believe the latter happened 
because the people who created the baked goods business concept were still very wary 
of “polluting it” with the other business. The overall outcome of the ranking did 
support the view that we should proceed with the merged concept. We concluded the 
meeting by outlining next steps from Solae’s side: I and my Protocol colleague would 
work to write up the concept and pitch it to Solae’s corporate team in approximately 
four to six weeks. If they too were excited about it, we would move to the next phase 
and begin small-scale pilot testing. While I and my Protocol colleague would return to 
the US to do this work, the other team members and liaisons would continue to work 
with them in pulling together various data and information necessary for the report to 
Solae. There was genuine excitement among the group, and a real sense of 
accomplishment from an intensive month of engagement. 
With time running short, we scheduled two back-to-back days of concept 
ideation for the Hyderabad site. I and my Protocol colleague were slated to return to 
the US the day after the second workshop (we had already extended our stay by a 
week). As such, our goal wasn’t to reach a converged concept in those two days, but to 
outline an initial set of concepts that we and the Solae team remaining in India could 
iterate and refine via teleconference. The Solae team in India would continue to 
interface with the Hyderabad community participants through the refinement and 
convergence period.  
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 On our request, a Solae manager from the India office was asked by Solae’s 
corporate office in the US to participate in the sessions. Approximately 24 women 
attended each day. The first day of the idea generation workshop was divided into two 
main parts. The first part was an introduction to Solae and the kinds of products it 
produced, while the second part developed the set of success criteria that the business 
concepts would aim to meet. In Parvathagiri, the introduction to Solae and its products 
was addressed in the PED workshop on resources; due to lack of time (the workshops 
in Hyderabad were shorter in length), we weren’t able to cover this in the Hyderabad 
resource workshop. 
To discuss Solae’s resources, we broke the group into breakout teams and 
projected images of the company taken by the Solae India manager, pausing for a 
couple of minutes on each photo. The photos were of such things as the corporate 
office in Delhi, the showroom containing their various products and companies that 
integrate Solae’s ingredients, the cubicles and workstations, the people, and the testing 
lab. We asked the teams to discuss what they saw and to jot down the kinds of 
resources that Solae could bring to a business. Once the photos were all projected, the 
community participants shared with the Solae India manager what they saw. He then 
affirmed, corrected, or elaborated of their observations. The goal of this approach was 
to have the community “take ownership” for what Solae could offer, rather than being 
told.   
We then had a variety of Solae protein fortified foods prepared for a tasting. 
The foods included a variety of Indian snack foods and appetizers, energy bars, and 
soy milk based tea. The Solae India manager also brought with him several pouches of 
the different varieties of soy protein isolate that they sold in India. We asked the 
community participants to share their observations about each of the foods. The Solae 
India manager also provided information on the nutritional benefits of soy protein. 
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The second part of the day was used to develop the success criteria for the 
business. This exercise was equivalent to what we conducted in Parvathagiri. As in 
Parvathagiri, the translation of the goal of the exercise was imperfect: the community 
participants identified mostly factors that make a business successful, such as “good 
customer service,” rather than the kind of impact or outputs that the partners want to 
see the business create. As in Parvathagiri, we noted that for Solae it was important 
that the business concept have “deep reach” into their community and be affordable 
and accessible to a large number of people in the community. 
Day two consisted entirely of small-group brainstorming to develop an initial 
set of concepts. At the beginning of the session, I stressed to the group that the idea 
generation would not end that day; rather, we would continue to refine and converge 
the ideas over several weeks. I also re-iterated the key business success criteria for 
Solae. As in Parvathagiri, the breakout task assignment was to “Creatively combine 
the group’s resources to generate business ideas that broadly serve the community.” 
On flipcharts, each team was to identify 1) the business concept; 2) the core customer 
segment; 3) the unique business value; and 4) the value/benefits received by each 
partner. As in Parvathagiri, each of the breakout teams contained a Solae team 
representative. The breakout discussions were divided into two, two-hour periods 
separated by lunch. We had one hour for the report-backs followed by question and 
answer. 
We experienced the same difficulty of getting the ideation going; also the 
groups fell into the same “traps,” such as focusing on facilities and restaurants. The 
four concepts eventually developed were similar in substance to what was created in 
Parvathagiri. The first concept was a children’s education and tutoring center that 
provided healthy food. The second concept was a tiffin restaurant (tiffins are similar to 
“heavy appetizers” and include such things as samosas) that provided health food. The 
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third concept was a breakfast tiffin production and direct-to-home delivery service (the 
group in which I participated). The fourth concept was a family-focused bakery and 
tiffin center with sales points throughout the slum.  
We concluded the session by congratulating everyone on a great start and their 
hard work and commitment over the three weeks. We explained that I and my 
colleagues would return to the US where we would continue to work with the Solae 
team in India to refine and converge the concepts; the Solae team would continue to 
work with them throughout this process. I would then present the refined concept to 
Solae in the US sometime in the next six weeks in the hope that they would support a 
pilot test.  
Before I and my Protocol colleague returned to the US, we met with each of 
the local partners (AeA, SIDUR, MARI) to discuss next steps and the timeline moving 
forward. We noted that our expectation was to meet with Solae in August to present 
the ideas and to get their decision at that time on whether or not to move forward. Four 
of the five team members in India would continue to be under contract (through AeA) 
and on the project through the end of July (one of the business-trained team members 
was leaving the project at the end of June). The team’s primary role for the month of 
July was to 1) conduct any data collection necessary for developing the presentation to 
Solae and 2) continue to work with the Rasul Pura slum community to refine and 
converge the business concepts.  
Having returned to the US, my focus over the months of July and August 2006 
was to converge and refine the business concept for the Rasul Pura site and to then 
develop “the business case” around both the Parvathagiri and Rasul Pura business 
concepts. The ultimate goal was to give Solae’s senior management team the 
confidence that there was a sufficiently compelling business opportunity in both 
locations to warrant further investment in a pilot.  
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Managing the convergence of the Rasul Pura business concept at a distance 
introduced an additional complexity. We started the process with a conference call 
with the Solae India team to discuss the output of the idea generation workshop. In 
that discussion, we decided to collapse two of the ideas together that involved a 
restaurant/tiffin center, thereby remaining with three initial concepts (children’s 
education center, family bakery and tiffins center, sunrise tiffin delivery service). In 
addition, we discussed how the children’s education center concept held a minimal 
role for Solae and, therefore, was unlikely to get support. We also agreed to write up 
the concepts and, as we had done in Parvathagiri, to shape the concepts in a manner 
that we felt would be attractive to Solae. Please see Appendix 16 for the three business 
concept write-ups. The Solae team in India then arranged to have a discussion with the 
community participants on the three re-focused business concepts.  
At that meeting, which was attended by 18 women, our Solae team explained 
the reason for narrowing down to three concepts. They then facilitated a discussion 
with the community participants on the strengths and weaknesses of those concepts. 
We then held a conference call with the Solae team to discuss the outcomes of that 
session. The good news was that the community participants were skeptical of the 
demand for a children’s education center that provided dinner and didn’t see there was 
much opportunity for Solae. That concept was dropped from further discussion 
(though the spirit of serving children was retained).  
In discussing the other two concepts, however, the discussion simply became 
one of what the women liked and disliked and felt comfortable with, rather than what 
needed to be done to strengthen the business concepts in terms of scalability, reach, 
and transformational impact. The participants, for example, did not feel comfortable 
managing a direct-to-home distribution model and, therefore, decided to drop that 
aspect from the one concept; instead, they wanted to run a restaurant facility that 
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offered take-out. They decided, therefore, to focus on the family bakery and tiffin 
center and add the breakfast tiffins in take-out to its offering. As I noted earlier, the 
natural tendency to migrate to a restaurant-type facility was precisely what we were 
trying to avoid because of the limited scalability and reach of any facility (particularly 
in the slum, where available space presented an enormous constraint). We noted this 
issue with the Solae team and emphasized that we ourselves needed to advance and 
evolve the ideas in the discussions, not simply go with what the community 
participants feel more comfortable with. I and my US colleague said that we would 
iterate on the concept ourselves and then re-connect with the team to discuss.  
In our offline effort to evolve the family bakery and tiffins concept, we wanted 
to retain the element of creating family-focused recreation and togetherness 
opportunities built around food—that element we believed was the core offering of the 
current concept as envisioned by the community partners. However, to make the 
concept attractive to Solae, we needed to de-link it from a dependence on a physical 
site and to strengthen its ability to influence and shape daily cooking habits.  
In our brainstorming session, we thought back to the resource photography 
workshop discussion in which one of the surprise resources was rooftops: rooftops, as 
the community noted, provided a peaceful get-away. As well, the kind of getaway that 
was often mentioned was one that provided greenspace. The density of construction in 
the slum had eliminated most trees. In fact, one of the community resources 
photographed was one of the few remaining trees which served as a place to 
congregate (similar in spirit to what the Parvathagiri community participants noted as 
well).  We began to look into the concept of rooftop gardens and urban agriculture and 
saw in that an opportunity to create the sense of “place” that the women wanted in a 
manner that had a far greater degree of flexibility (there were a lot of unused rooftops 
in the slum whereas ground-level space was near impossible to acquire), did not entail 
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much construction, and provided a unique branding opportunity. We also were 
reminded of the conversations during the food consumption maps that noted the poor 
quality of greens and fresh vegetables available in the slum. According to the women 
participants, they would travel to markets outside the slum to get higher quality 
vegetables at a lower price. The rooftop gardens and urban agriculture techniques 
could also be folded into the concept.  
In discussing the challenge of influencing daily cooking habits, we came back 
to the concept that had emerged in Parvathagiri about a community cooking/training 
center which would make available a kitchen facility. Also, we were reminded of the 
Rasul Pura women’s comment that cooking shows on television were very popular in 
the slum; there was a strong interest in learning new techniques and improving 
cooking skills. Creating a widespread cooking culture that integrated soy protein 
would need to harness that interest.  
Based on these insights and the current shape of the business idea, we outlined 
a concept we called the Solae Culinary Park. The culinary park would convert 
rooftops in the slum into park-like areas that had a food motif: the plants grown would 
be mainly food crops and herbs. The main function of the park was to create an 
interest and awareness around food and nutrition and the business, demonstrate the 
preparation of foods using soy protein, sample out an ever-changing menu of soy-
protein fortified foods, and serve as a brand anchor for the business. A chef’s group 
would prepare and sell packaged foods using the soy-protein to spur interest in using 
the soy protein. They would also go direct to people’s homes to do in-home 
demonstrations and hands-on cooking training with a group of the woman’s friends 
and neighbors to spur adoption of the soy protein. The business could even look to 
expand and spread the rooftop and container growing practices in the slum, potentially 
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even contracting out with people to grow the ingredients used in the packaged and 
prepared foods.  
We discussed this vision with the Solae team in India. There was excitement 
and interest about linking the business and the soy protein to wider issues of 
greenspace and food insecurity. The Solae India team members conducted their own 
brainstorm session of various ways the rooftop gardens could drive interest in the soy 
protein and, more broadly, in better cooking and nutrition. They outlined the following 
opportunities and elements that could be addressed at a rooftop garden:  
1. Food  
• Provide advantages, nutrition and portion size information for 
food served  
• Tips on selecting and purchasing best ingredients 
• Cooking demonstrations on cutting and cooking techniques 
• Cooking tips on retaining foods nutritional content 
• Demonstrations of serving techniques 
• Tips on storing leftovers 
2. Children -  Create ways to improve child’s social skills, problem 
solving and creativity through early play experiences in a garden 
environment 
• Games around cooking; sandboxes  
• Arts and Craft classes  
• Be a Fit Kid presentations  
3. Women  
• Information on how to manage the home in a better way 





• Community gardens provide space to enjoy nature 
• Information about medicinal plants 
5. Community 
• Games which build a sense of community around better health 
and nutrition awareness   
• Platform to showcase local art  
• Movie nights that demonstrates nutritional issues; pictorial 
Magazines that even illiterate can understand. 
Based on our team’s discussions, we drafted a description of this general 
concept and outlined the kinds of value that each component of the concept created 
(please see Appendix 17). We also found as many photos and examples of rooftop 
gardens that the Solae India team could share with the community participants. At the 
end of July, the Solae India team met with the Rasul Pura community participants to 
continue the discussion of the business concept. The community participants 
themselves shared that they could not find a store front for the bakery in the slum. The 
Solae India team presented the re-formulated idea with the roof-top garden 
component. As the team reported, there was a lot of interest in the rooftop component 
and the possibility of growing vegetables. There was also a lot of discussion of where 
and how to start. They were skeptical of offering a training course until they had 
established the business. The community participants said that they would meet on 
their own to continue discussing the business concept.  The Solae India team re-
iterated that I would be meeting with Solae shortly (in August) to present the general 
concept. Based on the reception they received to the idea, the Solae India team felt that 
this very idea could be presented to Solae. 
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I and my Protocol colleague also continued to formalize the business concept 
out of Parvathagiri. Although there was agreement during our final re-vision workshop 
with the Parvathagiri community participants that a converged concept was in the best 
interest of Solae and the community, we did not have a clearly articulated and 
synthesized concept. From our perspective, the core focus of the concept could not be 
the bakery as such; again, the “restaurant” concept would hold little appeal to Solae 
both because of its limited impact on consumption and because it was a capital 
intensive business to scale. As such, we anchored the concept around the cooking 
center component that emphasized renting of the kitchen and the cooking training 
classes; the production of protein-fortified bakery goods was framed as a secondary 
revenue source that could generate interest in the protein. Conceptually, this concept 
lacked in our minds the “wow” or “that’s interesting” factor that the Rasul Pura 
concept contained; there wasn’t the same compelling imagery for the cooking center 
as accompanied the concept of food-focused rooftop gardens that would drive a broad-
based urban agriculture and greening movement in the slum.  
During the month of July, the Solae India team also conducted data collection 
in both Parvathagiri and in Rasul Pura. In Rasul Pura, they conducted RAP sessions 
around the perception and utilization of rooftops, what a “going-out” occasion looks 
like, perceptions of organic food, perception of greenspace, and the general food 
culture (please see Appendix 18). They also collected data on the quantities and prices 
of various prepared and packaged foods sold in the slum. In Parvathagiri, they 
collected data relating to the rental of a kitchen facility (i.e., the willingness to pay for 
kitchen facilities by visitors to Annaram Sharif); the kind, frequency, and price of 
bakery items purchased in Parvathagiri and Annaram Sharif; the number of villages 
within the county that were five kilometers from Parvathagiri and between five and ten 
kilometers distance and the available modes of transportation for each.  
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During July and August, I continued to engage with the Solae corporate lead to 
keep him apprised of our progress, to set a date to present to the Solae top 
management team, and to agree on the deliverables we were to present at that meeting. 
Just as we had experienced at the very start of the project, we continued to disagree 
about the detail and depth of our output. The corporate lead continued to press for a 
detailed analysis of the business operations, the financial model, and even a scaling 
strategy. The tension surrounding our inability to reach alignment escalated to the 
point that I was concerned that our presentation to the top management team would be 
adversely affected. This seemed to be born out by the fact that corporate lead’s initial 
haste to schedule the date for the meeting—which was driven in part by our insistence 
that the community needed to receive a decision as soon as possible to ensure that 
momentum wasn’t lost (as we experienced in Kenya)—was replaced by an aloofness. 
An early August target date passed. Based on this, my project colleague and co-
Director of the Protocol (Stuart Hart) reached out to the President directly to express 
the urgency of meeting as early as possible, as well as to voice concern about the fit 
between the nature of the work and Solae’s corporate lead on the project. Based on 
that personal outreach, an August 23 date was set. He also encouraged that the 
meeting include a broader audience of managers beyond the project’s corporate lead.  
In preparation for the August 23rd debrief at Solae’s corporate headquarters, I 
developed expanded strategic briefs for each of the two concepts. The briefs were 
divided into five sections: 1) key un-met community needs relevant to the concept; 2) 
a description of the business concept; 3) the business and community value created by 
each component of the business concept; 4) strategic business factors that would drive 
success; and 5) factors influencing the sustainability of Solae’s competitive position 
(please see Appendices 16 and 17).  In addition, I developed a 60-slide powerpoint 
presentation divided into four main sections: 1) BOP Protocol theory overview; 2) 
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field overview of both project sites; 3) overview of both business concepts; and 4) 
recommended next steps.  
Importantly, this presentation also contained a new draft model of the BOP 
Protocol process that I had led in developing with input of colleagues upon my return 
from India. This model reflected my first opportunity to translate the learnings to date 
from Kenya and India back into the process. The draft model was inspired by Bill 
McDonough’s fractal model for representing the interrelationship among the social, 
economic, and ecological dimensions of sustainability. I used the fractal concept as a 
way to visually represent the process as one continuous piece of work, rather than 
three independent phases that could be undertaken as discrete projects. In a 
fundamental sense, the structure of the Solae project—in which Solae would invest in 
the next phase of activities based on whether the initial business concept was deemed 
promising—had baked in the very same transition challenges we experienced in 
Kenya because of this piece-meal approach.  
The draft model also explicitly worded the output of the initial ideation work 
(the work we had just completed in India) as a “business concept;” the business model 
would be developed out in the course of the second phase of activity. Clearly, the 
intent of this change was to avoid the kind of mis-alignment regarding outputs that 
characterized the initial work with Solae in India. The new Protocol model also 
included the new set of activities that we had dubbed “participatory entrepreneurship 
development.” However, in the course of developing the model, I decided that the 
term “participatory” failed to convey the ethos; I opted for the term “collective 
entrepreneurship training,” as the activities were geared toward building the 
company’s ability to create a business together with community partners.  
The August 23rd meeting at Solae’s corporate headquarters in St. Louis was 
attended by the President, the Senior VP for Africa and South America, the just-tapped 
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manager for India (who was previously manager of South Africa and managed Solae’s 
school feeding program in Nigeria), the VP for technology, and the Solae corporate 
lead on the project (who was Director of Global Accounts).  I and my US colleague, 
project Co-Director Stuart Hart, both attended.   
The meeting began with introductions. Noteworthy among the introductions 
was that the in-coming manager for Solae’s India business was also being put in 
charge of yet-to-be-finalized platform within Solae called Nutrition for Sustainable 
Development (NFSD) that would house the company’s BOP efforts. Those BOP 
efforts would include two kinds of initiatives: 1) institutional initiatives like the school 
feeding program that worked with government and non-governmental agencies; and 2) 
co-creation initiatives like the work in India that were creating bottom-up businesses 
in partnership with communities. NFSD would report directly to the President. The 
creation of this position effectively removed the corporate lead from an ongoing role 
in the project. 
After the initial overview of the Protocol theory and debrief of the India field 
work, I outlined the Solae Culinary Park business concept developed in Rasul Pura 
slum. The vision and concept created significant interest and a very positive, lively 
discussion. The group started to input their own visions of the transformative 
community impact the business could have and the opportunities to engage other 
divisions within DuPont. A discussion also ensued regarding scale, particularly how 
this core business could be packed up and replicated in an efficient, systematic manner 
that would allow Solae to occupy a more arm’s length role in the expansion. Such a 
scaling strategy was required if the business were to fit within Solae’s B2B structure.  
After a break, we turned to the Parvathagiri “Cooking Well Center” concept. 
As we had anticipated and ourselves had felt, there was much less enthusiasm for the 
idea. The presentation structure was identical, and just as with the Rasul Pura concept, 
  
248 
I showed a before and after photo of what a Cooking Well Center would look like. In 
retrospect, it seemed that the Rasul Pura concept enabled the audience’s own 
imagination to run with the concept, whereas the Parvathagiri concept appeared to 
limit imagination and personal investment. Conceptually, the Rasul Pura concept was 
anchored the rooftop gardens, which weren’t spatially confined; in fact, as we noted 
during the presentation, the intent would be to instigate a slum-wide move to roof-top 
gardens. The Parvathagiri concept, by contrast, was anchored around a bounded space 
in the form of the Cooking Center. It seems plausible that the kind of spatial imagery 
catalyzed by the concepts also shaped how much psychological room the audience felt 
they had to fill in the concept.  
I outlined the recommended next steps and outstanding questions on each 
business concept, framing the activities using the new draft model for Phase II of the 
Protocol (please see Appendices 19 and 20). In addition, I noted the key outstanding 
issues, particularly the urgency of re-constituting the Solae team in India, as the 
contracts for the team members had expired. I emphasized the issue of timing: the 
momentum in the communities was fragile, as was their trust, and giving them a 
go/no-go decision in a timely manner was critical. 
Generally speaking, the message at the meeting was that Solae was very 
interested and mostly satisfied by the direction. At the same time, there was no explicit 
commitment to invest in the next phase of work. Instead, Solae asked for us to submit 
a proposal for how we (Cornell/the BOP Protocol team) would continue to support the 
work. The in-coming manager to India who would head the NFSD platform would 
need time to understand the totality of the work that had happened in order to 
determine the best path forward. In addition, he would be relocating to India with the 
goal of arriving there by the end of the year (December 2006).  
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Upon return, I drafted a 6-month proposal for our Protocol team to lead a Solae 
India team through Phase II of the Protocol with the goal of refining and launching a 
“pilot-ready” business model in both project sites. My Protocol colleague would 
assume the lead role and I would provide overall project guidance and support to my 
colleague. As in the first Phase, we would also continue to manage the field-level 
budget and administration.  
After several weeks had passed without response, I reached out to the 
incoming manager to press for a decision, recognizing that the communities were in a 
holding pattern. We eventually spoke and discussed the mis-alignment with the 
original corporate lead. His concern with the proposal was that the work and approach 
was very experimental, and that we ourselves were still in a learning stage. In addition, 
in our discussions in St. Louis we had emphasized the importance of Solae taking 
leadership and ownership of the project: The proposal did not make clear the need for 
this, nor how we would transition Solae into a leadership role. Based on this, he asked 
for a revised proposal that would establish more of a partnership between the Cornell 
Protocol team and Solae, rather than a consulting arrangement that outsourced the 
work.  
I drafted a second proposal with this in mind. Per the proposal,  
 
“the purpose of the project is to conduct the minimum set of activities 
that maintain momentum and advance business development while 
Solae formalizes its Nutrition for Sustainable Development (NfSD) 
SBU. The proposed activities and their execution are designed to 
smooth NfSD’s integration into the project leadership position while 
providing a platform on which to launch eventual business pilot 
testing.”  
 
The four month project timeline was based on the four activity areas in Phase II of the 
draft BOP Protocol model. They included: 
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1. Formation of Project Community 
a. Establish a Solae India Pilot Team consisting of local Indians 
that were part of the Solae Protocol team, as well as community 
liaisons from the rural and urban sites. 
b. Get support and commitment from local NGO partners (MARI 
in rural area and SIDUR in urban) and formalize project 
relationships as needed 
c. Develop an internal communication and reporting process 
among Solae, Cornell, and the India Pilot Team o Assist Solae 
in identifying and vetting potential Solae hires to lead the 
Hyderabad project sites  
2. Building Shared Commitment 
a. Establish continuity, alignment, and shared commitment with 
project communities by holding series of workshops that a) 
outline Solae’s time-line and project intent in manner that 
signals commitment while managing expectations; b) establish 
partners’ roles and responsibilities and “elect” representative 
community pilot team; c) Develop a joint vision/values 
statement among Solae, the partners and the communities to 
guide project work. Other workshops may be added based on 
partner and community recommendations. 
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3. New Capability Development 
a. Co-identify with the community and local partners the 
necessary skills and training needed by the community team 
members. We anticipate these trainings will include, at a 
minimum conflict resolution, book-keeping/basic accounting, 
food and nutrition, marketing and customer care. These 
trainings should draw on Solae’s (and potentially Dupont’s) 
staff whenever possible in order to strengthen the ties to the 
community.  
4. Business Model Co-Development  
a. Co-identify and prioritize key market research needed to 
determine the initial product/service offering  
b. Co-identify and prioritize key knowledge-gaps for assessing and 
testing out the business concepts  
c. Co-develop a research plan of action and roles/responsibilities 
for collection and analysis of needed information 
I discussed the new proposal with the incoming India/NfSD manager, and he 
stated that it was in alignment with his view and that he would circulate it internally 
for final budgetary sign-off. Another week passed, however, putting us into October 
2006. I had maintained communication with the local NGO partners, and they raised 
the strong concern that further delay would jeopardize Solae’s trust and relationships 
in the communities. I booked a return flight to India the following week on the 
confidence that the final project approval would be granted shortly. Approval was 
indeed granted before my departure. 
This concludes my summary of the Prefield and Phase I segments of the Solae 




Field Summary: October 2006 – April 2007  
This six-month period equated to the first half of Phase II activities of the new 
BOP Protocol model. It consisted of the initial four month contract outlined above, as 
well as a two-month contract extension that was necessary to provide the new Solae 
India General Manager/NfSD Global Lead with additional time to put in place an 
organizational structure to manage the projects and ensure a smooth handoff.  
During this period, I continued to occupy the role of project manager, 
managing the project budgets and supervising the field team’s action plans. Over the 
course of this contract period, I returned to India on two occasions (October 2006 and 
January 2007) for a combined total of 28 days. In the US, I communicated with the 
India project field lead via skype approximately 10 hours per week, helping him 
develop project plans and coaching him through the process. Over this period, the 
more fundamental learnings from Kenya had materialized with regards to the 
limitations of moving from business concept to pilot using traditional market research 
(e.g., questionnaires) and product development, thereby leading to on-the-fly 
adaptation of the process that further changed our understanding and structure of 
Phase II.  
Before returning to India in October 2006, I contacted our project partners in 
Phase I (i.e., AeA, MARI, SIDUR) and outlined Solae’s decision and the objectives 
for my visit, which included re-establishing a field team, gaining alignment on the role 
of the local partners, and re-starting progress on the businesses in both sites. It was 
clear that the issue of re-constituting a field team was going to present a challenge and 
would impact the relationship with the local partners. The reason for this was that of 
the five people on the Solae India team, I and my Protocol colleague believed that the 
social entrepreneur—the person who had left the team after homestays because of a 
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contractual dispute with AeA—was the most qualified to lead the work. When I 
approached the social entrepreneur about the opportunity, he was available and 
interested. AeA, however, raised concerns about working with a team led by this 
person.  
When I arrived in India, I immediately met with the social entrepreneur to 
discuss the position. His extensive social work training, fluency in Telegu, and almost 
ten years experience facilitating the development of community-based enterprises 
were an excellent match for the job. Based on our learning in Kenya, I and my 
colleague felt that it was important that the effort be led in the field by a single person 
with accountability for the businesses’ success, rather than a “committee approach” in 
which several people were giving a portion of their time. As such, our desire was to 
have the social entrepreneur be the overall project field lead with final decision-
making authority. He would be supported by the AeA team member from Phase I 
fluent in Telegu who had extensive development and community experience. 
Unfortunately, because of the prior contractual conflict with the social entrepreneur, 
AeA declined to participate further.  
I drew up and closed a four month contract for the social entrepreneur to serve 
as the project field lead. Due to other prior consulting obligations, he would not be 
able to devote full-time to the project for the next month until those obligations were 
fulfilled. He and I began a process of intensive de-briefing to catch him up on all that 
had transpired after his premature departure from the team in Phase I. We also 
discussed the Solae proposal and the expectations about deliverables for the four-
month period. All of my subsequent meetings with the local partners and with the 
community participants from Phase I were together with the project field lead to 
establish and communicate clearly his leadership role on the ground.  
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My targeted profile for the field team was for an overall project field lead 
managing a full-time, two-person team dedicated to each of the project sites. The two-
person team for each site would include a person with business experience and a 
second with social work/community development experience. This approach was one 
that we had used in Kenya and believed it provided the necessary mix of skills 
required to address the challenges posed by the work. I had hoped that the person with 
community skills could be drawn from the community liaisons seconded from MARI 
and SIDUR in Phase I, as retaining them would provide valuable “institutional 
memory” and a continuity of relationship between Solae and the community 
participants.  
I and the project field lead discussed this issue with both of the NGO partners, 
and they agreed to second, yet again, their staff to the project. The same experienced 
community liaison was provided by SIDUR. From MARI we contracted two of the 
original three liaisons, as we decided that additional capacity was necessary to deal 
with the geographic distance among the villages targeted by the business. To ensure 
that there was a clear reporting structure and that the community saw itself as 
partnering with Solae (the former a challenge we experienced in Phase I of the India 
project; the latter a challenge that emerged in the later phases of the Kenya project), 
both of the NGO partners agreed that the seconded employee would put aside his/her 
NGO affiliation and assume a Solae identity and reporting relationship.  
 None of the people with business skills from the Phase I team were available 
for Phase II. As such, I developed with the project field lead a job description for a 
business associate, ideally a recent Indian MBA graduate who possessed some of the 
hard business skills to complement the social entrepreneurship experience of the 
project field lead. The job description was circulated to graduate business programs in 
Hyderabad, as well as to our local partners.  
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To gain alignment with our local partners MARI and SIDUR, I met with the 
directors of each organization twice: once alone, and a second time with the just-hired 
project field lead. In addition to making available the original community liaisons to 
the project field team, I asked both organizations for their continuing institutional 
support to the effort. As in Phase I, that institutional support consisted of providing 1) 
a local organizational structure to house the field budget; 2) accounting oversight; and 
3) director-level support in managing social issues at the community level.  
But unlike in Phase I, I asked that the NGO’s assume a behind-the-scenes role 
institutionally, thereby enabling Solae and the community participants to build the 
capability for co-creating a business together and to solidify a feeling of 
interdependence. The reason for this framing was in response to our experience in 
Kenya, where CFK’s overt institutional role in the project (per our request) had the 
effect of outsourcing the “social-side” of the business development process, rather 
than forcing SC Johnson to do business development in a manner that incorporated 
community engagement and facilitation. CFK’s continuing role as a field-level project 
partner also led to a feeling that the work was a kind of development project, rather 
than an entrepreneurial, business development effort. For example, in Kenya, much 
time and effort was invested in building a broad leadership capacity among the various 
youth participants; while the development argument for this was unequivocal, it 
significantly slowed progress and decision-making to the point that enthusiasm 
dropped significantly for the business.  
Both MARI and SIDUR understood the rationale and fully supported their 
roles. Upon returning home, I finalized a four-month project budget for each site in 
consultation with the project field lead and developed contracts with both MARI and 
SIDUR. I also developed an organizational chart and communication protocol that 
reflected this relationship.  
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My last objective for the trip was to meet with both communities and to re-
kindle their energy and spirits in moving forward with the business. I had been 
informed by the local NGO’s that the three-month hiatus had undermined trust. I 
traveled with the project field lead to both locations. I contacted MARI’s community 
liaisons in Parvathagiri ahead of our visit so that they would organize a meeting with 
the community participants. When we arrived, we first met with the original three 
community liaisons to get their feelings on the community participants’ state of mind 
and their own enthusiasm. They would discuss with MARI and decide which two of 
them would be seconded to Solae for the project.  
We then met with the community participants at MARI’s field office, the site 
of our ideation workshops. Fourteen women arrived for the meeting. I brought with 
me hundreds of photos that I had taken during my homestay and the various 
workshops and meeting. The photos helped create a lively mood. I explained that our 
three-month absence was for good reasons: Solae was supporting moving forward 
with the business but wanted to create a new platform in the company to oversee the 
BOP work. To do so required re-locating a manager to India from the South Africa 
office to manage the platform. The delay occurred because of the time needed to 
develop the plan and put it in motion. I shared that the coming four months would be a 
transition period for Solae, as the new manager arrived and developed an 
understanding of the businesses. On the ground, however, the work toward starting the 
business would happen immediately. I also explained that the project field lead—who 
was known to them, as he had conducted his homestay in the village site—would be 
the overall lead on the project for Solae and that he would be supported by MARI’s 
staff. The project field lead noted to the community that he would return the following 
week to begin working with them in laying a foundation for the business. In general, 
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there was strong support, though the body language and comments (as translated to 
me) clearly indicated a tempered enthusiasm and skepticism.  
We repeated this same meeting agenda in the Rasul Pura slum site in 
Hyderabad. After first meeting with the SIDUR community liaisons from Phase I, we 
met with 18 of the women participants from Phase I. The meeting was held in one of 
the women’s homes located in a government housing project in the slum.  As in 
Parvathagiri, I provided the same explanation for the three-month absence, along with 
the plan moving forward. However, in comparison with the meeting in the village, this 
meeting was considerably more contentious. In addition to voicing their disapproval of 
the time elapsed, several people also said that they didn’t understand the rooftop-
garden concept and argued that the idea was not theirs. The project field lead—who 
they had not met during Phase I activities—promised that he would return the 
following week to work towards alignment and clarity on the business concept, and to 
start laying a foundation for the business. In our debrief following the community 
meeting, the project field lead suspected that the concept refinement sessions that 
happened with the community following my and my colleague’s departure were 
insufficient in creating a sense of ownership for the evolved concept. Creating that 
sense of shared vision for the business would be a key initial task of his.  
Before departing, I and the project field lead discussed his deliverables and 
milestones for the four month period based on the project proposal to Solae. The 
outputs from that proposal (outlined above) largely equated to his deliverables. The 
main difference was in the “formation of the project community” activity cluster; 
under that activity, his deliverables included: 
o  “Elect” representative community pilot team and establish information 
sharing mechanism to full community team 
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o Manage interface with community NGO partners (MARI in rural area 
and SIDUR in urban) and project affiliates (SERP, ISB, NIN)  
o Serve as communication hub between Solae Community 
Implementation Team and Cornell BoP Protocol Team  
We also established a reporting structure that included monthly written reports 
outlining actions taken, key organizational and business challenges, learnings, and 
recommended next steps. My protocol colleague would return in the beginning of 
December to spend two weeks with him. The three of us would communicate 
regularly via skype. Before jumping into action mode, the project field lead and I 
agreed that he should first spend several days living in each of the communities and 
spending time building trust and his personal relationship with the community 
participants. His other main priorities for the coming months as he transitioned into his 
role as project field included hiring the two business associates, formalizing the 
community participants/business partners committed to bringing the business to life, 
and ensuring shared alignment regarding the business concept.   
 Between my departure on October 28, 2006 and my return on January 30, 
2007, significant progress was made in the four activity areas in the proposal and 
workplan, despite the holiday season. In terms of “Project Team Formation” both the 
Solae team and the community team was solidified. In terms of Solae, two MBA 
interns were hired on ten-week fellowships with the intent that they would be hired on 
full-time once they completed their degrees in February 2007. Their induction into the 
project consisted of seven contact hours of basic Protocol orientation with me via 
skype; a three-day infield community orientation led by the project field lead that 
involved their shadowing the lead, followed by daily debriefs; and a six-day homestay 
in the communities. One of the MBAs was placed in Rasul Pura to work with the 
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SIDUR community liaison on secondment to Solae, and the other in Parvathagiri to 
fill out the Solae team consisting of the two MARI community liaisons on secondment 
to Solae. A two-day team retreat was conducted with the full Solae field team to 
ensure there was alignment on the project mission and each person’s role and 
responsibilities, to achieve a shared understanding of the business concepts and 
strategy in both sites, and to identify opportunities for sharing and leveraging 
resources across sites.  
Additionally, the new Solae India General Manager and Global Lead of NFSD 
had appointed a senior Solae manager in India to serve as the full-time South Asia 
manager of the Nutrition for Sustainable Development platform. He was the same 
manager who had attended the business concept refinement workshop in Parvathagiri 
and the initial ideation workshops in Rasul Pura. In terms of the project, his skills set 
was a powerful match: he had led the company’s launch into its first business-to-
consumer product; he held a senior position in the India office; and he was a native of 
Hyderabad and fluent in Telegu. His appointment to the position localized the project 
management structure and rooted accountability and “ownership” for the project with 
the in-country management team, a missing piece in Kenya that made it difficult to 
keep the CCS business linked into the broader SC Johnson corporate structure. The 
one downside was that he lived in Delhi and would be splitting his time between the 
two Protocol projects in AP, the project in Mumbai we had brokered with SP Jain, and 
new business efforts (targeting Solae’s traditional customer base) in Pakistan. 
Realistically, he would only spend several days/month in each of the Protocol sites in 
AP.   
On the community side of the equation, a formalized community business team 
was established in both sites, names were chosen for each business group, and 
temporary office spaces were identified. As we learned in Kenya, establishing the 
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clear sense that the women were individuals coming together to start a business—not 
representatives of their self-help groups, as occurred in Kenya—was vital to building 
an effective organizational foundation and decision-making structure. In Rasul Pura, 
formalization of the community business team was accomplished over two sessions. 
Twenty-four women—all of whom had participated in the PED and ideation 
workhops—pledged their commitment to working together as founders of a new 
business in partnership with Solae. They all signed a document attesting that they 
would dedicate themselves to the effort. They chose to name themselves “Solae 
Chiguru,” where Chiguru means “new growth” in Telegu. A spare room of one of the 
members living in government housing was given over for the group’s daily use.  
In Parvathagiri, formalizing the team required a longer period of time, as I and 
the team felt that it was important to recruit new members from the SC Caste. As a 
reminder, all of the SC Caste people (the caste group with the lowest social standing) 
dropped out during the series of PED workshops due to the unpredictability of their 
livelihood activities, which consisted mainly of day-labor in farmer’s fields. Also, 
many of the representatives from Annaram Sharif had dropped out during the hiatus 
between Phase I and Phase II, urged on by their husbands which had caused the 
disturbance at the start of the idea generation workshops.   
Before starting the recruitment, a pledge was signed by 19 of the women who 
participated in the PED and ideation workshops to commit to being founders and 
partners in the new business. The group developed their own attendance policy in 
which late-comers paid a small fine to the business that was used as an emergency 
fund. Being late or absent without informing the team ahead of time would result in 
dismissal. The recruitment process reached out to approximately a dozen new women, 
the majority of which were SC Caste members (the main criteria used to identify new 
people included having low income and education, single and/or widowed, young age, 
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strong energy). After they had a chance to develop an understanding of what was 
entailed and required of them, the recruits were given the option to join the team. Six 
of the women took the offer. As part of an induction process, the women were paired 
in a buddy-system with one of the established members. A formal induction ceremony 
was held for the six new members. The team chose the name Solae Samatha 
(equality). A large room of a multi-family house in Parvathagiri was rented for the 
purpose of an office. 
 It bears mentioning that attaching “Solae” to the names of both groups was 
done explicitly to help ensure that the women partners saw themselves as an extension 
of Solae, and that this same identification was communicated to the broader 
community. The need to weave a tight bond between Solae and the community 
partners was a learning coming from Kenya: for Solae, that bond would help ensure a 
competitive edge for Solae’s protein brand in the event of later entrants (there was also 
a low-cost, low-quality soy protein already available in most villages); for the 
community partners, it would confer a legitimacy on them in terms of the quality of 
their offering.  That said, the name was an informal one—once we reached the point of 
formally registering the businesses, concerns at Solae about legal liability resulted in 
the Solae name being dropped. 
  Lastly, to begin to establish a general leadership structure without creating the 
internal political posturing as experienced in Kenya, so-called “Link Members” were 
selected for each site. Link Members were volunteers who took on extra responsibility 
to assist their team. For example, they would be the contact points for the Solae team 
when scheduling meetings and delivering information to the full group. Six LMs were 
elected in Parvathagiri and five in Rasul Pura. 
 Under the “Building Shared Commitment” activity cluster, the key targeted 
outcome for both sites was reaching shared agreement on and understanding of the 
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business concept. As I noted earlier, the Rasul Pura community partners were not in 
alignment with the concept of the Solae Culinary Park—they didn’t see any relation 
between it and what had been developed during the ideation sessions. The Parvathagiri 
business required further refinement, as the current articulation of the Cooking Well 
Center lacked a compelling vision and means for impacting daily cooking habits. The 
lack of a shared vision and commitment to clear business concept was a key failing in 
Kenya and a cause, in my view, of the strategic drift that occurred as the CCS business 
was being developed.  
 Two business concept alignment workshops were held in Rasul Pura, one of 
which my Protocol colleague attended. Prior to the workshops, the project field lead 
had the groups share out their understanding of the ideation process and different 
kinds of business concepts that had been discussed and the strengths, weaknesses, and 
challenges of each. Apparently their understanding of the rooftop garden was that it 
was simply about hydroponic cultivation of plants.  During the business concept 
alignment workshops, the project field lead used role playing and drawing to help the 
communities work through the Culinary Park concept, drawing linkages between it 
and the bakery and restaurant ideas. As I and my Protocol colleague had done 
ourselves, the project field lead discussed and explained the concept with the women 
partners in terms of the business value provided by the various dimensions (e.g., broad 
reach and scalability, removed dependency on good store location, impacting the 
biggest share of the food dollar) in the context of the slum. This approach enabled the 
group to “take ownership” of the concept and see it as an evolution of their thinking, 
rather than an imposition of an external idea. To keep the concept front-and-center in 
people’s minds, a poster was made of the business concept and attached to the wall. 
 As in Rasul Pura, the project field lead first held two debrief sessions with the 
women partners to first gain an understanding of how the business concept came about 
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and what they understood it to be. He then explained the “Cooking Well” concept as 
we had summarized it, drawing links to the two core concepts out of which it was 
developed. While there was alignment on what the concept was, there was a lack of 
belief and energy by the women partners in the concept.  
To break through this conceptual rut, I and the project field lead and my 
protocol colleague re-started the ideation process, focusing on the core desire of 
having the business play a central role in the lives of housewives (the decision-makers 
of what the family eats). Framing the goal in this manner—which enabled a 
conceptual breakthrough—stemmed from the project field lead’s prior work with a 
social enterprise and my protocol colleague’s own intuitive sense of the business. As 
we had done in Parvathagiri, we iterated offline on the concept, and the project field 
lead would then re-engage with the community.  
Over a period of several weeks, we moved toward the concept of a “Solae 
Champions Network” consisting of “a network of mobile women Solae Champions 
supported by a common Solae Culinary Station that delivers nutritious foods to their 
communities and provides nutrition-based cooking demonstrations and trainings in 
the comfort of women’s own homes.” This new concept retained the physical bakery 
storefront and central production facility, but separated the cooking training function 
from it. Recognizing that the best way to reach and affect the cooking habits of 
housewives was by reaching them in their own homes, the cooking training was best 
performed by village-based women representing the business who could work with 
women in either her or her customers’ own home. These “village champions” as they 
were called could also sell the packaged foods prepared at the central Culinary Station. 
There was mutual excitement about this concept among all of the participants. As 




The other key output under “building shared commitment” was establishing a 
clear understanding that Solae was working with the women community members as 
equal business partners. It was not an employment relationship, nor was Solae 
providing grant funding. It would require sacrifice and commitment on everyone’s 
part. Both MARI and SIDUR had emphasized this element. The MARI Director had 
noted that the communities had been “under paternalizing processes” and that he had 
found in his own work that undoing this mentality was a continuous struggle. The 
project field lead explicitly addressed this issue of partnership roles with both 
communities using role playing techniques. We believed that this message had been 
internalized when the Chiguru women insisted that they pay for the ingredients used 
for the tasting workshop and to pay for their own transport during the rooftop garden 
field visits.  
 Under the “Capability Development” activity set, both project teams and the 
community partners had outlined key areas that they felt required attention: group 
building, team building, conflict management, Solae product induction, and health and 
nutrition training. SIDUR and MARI both facilitated ½ day training sessions to deal 
with the team building and conflict management issues. Having the NGOs facilitate 
those sessions rather than the Solae team was done so that Solae team members were 
not seen as “arbiters” within the group, but part of the group. 
So that the women partners learned about Solae’s soy protein, we used an 
approach that was informed by our experience in Kenya but sprang largely from the 
intuition of the project field lead who was experienced in adult education techniques. 
In Kenya, several product induction sessions were taught by an SC Johnson manager. 
The sessions were traditional “class-room” style and involved a final written test to 
ensure that everyone possessed baseline knowledge.  
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With Solae, we used an experiential learning approach: each of the women 
partners, after a thirty minute presentation on the very basics of soy protein isolate, 
was provided 50 grams of soy protein to cook with in her own home. Each day, there 
was a debrief session in which the women explained what they had prepared, what 
they discovered in the preparation process, what the product tasted like, and the 
family’s reactions. Technical questions about the soy protein that could not be 
answered by the field team were written down and discussed with the Solae India 
NFSD manager during his visit. Another packet of 50 grams of soy protein was 
provided.  
Interestingly, the women undertook a wide range of experiments on their own, 
incorporating the soy protein in an enormous range of food types. The Solae India 
manager for NFSD was shocked to learn that one of the women succeeded in 
incorporating the soy protein into yogurt she had prepared, something that Solae’s 
food scientists in India had not managed to accomplish. Through this process, the 
women partners were also acquiring personal anecdotes of their experience with soy 
protein: in one case, a husband refused to eat a traditional breakfast porridge unless it 
contained the soy protein because he preferred the taste and texture; in another, one of 
the women partners herself noted that she felt physically better and that the leg pains 
she experienced had subsided after eating the protein for a month. The cooking and 
experimentation at home, in other words, resulted in the women partners and their 
extended families becoming believers in the product and far more committed to it than 
would have been achieved through class-room training.  
The same action learning approach was used to shape the groups’ expectations 
of what running a business involved. In both project sites, the Solae field teams and 
women partners visited a local company that produced a packaged food product. Solae 
Samatha, for example, looked at the production of a milk-based sweet called kova. 
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After visiting the company, they back-tracked and followed the production and sale of 
milk from farmer to the company’s supplier. They also looked downstream and 
tracked the distribution and retail sale of the kova. At each stage, they inquired into 
how pricing was determined (information they didn’t always receive) and were usually 
shown how the individual/company kept track of orders and sales and costs and 
managed their production process. Solae Chiguru followed the same process by 
looking at the production of samosas. I believe this was an important missing 
ingredient in Kenya and part of the reason why moving from the concept stage to 
business activities proved so difficult—the self-help youth groups likely had no 
picture in their minds of what they were ultimately trying to create.   
The fourth activity set, “Business Model Co-Development,” was also informed 
by the shift to an action-learning approach.  Both project sites identified key questions 
that needed to be answered around aspects of their particular business concepts. The 
Solae Chiguru (Rasul Pura) team identified the following questions:  
 Rooftop locations, availability, cost, access  
 Rooftop gardens – legal/zoning issues, growing technologies 
 Food production sites  
 Cookery equipment needs & costs 
The Solae Samatha (Parvathagiri) team’s questions included:  
 Positioning a Solae Champion to effectively drive product adoption and 
nutrition advocacy  
 Cooking equipment needs & costs 
 Location of Culinary Station  
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To understand of these elements, the teams conducted extensive site visits, reaching 
out to other businesses and people to help them in their undertaking. To investigate 
what was entailed with a roof-top garden, for example, the Solae Chiguru team in 
Hyderabad divided into four teams with each team visiting an example of a roof-top 
garden in Hyderabad. They then held a debrief session at a plant nursery operated by a 
colleague of the project field lead, sharing what each witnessed and the elements they 
could borrow for their own business. The owner of the plant nursery provided a tour of 
his facility, answering questions from the Chiguru women partners about crops and 
plants appropriate for the roof-top conditions they witnessed. The owner of this 
nursery would later visit the slum as an interested friend to advise the women on 
installing a rooftop garden.  
In addition to creating a richer and more effective learning mechanism, this 
approach had several other positive effects. For one, reaching out to the broader 
community for help in realizing their business concept helped raise the profile of Solae 
Chiguru and Solae Samatha and generate additional interest and support in their effort. 
Almost without fail, people were very willing to share their knowledge and 
experiences as the owner of the plant nursery was. Second, it provided the women 
partners with a low-risk way to start developing customer engagement skills and 
communicating their business concepts effectively, thereby helping to reinforce a 
common vision. Third, it created a far more tangible picture of the business concept in 
everyone’s minds, including the Solae field teams—the visits gave everyone concrete 
examples and shared experiences with which to discuss the otherwise abstract business 
concepts.  
Yet perhaps the single-most important adaptation in our field work was in how 
we began to develop the initial product set that comprised the business model. As I 
noted in the previous chapter, in Kenya, SC Johnson’s field teams and the self-help 
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youth groups used surveys and conducted some small-scale test marketing to 
determine the initial product offering at launch. In retrospect, we recognized that this 
approach did little to build demand for a product offering that had no precedent in the 
community (a direct-to-home cleaning service). We faced the same challenge with soy 
protein and the direct-to-home services of the Solae business concepts. Aware of this 
I, the project field manager, and my Protocol colleague developed the idea of a series 
of Cookery Day Workshops (please see Appendix 25). The workshops would replicate 
in the broader community of potential customers the same hands-on learning and 
social experiences that the women business partners had with the soy protein. Our 
interest was to get people from the community together to socialize while cooking 
with the soy protein—doing so would simultaneously start building demand and 
interest in the community, habituate them to the cooking skills and knowledge 
necessary to cook with the soy protein, and result in the broader community 
developing out the actual product set. The workshops would also create hands-on 
learning and experience for the women business partners in engaging customers and 
building management skills. We planned to do the first such workshop in Rasul Pura 
during my visit, once the women partners had garnered sufficient hands-on experience 
of their own. 
My 14-day visit from January 30 – February 12, 2007 was not part of the four-
month proposal to Solae. However, I made the unscheduled trip on the request of the 
project field lead to provide him with close, sustained support and guidance on 
developing the businesses. He also felt that my presence would boost the women 
partners’ motivation and help him to address what he regarded as ongoing mis-
alignment with the NGO partners’ roles and responsibilities in the project. My visit 
was also encouraged by the new General Manager for Solae India/Global Lead NFSD, 
as his newly appointed head for NFSD India was scheduled to visit the project sites for 
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the first time in his new capacity. He asked that I spend time with the Solae NFSD 
India Lead, debriefing him on all that had transpired and inducting him in the 
approach. I coordinated my travel so that I would have a full week to work with the 
project field lead and both field teams prior to the Solae India NFSD’s visit to the 
project sites.  
I began my first week with an extensive debrief with the project field lead in 
which we planned out my visit and discussed the work plan for the month of February 
(the last month of activities before Solae would decide on the fate of the projects). The 
first week’s agenda was divided between the two sites and began with the Solae 
Chiguru business in Rasul Pura (Hyderabad site). I first spent half a day with Solae’s 
two-person field team there, debriefing on the activities that had been completed and 
discussing in detail the business concept and strategy. Apart from the other activities 
discussed above, they described a recently completed tasting workshop they had 
conducted with the Solae Chiguru team. For the tasting workshop, each of the Solae 
Chiguru members prepared their signature dish using the soy protein they had been 
experimenting with for several weeks. During the tasting session, they evaluated each 
other’s dishes and presentation of the food and shared their learnings and secrets in 
using the soy protein. The session was rated a huge success, and helped to identify the 
people in the group who were the most talented cooks. The session also served as 
preparation for the first Cookery Workshop that was slated for the following week 
(which I describe in detail below).   
The next day, I participated in an all-day meeting with Solae Chiguru 
described above at the plant nursery. The Chiguru women had completed site visits to 
various rooftop-gardens around Hyderbad to help determine the shape that their 
rooftop garden would take. During the debrief discussion, one of the women noted that 
they were looking to site the rooftop garden outside of the Rasul Pura slum, as they 
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wanted to pursue clients with higher incomes. This launched a rather heated discussion 
and surfaced a mis-alignment between I/the Solae team and the women partners. I and 
the Solae project field lead noted that Solae already sells its protein to wealthier 
consumers and is partnering with people in Rasul Pura community in order to create a 
business that meets the needs of lower-income consumers. Rather than push the 
discussion further, the project field lead asked that the Solae Chiguru women discuss 
the issue further with the Solae field team over the coming days and come to a 
decision. This approach used by the project field lead—to share Solae’s needs and 
objectives with the project and to then ask the community partners to reflect on it 
offline with the Solae field team—seemed to be an effective way to move the project 
forward in a manner that addressed Solae’s needs without the community partners 
feeling that they were being dictated to. The following day, the project field lead 
received a call from a field team member stating that the issue was resolved. It turned 
out that they had been concerned that putting in one roof-top garden would create a 
split among the members and community, as they came from different neighborhoods 
in the slum—putting the rooftop garden up outside the slum obviated that potential 
division. The women were relieved and excited when they realized that the business 
could create and operate a network of rooftop gardens in the slum and weren’t limited 
to only one. The incident revealed the importance of continuing discussions about the 
business concept even after completing idea generation in order to proactively surface 
areas of mis-alignment.  
I and the project field lead then met with the Directors of SIDUR. We shared 
our belief that the work on the ground was progressing well and that the community 
partners were demonstrating a clear commitment and sense of mutual responsibility to 
the business. We invited both of them to the first Cookery Workshop scheduled the 
following week to sustain their connection to the project. I also noted that I would be 
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meeting with Solae in March to present the progress with the hope that they would 
continue their support. The only issue we needed to address concerned the SIDUR 
community liaison’s ongoing demands from his previous work at SIDUR that often 
pulled him away from his work on the Solae project.  
We then traveled to Parvathagiri where we repeated this agenda. I first 
debriefed with the three-person field team there on activities completed and next steps, 
participated in a scheduled event with the Solae Samatha women partners, and 
finished with a meeting with the Director of MARI.  
The meeting with the Solae field team in Parvathagiri highlighted a tension 
among the team members, one that I and the project field lead had a hand in creating. 
The team, as I noted, consisted of the business fellow completing his MBA and two 
MARI community liaisons involved in Phase I. The MBA, though only on fellowship, 
had already moved to the village and was living in a room attached to the temporary 
office. One of the liaisons had run the local micro-finance efforts of MARI in 
Parvathagiri and had the equivalent of a high-school education; the other liaison was 
trained in maternal health and had college-level training.  
My and the project field lead’s preference was for the less-educated MARI 
liaison to play the lead “social” coordinator role, and to be supported by the other 
MARI person. Our reason for this was that the less-educated person lived in the 
community and had close personal ties, while the other person bused into Parvathagiri 
from Warangal (approximately one hour away). In addition, her experience with the 
micro-finance work was more in tune with business development, whereas the other 
liaison was steeped in the language and experience of health and nutrition. While 
nutrition knowledge was valuable, we wanted to be careful not to fall into a public-




Putting the more senior person from MARI into a subordinate, supporting role 
was, in retrospect, a poor decision on our part—it was unfair of us to expect them to 
shed the organizational hierarchies and identities that they had established at MARI. In 
addition, the more senior liaison also spoke better English, had excellent project 
management and documentation skills, and had a direct reporting role to the MARI 
Director—she was naturally pulled into a team lead role, thereby creating tension with 
the other two members. 
The interpersonal team issue aside, during our meeting they shared out the 
extensive and rigorous process to recruit and induct new members. They also shared 
the work used to instill the women’s sense of being equally responsible business 
partners with Solae. Lastly, they shared the initial discussions with the Solae Samatha 
women regarding nutrition; they had discussed how nutritional demands varied across 
age, sex, income, and occupation and the three main bodily functions that food 
provides. In hearing the latter, I quickly raised the issue that we needed to be careful 
of thinking about food’s function and the business’s value proposition as simply one 
of “better health”—I shared the comment by a teammate from Phase I that he “lived to 
eat” as a way to remind the team that we need to frame our value proposition, 
particularly early on, as broadly as possible.  
That afternoon, we had an initial debrief meeting with the Solae Samatha 
women partners. They shared how the tireless recruiting efforts by the field team over 
the past few months signaled to them that things were back on track. Their 
determination was galvanized by the actions of the field team. They also discussed the 
new business concept and the vision of a network of Solae Champions. We concluded 
the meeting by dispersing the weekly allotment of Solae’s soy protein and discussing 
the workshop for the following day. The workshop was the same “tasting workshop” 
conducted by the Solae Chiguru business a couple of weeks prior. Each team member 
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was asked to prepare their favorite dish incorporating the soy protein; they were to 
keep track of the ingredients and the quantities used. That evening, I visited with my 
homestay hosts and tried to re-connect with other people from the village I had met 
during Phase I activities.  
The next day was dedicated to the workshop. The format replicated the 
structure of the workshop in Rasul Pura. One of the women would explain her dish, 
the general recipe, and how much soy protein she added and how. She would then 
serve everyone a small tasting portion. Everyone shared their comments on what they 
liked about the dish and what were areas of improvement. The evaluation focused on 
the taste and texture of the food, as well as how it was presented. The cycle would 
repeat with the next woman. Twenty-five dishes later, we surveyed the team to see 
which everyone’s favorite dishes were. As in Rasul Pura, the group felt that it was a 
valuable exercise and also gave each person an opportunity to take center-stage and 
communicate to her peers.  
One point worth noting was that the project field lead observed (privately) that 
the culinary skills of the Solae Samatha group were not as strong as that in Hyderabad. 
Also, he felt that the nature of the discussion around the food was less creative and 
passionate than in the Rasul Pura workshop—he and I both attributed this to the 
different experiences and personalities of Solae’s field teams. In Rasul Pura, the 
business coordinator had worked for two years in an up-scale hotel restaurant and was 
keenly interested in the culinary industry and food preparation. The dominant voice 
among Solae’s three team members in Parvathagiri was the community liaison trained 
in maternal and child health. This difference in emphasis between the two sites would 
continue throughout the project. 
Late that afternoon, on the return to Hyderabad, I and the project field lead 
stopped in Warangal to meet with the Director of MARI. I shared my personal view of 
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the great work and progress happening in the field. His raised a concern about the 
husbands of the Samatha women and the need to get their full endorsement and 
understanding. He himself would lead this discussion in the coming weeks. We 
discussed the interpersonal team dynamics of the Solae field team and our desire for 
the more senior community liaison from MARI to play more of a support role. I also 
emphasized the need to channel MARI’s contact with the community through the 
project field lead and the Solae field team, as the project lead felt that the 
communication protocol and chain of command that I had outlined in October 2006 at 
the start of Phase II was not being adhered to. He agreed that the business effort 
should be led by Solae, but pointed out that he had extensive experience working in 
the community and addressing the social issues. We discussed how efforts to address 
social issues could have significant impact on business actions and, therefore, needed 
to be coordinated. There was agreement on this general point, though it was clear that 
the MARI Director felt that there was not sufficient communication between the Solae 
project team and MARI.  
During the second week of my visit, the Solae NFSD India Lead arrived from 
Delhi. He, the Solae project field lead, and I spent several hours going through the 
presentation that I and my colleague gave to Solae’s top-management team in St Louis 
in August which contained the underlying theory of the Protocol, an overview of the 
three-phase process using the revised Protocol model (with examples from India and 
Kenya), the business concepts developed in both sites, and the four main platforms of 
activity and milestones for the four-month transition phase period. Over the next few 
days, the three of us would visit both the Solae Chiguru and Solae Samatha businesses 
and the Directors of both SIDUR and MARI. 
Our first stop that same day was Solae Chiguru. The meeting, which lasted for 
a couple of hours and was held in Solae Chiguru’s temporary office space, served as a 
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formal introduction between the Solae NFSD India Lead and the women business 
partners. The Solae NFSD India Lead introduced who he was and his role in the 
project (they had met him briefly during concept ideation in Phase I). He was very at-
ease speaking with the women (he was fluent in their native tongue), fielding 
questions as well as inquiring about the business concept and their plans. Several of 
the women were not present, as they were preparing for their first formal cookery day 
workshop scheduled for the next day. We ended the meeting to give the rest of the 
team time to prepare for the significant event. I, the project field lead, and the Solae 
NFSD India Lead traveled to SIDUR’s offices for an introductory meeting between 
SIDUR’s Directors and the Solae India NFSD manager.    
The main event for the next day was the Solae Chiguru cookery workshop. As 
I noted earlier, the underlying idea behind the workshop was to create the same kinds 
of hands-on cooking experimentation opportunities for people in the broader 
community in order for them to “buy into” the business concept and to help develop 
some of the initial products. The workshop was called the “Guru’s Day” workshop as 
the session brought together friends of the Solae Chiguru women who they considered 
to be cooking experts. The workshop was the culmination of a longer process that 
began earlier in the week, with each of the Chiguru women identifying a person in 
Rasul Pura who they considered to be a cooking expert. They then met with the 
person, explained the broad business concept, did a cooking demonstrated with the soy 
protein, noted the importance of excellent cooking skills to their business, and then 
asked whether the person would be willing to share their expertise with them by 
cooking their signature dish using the soy protein. After agreeing, they met up at the 
guru’s home before the event (the Solae Chiguru woman brought ingredients) 
prepared the dish together, jotting down the recipe as they went. 
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The workshop was a way of highlighting the guru’s work, creating 
opportunities for others in the community to be involved, and to start enacting the 
roof-top garden concept. The workshop was held on a rooftop in the slum that was 
among the potential first sites for the rooftop garden. Plants were borrowed from a 
nursery, and a colorful tent was set up to simulate the look and function of the rooftop 
garden. Tables were set up, and the twenty-three dishes were artfully arranged. A 
Solae Chiguru banner was strung up bearing the Solae logo.  In addition to the gurus 
themselves, their family members were invited. Approximately a dozen leaders in the 
community were invited to be formal tasters. The several hour function was structured 
to highlight the guru’s and their food. As had been done in the internal tasting 
workshop, each of the guru’s was given a chance to address the group, explain the 
origins of her dish, and to speak about what was different in the taste or cooking 
process due to the soy protein. Afterwards, the outside taster’s panel offered their 
opinions on the dish. The event was extremely lively and well-organized and 
accomplished the objectives.  
We traveled the next day to Parvathagiri, stopping first in Warangal to meet 
with the MARI Director. We arrived in Parvathagiri village near mid-day and 
assembled in the temporary office. The meeting with the Solae Samatha women was, 
as in Rasul Pura, meant to introduce them to the Solae India NFSD manager. This was 
also his first occasion to meet the business-coordinator on the Solae field team. The 
women shared the early history of the project and what had transpired since October 
2006 when the project was re-started. As had been communicated to me in my 
meeting the prior week, several people praised the efforts and commitment of the field 
team and explained their own commitment and sacrifice to join the project. One of the 
newly recruited women, for example, shared that she sold her herd of 40 goats so that 
she would have the time available to start the business. An elaborate lunch was served 
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of dishes containing soy protein. We returned that evening to Hyderabad. The positive 
meetings, the clear commitment from the women partners, and the successful cookery 
workshop certainly left a very favorable impression with the Solae India NFSD 
manager. 
During the few remaining days of my visit, I worked with the project field lead 
on prioritizing next steps that would have a high impact on Solae’s evaluation of the 
project—the review meeting with Solae’s corporate team in St Louis was to take place 
in less than four weeks on March 8, 2006. I asked him to work with the field teams to 
document various anecdotes that would convey the various successes to date against 
the objectives. Lastly, I agreed to work with Solae to get approval for a two-month 
extension of the contracts and project funds (they were set to expire before the Solae 
review meeting) so that there would be no interruption to field level activities while 
Solae decided whether to continue the project or not.  
 In the four weeks leading up to the March 8, 2007 review meeting at Solae’s 
headquarters in St. Louis, I secured approval from the incoming Solae Global Lead for 
NFSD for the one-month project extensions. I finalized the contract extensions for the 
project field lead, the two business coordinators on fellowships, and for the local NGO 
partners MARI and SIDUR.  
The Solae Chiguru team in Rasul Pura continued forward progress. Led by 
Solae’s field team, they completed a two-part action learning event called a “market 
immersion.” The market immersion entailed visiting a central produce market to look 
at the buying and selling processes. One of the women among the Solae Chiguru team 
operated a vegetable stall in the market, and was able to get the group good access to 
other vendors. They then did field visits to a variety of food-related retail shops, 
focusing on the presentation and the marketing of the products.  
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In terms of the business concept, the group had set as its first priorities the 
establishment of an initial rooftop garden and the Chef’s group (which would be 
responsible for prepared food sales in the slum).  The team contacted a structural 
engineer. They visited a large farm on the outskirts of Hyderabad to understand better 
crop varieties and needs. They developed initial categorizes of plants based on what 
could be grown easily in a rooftop setting. They also began to outline various 
customer-relationship strategies that would solidify their position as cooking hubs 
with their neighbors: one approach that gained strong interest was having each Solae 
Chiguru chef possess a set of branded cooking vessels that could be loaned out to 
neighbors. It was commonplace for neighbors to turn to each other to borrow cooking 
equipment when guests were arriving and they needed additional capacity.  Per my 
request, the team was also forecasting out the working capital and fixed capital costs 
of getting this core part of the business up and running. The practice of daily cooking 
with the soy protein in their homes also continued. 
In Parvathagiri, the Director of MARI led a workshop with the husbands of the 
Samatha women, gaining the husbands’ full support and understanding of the 
women’s efforts. In addition, the Director established an emergency insurance fund 
among for the Samatha business into which each of the women contributed one rupee 
per day. In the event of an emergency, a member could (with the others’ approval) 
withdraw money without having to repay it. The MARI Director felt that having the 
women invest some small portion of their money in this manner was valuable for 
establishing the sense of mutual responsible and group solidarity.  
In addition to the daily in-home cooking, the Solae Samatha women were 
meeting daily to cook together, with cooking responsibility rotated among the team 
members. Ingredient quantities were carefully measured and recorded. Before and 
after cooking weights were recorded. They also began mapping out their social 
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relationships to neighboring villages and planning the process for reaching out and 
recruiting Solae Champions for those villages. As did Chiguru, they also prepared 
budget estimates for their food production/retail center (the Culinary Center). 
Despite this progress, near the end of the month a significant event halted work 
in Parvathagiri for two weeks. The issue stemmed from a caste-conflict within the 
Solae Samatha women themselves. Unrecognized by the field team was the fact that 
two of the higher caste women on the team would not eat the food on the days when it 
was prepared by the recently inducted Scheduled Caste women. One of the SC women 
finally raised this to everyone’s attention and argued that they could not work together 
as business partners if they didn’t treat each other equally. The two dozen women 
voted to remove the two women from the team. Word of the incident spread through 
the village. Husbands became involved. The MARI Director intervened and brought 
the Solae Samatha women together. He facilitated a discussion about the pros and 
cons of that decision, and he asked that they debate it further and then make a 
decision. The women stuck to their decision.  
Tension was also mounting within the Solae field team in Parvathagiri, with 
internal debates regarding each other’s roles and responsibilities. The MARI liaison 
who was asked to play a support role apparently introduced herself as the project 
coordinator. That issued, in turn, intensified the Solae project field lead’s concern that 
the NGO partners were playing too dominant and overt a role and not working through 
the Solae team, as the MARI liaison in question worked closely with the Director. The 
Solae project field lead felt the Director was enabling her to subvert the desired 
hierarchy. The project field lead also argued that the MARI Director unilaterally 
established the insurance fund for the Samatha group and should not have intervened 
in the caste dispute. My failure to understand the severity of this tension would result 
in a significant turn in fate for the project. 
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In preparation for the Solae meeting in St Louis, I worked with my Protocol 
colleague to update and refine the business concept strategy briefs. I also developed a 
50-slide power point presentation that reviewed the Protocol process, re-capped the 
Phase I work, summarized the accomplishments during the five month transition 
period against objectives, and outlined recommendations for moving forward. This 
presentation was noteworthy in my research as it marks the point at which I first began 
to synthesize and integrate the key learnings from the Kenya and India projects about 
the need to create consumer demand, as well as a new business. My thinking was 
shaped by work in the entrepreneurship literature on the concepts of opportunity 
creation and effectuation by Sharon Alvarez/Jay Barney and Saras Sarasvathy, 
respectively. Both of these perspectives articulated a pragmatist-based philosophy by 
which entrepreneurs progressively and contingently evolve a new business and 
business model by harnessing resources at hand and responding to consumer feedback. 
Sarasvathy, in particular, focused on the entrepreneurial process outside of an 
established industry.  
Below I reproduce three slides from that presentation, as they demonstrate this 
critical re-articulation of the BOP challenge and the re-positioning of the Protocol in 
response to the dual task of business model innovation and market creation. While the 
new framing still retained parts of the radical localization logic (the business model 
innovation description in the third slide continues to talk about embedding the model 
into the local cultural and physical infrastructure), it contained the seeds of a novel 
theoretical perspective which I elaborate in Chapters 7 and 8 regarding market 







FIGURE 7:  Revised Process Logic 
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The presentation also demonstrated a further evolution and refinement of the 
objectives for the main activities under Phases I and II of the revised Protocol model. 
Appendices 23 and 24 contain slides from the presentation that reflect this refinement 
of first two phases.  
On March 8, 2007 I and my colleague—the co-director of the BOP Protocol 
Project—met in St. Louis with Solae’s President, the newly appointed Global Lead of 
NFSD, the VP for technology, and the Senior VP for Africa and South America.  We 
handed out the updated business concept briefs and then proceeded to the power point 
presentation. The framing of the Protocol as a process to cocreate a new business and 
a new market seemed to resonate and spurred a lively discussion about whether 
scaling out the business would require shifting from a market creator stance to a 
market prospector stance (as reflected in the 2x2 matrix above). There was also a 
sense that they were pleased with the progress in field over the course of the past four 
months, including the re-focusing of the rural business concept. The Global Lead for 
NFSD, for example, re-counted his initial experience of visiting the Parvathagiri 
project site in December 2006 upon relocating to India. He shared how, after 
introducing himself to the Solae Samatha women and telling them that Solae was 
pleased to be working with them, that one of the women responded in a somewhat 
surprised tone with the words “But sir, WE are Solae.” The sense of commitment and 
shared identity generated through the co-creation process had impressed him. 
The remainder of the meeting focused on the slides I developed on next steps, 
near term challenges, and milestones (please see Appendix 28). We also discussed 
liability issues associated with the groups representing themselves under the Solae 
banner, as well as the potential negative consequences of the strong community 
identification with Solae. As one of Solae’s managers remarked, “it makes me 
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nervous.”  The meeting concluded with my agreeing to return to India later that month 
to formally transition the project into Solae’s hands—the result we had hoped for.   
In the three-weeks between the successful meeting at Solae’s headquarters and 
my return trip to India to facilitate a formal hand-over of the project to Solae, I 
continued to work closely with the project field lead in planning out key issues 
associated with the hand-off and continuation of the project, as well as to monitor 
performance on the ground. The key next steps necessary for an effective handoff and 
continuation of the project included retaining the full field team, reaching agreement 
with the NGO partners on an appropriate role moving forward, and inducting the two 
senior Solae managers (the Global Lead for NFSD and the India Lead for NFSD) into 
the project sites. Retaining the team required securing the commitment of the two 
MBA coordinators who were currently hired as fellows. The project field lead secured 
their commitment, and began negotiating their full-time stay at once. It also required 
securing on extended contracts the community liaisons on secondment from MARI 
and SIDUR—a sensitive issue, as it was inseparable from the larger role of the NGOs 
in the project. I notified both SIDUR and MARI of the green light from Solae, and 
raised the issue of retaining their staff on the Solae team for an extended period of 
time. Both were open to continuing that arrangement. The purpose of inducting the 
two senior Solae managers was to deepen the bond between the women partners and 
Solae the company; it would also be valuable in establishing their rapport and 
legitimacy with the field team.  
Forward progress in both sites continued. The Solae Chiguru group explored 
various home/rooftop configurations in the Rasul Pura slum and the particular needs 
of each to function as a rooftop garden. For example, SIDUR’s healthy-hut clinic 
office in Rasul Pura was being evaluated as an initial rooftop garden, as it was similar 
in size and structure to many of the homes in the slum. Water audits were conducted 
  
284 
with an engineer. The field team in Rasul Pura also visited the government 
horticulture department which conducted training for housewives on the preparation of 
jams and other forms of food preservation. The team also began to contact government 
culinary schools and the MBA coordinator’s colleagues in the hotel industry.  
In Parvathagiri, things had settled down following the removal of the two 
Samatha team members. The field team led research to determine whether the culinary 
station should be based in Parvathagiri village (the county seat for the local 
government) or in Annaram Sharif (which had the shrine). They also began mapping 
out an outreach and recruitment approach in the surrounding villages that—much like 
the cookery workshops—would drive interest and demand by engaging the broader 
communities in the business development process. The first step of the plan was for 
the Solae Samatha women to pair up and spend two to three nights (a mini homestay) 
in one of an initial ten target villages (chosen based on the number of people that 
travel from them to Parvathagiri and Annaram Sharif) as an initial ice-breaker and 
buzz creator. The Samatha women would use family connections to find a place to 
stay. The first such mini-homestays were scheduled to occur within two weeks and 
before I arrived in India. The project field lead emphasized the significance of the 
idea: women traveling alone outside of their village were almost un-heard of, 
particularly in the capacity of business entrepreneur. It would be an important, 
transformative moment in the lives of the Solae Samatha women.   
The other key issue I discussed with the project field lead was that of branding 
and Solae’s concern about the new businesses using the Solae name and brand. 
Building a brand that established a close identity and feeling of affiliation between 
Solae and the broader community was critical to sustaining Solae’s competitive 
position. But that would have to be accomplished through informal means. We agreed 
to make branding a key point of discussion during my visit with the field teams.  
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Before traveling to India, I also spoke with the Solae Global Lead of NFSD 
about next steps from Solae’s corporate perspective. He reported that there was strong 
support and excitement about the work at the steering-committee level in the 
company, and that they were now working to build support at the divisional and 
regional level of the organization, as well as within top-level management of DuPont 
India. He was already considering how to increase capacity within NFSD and to create 
a position responsible solely for the grassroots, co-creation approach (as exemplified 
by the Protocol). He noted that that approach could inform how they do business in 
their traditional markets as well.  
In terms of my and Cornell’s ongoing role in the project, he asked—as in the 
just completed transition phase—that we continue to engage with them in a 
partnership framework, as he saw this as a learning for both organizations. However, 
he recognized and embraced the fact that Solae would have to step up and be the de 
facto leaders and owners of the project in the field. Per his request, I developed a 
proposal that outlined a one-year partnership between Solae and Cornell. The proposal 
outlined the following three areas of support:   
1. Leadership Transition: 
o To guide Solae’s transition into the project leadership role, ensuring all 
Solae team members are inducted into the Protocol process and project 
context 
2. Formalization of Pilot Teams & Project Structure:  
o To formalize the project field teams and articulate specific roles for the 
local NGO partners in the projects  
o To establish the project management and organizational control 
structures moving forward 
3. Protocol Implementation & Development: 
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o To coach the Solae field teams on translating the BoP Protocol process 
into on-the-ground actions and milestones 
o To document on-the-ground actions, strategies, and learnings in order 
to provide a foundation for potential replication and/or scale-out  
Over the course of the year, I would travel to the project sites on four occasions, with 
the up-coming trip counting as the first of those trips. The proposal was accepted. 
 This concludes my summary of the six-month period that equated to the first 
half of Phase II of the BOP Protocol process.   
 
Field Summary: April 2007 – December 2007 
This nine-month period equated to the second half of Phase II activities under 
the new BOP Protocol model, the end point of which I later defined as the creation of 
an initial product/service offering and the formal registration of the business entity so 
that formal sales could begin. My role in this period—as the contract with Solae above 
outlined—was to have been that of arm’s length advisor to the field team and to help 
capture learnings. Due to a turn of events on the ground that resulted in the departure 
of the project field lead at the end of July 2006, my involvement changed 
considerably. While the contractual terms of the relationship with Solae remained 
unchanged, I worked closely with the Solae India NFSD manager to manage and 
direct the field teams.  
Over the course of these nine months, I returned to India on four occasions for 
a combined total of 68 days. Following the departure of the project field lead, I 
communicated by phone with the Solae India NFSD manager on a weekly basis and 
with the field teams via email; I was copied on all project communications with the 
field teams and was treated as part of the core management team. From the US, I 
worked approximately 15 hours per week to guide and support the project. 
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Importantly, over this period I finalized the re-vised BOP Protocol model and wrote 
up the field process which was published as the 2nd Edition of the BOP Protocol.  
On March 29, 2006—little more than three-weeks after the meeting at Solae’s 
headquarters in St Louis—I returned to India for 15 days to formally “hand-off” the 
project to Solae and to create alignment with the field teams and project partners on 
next steps. During the first week of my trip, I and the project field lead first met with 
both NGO partners to discuss the partnership moving forward. We then traveled to 
both project sites with the Solae Global Lead for NFSD and the India Lead for NFSD 
to send the message that Solae was fully behind the businesses and excited to be 
entering this new phase of the project. The purpose of the visit was largely symbolic 
and geared toward deepening the sense of affiliation between the women community 
partners and Solae, between Solae and the local NGO partners, and between Solae and 
the field teams. The second week of my trip was oriented to addressing specifically 
issues around business development at both sites. 
The day after my arrival, I and the project field lead met with the Directors of 
SIDUR and the Director of MARI (in separate visits) to share the good news and to 
discuss the desired partnership between them and Solae moving forward. In addition 
to asking to retain the community liaisons under the Solae banner, we discussed the 
NGO partners adopting a “behind-the-scenes” role and channeling their involvement 
in the project through the Solae team. In NGO parlance, SIDUR and MARI would 
become “resource partners” that they could tap into for advice and consultation in 
addressing challenges with the community partners. The reasons for this were to 
ensure clarity on the ground regarding decision making, clarity as to who holds 
responsibility for success (and potential failure), to build Solae’s capability for 
managing community and social issues, and to build the community partners’ 
capability for working with companies.  There was general agreement by both SIDUR 
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and MARI, though the discussion with MARI highlighted a clear interpersonal strain 
between him and the project field lead. The Director of MARI was reluctant to agree 
to be dependent on working through the project field lead; he expressed the need to 
retain the right to enter into the community and intervene if he deemed necessary. In 
both meetings, it was agreed that the next step was to outline a memorandum of 
understanding between them and Solae.  
Shortly thereafter I, the project field lead, the Solae Global Lead NFSD, and 
the Solae India NFSD visited the Rasul Pura site in Hyderabad. The day’s meeting 
was divided into two parts: the first part consisted of a lunch prepared by the Solae 
Chiguru women held on the rooftop in the Rasul Pura slum. As with the Cookery 
Workshop, the lunch session was used as an opportunity to simulate the rooftop 
garden experience as outlined in the business concept and to invite members from the 
community to participate. In addition to the children and several of the husbands of the 
Chiguru women, attendees of the lunch included various informal leaders from the 
Rasul Pura commuity. The Directors of SIDUR attended as well. The Solae Chiguru 
women had embroidered the Solae logo onto their saris. The signage they hung from 
the tent and placed on the tables where the soy protein-fortified dishes also contained 
the Solae logo and their Solae Chiguru name.  
After the lunch—at which Solae Chiguru welcomed the Solae Global Lead for 
NFSD and expressed their excitement and commitment—everyone (with the exception 
of family and friends) assembled at a nearby retreat center to hold a more formal 
meeting and discussion. The meeting began with the Chiguru women presenting a 
sketch of their business concept and the four main dimensions of the business. They 
then outlined the activities that had taken place over the past few months, and 
described their next steps. During their presentations, I noted that they emphasized 
heavily the sale of packaged and prepared foods on the rooftop garden and through 
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push-carts. Sensing that the women’s interest in having a restaurant and selling 
packaged goods was sidelining the more critical aspect of getting housewives to 
incorporate the soy protein into their daily cooking (and using the rooftop garden as a 
branding mechanism to drive families’ interest), I asked the Solae Chiguru women 
which part of their business would be the most valuable for their long-term sales and 
sustained growth. We facilitated out the observation that selling packaged foods in 
Rasul Pura would create some quick sales, but that the total revenue potential was 
relatively low because people ate mostly at home and there were already a lot of 
people selling prepared foods. By getting housewives to cook with the soy protein, 
they would ensure repeat sales, have access into the biggest part of a family’s food 
consumption dollar, and would have a little to no competition. The discussion 
concluded with the need to prioritize the various sales channels and opportunities and 
to balance capturing the low-hanging fruit in order to preserve momentum with 
building a foundation for the longer-term, core revenue drivers of the business.  
The second half of the discussion consisted of the NFSD Global Lead outlining 
Solae’s corporate commitment to the business and identifying the Solae team on the 
ground who would be leading the effort with them (the project field lead and the 
business coordinator, supported by the community liaison from SIDUR). He then 
engaged in a question and answer session, responding to various technical and health-
related questions regarding the soy protein isolate.  The meeting was adjourned on a 
high note with everyone voicing excitement about the future.  
After the Chiguru women departed, the four of us (I, the project field lead, the 
NFSD Global Lead, and NFSD India Lead) met with the Directors of SIDUR to 
discuss their role in the project moving forward. The NFSD Global Lead expressed 
Solae’s desire to have SIDUR continue to help facilitate the company’s engagement of 
the community. Importantly, Solae would contract directly with them rather than have 
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Cornell play an intermediary role. They agreed to develop out a memorandum of 
understanding between Solae and SIDUR that would outline the specific roles and 
responsibilities of the partnership. We then met separately with the business 
coordinator who had agreed to continue on in his role. Solae would finalize his 
contract in the coming month. The NFSD Global Lead noted that the business 
coordinator would be responsible for driving the project forward and was the point 
person for Solae in the effort.  
The next morning, the four of us traveled to Parvathagiri where we held a 
debrief and discussion with the Solae Parvathagiri women, met with the Director of 
MARI to discus their partnership with Solae moving forward, and then met with the 
business coordinator to discuss his responsibilities as the Solae point-person on the 
field. The afternoon meeting with Solae Samatha was held at their temporary office 
space in Parvathagiri. After sharing the history of the project, they outlined the 
business concept and the idea of the Solae Champions Network. 
They debriefed their just-completed mini-homestays in outlying villages. As 
planned, they had formed three-person teams and contacted a friend or relative in the 
target village to have a place to stay. The three-women arrived in the village by bus 
and immediately attracted residents’ attention because they were traveling alone. 
Word spread through the village that they had come from Parvathagiri where they 
were starting a business. During the three days/two nights they spent in the village, 
they spent most of their time in informal conversations with locals keen to learn more 
about their business and soy protein. They also visited the village school to meet with 
teachers where they shared the business idea and the benefits of soy protein. In the 
evenings they cooked meals using the soy protein. The Samatha women all spoke of 
the enormous confidence the home visits instilled in them. They returned with the 
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names of several women who they believed could be effective Solae Champions in 
their village.  
The one issue that did concern me was the messaging around the soy protein 
and the business in general—the Samatha women often said they shared with people 
that the soy protein was vital for good health and could alleviate various ailments. The 
messaging was very clinical, with undertones that the soy protein powder was a 
medicine of sorts. The strong focus on the health message clearly stemmed from the 
presence of the MARI liaison trained in maternal and child health. Apart from worries 
of misrepresentation, I pointed out that we needed to be far more open-ended with 
how the initial value proposition of the business is presented, as the nutritional 
message would likely only appeal to a narrow segment of people (as was the case in 
the US).  
As in Rasul Pura, the NFSD Global Lead shared Solae’s commitment to the 
Samatha women of building the business and highlighted the Solae field team 
members that would work closely with them. After a lunch of soy-protein fortified 
foods prepared by the Solae Samatha women, we met with the Director of MARI; as 
in the case with SIDUR, it was agreed that a memorandum of understanding would be 
drawn up outlining the nature of the partnership between MARI and Solae. The last 
meeting of the evening was with the business coordinator. Again, his role as the Solae 
lead on the ground and driver of the project was strongly emphasized. As we had 
planned and in an effort to induct the NFSD Global Lead and the NFSD India Lead 
into the project, both of them spent the night with one of the families of the Samatha 
members.  
After the NFSD Global and India Leads returned to Solae’s headquarters in 
Delhi, I spent the following week working with the project field lead and visiting both 
sites to discuss specifics of the action plan. In Rasul Pura, we and three leads from the 
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Chiguru team met with a horticulturalist and an engineer to determine the layout and 
cost for the rooftop garden. A planning meeting was held with the full Chiguru team at 
the retreat center to discuss next steps. During the meeting, we re-started the 
discussion of the strategic importance of the direct-to-home cooking support services, 
as getting housewives to cook with the soy protein was essential for the business’s 
success. In that discussion, we all determined that it was important to start an action 
learning process around how to build and sustain ongoing cooking relationships with 
housewives and to acclimatize the community to that service offering. I shared our 
experience in Kenya, in which months of product development and testing of a direct-
to-home cleaning service was met with no consumer demand, as consumers weren’t 
used to having people sell things door-to-door, much less pay to have their mud-
walled homes cleaned.  
In Parvathagiri, I and the project field lead discussed next steps with the field 
team and the Samatha team. They had instituted a rigorous, systematic cooking 
schedule that entailed daily cooking shifts. As they cooked they tracked and recorded 
ingredient quantities, pre- and post-cooked weights, fuel usage, and cooking time 
among others. As in Rasul Pura, we talked about the importance of conducting action 
learning to systematize the direct-to-home service to housewives that would facilitate 
their cooking with the soy protein. Significant time was also spent on the positioning 
and branding of the business and the importance of broadening beyond the basic 
health message.   
The team tensions noted earlier had continued: The business coordinator 
shared that there was lack of clarity on the ground about who was running the project, 
as the one MARI community liaison continued to insert herself into a de facto 
leadership role. This also, according to the business coordinator, muddied the waters 
as to whether Solae or MARI was the project driver, as this person also represented 
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herself as a MARI person rather than a Solae member. We reminded the business 
coordinator that the NFSD Global Lead unequivocally stated that the business 
coordinator was the point person on the project and responsible for its success.  
Before leaving India and based on the issues I observed at both of the sites, I 
worked with the field team and the project field lead to map out and prioritize 
potential sales channels and to develop an initial broad brand positioning geared 
towards appealing to as wide an initial audience as possible (please see Appendices 27 
and 28). Also, I spoke at length with the project field lead about managing the 
transition. He was concerned that Solae would push for sales too fast and not allow the 
action learning and co-creation processes to evolve. I assured him that he had the 
support and understanding of the company’s senior leadership, and that the NFSD 
Global Lead possessed a strong, intuitive understanding of what the co-creation 
process was trying to do. I returned to the U.S. confident that the project had a solid 
foundation and was on a strong upward trajectory. 
In the weeks following my return to the U.S., the project field became 
increasingly concerned about the relationship between Solae and the NGO partners 
and how it affected his ability to lead the field work. In Parvathagiri, a visit by the 
Director and a senior manager of MARI to the Samatha women was viewed as a 
breach of the project field lead’s oversight. A visit by a representative of AeA (our 
partner from Phase I) to the Solae Chiguru women raised further concern for the 
project field lead and the need to establish clear project authority. His concern, 
however, was only intensified by the fact that the writing of the MOU’s between Solae 
and the NGOs was also being handled by the NFSD India Lead—a person he felt 
lacked the experience of working with NGOs, and a task he felt was more 
appropriately his own. An initial draft MOU developed by MARI and shared with the 
project field lead apparently stated that MARI would be in charge of the transition 
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plan. The project field lead felt I had failed to effectively deal with the partnership 
issue before the hand-off to Solae. To help address this issue, I suggested that I write a 
project transition letter to all of the partners we had worked with, thanking them for 
their support and outlining the transition taking place. He agreed that this would be 
useful. I discussed the same with the NFSD Global Lead, who also thought it would 
be valuable. It was important, he noted, that the tone not read as “Solae is taking over” 
but that the project remained a Solae venture as always, but there were new faces 
leading the work on the ground. I developed a draft letter and circulated it to Solae for 
approval before sending it out (please see Appendix 31).  
In terms of the businesses, the project field lead voiced concern that there was 
mounting impatience in both project sites. As he put it, they were ready for “real 
action.” According to the project lead, even greater pressure was coming from Solae 
and the NFSD Global Lead. In addition to this perception of haste, the project field 
lead was concerned about a continuing emphasis by the Solae Samatha team and the 
Solae field team in Parvathagiri on selling soy protein as a stand-along nutrition 
product rather than building a personal-level relationship with housewives premised 
on a broader value proposition of socializing, improved cooking skills, and family 
happiness and welfare. The event that triggered this concern was that the Samatha 
women had returned from a second visit to their mini-homestay villages having 
identified the local residents to serve as the Solae Champion. All of the women 
selected were small, petty store owners whose shops were located on the main road—
the main criteria for selection was primarily whether the person had the ability to sell 
product. Importantly, the emphasis on selling soy protein as a stand-alone nutrition 
product was related to the partner issue—the person who most reflected and advanced 
this view was the senior MARI community liaison who the project lead had asked to 
play a support role.  The project field lead met with the Solae field team in 
  
295 
Parvathagiri and the Solae Samatha women to re-visit the business concept and the 
importance of, first-and-foremost, learning how to build and sustain relationships with 
housewives.   
Following these discussions with the project field lead, I received no 
communication or updates from him for more than a month, despite several efforts to 
contact him. In June, I reached out to the Global Lead of NFSD to see how the project 
was progressing. As I had feared, progress on the ground had completely stalled and 
the relationship with the project field lead was very strained. The handoff of project 
administration to Solae had also resulted in several interruptions: the field-level funds 
and contracts with the business coordinators were delayed because of corporate 
accounting and human-resource requirements by DuPont/Solae. In a field visit in June 
to determine why field activities had halted, the NFSD Global Lead felt that a 
“paralysis by analysis” had set into the teams. To help provide clarity and structure, he 
proposed—and received support from the project field lead—to set a 100-day goal 
called Mission 100 to create initial forecasts of the business opportunity in both sites. 
In addition, with the blessing of the project field lead, he removed the business 
coordinator from the Parvathagiri site, believing that the field-level confusion was due 
in large part to his management of the project. The business coordinator was re-
assigned to assist with Solae’s project work in Mumbai. I was asked to return to India 
as soon as I could to help address some of project issues and re-ignite progress. I 
scheduled a 14-day trip at the beginning of July to India.  
Two-days before departure, I spoke with the project field lead briefly to 
arrange my itinerary and to debrief with him on the past month’s events. His mood 
was decidedly down. Things were “messed up” according to him, and “everything had 
changed in the way the work was understood.” He said that Solae wanted the NGOs to 
play the main business partners role, and that the “fundamentals were migrating from 
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co-creation.” He interpreted Mission 100—a plan that he himself verbally endorsed 
and, in fact, had named—as a sign that Solae was planning to end the project in the 
next few months. Motivation, he said, was very low in both sites. He felt that the 
NFSD India Lead was the de facto person in charge, not him, and that this person had 
a strong corporate mindset that wasn’t well matched for the project needs. I reassured 
him that Solae had no intention to close the project. During my visit, he agreed to meet 
and discuss how the shift had occurred and what needed to be done to set the projects 
back on track.  
Over the course of the two weeks in India, I tried to get an understanding of the 
interpersonal and team dynamics that were driving a wedge between the Solae 
corporate team and the Solae field team and, by extension, between Solae and the 
community business partners. I spent several days with project field listening to and, at 
times, debating his interpretations; I spoke with the field teams for several hours on 
multiple occasions; and I met with the NGO partners. All the while I cycled back to 
the NFSD Global Lead to discuss and analyze. In the end, while the project field 
lead’s intense management style and entrepreneurial mindset were excellent in 
building an initial shared vision and forward momentum when the project was 
managed outside of Solae, these same skills proved counter-productive when it 
became critical to start institutionalizing the effort within Solae and bridging the field-
level demands with corporate-level demands. And the close bonds he had built 
between himself and the field teams that enabled him to motivate the team, now 
simply channeled directly to the team (and from there, on to the community) his 
strongly negative reading of Solae’s intentions.  
In my initial debrief with him, the project lead noted that he had all but stopped 
visiting the field sites over the past month, stating that Solae was now “facing toward 
the NGOs” and had entrusted project management to them. He shared that he had 
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already “wished MARI and SIDUR good luck in running the projects.” The women 
partners in Parvathagiri had demanded and were now receiving 1,000 rupees per 
month per person to continue in the project—a decision that he said was made by 
MARI and one that he had opposed (but had not verbalized to anyone, including the 
NFSD Global Lead). The Chiguru women were also making a demand for money. 
Furthermore, he believed the focus on sales per Mission 100 was a clear indication 
that Solae was not committed to the project for the long term but would shut down the 
project if the sales forecasts in the following month were not sufficiently compelling.  
The Solae field team in Rasul Pura expressed the same distrust of Solae’s 
intentions, providing a slew of examples as proof, such as the delay in their contracts 
being finalized, the absence of field-level funds for several weeks, and even not 
having received their business cards and Solae t-shirts as promised. They even voiced 
their belief that “Solae was leading the communities on.” They said that nothing could 
be done until the Chiguru women received assurance and guaranteed money from 
Solae. While there were perfectly legitimate explanations for the delays and mis-steps 
by Solae the field team noted and experienced, the project field lead had done nothing 
to dissuade them of their interpretations but instead fueled them.   
After getting this backdrop, I spent several days with the project manager, the 
NFSD India Lead, and a marketing manager from DuPont who had been appointed to 
the project for 25% of her time (a fact read by the field teams as a sign of their 
eventual replacement, rather than a sign of DuPont/Solae’s commitment). In addition 
to visiting the Rasul Pura project site, the NFSD India Lead had organized a full team 
and partner debrief meeting to try and restore alignment and determine next steps.  
Our meeting with the Solae Chiguru women partners was scheduled to respond 
to their demand (made during the June visit by the NFSD Global Lead) for a signed 
agreement and contract with Solae. Before entering into that discussion, the NFSD 
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India Lead introduced the DuPont marketing manager, noting that she would be a 
valuable resource in helping create the initial business plans and to do the necessary 
test marketing to set prices and establish market potential. Several of the Chiguru 
women objected, stating that they would arrive at the price by starting the business. 
After a brief discussion with the Chiguru women on the issue of the signed agreement, 
we were asked to leave the room so that the women could talk about their specific 
demands.  
During the break, I discussed with the NFSD India Lead that the test marketing 
and business plan approach was contrary to what we had been instructing the field 
team and discussing with the communities. I explained the experience in Kenya and 
how the work over the last four months reflected a different approach. Interestingly, he 
was absolutely surprised by the comment, unaware of this important difference and 
thinking that test marketing was what we had been recommending through the 
Protocol. I described how we would evolve out the business model by starting small 
and then co-create the market by extending the same process used to create the idea to 
creating the initial product offering. He was completely supportive. This 30 minute 
discussion revealed a key mis-understanding about the process by the NFSD 
management team that was leading to mis-communication and mis-perceptions of 
their intentions. It also underscored how not having a written document about the key 
changes in the Protocol process was enabling the mis-interpretations to form and 
persist. 
We returned to finish the discussion with the community. On a flipchart they 
had listed their “demands:” an office, an agreement stating the Chiguru women were 
Solae’s business partners, project funds kept in a joint account with the women’s time-
investment to date reflected on the balance sheet, and a pool of money set aside that 
would go to the women should Solae leave the project before one year. The money 
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total was equivalent to 15 months salary for each person at a rate of 5,000 rupees per 
month—the average salary of a woman working as a maid or in a factory (as most of 
the women in the slum did) was approximately 2,500 rupees/month. They shared that 
their husbands were pressuring them and that they were giving up wages to be 
involved in the project. They could not hold out any longer. While the need underlying 
the request was understanding, the way it was presented (as a demand) and the angry 
tone with which it was delivered made it clear to me that the project field lead’s and 
the field team’s suspicions and mistrust about Solae’s intentions had been verbalized 
to the community partners. This suspicion was later validated by the former business 
coordinator in Parvathagiri. The sense of mutual commitment and joint responsibility 
was all but gone.  
The NFSD India Lead calmly read through the demands and said that all of 
them—with the exception of the reserve account—were already going to happen. The 
project field lead and the Solae field team were silent. I noted to everyone that I felt 
that the way these had been presented as demands, rather than discussing their 
underlying needs and how as partners they could be addressed, was contrary to the 
spirit of the project and what it means to be partners. Without question, creating some 
kind of bridge fund that would allow the women to invest significant time in 
developing the business was necessary and something we had not planned for 
sufficiently. Unfortunately, the manner in which it was raised and dealt with (Solae 
would eventually agree to pay a 3,000 rupee per month “payment” to each person on 
the team) instituted an “employee” relationship between Solae and the women partners 
and noticeably (negatively) affected over the course of the coming year the vigor the 
women had previously demonstrated.  
The project review meeting was held the next day. The meeting was attended 
by all five members of the field teams and the Directors of MARI and SIDUR, in 
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addition to me, the DuPont marketing manager, and the project field lead. It was the 
first time that the partners and team members from both sites had come together since 
the project launch the previous year. The NFSD India Lead noted that the purpose of 
the meeting was to get everyone on the same page and create sharing between the two 
projects. In his introduction, he noted that the approach Solae was using was not a 
standard process model—it was about co-creation. And because this process was new, 
there would be gaps periodically, and that there would need to be learning and 
unlearning by everyone. I could not help but feel that the NFSD India manager had 
taken to heart our discussion about the difference between market testing and co-
creation.  
Both field teams gave brief presentations on their businesses and summarized 
the completed actions. The key topics of discussion for the meeting (raised by the 
various participants) concerned the general value proposition and branding of the 
businesses, how the new businesses would be structured in relationship to Solae 
India’s operations, and the general project timeline and milestones from Solae’s 
perspective. The branding and value proposition discussions generated a valuable 
discussion regarding the need to think beyond simply nutrition and the soy protein—
the soy protein was part of a much bigger business concept and model that carried a 
much broader value proposition.  
The discussion regarding business structure noted that Solae would not have 
legal ownership of the new businesses; instead, the businesses would evolve into a 
customer of Solae and receive the same kind of support that Solae provides all of its 
customers. We discussed, however, that because Solae was investing its resources to 
create this new business with the women, Solae expected that the community 
businesses would value the company’s investment and commitment and continue to 
build and grow the business in a manner that was mutually beneficial. Solae would 
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not, however, create a legal document requiring this, as it was contrary to the spirit of 
the project. We did discuss the possibility of creating a board for the new businesses 
that would include the Solae and the NGO partners in recognition of their important 
role. And in discussing the timeline, the NFSD India manager stated that they were 
hoping that by the end of the year they would have enough information and learning to 
understand the full business model and start operations—a clear signal that Mission 
100 was not intended as a go/no-go decision point. Most everyone expressed that the 
meeting was very valuable and helped clarify the path forward.   
After the NFSD India manager and DuPont marketing manager returned to 
Delhi, I continued to hold extensive discussions with the project field lead in an effort 
to address every one of his suspicions and doubts and to re-store his confidence in the 
project. The project review meeting helped reinforce my message. I was successful in 
that goal, and the same spirit and excitement that the project lead had demonstrated at 
the start of Phase II seemed to return. However, in those discussions, he shared the 
concern that it might be difficult to change the direction of the projects, particularly in 
Parvathagiri, as he had already told the Director of MARI that his organization was 
now responsible for the project. Furthermore, he agreed that he had tacitly encouraged 
the field team in their suspicions (including of my own intentions) and that it would 
take time to restore their confidence. This was particularly the case in Rasul Pura, 
where he had focused his time over the past couple of months. Having ferreted out the 
various issues, I arranged to have a meeting in Delhi the day of my departure to the 
US with the project field lead, the NFSD Global Lead, and the NFSD India Lead to 
openly discuss the project lead’s concerns and needs and to work to create the support 
network that would enable him to do the work.  
Before heading to Delhi, I traveled to the project site in Parvathagiri as a show 
of moral support more than anything, as I did not want to create further confusion 
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regarding decision making and partnership roles. I was accompanied by a manager of 
SC Johnson’s BOP project in Kenya and a Cornell PhD student advising the Kenya 
project who was a colleague of mine. I had invited them to see the work and approach 
being used in India, and to then meet in Delhi with Solae’s NFSD management team 
to share learnings. In Parvathagiri, the field team now consisted only of the two 
community liaisons from MARI, with the liaison trained in maternal and child health 
serving in the leadership role. The field team had already debriefed the Solae women 
on the partner meeting.  
During the meeting with the Samatha women partners, the Samatha women 
provided a summary of the project to my colleagues, and then described the activities 
they had been doing over the past few months, ranging from the mini-homestays, 
efforts to select village champions, choosing a site for their culinary center, to their 
daily cooking practice. They also asked questions about the Kenya business.  
I then debriefed with the field team. They expressed a strong frustration and 
confusion regarding the events of the past few months. They noted that the project 
field lead had not visited the site for more than a month, and that the Rasul Pura field 
team showed no interest in working together and learning from each other. The new 
field team lead emphatically noted that there was no confusion that Solae was leading 
the project, not MARI. They were hungry for support and guidance. I agreed with their 
desire to work closely with and share learnings with the Rasul Pura field team, and 
explained where I believed the confusion and mis-understanding had come from. In 
discussing next steps on the business, I shared my concern of the strong nutrition 
focus that continued in the site. Also, we discussed the broader vision and role that the 
village Champions would play, and the need to first themselves develop a “model 
village Champion” through action learning (as they were doing with the food 
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preparation). Doing that would create a real-life example from which to train new 
village champions and to inspire customers in those villages.   
The SC Johnson manager and my Cornell colleague traveled with me to 
Solae’s India headquarters in Delhi. Before the meeting with the NFSD management 
to discuss the concerns of the project field lead, we first held a meeting aimed at 
sharing learnings between the Kenya and India project sites. The SC Johnson manager 
outlined what he observed in his visit. Interestingly, when the NFSD Global Lead 
outlined what he saw as next steps in the India businesses, he spoke about the need to 
do market testing of the concept, determine the price point for the soy protein, and to 
generate a business plan outlining the potential market opportunity for the soy protein. 
His view was that the “empowerment process” had been completed and now the need 
was to “have answers” as to whether the investment in the project was worth it. His 
vision was precisely what the NFSD India Lead had shared in our meeting with the 
Solae Chiguru women. As I had done with the NFSD India Lead, I articulated the 
difference between testing out the business concept and assessing market potential 
versus creating the business and the market. The key issues I raised in order to explain 
why the market testing approach would not be effective were:  
o The women business partners have become believers in the soy protein 
product because they learned it for themselves through cooking with it on 
their own– they were not instructed in the value of Solae protein and then 
told that they should value it. The same process now has to be extended to 
the broader community so that they to have ownership of the value 
proposition and to create “pull-through” demand.  
o We can’t determine willingness to pay for the soy protein outside of the 
context of the business model—the brand and the perceived value created 
  
304 
by the other aspects of the model can increase (or potentially decrease) 
what people are willing to pay for the soy protein alone. 
o Creating forecasts of consumer demand will create false expectations in the 
business partners.  
In his pushback, it became clear to me that there was confusion in how we 
were using the phrase “evolution of the business.” He interpreted that to mean that the 
general business idea would keep evolving. I explained that the core business concept 
is fixed—the business concept outlines a vision of the kind of change desired in the 
community and a core business offering that can bring about that change in the 
community. In the case of the Solae businesses, for example, getting soy protein 
incorporated as part of a healthy, balanced diet required getting housewives to 
incorporate the soy protein into the daily cooking. In our view, changing housewives’ 
cooking habits was best done by creating socializing opportunities for women 
organized around cooking so that they would learn from each other and develop the 
skills through hands-on practice. It also required getting the broader family excited 
and interested in the food—that was best done through demonstrating the great tasting 
food varieties that could be created.  What would be progressively evolving in the 
coming phases was the specific shape and form of the products, and the business as an 
organizational structure. What was unique about the Protocol approach was that the 
evolution of the supply-side would be done in a manner that also created demand.  
It also became clear to me that stating the output of Phase II as a “business 
model” (how the draft model and proposal to Solae noted it) was creating the wrong 
image in people’s minds. Phase II wasn’t about turning the concept into a full-blown 
business model—it was about getting a core piece of the business going in a 
rudimentary form. Having the SC Johnson manager present was enormously valuable 
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in that discussion, as he shared how the Kenya business was shifting to using action 
learning as a way of generating demand in the broader community. The market 
research approach had indeed created expectations of immediate riches among the 
self-help youth groups; and in the end, consumers were not willing to pay as they had 
indicated.  
We adjourned, and I, the project field lead, the NFSD Global Lead and the 
NFSD India Lead began our separate meeting. The discussion was tense. The project 
field lead made clear that he doubted the motivations and intent of the NFSD India 
Lead, who listened to this criticism with extraordinary patience and understanding. He 
also outlined the various ways in which he felt his leadership role was directly and 
indirectly undermined in the project vis-à-vis the NGO partners. When asked, though, 
what needed to be done to give him the necessary authority and structure, he offered 
no concrete solutions. Eventually, it was agreed upon that the NFSD India Lead would 
have no involvement with any of the in-field aspects of the project, that the project 
field lead would report directly to the NFSD Global Lead, and that the NFSD Global 
Lead would travel to each of the sites the following week to make clear to both MARI 
and SIDUR that these were Solae projects and that the project field lead would have 
total decision making authority. It was made clear to the project lead, however, that he 
was responsible for the performance of the projects. I was cautiously optimistic about 
the path forward. 
Upon returning home, I created and circulated an action plan (reproduced 
below) of the key next steps for the months of July and August 2007 based on the 
discussions over the two-week trip. I grouped the activities using the four main action 
platforms in Phase II of the Protocol. As seen below, I used the term “business 





1. Project Team Development – Boost the Solae Teams’ feelings of 
confidence and security by strengthening their identity with the Solae 
Company and ensuring alignment among the full team as to the project 
intent, process, and roles/responsibilities.  Activities discussed include: 
o Conduct a Solae Induction for the Solae Team members  
o Shift XXX into a Solae team lead position for Parvathagiri 
o Secure an additional Solae business coordinator for Parvathagiri Site   
 
2. Building Shared Commitment – Reinvigorate personal trust and bond 
between Community Teams and Solae while cultivating a shared 
organizational identity. Activities discussed include: 
o Conduct “Partnership Launch Workshop” to develop joint business 
credo (operating values and principles) and partner vows (each 
partner’s commitment to the other)  
o Establish joint Solae-Community operating funds accounts in 
Hyderabad & Warangal 
o Secure a project office space for Hyderabad and Parvathagiri teams (if 
different office space required in Parvathagiri) 
o Establish team name (and potentially the logo)  
o Determine with Community Teams the desired identity and necessary 
markers (e.g., saris, badges) for initial business activity and community 
outreach 
 
3. New Capability Development – Develop the skills and background 
knowledge necessary for beginning the business, for developing and 
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refining an initial product/service offering, and for refining an initial brand 
position. Activities discussed/suggested include:  
o Identify together with the communities those specific skills necessary 
to: 
 Professionally initiate the “highest-priority” dimensions of the 
business concept (see #4 below) 
 Effectively evolve an initial product/service offering that 
maximizes value creation potential for Solae and the 
Community Team 
 Effectively evolve an initial brand position consistent across 
levels 
 
4. Business Prototype Co-Creation – Develop timeline and milestones 
together with the Solae Community for sequencing the business concept 
and developing an initial product/service offering (including pricing) and 
brand positioning. Activities discussed/suggested include:  
o Map the revenue opportunities in the business models and the 
necessary resources linked with each revenue-generating activity 
o Prioritize the revenue opportunities (e.g., level of resources required, 
ease of implementation, revenue generation time-frame, long-term 
business potential) 
 
Also, in light of the ongoing mis-alignment regarding the Protocol approach, I 
turned my attention to drafting the new process based on the learnings to date in 
Kenya and India. Having a written document would help provide a reference point 
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among all of the field team members and stakeholders involved in the process—a 
critical issue at this juncture of the project.  
On August 3—less than two weeks returning from India—the project field lead 
emailed me to announce his resignation and immediate withdrawal from the project, 
citing ongoing inconsistencies in the Solae NFSD management’s communication and 
actions. I spoke with the project field lead, asking that he continue in his capacity 
through the end of the month so that a replacement could be found and to help ensure 
continuity. He gave no definitive answer. I discussed the issue with the NFSD Global 
Lead who had also requested the same of the project field lead. In either case, the stop 
gap measure was to have the NFSD India Lead step into a more direct leadership role, 
though his living in Delhi would make that difficult. In addition, the skill set needed to 
drive the projects on the ground level were different from those he possessed. Per the 
Global Lead’s request, I began a search for someone to fill the project lead role. Also, 
to help transition and support the NFSD India Lead and to help sustain motivation 
among the field teams and community business partners, I planned an emergency 10-
day trip to India later that month. As it turned out, the project field lead chose to not 
remain with the project through the end of the month. 
Over the next two weeks, I coordinated my agenda with the NFSD India Lead, 
which included holding a two-day team retreat, meeting with the Directors of both 
NGO partners, and meeting with both Samatha and Chiguru businesses. On a final 
coordination call with the NFSD India Lead the day before my departure, he shared 
with me the news that the President of Solae—the champion of the NFSD platform 
and of the BOP Protocol projects—had left the company.  A senior manager heading 
up DuPont’s food and nutrition platform would assume the position of Solae’s 
Chairman of the Board and temporary CEO. Solae’s financial performance since its 
acquisition by DuPont had declined year-on-year, with gross margins at an all-time 
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low. The NFSD Global Lead was slated to travel to St Louis on September 5, 2007 to 
report on status of the NFSD platform to the new Chairman/CEO.  
Upon arriving in India, I met separately with the Directors of SIDUR and 
MARI to discuss the situation and get their assessment of the current state of the 
project and field capacity. SIDUR had been completely confused by the turn of events 
over the preceding four months. In their view, no forward progress had been achieved; 
the field team and the project field lead were not providing them with any timelines or 
work plans. Critically, they felt that the Solae team was representing neither Solae nor 
SIDUR in the project, but had become “simply messengers” of the community. They 
agreed to help identify a new project field lead.  
My discussion with MARI was similar, in the sense that he too felt that he had 
been kept completely in the dark by the project field lead about the project work on 
the ground; it was because of this that the MARI Director felt compelled to go to the 
field and see what was happening. In discussing the capabilities needed in a project 
lead, we agreed that the person needed to be a skilled entrepreneur with development 
sensitivities, rather than a development professional with an entrepreneurial bent, as 
was the case with the project lead. The MARI Director believed that the project field 
lead’s paranoia regarding project control stemmed in large part from his insecurity in 
advancing a business development effort. The Solae NFSD Global Lead independently 
arrived at the same conclusion. We both agreed that the two MARI community 
liaisons guiding the project in Parvathagiri needed a business coordinator to 
complement their skills; in the interim, the MARI community liaison trained in 
maternal/child health would assume the leadership role in the rural site due to her 
experience in program management. He too offered to explore his connections to fill 
the project field lead role. 
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 Next, I and Solae’s NFSD India Lead guided a two-day team retreat at 
DuPont’s Pioneer office in Hyderabad that brought together the two-person teams 
from the Rasul Pura and Parvathagiri sites, the business coordinator that was removed 
from Parvathagiri to a Solae project in Mumbai, and the DuPont marketing manager. 
The broad objectives behind the retreat were to start drawing the project sites closer 
together to create a buffer and flexibility in team capacity (we were concerned that the 
Rasul Pura’s field team’s strong loyalty to project field lead would result in their also 
resigning from the project) and to establish a common project workplan to better 
enable the NFSD India Lead to manage the projects from a distance.  
Day one of the retreat addressed the big picture: the departure of the project 
field lead, the roles and responsibilities of the various team members present at the 
meeting (including me), the communication channels among ourselves, and a review 
of Phase II of the Protocol. The key message to the field teams was that the best way 
to accelerate progress on the ground was to share learnings across sites and operates as 
a single team. The second day focused on the businesses and next steps. Each of the 
field teams was given time to collect their thoughts and present their business concept 
and the activities that had been completed. During this discussion, there was clear 
tension between the teams and a jockeying for position; in particular, the Rasul Pura 
team—who had been most strongly influenced by the former project field lead—was 
borderline disrespectful of the others.  The last part of the day was focused on 
discussing a common workplan format and then trying to populate an initial three-
month workplan. I shared the workplan structure (based on the four core activities 
under Phase II of the Protocol) that I and the project field lead used; with 
modifications, we agreed on using it as a common workplan structure for both teams. 
Each team then had time to begin thinking through some initial milestones, objectives, 
and activities which they then presented out to the full group for discussion. One of 
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the Directors of SIDUR joined the meeting for this last part of the retreat. These first-
attempts at workplans revealed that the field teams would need significant input and 
guidance in thinking through and articulating the workplan. Having run out of time, 
the field teams agreed to complete the workplans and then send them to me and the 
NFSD India Lead for input and feedback. The goal was to finalize and lock-in the 
workplans for September and October by the end of the first week of September.  
After the meeting, I had offline discussions with the field team members. The 
Parvathagiri team was keen to move forward and recognized their need to shift out of 
a non-profit/public health mindset into a business mindset. But among the Rasul Pura 
team, there was the belief the project field lead had been fired, and, because of this, 
their resentment of Solae was strong. I tried to address this, though it was clear that 
they were skeptical of me and the others in the project. Recognizing this, I discussed 
with the NFSD India Lead the importance of having the field teams go through a 
formal induction process into DuPont in order to help re-establish their sense of 
affiliation and identity with DuPont/Solae.  
Over the remainder of my trip, I and the NFSD India Lead visited both project 
sites. The main objectives of the visits was to formally announce the departure of the 
project field lead (he had not informed the communities), to reassure them that the 
field team would remain to work with them, and to reinforce Solae’s commitment to 
the effort and the ongoing support that I and the NGO partners would provide. In 
Parvathagiri, our meeting was held in the three-room, open-air structure that had been 
selected as the site for the Culinary Station (the combination food production and 
retail outlet center). The Samatha women expressed concern about the news regarding 
the project field lead, as they had witnessed the business lead from their site removed 
in June; this seemed like a further reduction in support just at a time when they needed 
Solae’s guidance the most. The NFSD India Lead reassured them as best he could that 
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Solae would remain committed. Furthermore, with him he brought a one-year 
agreement per their request (not legally binding) that recognized the Samatha women 
as Solae’s business partners in the venture, and committed to working with them for 
one year (per Solae’s legal team, the contract contained a no-fault clause that would 
enable Solae to cancel the contract with 30 days notice). All of the women signed the 
document. Their mood was hesitant, though they generally seemed in good spirits and 
expressed a determination to move forward. Prior to our meeting, they had been 
debriefed by their field team on the just-completed retreat and the need to develop the 
two-month workplan.  
In Hyderabad, our meeting with the Solae Chiguru women partners followed a 
similar structure. The meeting was held in their recently rented office space in the 
Rasul Pura slum; the office had a small kitchen where they could prepare food 
quantities sufficient for workshops and sampling and trying out new recipes. As in 
Parvathagiri, the NFSD India Lead brought with him the agreement stating Solae’s 
one-year commitment to work with the Chiguru women partners to develop the 
business. Unlike in Parvathagiri, however, the Chiguru women were not satisfied with 
the agreement because it did not provide for a reserve fund based on their labor 
investment over the past year. The NFSD India Lead explained that they would 
provide for monthly capital to bridge their needs, and that the field team would work 
with them over the next few weeks to determine the appropriate amount. However, 
creating a reserve fund was not only against the partnership spirit and commitment to 
mutual responsibility, but it was also planning for failure. This was not taken well by 
the Chiguru women, and we departed to cold farewells. Rebuilding the spirit of the 
partnership relationship was clearly going to be difficult in Rasul Pura.  
Apart from these overarching partnership and team-level issues, both sites had 
made progress on their businesses under the Mission 100 plan that the NFSD Global 
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Lead tried to implement in June. However, I noted similar challenges in both sites 
under the “Business Prototype Co-Creation” objective. First, both sites had initiated 
what were being called “outreach activities” that were initially intended as a way to 
develop, through action learning, the direct-to-home service component of the 
business (i.e., the group cooking) that was central to habituating housewives to 
cooking with soy protein. Lacking the guidance of the project field lead, however, 
these activities were being carried out as traditional “awareness building” exercises—
the women would go in a group of three to a household, introduce them to the soy 
protein and the health benefits of it, and then do a cooking demonstration for them. 
This was fundamentally different from the cocreation approach used in the Cookery 
Workshops, in which friends and neighbors were invited to share their own insights 
and expertise and to jointly cook together. The end-product of that event (recipes of 
great-tasting foods) became part of the initial customer offering. I raised the issue with 
both field teams and encouraged them to conduct the outreach in a way that would 
similarly involve the broader community in developing the eventual direct-to-home 
service offering.  
The second common challenge in both sites was a tendency to focus on a piece 
of the business concept in isolation of the wider business concept. For example, both 
sites were developing soy-protein fortified packaged and fresh foods as part of their 
prototype activities. Their function in the business concept, however, was to build 
interest and desire among husbands and children for protein-fortified foods so that 
they would support and even encourage their wives/mothers to learn to cook with the 
soy (even though housewives did the cooking, husbands often held the purse strings 
for ingredient purchases, and children influenced what mothers cooked). But as they 
began to develop these initial products and determine packaging, price points, and 
sales sites, the teams’ focus turned toward maximizing the sales from these individual 
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products. The packaging and sales points, for example, contained no indication that 
customers could prepare soy-protein foods at home (by including a recipe for 
example) nor any way to contact someone to invite them to their home for a 
demonstration.  
In retrospect, the way we graphically represented the business concept (as a 
collection of complementary offerings) enabled this kind of maximizing logic when 
developing the initial offering. The business concept would better have been 
represented from the perspective of the core customer (housewives) and framed 
around the core-revenue model driving the business (in this case, from sales of protein 
ingredients by Solae Champions/Proteges building cooking clubs among housewives). 
Also, in place of discussing the concept of “complementary products and services” as 
part of the initial collective entrepreneurship workshops we should have focused on 
the idea of integrated products and services.  
Before returning to the US, I stopped in Delhi to debrief with the NFSD 
management team. We agreed that in this transition period I would continue to work 
closely and support the NFSD India Lead. To that end, we planned for my return the 
following month (November 2007) for an extended visit to help the NFSD India Lead 
solidify his role as the project field lead and to ingrain a planning routine in the two 
field teams. While in Delhi, we also interviewed a candidate for the project field lead 
position that I had identified through contacts. We decided that, though he was too 
inexperienced to assume the overall project field lead position, he could certainly fill 
the gap for a business coordinator in Parvathagiri. We planned to recruit and interview 
additional candidates with the goal of making a final hire on my return trip. 
On returning to the US, I stayed closely engaged with the Solae NFSD India 
Lead team to help guide the development of the workplans and to advise on various 
issues. Developing the workplans in the two sites took several weeks to accomplish 
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rather than several days as initial hoped. The process of creating the workplans 
highlighted the teams’ lack of business experience and their minimal exposure to 
using spreadsheets and Word documents. There was also a language barrier—the team 
members were being asked to do work in a language in which the most fluent had only 
basic proficiency. The Parvathagiri field team, however, did have strong project 
management, execution, and planning skills—they needed the strategic guidance and 
the business content piece. The Rasul Pura team, however, lacked even basic project 
management and reporting skills and chafed under the requests for better reporting and 
planning.   
In Rasul Pura, as the workplan was being developed, the field team was also 
working with the Chiguru women to determine a monthly amount that each Chiguru 
business partner would receive to enable them to dedicate their time to building the 
business. Unfortunately, the process continued to move forward as a negotiation rather 
than a discussion among partners to address the other’s needs. As noted earlier, the 
Samatha women in Parvathagiri were each receiving 1,000 rupees/month, an amount 
lower than what they would earn by doing day labor in the fields. The Chiguru women 
demanded 4,0000 rupees/month. Eventually, the number was brought down to 2,000 
rupees, an amount still above what they would earn in their jobs as housekeepers and 
factory workers. At this level, there was no sense of “entrepreneurial risk”—instead, 
they were shifting into a de facto employee status. I raised this issue with NFSD India 
Lead; both he and the Directors of SIDUR had the same concern. The eventual 
agreement that was signed noted that Solae’s contribution would decrease once 
revenues started to be generated; it also required full participation at all events and 
meetings. While the former was valuable in signaling that the capital contribution was 
for working capital, the latter reinforced the feeling that the funds were a form of 
payment for work completed. Interestingly, when Solae stopped providing this 
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monthly payment at the end of 2008, almost all of the Samatha team members 
persevered and continued to try and grow the business; in Rasul Pura, almost two-
thirds of the team members stopped participating.  
During my six weeks in the US before returning to India, progress was made in 
both sites on the businesses. In Hyderabad, the majority of activities consisted of 
action learning events and activities undertaken to create the business prototype. The 
action learning approach was applied to determine the shape and form that their 
kitchen facility should take. The Chiguru women divided into three groups of 
approximately eight people. Each group then visited a different kind of kitchen. One 
was a local college cafeteria, another high-end commercial restaurant, and the third a 
sweet shop. The field visits provided important insights into space utilization, staffing, 
and professional operation.   
To develop a better sense of the process and cost of producing packaged foods, 
the Chiguru women held a “food exhibition” at a temple in the slum where they gave 
out food samples and sold packaged sweets and snacks in ziplock bags displayed on a 
folding table with a saffron cloth. A banner in Telegu read “Solae Menu – Better 
Health” and “Solae Tastes – Sweet as Honey.” They invited people they had contacted 
during outreach to the event. Initially, the Chiguru women followed a cost-plus pricing 
model (totaling all of their costs and then adding a profit), only to discover that their 
prices would be too high. They ended up simply matching the going market price for 
their products for the event, a decision which raised a valuable conversation about 
value-based pricing versus cost-plus pricing.  
A pricing exercise around the soy protein was also conducted, as Solae did not 
want to specify a priori the cost of the soy protein to the businesses. Rather—as they 
did with their core customers—they used a value based pricing approach, backing out 
a customer price according to the value it created for them. With the guidance of the 
  
317 
NFSD India Lead, the women surveyed the various kinds of protein sources available 
in the community and calculated the price per gram of protein. From this as a 
benchmark, the NFSD India Lead asked them to give him the price that they felt 
appropriate for the soy protein ingredient. This approach, which made perfect sense 
for Solae’s core customer base, was an awkward fit. For one, it pulled Solae out of a 
partner role and into a supplier role to the businesses, and (based on the feedback I 
received) created the same feeling of negotiation that surrounded the monthly payment 
to the women. Second, because the protein pricing exercise was done by comparing 
the cost of physical goods (like eggs, milk, chicken), it further locked the women into 
seeing their business as primarily selling a physical product (soy protein or protein-
fortified foods), rather than as a service (enabling socializing activities among women 
via cooking).  
As part of activities under new capability development, a day-and-a-half 
nutrition training program was organized for the Chiguru women. A nutritionist from 
Mumbai that had worked extensively with Solae in the past created a hands-on 
learning experience. The women were asked to track their food consumption at home 
for a week. The nutritionist then analyzed each person’s diet, creating a chart that had 
zip-locked bags of food taped it to visually communicate the nutrition per serving size 
of a various common foods.  
Almost half of the team’s time and energy, though, was invested in formal 
outreach activities designed to create demand. The outreach campaign focused on 
reaching housewives in their homes and on schools in the slum. The direct-to-home 
outreach began by identifying twelve target areas or clusters in the slum. Based on role 
playing and learnings from initial outreach experiences, the Chiguru women went in 
teams of five people to women’s homes along one of the lanes in their assigned 
cluster. Once invited inside a home, one person led the discussion, one person did the 
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cooking, one person documented the session, and two others floated outside the home, 
inviting additional neighbors into the session and/or answering questions. The Chiguru 
women would bring their own vegetables to the session to prepare the food. 
Several days were dedicated to reaching out to almost a dozen private schools 
in the slum. Going in groups of five, the Chiguru women would arrange to meet with 
the school principal and teachers. The 1-1/2 hour meeting would focus on explaining 
the business concept, the partnership with Solae, and the health benefits of soy protein.   
As I noted above, this demand creation/outreach work continued to be framed 
as an awareness building challenge, not one of getting the broader community to feel a 
sense of ownership and investment in the business. Thus, rather than engaging the 
community to cocreate elements of the business offering as they had under the 
guidance of the former project field lead, they continued to engage the community to 
educate them about the Chiguru business and the soy protein benefits. 
 In Parvathagiri, a similar set of activities was taking place, though the 
emphasis was quite different. There, a significant amount of time was invested in 
using action learning not only to help develop the business prototype, but the 
rudimentary management systems for accounting, production, sales, and office 
management that fell under the new capability development activity platform. The 
Samatha women were divided into four committees: business development, 
purchasing, planning and preparation, and office management. A monthly review was 
held to debrief completed actions and plan next steps. Each of the business teams gave 
summaries of their work and expenditures.  
 The Business Development team oversaw the recruitment effort of the local 
village Champion from four neighboring villages. The team would spend a full day in 
the village, identifying people who would be effective Champions based on the village 
profile. They would return later and approach two women candidates for the 
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Champion position, with the intention of eventually choosing one. Each person was 
given 100 grams of protein to experiment with in their home cooking, much as the 
Samatha team members had done. The Purchasing Team completed four visits to 
village markets, two of which were located by a railway and two by a road. The team 
recorded the goods sold, their prices, the origin of the goods, and the number of people 
in attendance. They also completed a retail/wholesale price survey of food ingredients, 
recording observations about how foods were presented and the distinguishing aspects 
of the service (e.g., cleanliness, friendliness of shopkeeper). The Planning and 
Preparation Team ordered and tracked the quantity and cost of all the ingredients used 
in daily cooking training (see below) by the Samatha women. Sixty recipes were 
documented. Management books were created for ingredient expenditures, pre-cooked 
and post-cooked food weights, and profit (using a simulated sale price based on 
current market rates for equivalent dishes). The Office Management Team created 
record books for daily attendance, protein inventory (it was kept in 10, 20, and 50 
gram zip-lock bags), samples of protein given out, meeting minutes, monthly 
attendance, and office assets (e.g., food scale, packaging material, basic office 
supplies).  Creating these rudimentary management systems through the action 
learning activities was a key advancement over our approach in Kenya; the resulting 
systems, because they had been developed as part of a concrete activity, were 
inherently accessible and usable by the women, many of who were illiterate. 
Unfortunately, because of the intra-team tensions, this key process learning was not 
applied in Rasul Pura. 
To continuously build the cooking skills of all of the Samatha women and 
create new recipe innovations, the group divided into seven teams of three people 
each. Seven core recipes were selected. Each day from 9:00 to 11:00, one of the teams 
cooked one of the recipes for the group lunch and was responsible for clean-up. They 
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rotated through the seven items, and then started with a new seven recipes. The 
Planning and Preparation Team recorded the profit the Samatha women would have 
generated had they sold the lunch meals at the going market rate. The Planning and 
Preparation Team also laid out and recorded all of the necessary ingredients for the 
next day’s food preparation team.  
The Parvathagiri field team working with the Samatha women also modified 
the approach used in Rasul Pura to establish a price for Solae’s soy protein. Rather 
than simply benchmarking against the protein cost of other forms of protein (an 
exercise that they completed as well), the Parvathagiri team looked at the theoretical 
profit margin for the lunch meals they prepared for themselves after accounting for 
their targeted take-home pay. That leftover margin was the basis for establishing the 
added value of the soy protein. This approach was more effective in maintaining the 
spirit of partnership, as it was inherently framed as how Solae and the Samatha women 
partners can share returns, rather than what the community business partners would be 
willing to pay Solae (the case in Rasul Pura). 
 The Samatha women continued to do the mini-homestays in neighboring 
villages (22 villages in two months), both to select village champions, but also as a 
form of outreach and demand creation. Three women would travel together, spending 
three days and two nights in the village. As with the first homestays, the Samatha 
women stayed with relatives of other Samatha team members. Once they arrived, they 
divided the village into four quadrants and located four to five families per quadrant 
who they would visit and discuss their business and the value of soy protein. They 
would also visit with the school and the government-funded crèche (anganwadi) to 
share about their business and to learn about the health and nutrition status of the 
village. Samples of the soy protein were handed out. During their last day, the 
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Samatha women would prepare soy-protein fortified sweets for the family that hosted 
them.  
Lastly, the Samatha team also instituted a “neighbor sharing” program, in 
which each of the Samatha members would work with three of their neighbors. Each 
of the neighbors was given protein to experiment with, just as the Samatha women had 
done themselves. A Neighbor Expo was scheduled to be held when I returned to India, 
which would bring together the neighbors to share their experiences. However, despite 
the discussions during my previous two visits, the demand creation aspect of the 
homestays and even the Neighbor Sharing program were premised (as with Chiguru) 
on simply awareness building and educating people about the need for soy protein, not 
cocreation of the actual products, services, and value proposition.  Clearly, the way I 
explained this issue was failing to communicate the difference between “promotion” 
and “cocreation.”  
I returned to India on October 25, 2007 for 25 days to work closely with the 
NFSD India Lead and the two businesses. My initial agenda was to first spend several 
days on my own at both of the project sites debriefing with the field teams and 
community partners and participating in any scheduled events. I also would visit 
Solae’s project site in Mumbai to advise the team working on the related project with 
SP Jain University. During the second week, I would repeat the visits to the sites 
together with the NFSD India Lead. During the third week we planned to do a team 
planning retreat with the goal of developing the next round of three-month workplans, 
followed by a full partners retreat.  
In Rasul Pura, I debriefed a full day with the Solae field team during which 
time they shared out the above-described activities completed over the previous six 
weeks. The next day we visited with the Chiguru women at their office in Rasul Pura. 
The mood had picked up decidedly compared with my previous visit. The women 
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noted how word had spread through Rasul Pura about their business, and they were 
receiving frequent requests for soy protein. The demand they felt stemmed from their 
having visited more than 600 homes since June 2007 as part of their outreach.  
Some of the issues that I noted and that we discussed concerned developing a 
more professional business image and management routines, establishing a more 
consistent brand image, and conducting the outreach using a cocreation approach that 
creates the Protégé service offering (i.e., the direct-to-home engagement of 
housewives). I raised the issue of business professionalism, as the Chiguru office 
space had no “feeling” of an office space: the door outside had no indication of it 
being the Chiguru office, the walls were bare, the test kitchen had ingredients and 
cooking utensils piled up, and the bulk soy protein and a scale sat on the floor amidst 
papers and posters and the few records they had kept. We discussed the kinds of things 
that reflect a professional business atmosphere (e.g., project documentation, field 
notes, and other documents easily accessible and filed clearly; soy protein kept 
together with the food items; business concept, project milestones, goals, and 
workplans clearly displayed for easy reference) and their impact on the impression and 
expectations of potential customers and of DuPont/Solae managers that visited. Over 
the course of the week, the Chiguru office space experienced a facelift that addressed 
many of the issues we discussed, including putting up a Chiguru banner and a photo of 
the Chiguru members, putting a poster-sized map of Rasul Pura on the wall that 
marked the areas where outreach was conducted, posting the business concept and the 
weeks agenda on the wall.   
Related to the issue of the appearance of their office, we discussed the 
impressions that their personal appearance had. Everyone immediately raised the 
importance of having a common sari and handbags, as that would enhance not only 
their visibility, but also their credibility in the community. According to the field team, 
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they had asked for funding to purchase saris but had not yet received approval. It 
turned out that DuPont’s accounting requirements were forcing the NFSD Field Lead 
to get prior approval for even the smallest of expenditures. We agreed that the saris 
were a priority; to expedite the process and to maximize the impact of their future 
outreach efforts, they purchased samples to be shared with the NFSD India Lead the 
following week during his visit. Not having the project infrastructure in place to make 
field-level funds readily available to the field team was clearly a consequence of 
handing off the project to Solae in mid-stream; ensuring that this infrastructure was in 
place during the pre-field phase was a key learning. 
Lastly, we again discussed the issue of doing the outreach in a manner that 
developed out the direct-to-home service. In our discussions, it was clear that both the 
Chiguru women and the field team were not linking this activity to their business 
concept (the Protégé services) but simply saw it as awareness building. I suggested to 
the field team that they post the business concept on the wall to help make clear how 
the action learning activities (e.g., outreach) was contributing to creating the product 
and service offering. Because of the language barrier, I wasn’t able to communicate 
this directly to the Chiguru women. This issue underscored the importance of having a 
field team that understood the subtle, yet critical, difference between market creation 
and awareness building.   
Over the course of a three-day visit to Parvathagiri, I debriefed extensively 
with the field team and the Samatha women and then participated in a Neighbor Expo 
event. In contrast with Rasul Pura, the Parvathagiri field team and the Samatha women 
presented a strong sense of professionalism: files were rigorously maintained for all of 
their activities; workplans, activity schedules, key objectives, and posters about food 
nutrition were posted on the walls; and a team photo was hung on the wall. As I 
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explained to them, this professionalism instilled confidence in visitors and contributed 
to an image of success.  
In our debrief sessions, the two key business issues we discussed concerned 
expanding the brand positioning beyond “healthy food” and seeing the soy product as 
part of a broader service offering. As I had noted earlier, the field team and the 
Samatha women had exhibited a strong tendency toward a narrow customer value 
proposition that could be summed up as “soy protein is good for your health.” During 
the July 2007 team and partner meeting and the team retreat in September 2007, we 
discussed the importance of framing the brand and value proposition much more 
broadly to avoid pigeon-holing the business in a small niche market and creating the 
perception that soy protein was a medicine.  The Parvathagiri field team had taken this 
message to heart and had been working with the Samatha women on articulating the 
unique value of their business. They shared the following list of unique values they 
had brainstormed together:  
 
• Strength giving foods 
• Food with protein and minerals 
• Clean food 
• Quality items used to prepare food 
• Nice food presentation 
• Available to poorest customers 
• Organic paddy and veggies to prepare foods 
• Foods for health  
• Protein-based items 
• Tasty, nutritious 
• Wide variety of food 
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• Make food for children and elderly 
• Serve rural areas 
 
As is clear from the above, the positioning continued to remain trapped under the 
narrow category of “healthy food.” I pointed this out during out debrief and tried to 
facilitate a discussion that drew on the Samatha women’s own experiences in learning 
to value and cook with the soy protein over the prior eight months. I tried to facilitate 
out how an important motivation behind their own learning experience was the fun 
and enjoyment that came from cooking together, sharing recipes with each other, and 
involving their family members in testing out new recipes. And their customers, I 
reminded them, would not have the powerful incentive of creating a business, so the 
motivation to go through the learning curve had to be particularly compelling. Getting 
the field team and the community business partner to think about the broader brand 
positioning continued to be a constant challenge and reinforced the importance of 
having field team members comfortable with linking the abstraction of a business’s 
brand to concrete actions—this style of thinking did not come naturally to the 
community partners.  
A related issue and challenge in Parvathagiri (and one that also was present to 
a lesser degree in Rasul Pura) was the group’s difficulty of grasping the concept of 
selling a service.  Both the field team and the Samatha women saw the offering in 
terms of a physical product, be it the soy protein powder that they would sell directly 
to housewives or the packaged and prepared foods containing soy protein sold to the 
wider community. These products were what the customer was actually buying in their 
minds. Upon understanding this, I realized why their brand message continued to 
focus on “healthy foods”—they only saw their product in terms of the physical food 
products, not the services they would provide. They viewed their interaction with 
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housewives (e.g., in-home joint cooking with neighbors, cooking counseling, family 
diet audits) as simply part of the sales process, but not part of the value that the 
customer received. In discussing how the manner in which they engaged customers to 
get them using soy protein created customer value, their reaction was that customers 
would not pay for that, but would pay for the soy protein. In other words, they saw the 
product value as separate from the service value, not as an overall customer offering. I 
tried to discuss with the field team the need to view the customer engagement as an 
event that contained various dimensions—some involving tangible products like the 
soy protein, some involving intangibles like opportunities to socialize with other 
women—that together determined the value for a customer. Despite extensive 
discussions, this proved to be a difficult conceptual hurdle to overcome.  
 In addition to debriefs and discussions, one full day of my visit entailed 
participating in the Neighbors Expo, one of the major group events that the Samatha 
business held. As noted earlier, each of the Samatha women provided three of their 
neighbor housewives with 100 grams of the soy protein two weeks earlier and were 
asked to simply experiment with the product. The Samatha women also provided some 
basics on cooking with the protein. For the Expo, each of the housewives was invited, 
along with two of her family members. The local political leaders of Parvathagiri and 
Annaram Sharif were invited. A large, colorful tent was erected in the courtyard in 
front of the temporary office space, and a microphone and speakers were set up. A 
separate table contained approximately a dozen varieties of soy-protein fortified 
packaged sweets and snacks prepared ahead of time by the Samatha women.  
 The workshop opened at noon and ran until 3:30 PM. After a welcome by one 
of the Samatha women, the Director of SIDUR addressed the crowd of some 70 
people, providing history on the Samatha women’s effort. Afterwards, all of the men 
in attendance were invited to view the prepared foods and purchase them, followed by 
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the women and children. Once things settled down and everyone reconvened under the 
tent, the microphone was passed around to give all of the women neighbors a chance 
to reflect on cooking with the soy protein. Husbands and children also provided input. 
Interestingly, a number of people from the community stated that their leg or neck 
pains had been alleviated; one person commented that they weren’t able to walk but 
could after eating the soy protein during the two weeks. These types of comments 
clearly indicated that some of the Samatha women were continuing to present the soy 
protein in a medicinal light. Other comments were less grandiose: several noted that 
they liked the taste and would use it regularly. Another commented that she would 
share it would several of her friends. Many of the comments offered encouragement to 
Samatha’s goal of improving the community’s health through their business.  
 In terms of creating a business, the action learning event was tremendously 
valuable. The event provided an opportunity to use the planning, production, and 
accounting systems that the group had been developing over the past six weeks. It also 
provided a low-risk opportunity to hone their customer presentation skills, and 
generated valuable momentum and confidence through the actual sale of products they 
had prepared. From a market creation perspective, the event was orchestrated largely 
as an awareness building event. Also, the housewives’ exposure to the soy protein was 
structured as a sampling strategy rather than a cocreation strategy that helped generate 
the actual product offering and brand positioning. As such, I was doubtful that the 
event and the two-week process leading up to it would create the sense of ownership 
and personal investment in the business and value proposition that would convert the 
stated intentions to buy the soy protein into actual purchases.  
 During our debrief of the event late that afternoon, it was clear that having 
successfully orchestrated the event was a huge confidence builder for the Samatha 
women. They stated that they better understood the link between the work they had 
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done to engage the community and creating demand for their product; as they stated, 
they had created some suspense in the community and fulfilled it on that day. One of 
the younger women recruited into the business—the youngest child of ten children—
expressed how being part of the business had changed her life and her hope for the 
future. I congratulated them on the tremendous work they had done and the high level 
of professionalism they demonstrated. Moving forward, I expressed my excitement to 
see them develop a common brand identity sop that their time in the community would 
have greater visual impact. Also, we discussed the importance of using consistently 
the term “Solae soy protein” when discussing their product—several times during the 
expo, either they or the guests referenced the product as either “soy powder” or “soy 
flour.” The Solae brand was an important part of their value proposition and 
credibility, and avoiding confusion between their soy protein isolate and soy flour was 
critical, as they were entirely different products and soy flour was already available (at 
a considerably cheaper cost than the soy isolate). 
  From Parvathagiri I traveled to Mumbai to advise the Solae project team there. 
I returned to Hyderabad and began developing the draft agenda for the team retreat 
and finalizing my agenda over the next two weeks in expectation of the arrival of the 
NFSD India Lead. I received a call from the NFSD India Lead thinking that he was 
confirming his arrival time in Hyderabad. Instead, he shared with me the news that the 
new top-management team of Solae had met with the NFSD Global Lead in St Louis 
and informed him that the Nutrition for Sustainable Development platform and all 
projects under it were to be closed down by the end of the year. The company’s 
primary objective was to address sagging profit margins, and any project that was not 
profitable in the short term was scaled back or cut.  I shifted my schedule and traveled 
immediately to Delhi where I met with the NFSD Global Lead who had returned from 
St Louis and the NFSD India Lead to discuss our alternatives.  
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As the NFSD Global Lead explained, Nutrition for Sustainable Development 
had not been formally integrated into the company’s corporate structure at this point in 
time, and was essentially a “special project” of the former President. The new 
management team had little background on the BOP concept and the strategic basis of 
the innovation approach we were using. Without the background and understanding, 
the project appeared to be not only a near-term drain on the company’s profitability, 
but also counter to Solae’s core strategy as a business-to-business provider of soy 
protein solutions. 
In discussing the situation, it was clear that, as a first start, we needed to better 
communicate the strategic logic behind the project and the history that led to its 
inception that included the BOP call to action by DuPont’s CEO. We believed that 
educating the new Solae top management team about the project could potentially help 
shift their view on its value to Solae’s strategic interests. Although financial support 
was unlikely, we hoped that Solae’s top management would support continuing to 
dedicate human resources to the effort, as well as in-kind resources (e.g., soy protein). 
Creating a short brief that provided this history was the first thing on our to-do list. 
Second, because of the project’s connection to DuPont’s broader efforts around BOP 
and sustainability, we believed that DuPont would have a stake and interest in seeing 
the project continue, given that Solae’s initiative was among the most extensive across 
DuPont’s SBUs. To make our case for financial support, we needed to develop a 
proposal that outlined the various sources of value to DuPont through the project.  
Over the course of the week, I worked continuously to generate drafts of both 
the project summary document and the DuPont proposal. Our goal was to have both 
documents ready for circulation in one-week’s time. The seven-page summary used 
Solae’s internal language to frame the project as a new “go-to-market process” geared 
toward reaching a new mass market. The document outlined the project intent, the 
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three-phase Protocol process, the origin of the Solae India projects, a summary 
timeline of the India projects, and the current status and next steps. The summary 
explicitly noted the role that DuPont played in supporting the BOP Protocol Initiative 
and the involvement of DuPont personnel in the initial scoping and championing of 
the Solae project. It concluded by stating that  
 
“confidence is very high among the community team and the Solae 
team, as revenue generated during recent action learning and outreach 
activities confirm that the broader community’s expressed desire for 
Solae-based foods and protein will be converted into actual sales. By 
mid December, all three business sites will have in place a business 
prototype and will launch formal business operations, thereby 
completing Phase II of the Protocol. During Phase III, which will be 
completed in calendar year ’08, the businesses will move towards 
implementation of the full business concept while intensifying outreach 
to the full populations within each site. We strongly feel that the three 
businesses will be fully self-sustaining and capable of expansion to 
adjacent slums and villages within a 1-year period.”  
The 16-page proposal to DuPont requested sufficient budget to support the 
project through 2008, at which point we believed the businesses would be financially 
self-sustaining (please see Exhibit 31 for the Executive Summary). The proposal 
outlined three sources of near-term and long-term value to DuPont to justify the 
investment of bringing the businesses to sustainability: media exposure and PR value, 
the creation of a DuPont BOP center of excellence, and an option to pursue scale-out. 
Our media exposure argument noted that DuPont/Solae’s Protocol effort had been 
highlighted at ten major conferences and was mentioned in publications including 
Fortune, BusinessWeek online, SocialFunds.com, India Times, and the Financial 
Express. The Center of Excellence argument noted that the project could serve as a 
training ground in “BoP best practices” for other DuPont business units interested in 
entering the BOP space but who have been unsure of how to proceed. The scale-out 
argument outlined the significant income potential from scaling the initial businesses 
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across slums and rural villages in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra states through a 
franchise-based structure that was consistent with Solae’s business-to-business 
corporate strategy (please see Exhibit 32). Our revenue model, which was premised on 
a buddy-system of franchise replication in which existing franchises supported the 
founding of a new franchise, forecasted reaching a tipping point in new franchise 
foundings and net income by 2013.   
While our argument for support from DuPont focused on the up-side value of 
doing so, we concluded the proposal by noting the potential down-side of pulling out 
from the projects. Specifically, we explained how many of the women from the 
community involved in the businesses had quit other employment and, in one case, 
even sell her herd of goats to fully dedicate themselves to launching the venture. 
Halting the projects abruptly would hit the community teams hard due to these 
irreversible commitments made with the expectation that Solae’s support would 
continue through 2008. 
With the summary and proposal completed, I and the NFSD India Lead used 
the third week of my visit to meet with the Directors of the non-profit partners in both 
sites, as well as with SP Jain in Mumbai. Our objective was to explain the decision 
made by the Solae corporate team to close the NFSD projects and the efforts we were 
taking to pursue support within DuPont; to understand their capacity to support the 
projects, either through their own resources or by mobilizing donor investment, should 
neither Solae nor DuPont grant support; and to seek their advice on when and whether 
to bring the issue to the attention of the field teams and/or the community women 
partners.  
SIDUR said that in the event of a total pull-out that they would continue to 
allow the SIDUR liaison on the field team to continue supporting the Chiguru women. 
Also, they believed they could marshal the necessary external donor capital to provide 
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working capital to the Chiguru women. MARI was decidedly less optimistic. While 
they could provide a few months of in-kind support through the one of the MARI 
liaisons on the field team, they did not believe that financial capital could be mobilized 
in the six weeks remaining in 2007. Furthermore, based on the MARI Director’s 
hands-on experience (and failure) launching the chili processing factory in 
Parvathagiri, he recognized that the Samatha women needed sophisticated business 
guidance that his organization could not provide. MARI argued forcefully that pulling-
out was not an option, and that Solae (even Cornell as a key institutional partner in the 
project) had to find the necessary resources to enable the projects to continue 
uninterrupted. For if Solae pulled out, it was MARI who would be bear the brunt of 
the backlash, as their compromised credibility would impact their current and future 
programmatic efforts in and around Parvathagiri. One common point of agreement 
among SIDUR, MARI, Solae and me was that we would not notify Chiguru nor 
Samatha about the situation, as it would quickly demoralize everyone and jeopardize 
their still mending trust and partnership with Solae. We would, however, make the 
field teams aware of the general situation.    
I concluded my trip by visiting together with the NFSD India Lead the two 
field teams and community partners. We communicated to the field teams the financial 
pressures in Solae and the resulting decrease in funding available for the project from 
Solae. We explained that all of the partners were committed to making it work, and we 
were exploring additional channels in DuPont and Solae to ensure sufficient funds for 
sustaining, at a minimum, the field teams. We stressed the importance of them 
accelerating the work in the field so that the businesses were ready and able to move 
into formal sales; in addition, they should accelerate the timeline for getting key 
business infrastructure elements (e.g., the kitchens) into place and funded during 
December 2007. In our meetings with Samatha and Chiguru, the NFSD India Lead 
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listened to their completed actions and next steps. He then gave a motivational talk, 
noting how far they had come and urging them to finalize the few remaining issues 
(e.g., packaging, formal registration of the business) so that they could start growing 
sales revenues.  I returned to the US. 
 From the US, I remained in touch with the NFSD India Lead and continued to 
provide guidance regarding workplan activities. The Samatha team began negotiations 
with an engineer for the construction needed on the building they selected in Annaram 
Sharif to hold the Culinary Center. They also finalized and purchased their team saris 
and the necessary cooking equipment and utensils for the Culinary Center. 
Additionally, they standardized the recipes for the packaged and prepared foods to 
finalize their costing. The field team began investigating the range of organizational 
legal structures for the Samatha business. The Chiguru team similarly purchased their 
saris and an initial set of cooking equipment. They also designed and purchased 
branded handbags that they would use for their outreach. The two field teams also 
began cooperating on developing the packaging and labeling for the packaged foods 
with the support of the DuPont Market manager. The Chiguru team had already 
initiated door-to-door sales of packed sweets and snacks using a cost-plus pricing 
model. They also began taking orders for packaged sweets from primary schools for 
the Republic Day festival at the end of January. Their outreach continued with the 
Chiguru women having reached 1,300 households by the end of the year.   
In mid-December, the NFSD India Lead informed me that Solae’s regional 
manager had agreed to provide funding sufficient to support the project for the first 
two months of 2008, thereby providing some breathing room. Furthermore, the 
President of DuPont India informed the NFSD Global Lead that he would be traveling 
to Hyderabad and wished to see the project site there. No final decision regarding 
DuPont’s support would come until after the President’s meeting. The President’s visit 
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took place on January 10, 2008. The Chiguru women shared the history of the project, 
their business concept, and their plans moving forward. The President was impressed 
by the presentation and, according to the NFSD India Lead, noted that his idea of the 
slums had completely changed. Three days later, the NFSD Global Lead received the 
message that DuPont would support financially the project through 20008 with the 
expectation that the economic model would be fully developed and the businesses 
sustainable.  
This concludes my overview of the period April 2007 through December 2007 
and marks the end of Phase II of the BOP Protocol activities.  
As noted earlier, I began writing the 2nd Edition of the Protocol in July 2007. 
The final, completed version with my co-author and colleague’s feedback was 
finalized at the end of 2007. The 2nd Edition of the Protocol synthesizes and reflects 
the wide range of management insights and challenges that I have outlined above and 
in the preceding chapter that detailed my involvement in the SC Johnson Kenya 
project. Chapter 6, which contains the 2nd Edition of the Protocol, is the practical 
management output of my dissertation. 
The majority of my formative field learnings that underpin the core theoretical 
insights about market creation strategy that I put forth in chapters eight and nine had 
also taken place by this point in time. Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, 
the following overview of my remaining 15 months involvement in the Solae India 
project over the period Jan 2008 – March 2009 will be abbreviated, outlining the 
overall flow of events and drawing out particular challenges and activities relevant to 




Field Summary: January 2008 – March 2009  
While the additional funding was secured to ensure the project’s field 
operations, there was no support for retaining the NFSD platform in Solae. As such, 
the NFSD India manager was required to re-direct the majority of his time and 
attention to Solae’s core business. This left a significant capability gap, as the field 
teams were already lacking in strong management skills and business development 
experience. Without an intensification of the NFSD India Lead’s involvement, it was 
difficult to see how the businesses would reach a point of being cash-flow positive by 
the end of the year. To boost the field team’s capacity to drive business development, I 
immediately began working to hire a full-time, MBA-level “BOP Protocol Fellow.” In 
addition to bringing much needed business acumen to the field, it also would enable 
me to provide more sustained and timely input and support to the field, as well as to 
better capture learnings for the Protocol process.  
I returned to India in mid-February 2008 for 22 days to help assess the state of 
the project, plan next steps, reach alignment with the various partners, and interview a 
Protocol Fellow candidate. A multi-day team retreat was held shortly after my arrival. 
The first day of the retreat included the Directors of the partner NGOS. The NFSD 
India Lead opened by explaining that support from DuPont would enable the project to 
continue for the year, though his involvement would be reduced. While the field teams 
and NGOs had received word in mid-January that additional support from DuPont was 
granted, there was lingering confusion among the field team and the NGO partners as 
to what the commitment entailed. The field team members, whose contracts with 
Solae had not been renewed, believed that their positions were slated to end in March 
2008; they had already begun searching for other jobs. The NFSD India Lead 
corrected that misconception, though it revealed the extent to which the trust of 
Solae’s contracted field team members was delicate, even tenuous.  
  
336 
The NGO partners, furthermore, wanted greater clarity on the available 
finances for the year so that everyone could plan appropriately and stretch out the 
available dollars. The NFSD India Lead, however, did not have a concrete number to 
share; while support was being made available, the actual amount of funding and how 
it would transferred within DuPont/Solae wasn’t yet determined. The shared goal from 
that meeting was to bring the two community businesses to the point of financial 
sustainability as soon as possible and to start preparing the community partners 
mentally and organizationally to stand on their own feet. The NGO partners would 
reinforce this communication in their interactions with the community partners.  
During the next two days, I and the NFSD India Lead worked with the field 
teams to focus and harmonize their brand messages and to develop a set of milestones 
for bringing the businesses to the point of financial and organizational sustainability. 
In discussing the branding, I emphasized the importance of expanding beyond a 
nutrition message and towards the broader idea of personal relationships and social 
connections (please see Appendix 36). In terms of milestones, I was concerned that, 
given the conditions, the focus would turn purely to boosting short-term sales at the 
expense of a repeat customer base and an organizational foundation. I voiced the 
importance that both sites balance sales of packaged and prepared foods with 
developing long-term cooking relationships with housewives, the latter being the sales 
channel that would enable them to generate the sustained revenues necessary to 
support the entire team. Furthermore, it was important that effective management 
systems and organizational structures were in place so that the community partners 
could independently manage the business. Reflecting this thinking, the milestones 
outlined were divided into infrastructure, management systems, and performance. 
Furthermore, performance milestones included financials such as profit, as well as 
intangibles such as trust (please see Appendix 37).  
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I visited both sites and de-briefed with both field teams. In Rasul Pura, the 
Chiguru team members had divided themselves into three separate groups: one 
responsible for cooking and food production, another responsible for the outreach to 
housewives with the goal of selling the bulk soy protein, and the third one responsible 
for the sale of packaged and prepared foods. They had completed a very successful 
event with local schools on Republic Day (India’s Independence Day), selling more 
than 1,000 packages of sweets as part of programs they held at private schools (the 
programs were held on the school’s rooftops and simulated the rooftop garden concept 
by bringing in plants). Based on the successful event, one of the schools volunteered 
the use of their rooftop to establish the rooftop garden. Chiguru team members were 
also preparing to grow an assortment of food-related plants in containers in order to 
build the skills and understanding to maintain the rooftop garden. Tote bags were 
printed with Chiguru’s slogan “Chiguru connects people: Life and Livelihood,” an 
indication that they and the field team grasped the importance that socializing and 
relationships played in their business.  
The Samatha team had turned three team members’ homes in Parvathagiri and 
Annaram Sharif into model “Master Champions” homes. The model homes were 
meant to be prototypes for the village-based champions who too would base their 
operations from their homes. Each home had set up a sales counter at which they sold 
daily packaged foods, as well as freshly prepared foods. The model homes provided 
further opportunity for Samatha to establish and build out their management systems. 
The group, however, had continued to position themselves narrowly: A banner 
stretched across the model homes read “Your Health is our Aim: Samatha Nutrition 
Products.”   
Upon returning to the US, I hired the candidate I interviewed for the Protocol 
Fellow position, a just-graduated MBA from Cornell who had completed his final 
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semester on exchange at an Indian business school. He joined the project full-time in 
April 2008. After completing homestays in both sites as part of an induction, he began 
working with the field teams to help them in their strategy development and execution. 
Due to several factors, not least of which was my not providing clarity on the Protocol 
Fellow’s roles and responsibilities and decision-making authority vis-à-vis the field 
teams, his efforts to jumpstart progress on the ground created backlash from the field 
team members and the community partners, particularly in Rasul Pura where mis-trust 
by the field team and Chiguru women had been a recurring challenge. The Protocol 
Fellow’s ability to participate in the strategic planning and execution was significantly 
limited because of this and required a gradual re-introduction into the project over a 
two-month period before he could successfully re-engage. In the re-introduction 
period, he successfully developed standard costing for the Samatha business, as well 
as formal accounting reports.  
By April 2008, both the Samatha and Chiguru businesses finished formal 
registration (both were registered as cooperatives), finalized the packaging and pricing 
of their food products and soy protein (the soy protein was to be sold in pouches in 25, 
50, and 100 gram quantities), installed their initial set of cooking equipment in their 
kitchen facilities, and developed various marketing collateral such as brochures, flyers, 
and tote bags. Formal sales of packaged and prepared foods were started in April 2008 
in both locations; bulk protein sales were started in June 2008 because of delays in 
finalizing the shipment of pre-packaged protein (to ensure the purity of the soy 
protein, Solae asked one of its Indian business-to-business customers with packing 
capacity to ship protein packaged in the small quantities to the businesses).  
I returned to India in June/July 2008 for 12 days to help smooth-over the 
conflicts between the Protocol Fellow and the field teams, particularly in Rasul Pura, 
and to meet with the DuPont and Solae management teams to discuss next steps. I and 
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the Protocol Fellow spent several days with both field teams. The Chiguru team 
members who were part of the kitchen/cooks team were completing several days of 
cooking-training by a chef from a high-end hotel restaurant. I and the Protocol Fellow 
visited the school site offered as the location for the rooftop garden and met with the 
school principal who was very keen on the idea. Operating private schools was a 
competitive business in the slums, and having something like a rooftop garden could 
be a point of differentiation. We also discussed at length with the field team the 
imperative of building personal ties and relationships among the housewives. The 
business coordinator on the field team raised the idea of holding “jams” with 
housewives around food: a “jam,” as he explained, was an existing and well-accepted 
practice in which women came together to discuss a particular topic. We encouraged 
the field team to aggressively explore that idea and others. 
In Parvathagiri, I and the Protocol Fellow spent time at the Model Champions 
homes in Parvathagiri and Annaram Sharif villages. Surprisingly, the model homes 
were focused mostly on the selling of prepared and packaged foods to school children 
and male adults; housewives were not being drawn in through any programs or 
interactions.  We discussed with the field team the importance of harnessing the home 
as a mechanism for reaching housewives, as that would be the key revenue driver for 
the village champions and the Samatha business. We brainstormed ways that the 
packaged and prepared food sales could, at a minimum, be done in a manner that 
raised interest and awareness among housewives. Among the ideas suggested included 
inserting a business card with the packaged snacks, giving a flyer to husbands to take 
home to their wives, and displaying a poster with pictures of a group cooking sessions.  
Managerially, the Samatha group’s activities were very well coordinated, from 
the purchasing of raw materials, accounting for production, and recording sales. As in 
Rasul Pura, we talked at length with the field team about specific plans for building 
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the personal relationships among housewives. The thinking of the field team, however, 
remained caught in the nutrition-awareness paradigm: in sharing their plans for 
entering a new village, they foresaw holding a “health expo” that would get the 
community to understand the health benefits of soy. We shared with them the “jam” 
idea raised in Rasul Pura to try and get across the need to build social relationships 
among the housewives as a key strategy to their adoption of soy protein into their 
cooking habits.               
The debrief meeting with DuPont and Solae included DuPont’s General 
Manager for India, the person responsible for having secured the additional year of 
support. The Protocol Fellow and the DuPont Marketing Manager who was supporting 
the NFSD projects led the presentation on the current status of the businesses. The 
other meeting attendees included the NFSD Global Lead, DuPont’s India Manager of 
the company’s food and nutrition platform of businesses (of which Solae was a part), 
and the NFSD India Lead. In their presentation, they shared the initial one to two 
months sales data for the various products. The numbers were encouraging: In Rasul 
Pura, for example, Chiguru sold four kilograms (almost nine pounds) of the soy 
protein isolate to housewives in the first week of operations alone. As we all 
acknowledged, the real test would be whether the businesses could get repeat sales and 
grow revenues quickly enough, as only six months remained in the year.  
During this visit, it was announced that the NFSD Global Lead was being 
relocated immediately to Brazil to run Solae’s operations there. The Solae business in 
India, which was considerably smaller, would report into a DuPont manager for the 
company’s food and nutrition platform.  With his departure, the NFSD platform was 
officially dissolved. 
In the months of July, August, and September 2008, the performance of the 
two businesses started to diverge. The Chiguru business generated strong month-on-
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month growth in the sale of the soy protein, reaching almost 50 kilograms 
(approximately 110 pounds) by the month of September. During this time, Chiguru—
with the guidance of the Protocol Fellow—had instituted a “container program.” The 
container program involved selling the soy protein to customers in a re-usable, 
branded (i.e., with a label) plastic container that could be refilled on request. The 
refillable plastic container, though it required an initial one-time cost of $.50, resulted 
in a lower product cost to the customer and significantly higher margins for Chiguru 
(approximately 30% higher), as Chiguru could purchase bulk protein direct from Solae 
rather than the pre-packed protein (packaging the protein in the small pouches almost 
doubled the cost of the protein isolate). Customers kept the container in the kitchen 
next to other cooking ingredients. In one month time, Chiguru had 200 repeat 
container customers (all housewives). Chiguru invited the housewives to attend 
Chiguru-sponsored food events (such as the Republic Day event) at the primary 
schools attended by the customers’ children. They also began planning group cooking 
classes for the container-customers. The field team started to see the opportunity of 
creating a “container club.”  By the end of September, the Chiguru group was 
generating enough profit on their sales to supply almost one-third of their targeted 
take-home income.   
The Samatha business was not enjoying this same level of success. Sales for 
the three months were growing much slower, reaching a high of 28 kilograms 
(approximately 61 pounds) for the month of September 2008. More worrisome, 
however, was the source of those sales. The soy protein was being sold by seven 
outreach teams comprised of two people per team. Each team would focus on a 
different village. The month when protein sales started in a newly-served village, 
protein sales were between two to three kilograms; the next month, sales plummeted 
to 0.2 – 0.6 kilograms. Rather than working to develop a local Village Champion and 
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create the demand, the outreach teams simply moved on to other villages where they 
could find first-time buyers. Sales of soy protein even in their home-base villages of 
Parvathagiri and Annaram Sharif remained very low. By September, the outreach 
teams were becoming frantic, expending enormous time seeking out and traveling to 
new villages in which to sell the soy protein. The initial Village Champions that they 
recruited to be the local face and spirit of the Samatha business were also quitting, as 
they could not generate sufficient income. The Protocol Fellow noted that the 
messaging continued to be focused on the health benefits of soy protein. As part of the 
outreach team’s strategy, for example, the team would meet with school teachers in 
the community, explaining to them the importance of protein to children’s 
development. Even the containers they selected to try and implement Chiguru’s 
container approach were “medicinal” in appearance, according to the Protocol Fellow.  
I counseled the field team via email to create a portfolio of sales activities and 
to divide the team up among the different sales opportunities because of the different 
skills sets they demanded. To sell the soy protein, I noted, was the most lucrative (with 
gross margins more than 50%) but required significantly more time as it entailed a 
“lifestyle change” among the housewives—how she thinks about food, how she 
creates meals, how she budgets for meals, and how she evaluates meals. I noted that 
when I asked the Samatha women on my last trip how long it took them to feel 
comfortable cooking with soy protein, they replied that it took them a full year of 
practice. As such, enabling that learning process in housewives would similarly take 
time and require building an ongoing cooking relationship with them. Treating the 
sales and marketing for the soy protein in the same manner as they did for the 
packaged sweets was a recipe for disaster. To help structure their thinking of how to 
operationalize a sales process around housewives, I worked with the Protocol Fellow 
to outline a three-phase customer engagement strategy designed to build a housewife’s 
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interest in and knowledge of cooking with soy protein, thereby growing the per 
monthly family consumption of soy protein. Lastly, I emphasized that the “hook” for 
getting housewives interested in going through that lifestyle change had to be more 
compelling than “it’s good for you.” Starting with “fun through cooking” as the core 
message would reach a broader audience.  
At a higher project management level, another discussion began taking place. 
Even in Rasul Pura, where the Chiguru team was experiencing strong sales results, it 
was very doubtful that either of the two businesses would reach financial and 
organizational self-sustainability in the remaining three months of 2008. For Chiguru, 
it required tripling sales; for Samatha, it would mean sales growth of 500%. However, 
believing that these were indeed viable businesses and that they represented a growth 
opportunity for DuPont/Solae, the Protocol Fellow spearheaded the writing of a 
business plan to scale the venture with the goal of attracting outside investor capital 
from a social venture capital fund. I and the NFSD India Lead worked with the Fellow 
to fully develop the proposal, which was sent to a social venture capital fund in 
October 2008. It was also circulated internally in DuPont. Our business plan argued 
that  
 
“to rapidly and effectively magnify the impacts of these proven 
businesses beyond the borders of their communities in a manner that 
fits within DuPont/Solae’s ‘business to business’ (B2B) corporate 
structure, Solae is seeking to spin off Nutrition for Sustainable 
Development as an independent “social enterprise” Franchise 
Company that would facilitate and manage the creation of hundreds of 
new community-based businesses across India.”  
Solae and DuPont, upon seeing the business plan for scale-out, stated that 
neither Solae nor DuPont would provide any financial or human-resource support to a 
scaling strategy. They asked that the message be communicated clearly to the Samatha 
and Chiguru and the local NGO partners that there would be absolutely no additional 
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funding or human resource support from DuPont or Solae beyond 2008. That message 
was communicated by the NFSD India Lead during a mid-October visit to the project 
sites. The community partners were hit hard by the news; they did not believe that 
they could stand on their own and without the ongoing financial backing of Solae and 
had hoped that Solae would come up with additional funding. Moral sank once again 
on the uncertainty of the future. The blow was compounded by low October sales, as 
several major holidays occurred in that month. 
Despite the encouragement and counseling to both businesses to focus time on 
building repeat sales, the fear of losing financial support from Solae in two months 
time resulted in more “fire-sale” activities, particularly in Parvathagiri. The NGO 
partner MARI tried to assist Samatha by using its extensive network of self-help 
groups to promote and sell the soy protein. In November, approximately one-half of 
Samatha’s protein sales were to MARI—protein sales unlikely to lead to repeat 
customers. The Samatha women also began planning to launch sales of the protein in 
the large city of Warangal a full one-hour drive away. In addition, they started 
planning to open a restaurant on the main road of Parvathagiri village in the hope of 
generating sales of prepared foods to visitors. Chiguru also started planning to leave 
Rasul Pura slum and start selling its packaged foods across Hyderabad.  
By December, there was still no final word from the venture capital firm 
whether it would invest in the NFSD Franchising business. I had initiated an intensive 
search together with DuPont’s corporate sustainability team in the US to identify 
companies in the food industry looking to enter the BOP and who would be interested 
in assuming the lead partner role to the community business partners. Both Chiguru 
and Samatha were hoping that one of these options would materialize so that 
additional funding would enable them to continue building their businesses. Morale 
was very low. In Rasul Pura, one of the field team members accepted employment 
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elsewhere. Seven of the Chiguru members stopped coming to work. Reminiscent of 
the previous year, Chiguru demanded that Solae continue to provide financial support 
through 2009.  
In the eleventh hour, an emergency three-month window of working capital to 
sustain the projects for the first quarter of 2009 was granted by Solae’s top 
management team to enable Solae to exit gracefully from the projects. Despite out best 
efforts, the social venture funds did not invest in the scale-out plan, nor did another 
corporation join as a partner (I was involved in extensive discussions and proposals 
with two other companies who expressed a strong interest; one chose to pursue a 
different path to enter the BOP, while the other succumbed to pressures of the 
economic crisis and cancelled its nascent BOP project).  
In March of 2009, I returned to India for 10 days to work with the NFSD India 
Lead to facilitate Solae’s exit from the project. We arranged a small pool of working 
capital and a support network that included MARI and SIDUR in the hope that it 
would enable Samatha and Chiguru to continue operations until they could grow sales 
to the point of financial sustainability.  
This concludes the overview of my involvement in Solae’s implementation of 





 CHAPTER 6: 
KNOWLEDGE CREATION II  
THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID PROTOCOL, 2ND EDITION 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the 2nd Edition of the BOP Protocol and the key 
differences between it and the 1st Edition. This 2nd Edition, which was released 
publically in March 2008, represents the second, manager-focused Knowledge 
Creation output from my research. 
 
BOP Protocol 2nd Edition: Linking New Business with New Market Creation 
The 2nd Edition of the Protocol differs from the 1st Edition both in terms of the 
underlying business objective and the innovation and entrepreneurship processes. The 
objective and targeted output in the 1st Edition was, as I’ve described, a radically 
localized business—a business whose value proposition and value chain harness and 
reflect to the greatest extent possible local needs, knowledge, resources, local 
infrastructure, and socio-cultural institutions. This output was based on the implicit 
assumption that creating an offering that matched local needs and socio-cultural habits 
would unleash a latent market while resulting in a cost effective offering. The 
innovation and entrepreneurship processes were matched to this output. The 1st 
Edition followed a linear business development path that began with acquiring local 
knowledge and insights, reflecting the local knowledge into a business concept, 
creating an initial prototype through additional research, and then evolving the 
business through small-scale pilot tests geared toward gaining consumer feedback. 
Once the fine-tuning was completed, the business would be scaled. The names of the 
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three main phases of the Protocol—Opening Up, Building the Ecosystem, and 
Enterprise Creation—are testament to this linear logic. Co-creation—a concept that 
occupied a significant position in the process—was conducted within this logic and 
business development framework.  
As I explained in the field summaries from Kenya and India, the core 
underlying strategic objective of creating a radically localized business turned out to 
be problematic. It was implicitly assumed that creating a product offering that matched 
up with needs would unleash a latent consumer demand; the challenge, so thought, 
was simply getting close enough and deep enough into the community to understand 
what those true needs were. The Kenya business certainly seemed to address pressing 
needs: in one test application of SC Johnson’s Raid in a Kibera home, some 40 
cockroaches emptied out of the one mud wall on which it was applied; mosquitoes 
interrupted sleep and were carriers of malaria (my homestay host in Kibera left a 
kerosene lantern burning on low to keep them away); and the odor of the open-pit 
latrines was a top concern.  
But when a Community Cleaning Service (CCS) person came knocking on 
his/her door to offer the cleaning service, the consumer didn’t know what to make of 
the offering. On reflection, CCS was bringing to consumers an offering for which they 
had no precedent. Unrecognized was the reality that the “disruptive business concept” 
would be inherently disruptive to the consumer. With this realization came a corollary 
learning: unmet needs are not equivalent to a market. (Simanis, 2009; Simanis et al., 
2008b) Serving unmet needs was different than improving on an existing product for 
which there already existed a market. I came to realize that in order to address these 
basic needs, consumers had to come to value the product concept and integrate it into 
their lives.  
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At the time of re-writing the 2nd Edition of the Protocol in 2007, I was in the 
early stages of formulating the core issue of market creation as a demand-side 
challenge. Based on what I knew at the time, I re-oriented the model to note explicitly 
the need to create a new enterprise and a new market. The 2nd Edition contains 
milestones and outputs for both dimensions. Subsequent learnings from India afforded 
me a much deeper and more nuanced understanding of the challenge of new market 
creation. Those learnings and their theoretical underpinnings are the focus of Chapters 
7 and 8.  
On the business/enterprise side of the equation, I made two core process 
changes in the 2nd Edition. The first concerned the purpose and use of co-creation; the 
second concerned a shift to “enactment” as the means of moving from concept stage to 
business offering.   
As I noted, co-creation was an integral element of the innovation process in the 
1st Edition of the Protocol. That said, the term was used very loosely—it simply 
meant, “doing things together with the community.” In the 1st Edition, co-creation 
techniques such as participatory rural appraisal were used to build trust and to better 
“hear the voices of the poor.” While these co-creation techniques were effective from 
a data gathering perspective, they proved insufficient—even counter-productive—for 
enabling co-creation of a new business idea with the community partners. To 
effectively co-create a business concept (not just a product idea) that would yield 
value for the company required first establishing a common business language that 
would bridge the wide gap in experiences and perspectives about what a business is 
and entails. Concepts such as unique customer value, core customer, integrated 
products, revenue drivers, and brand positioning—terms important to any in-depth 
discussion of a business concept—were completely foreign to the community. 
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What’s more, co-creating a concept was a very different challenge from co-
creating the actual business organization. As I recounted, the ideation approach with 
the community in Kenya focused on generating as many and as varied ideas as 
possible. That co-creation technique, however, inadvertently created a weak 
organizational foundation on which to build the business with the community business 
partners. Specifically, the innovation approach seeded divisions and cliques within the 
community business partners, with each ideation team championing and pushing for 
its idea, rather than working together constructively. By choosing one idea from 
among the many developed, the sense of shared commitment to the chosen idea and 
path forward was undermined. This learning was reflected in a different structure to 
the concept co-creation approach in India (e.g., working with a consistent community 
team, collective entrepreneurship workshops, converging the team on one concept) as 
well as in the 2nd Edition of the Protocol.  
The 2nd Edition also reflects a change in the broader underlying business 
development process from one that is causally based to one that is enacted. As I noted 
in the field summary, the creation theory of opportunity formation played a formative 
role in moving beyond the linear, market-research driven approach to operationalizing 
the business concept. That approach, which the literature labels a “discovery-based 
approach,” (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) fueled unrealistic expectations among the 
community partners in Kenya, as consumers would express a strong interest in paying 
for the product/service, leading to revenue and profitability forecasts that made profits 
appear quick and inevitable. It is also my belief that the act of conducting market 
research in the community seeded a sense of cautiousness in the community (rather 
than priming the pump and getting people excited about the product), as it established 
a kind of transactional relationship.  
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This change to an enactment-based approach is reflected structurally in the 2nd 
Edition with the use of a single fractal model rather than the three mutual value chains. 
Furthermore, the business outputs identified for the three phases changed to reflect this 
enactment approach—Phase I results in an actionable, umbrella business concept; 
Phase II generates a business prototype comprised of an initial product and service set 
and umbrella business brand; Phase III culminates with a financially sustainable, 
independently managed business. The shift to enactment also is reflected in the 
integration of action learning techniques for building a shared understanding of the 
business vision and the initial business prototype.  
Before proceeding to the 2nd Edition of the Protocol, I re-iterate that the ideas 
presented above have matured and further developed since re-writing the Protocol 
during the second half of 2007. While these core changes and others are reflected in 
the 2nd Edition, the document is imprecise, at times, in articulating these ideas. For 
example, the use of the term “business prototype” as the business output of Phase II 
has proven to be an ineffective choice of words, because of its associations with the 
rapid product prototyping processes championed by many of today’s human-centered 
design (HCD) approaches. The prototyping approach as outlined by HCD reflects the 
same linear, causal approach to entrepreneurship (albeit iterative) which proved 
unsuitable for commercializing a discontinuous business offering. Today, I use the 
term “skeleton business” to avoid that connotation and to better communicate the 
concept of starting with a small, scaled down version of the business. In another case, 
I named one of the four core activity platforms of Phase III “building the market base” 
to bring attention to the need for demand creation. However, in so doing, I reinforced 
the view that market creation is mainly an awareness-building exercise that is done 
once an initial product has been developed, rather than the key factor dictating the 
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shape and form of all three phases of the business development process. Following I 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite five decades and over $2 trillion dollars spent on foreign aid, the top-down 
prescriptions of the post-World War II “development regime” have proven ineffective. 
The Bretton Woods institutions, designed after World War II to manage the 
international financial system, are buckling under the weight of growing global 
discontent. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization are under increasing fire, even from insiders such as Jeffrey Sachs, 
Joseph Stiglitz, William Easterly, and George Soros.  Indeed, the so-called 
“Washington Consensus” is in disarray, having left a sting of financial crises in its 
wake.  
 
Increasingly, the private sector has been called upon to direct its dynamism and 
innovation to bear on the complex global challenges these public institutions were 
established to address. Microcredit and microfinance have exploded onto the scene, 
offering commercially viable approaches for banking the unbanked. “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” and “Sustainability” have moved front-and-center for large 
corporations from GE and Wal-Mart to Toyota and Tata. Ironically, where 
governments have faltered, corporations have increasingly stepped up to the plate to 
tackle thorny global challenges ranging from climate change to poverty.  
 
Notable among these recent corporate initiatives has been the quest to reach the “base 
of the pyramid” (BoP)8 — the more than four billion people globally with per capita 
incomes below $1,500 (purchasing power parity). Since the idea was first introduced 
by C.K. Prahalad and Stuart Hart at the turn of the 21st century,9 the list of large 
corporations transforming their business models to achieve the price points and cost 
positions required to reach the poor has grown. Single serve (sachet) packages, low-
cost production, extended “mom and pop” distribution, and NGO partnerships have 
become de rigueur. Yet, in the rush to capture the “fortune” at the base of the pyramid, 
something may have been lost — the perspective of the poor themselves.   
 
While commendable as an initial step, most “first generation” corporate BoP strategies 
have, in our view, failed to hit the mark. From Nike’s “World Shoe” misstep to create 
an athletic shoe for low income markets to Hindustan Lever’s sachet-packaged soaps,  
shampoos, and creams, these strategies represent arm’s length attempts to quickly tap 
into a new market. Pushing the company’s reformulated and repackaged products onto 
shantytown dwellers and rural villagers may indeed produce incremental sales in the 
near term. But in the long run, this strategy will almost certainly fail because the 
business remains alien to the communities it intends to serve. 
 
                                                
8 We use the term “base” instead of “bottom” because of the negative connotations of the latter. We 
thank our colleagues Jim Johnson and Ted London and the members of the BoP Learning Laboratory 
for this suggestion. 
9 C.K. Prahalad and Stuart Hart (2002) “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid.” Strategy+Business 
26: 54-67. 
  355 
Indeed, companies seeking to “target” the poor with affordable products, while well 
intentioned, may inadvertently be engaging in the latest form of corporate imperialism. 
“BoP 1.0” strategies, whether guided by “ethnographic” market insights or country 
level World Bank data, have implicitly imposed a narrow, consumption-based 
understanding of local needs and aspirations. A growing chorus of voices now raises 
concerns that corporate BoP strategies represent nothing more than veiled attempts to 
“sell to the poor,” as though simply turning the poor into “consumers” will address the 
fundamental problems of poverty and sustainable development.10 
 
If the enterprise-based approach to poverty alleviation is to flourish in the future, it is 
imperative that we now move rapidly to a “second-generation” of corporate BoP 
strategies. Second-generation BoP strategy requires an embedded process of co-
invention and business co-creation that brings corporations into close, personal 
business partnership with BoP communities. It moves corporations beyond mere deep 
listening and into deep dialogue with the poor, resulting in a shared commitment born 
out of mutual sharing and mutual learning. It breaks down the wall that “public-private 
partnerships” inadvertently erect when NGOs become mediators and interlocutors 
between companies and poor communities rather than bridges uniting them. By 
creatively marrying corporations’ and communities’ resources, capabilities, and 
energies, “BoP 2.0” strategies bring to life new business ideas and models that exceed 
what either partner could imagine or create on their own. In sum, building a BoP 
business that creates enduring community value, while establishing a foundation for 
long-term corporate growth and innovation, requires an entirely new strategic process 




















                                                
10 Aneel Karnani (2006) “The Misfortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid.” Greener Management 
International 51 (Summer): 99-110. 
11 For an in-depth analysis of “2nd generation” BoP strategy and capability development, please see 
Simanis and Hart (2008) “Beyond Selling to the Poor: Building Business Intimacy through Embedded 
Innovation.” 
Next Generation BoP Strategy 
BoP as consumer/producer 
Deep listening 
Reduce price points 
Redesign packaging, extend 
distribution 
Arm’s length relationships 
mediated by NGOs 
BoP as business partner 
Deep dialogue 
Expand imagination 
Marry capabilities, build shared 
commitment 
Direct, personal relationships 
facilitated by NGOs 
BoP 1.0 BoP 2.0 
“Selling to the Poor” “Business Co-Venturing” 
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Co-Creating Mutual Value 
To fill this capability gap, we have been deeply involved over the past five years in the 
design and development of a BoP 2.0 strategy process - the BoP Protocol (see 
Appendices 1 and 2 for an overview of the genesis of this project, as well as a set of 
Operating Business Principles). The BoP Protocol is a co-venturing process that 
integrates within a corporate entrepreneurship framework leading-edge thinking across 
a range of fields, including economic anthropology, international development, 
empathy-based   design, and environmental management. As one senior manager 
familiar with the process describes, “it is a structured approach to a non-structured 
challenge.”12  
 
Central to the BoP Protocol are the principles of “mutual value” and “cocreation.” By 
mutual value, we mean that each stage of the process, not simply the new business, 
creates value for all partners in terms important to each. The “co-” component of “co-
creation” captures the need for the company to work in equal partnership with BoP 
communities to imagine, launch, and grow a sustainable business. Co-development 
catalyzes business imagination and ensures the business model is culturally-
appropriate and environmentally sustainable by building off of local resources and 
capabilities. Importantly, it also expands the base of local entrepreneurial capacity. 
Key principles, techniques, and methods have been adapted from the fields of 
“participatory rural appraisal” (PRA)13 and “asset-based community development” 
(ABCD).14 
 
The “-creation” half of this logic reflects the view that a co-generated business concept 
has to be enacted through an evolutionary and highly interactive approach that 
ultimately crystallizes the new value proposition. In the absence of an existing product 
market that can be researched to reveal customer preferences and needs, the BoP 
Protocol uses action-learning techniques to roll-out a business concept in a low-risk 
manner. A “seed” value proposition is progressively evolved by the corporation 
together with community members through constant and deep interaction with the 
wider community. The creation process thereby ensures that the business is in tune 
                                                
12 We thank Mr. Upadrashta Purnachand of The Solae Company for this wonderful description. 
13 Participatory Rural Appraisal is a family of development approaches and methods that empower the 
poor to analyze their own needs and life conditions, to identify solutions based on local resources, and 
to take action. The methods, which are sensitive to differentials in power, status, and education (e.g., 
illiteracy), position the development professional as a facilitator of the development process, rather than 
as an expert solution provider. For more background on PRA philosophy and practice, see two seminal 
texts by Robert Chambers: Rural Development: Putting the Last First (1984) and Whose Reality 
Counts?: Putting the First Last (1998). 
14 Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) is a development approach that, much like PRA, 
begins with the premise that poor communities are rich in resources, skills, and competencies which can 
and should form the foundation for advancing change in the community. For more information on 
ABCD, please see John Kretzmann’s and John McNight’s seminal book, Building Communities from 
the Inside Out: A Path Towards Finding and Mobilizing a Community’s Assets (1993). 
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with the broader community’s needs and wants.15 This 2nd edition of the BoP Protocol 
reflects learnings gained through two ongoing applications of the process.16 In 2005, 
SC Johnson launched a BoP Protocol initiative in Kenya. Less than a year later, in 
2006, a DuPont subsidiary, The Solae Company, launched a BoP Protocol initiative in 
Andhra Pradesh, India. Both companies began the process in an urban slum and a rural 
village. 
 
Currently, SC Johnson is pursuing a business in partnership with slum communities in 
Nairobi. The Solae Company is developing separate business ventures with both a 
Hyderabad slum community and a rural village community in the Warangal District. 
To help bring to life core concepts and techniques, the BoP Protocol description below 
includes examples from the field experiences of SC Johnson and DuPont/Solae.17 
 
A License to Imagine 
Critics of globalization assert that any role multinationals come to play in addressing 
the challenges of poverty and sustainable development will necessarily be distant and 
impersonal in nature, driven by the logic of global competitiveness and economies of 
scale: Only locally-based initiatives can be truly culturally-appropriate and embedded 
in the local economy and landscape. “Small is beautiful,” as the saying goes.18 Critics 
also point out that some companies have 
chosen to simply adapt environmentally unsustainable products and services to sell in 
the BoP “mass market.” Left unchecked, this path clearly leads to environmental 
oblivion: If 6.5 billion people (8-9 billion by mid-century) consume at the levels of 
                                                
15 For more information on creation approaches to entrepreneurship, see the following two papers: Saras 
Sarasvathy (2001) “Causation and Effectuation: Towards a Theoretical Shift from Economic 
Inevitability to Entrepreneurial Contingency,” Academy of Management Review 26(2): 243-263, and 
Sharon Alvarez and Jay Barney 
16 Our deepest thanks to SC Johnson and The Solae Company, the CBO partners and communities in 
Kenya and India, and the various individuals who have made important contributions in these project 
sites. The insights that inform the BoP Protocol are a result of their collective efforts. For the SC 
Johnson project, we thank in particular Carolina for Kibera, KickStart, and Egerton University. People 
who have played key roles and provided valuable support and guidance include Scott Johnson, John 
Langdell, Joseph Njenga, Salim Mohammed, George Ngeta, John Mungai, Catherine Burnett, Nyokabi 
Kiarie, Kimeu Muindi, Edwin Oketch, Martin Fisher, Dennis Simiyu, Vincent Arnum, and Njeri Muhia. 
For the Solae project, we thank Modern Architects for Rural India, the Society for Integrated 
Development Rural and Urban Areas, Aide et Action, the Indian School of Business, and SP Jain 
Institute of Management. Key individuals and contributors over the course of the project include Kobus 
DeKlerk, Upadrashta Purnachand, David Hewitt, Padma Buggenini, Ravi Chandra Raju, Paul Chater, 
Shweta Aggarwal, Srinivasan Sankar, Sonika Giddiga, Koel Barua, Tanmoy Majumder, Indranil Das, 
Indira Viswanadham, Kalavathi Uppunutula, Padmaja Veerla, Kondal Rao Kanaparthi, Murali 
Ramisetty, Nanda Thumaty, Vardhan Thumaty, C. Upendranadh, Somesh Kumar, V. Chandrasekar, 
Reuben Abraham, Subramonia Sarma, Anil Kulkarni, and Nirja Mattoo. 
17 We are developing a BoP Protocol Field Guide that outlines the specific techniques and approaches 
used in both the SC Johnson (Kenya) and DuPont/Solae (India) Protocol projects. The Field Guide will 
be released in 2008. 
18 E.F. Schumacher (1974) Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered. Abacus. 
London. 
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today’s typical American, we would need 3-4 planet Earths to supply the raw 
materials, absorb the waste, and stabilize the climate. 
 
Through the BoP Protocol, we believe it is possible to shatter the presumed trade-off 
between being locally embedded and large in size, and between meeting the needs of 
the Base of the Pyramid and overwhelming the planet’s ecological systems. Indeed, 
we believe the interconnected challenges of addressing poverty and human 
development and restoring global ecological systems present multinational 
corporations (MNCs) with a unique opportunity — a “license to imagine,” to re-
conceptualize the corporation in a manner that can sustainably serve the diverse needs 
and values of people across the globe. Furthermore, taking the “great leap” to the BoP 
may be the wisest strategy for incubating the disruptive (and sustainable) technologies 
and business models of tomorrow.19 Learning to close the environmental loop at the 
Base of the 
Pyramid is one of the fundamental strategic challenges — and opportunities — facing 
MNCs in the years ahead.  
 
The time is now to acquire the license to imagine. By practicing a new, more inclusive 
brand of business development — one that deeply engages previously excluded 
voices, concerns, and interests — the corporate sector can become a catalyst for a truly 
sustainable form of world development and prosper in the process. The BoP Protocol, 




                                                
19 Clayton Christensen and Stuart Hart (2002) “The Great Leap: Driving Innovation from the Base of 
the Pyramid.” Sloan Management Review 44(1): 51-56. 
  359 
PREFACE 
 
We preface this 2nd edition of the BoP Protocol by, first and foremost, extending our 
deepest thanks to the community members in Kenya and India who, together with SC 
Johnson and DuPont, have embarked on this uncharted journey with us. We owe them 
all a debt of gratitude, as their sustained commitment to realizing an entrepreneurial 
vision has made this 2nd Edition possible. The names of these men and women can be 
found in Appendices 3(a) and 3(b). 
 
We are also grateful to the organizations that have provided resources to support the 
initial development of the BoP Protocol. Corporate partners in this effort are DuPont, 
SC Johnson, Tetra Pak, and Hewlett-Packard. Institutional partners include Cornell 
University’s Center for Sustainable Global Enterprise, University of Michigan 
Business School, William Davidson Institute, World Resources Institute, and the 
Johnson Foundation. 
 
Lastly, we offer a humble admission that we have much to learn. Our own in-field 
experiences have not unfolded smoothly and without road bumps and u-turns. Our 
initial theories were not always sufficient in addressing the complexity of real life. 
Yet, having managed these challenges firsthand, this revised and updated edition of 
the BoP Protocol represents deeply “grounded” theory that is robust enough to 
respond to a diverse range of corporate contexts. As the SC  Johnson and DuPont 
initiatives evolve, and as new projects are launched, we fully expect that our 
understanding and recommendations will likewise evolve to better capture the 
complexity of this challenge. We look forward to sharing these learnings in future 
editions of the BoP Protocol. 
 
 
BOP PROTOCOL – PRE-FIELD PROCESSES 
 
The BoP Protocol process begins with a prefield phase that consists of three 
interdependent activities: 1) the selection of appropriate BoP project site(s); 2) the 
formation and training of a multidisciplinary corporate “field” team; and 3) the 
selection of local community partners. A fourth core activity is the creation of an 
enabling environment or “R&D White Space” within the corporation that supports 
experimentation outside of the current business model and business development 
process. Depending on the company’s experience in the Base of the Pyramid, and  the 
extent of its social networks in the region of interest, the length of time needed to 
complete  pre-field activities will range from two to four months. A site visit by the 
team lead prior to in-field work is helpful for addressing logistical issues (e.g., 
communication, housing) and building a common understanding among all local 



























The project sites should be located in countries or regions which are considered to be 
of vital, long-term strategic interest and where some facilities exist, but in which the 
corporation does not already have an extensive, entrenched business presence. Such 
locations ensure that the project garners steadfast corporate support and resources 
throughout the business development process, while reducing the risk that the 
initiative is “captured” by the corporation’s “traditional” business norms and practices. 
The presence of existing facilities and staff also facilitates relationship building 
between the corporate team and the community partners by providing a tangible place 
(e.g., an office) for partners to visit that reflects the corporation’s culture and nature of 
operations. 
 
Launching the project in more than one community can create valuable opportunities 
for learning and sharing across communities and can, particularly in later stages, serve 
as a source of solidarity. This is true if the sites are sufficiently close to one another 
(e.g., within a two or three hour distance and reachable by public transportation) to 
allow for visits and exchanges.  However, multiple sites significantly increase the 
complexity of coordination and demand greater time and resources to manage. This is 
particularly the case if the project is launched in both an urban (shantytown) and rural 
(village) setting, as the difference in context will likely result in the evolution of two 
distinct business models. Importantly, a company should only launch multiple project 
sites if it is able and willing to support each of them fully throughout all three phases 
of the BoP Protocol. 
 










Team Formation & Preparation 
The initial corporate team should consist of approximately four people per site. It is 
vital that this team possess a range of functional expertise, (e.g., strategy, marketing, 
and R&D) both to ensure that the business ideas generated draw broadly on the 
company’s capabilities and to provide continuity throughout the business development 
process. It is equally important that among the corporate team members is an 
experienced development practitioner with deep understanding of community 
facilitation and mobilization, particularly within a social-entrepreneurship framework. 
One or two additional members with deep ties to the community are added to the 
corporate team once the site and local partner are established. Doing so enhances the 
community’s openness and provides a comfortable contact person to whom 
community members can raise questions and provide feedback on the team’s 
performance.  
 
The initial corporate team, together with other members of the corporation providing 
guidance and support to the initiative, receive training in core BoP business concepts, 
participatory methods, and the BoP Protocol process to instill a shared ethic and to 
build a common base of skills. Prior to entering the field, the corporate team develops 
and rehearses a shared representation of the corporation and the project objectives 
using a language appropriate to the local community, thereby ensuring a clear and 
consistent message. 
 
Corporate team members are selected on the basis of entrepreneurial experience and 
passion for engaging issues of poverty and sustainable development through 
enterprise. A blend of experienced managers with five or more years of service within 
the corporation along with younger (even new) talent ensures the team has deep 
insights into the corporation’s capabilities and technologies while remaining open to 
new possibilities and ways of operating. A team diverse in gender and age may also 
permit access to a wider range of people in a community. Corporate team members 
Real World Example 
SC Johnson launched its BoP Protocol project in the neighboring Nairobi 
slums of Kibera, Mathare, and Mitumba and in the rural village of Nyota 
Township. Nyota, which is accessible by auto vehicle only, is located 
approximately 5 hours outside of Nairobi. 
 
The Solae Company’s initiative began in the Hyderabad slum cluster of 
Rasul Pura, as well as in rural Parvathagiri “Mandal” (i.e., county). 
Parvathagiri Mandal can be reached from Hyderabad via a 2-hour train 
ride and an additional 1-hour car or bus ride. A third “sister site” was later 
launched in Mumbai.  
 
Both SCJ and Solae had prior, yet relatively small, business operations in 
their chosen project countries. 
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should be drawn, as much as possible, from the country where the project is based, as 
this creates a pool of local and “field-tested” talent to support the business in the 




Local Partner Selection 
A local partner such as a community based organization (CBO) plays a critical 
bridging role at the start of the project and helps facilitate new relationships between 
the corporation and the community. The corporate team will enter the community as 
an “outsider” and will, in the beginning, depend heavily on the social capital, trust, 
and community knowledge that a local partner provides. Local partners are financially 
compensated for their time and for any use of their facilities and other resources. 
However, it is important to maintain as flexible a partnership arrangement as possible, 
as the actual needs of the project are highly contingent and cannot be foreseen. 
 
The most important characteristics of an effective local partner are 1) that the 
organization is open to learning new capabilities and using enterprise as a way to 
advance its mission; 2) that its staff is experienced in using participatory development 
practices; and 3) that it is “socially embedded” in the community. Key indicators of an 
organization’s degree of embeddedness include whether its offices are located in the 
community and whether its staff is drawn from and/or live in the community. Locating 
embedded community partners is not easy, as they are, almost by definition, small in 
size and operate intensely within a narrow geographical range. In some cases, they 
may be identified through large, well-known multinational funding agencies (e.g., 










Real World Example 
The Solae Company’s team consisted of two recent MBA graduates of the 
Indian School of Business with prior experience in operations and marketing 
and an expressed interest in the BoP, and four senior-level development 
professionals on secondment from the Indian office of Aide et Action, an NGO 
skilled in the use of participatory methods. The team was guided in the field by 
two returning members of the SC Johnson Kenya project based in the US 
(Cornell University) and Brazil (BRINQ). The team reported to a senior-level 
Solae employee experienced in new business development.  

















R&D White Space 
To derive the maximum value and benefit from a BoP Protocol initiative, it is 
necessary to create a corporate “R&D White Space” that enables linkages to 
corporate-level resources and capabilities while at the same time maintaining 
sufficient independence from the routines, metrics, and structures that govern the core 
business. Corporate BoP Protocol initiatives are most appropriately (and perhaps most 
easily) funded through an R&D budget, as the process is best characterized as a 
special kind of “research and development” — business model R&D. As with 
traditional R&D, the potential for innovation is greatest when the initiative is 
supported by patient capital, has full license to experiment outside of the current 
corporate modus operandi, and is evaluated against long term milestones that 
emphasize learning. Since pursuing the BoP requires wholesale development of new 
skills and capabilities, the “R&D mindset” makes implicit sense as it eliminates the 
expectation for quick returns, rapid scale-up, and the other financial requirements 
imposed on conventional new business development initiatives. 
 
While it is important that a BoP Protocol initiative has independence from the 
corporation’s core operating procedures and norms, flying completely “under the 
radar” in a “skunk works” manner risks cutting the initiative off from the company’s 
broad base of technologies, human resources,  and organizational capabilities. Given 
that the corporation’s (and community’s) capabilities are the building blocks from 
which the new BoP business will be imagined and created, restricting access to these 
capabilities limits the team’s scope for innovation and constrains business 
possibilities. In all cases, particularly if “flying under the radar” is deemed politically 
necessary, the team should report to and/or be supported by a senior-level person in 
the company to facilitate the team’s access to resources and capabilities that may cut 
across geographical areas and organizational boundaries. 
 
Real World Example 
SC Johnson’s local partner in Nairobi is Carolina for Kibera (CFK). CFK, founded 
in 2001 to fight poverty and help prevent violence through community-based 
development, has its office in Kibera and draws the majority of its staff from the 
community. 
 
In Parvathagiri Mandal, The Solae Company partners with Modern Architects for 
Rural India (MARI). MARI, which was founded in the late 1980s by a team of social 
workers, works intensively in a four mandal area that includes Parvathagiri Mandal 
and promotes strong community-based organization of the poor. The director of 
MARI lived for four years in Parvathagiri, and maintains a small office in the 
community. Both the SC Johnson and Solae teams were supplemented with 2-3 
members from each of these organizations.   






BOP PROTOCOL – IN-FIELD PROCESSES 
 
Overview 
The in-field process is divided into three interdependent phases of activity that build a 
new, locally-embedded business and catalyze the local market in a progressive, 
evolutionary manner. The three phases can be envisioned as “fractals” of a triangle, 
each overlapping and evolving as activities flow from one stage to the next. Each 
phase has business outcomes along key enterprise (internal) and market (external) 
Real World Example 
The SC Johnson initiative was championed by the CEO of the company and 
directed by a senior VP who was head of the company’s corporate sustainability 
unit. From inception, the project also established a strong lateral connection with 
the General Manager of the company’s East Africa business (based in Nairobi) and 
the Regional Manager for South and East Africa in South Africa. 
 
The Solae Company initiative was championed by the CEO of the company and led 
by a senior director from the company’s Sales and Marketing division. A lateral 
connection was also established between the project and Solae’s India office in 
Delhi. 
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dimensions to reflect the increasing depth and complexity of the new business and the 
expansion of market demand and brand awareness. A co-creation logic — one 
premised on joint decision making by the corporation and the community in which 
decisions are informed by action-based learning and experimentation — guides the 
business development process from beginning to end. Importantly, the BoP Protocol 
process establishes a local “community team” with the ability to eventually manage 
and lead the new business independently as the corporation turns its attention to re-
embedding the proven business in other communities (see Scaling the BoP Protocol, 
page 41).  
 





Phase I — Opening Up  
Opening Up begins with a company immersion in the community using homestays to 
build rapport and a base of trust. The company then recruits a community team 
representative of the community’s diversity that is committed to working together with 
the corporation to develop new business ideas that can benefit all parties. A series of 
participatory workshops are designed to build understanding and a shared business 
language between the two groups. The phase culminates with idea co-creation 
workshops that converge the group on a single, actionable business concept. 
 
Phase II — Building the Ecosystem 
Building the Ecosystem begins by formalizing a project team comprised of company 
representatives and those community members who remain committed and motivated 
to building the new business. Role playing and group field visits are used to ensure 
that all team members develop a rich, shared vision of the business and a deep sense of 
responsibility for its success.  Action learning is used to build the project team’s 
business skills and conceptualize an initial business prototype. The prototype, which is 
evolved by reaching out to the wider community thereby creating “buzz” around the 
business, consists of the initial product/ service offering and an umbrella brand 
position. 
 
Phase III — Enterprise Creation 
Enterprise Creation creates the full business model using small-scale tests and 
continued action learning. Local market demand is jump-started through engagement 
of the wider community in this process. The community team deepens its management 
skills with the goal of eventually managing and leading the new business 
independently. At this time, the corporation puts into place a platform to support the 
replication of the new business in other geographies. The output of this phase is a 
business embedded in the social fabric of the community.  
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Key outputs from each phase are shown on the next page.  
 
  367 
PHASE I — OPENING UP 
 
Phase I, “Opening Up,” lays the foundation for creating a new partnership united by 
trust, mutual commitment, and a shared vision for a new business enterprise. It 
encompasses the steps involved in overcoming the skepticism and cultural distance 
between the corporation and the community, and ultimately forges a personal, peer-to-
peer relationship on which a business partnership of equals can be built. The total time 
needed to complete the in-field activities of Phase I is about eight to ten weeks per 
community site. Importantly, all knowledge generated during this phase is made 
broadly available to the community and local partners. This is done in recognition of 
the participatory principle of joint ownership, as well as to ensure transparency and 
minimize the circulation of potential rumors regarding the corporation’s intent. The 
information can be made available through various kinds of “base camps,” ranging 
from the local CBO partner’s office, a local school or community center, to a 
government office frequented by and easily accessible to community members.  
 
Phase I begins with building deep dialogue, then progresses to project team 
development and collective entrepreneurship development. The outcome of phase I 
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Building Deep Dialogue 
The corporate team enters the community with no preconceived product ideas and no 
initial commercial agenda. The focus is to start building relationships with local 
people and to gain an appreciation for how people in the community live their lives. 
Because of the corporate team’s “outsider status,” it is valuable to hold several small-
group community meetings hosted by the local partner to introduce the corporate 
members and the company, to explain the team’s intent, and to answer any questions 
people may have. When possible, the team also engages in additional “icebreaking” 
opportunities, such as participation in a community event hosted by the local partner, 
to ease the transition into the community.  
 
Following these initial introductions, the corporate team works together with the local 
partner and members of the community to identify families or individuals willing to 
host the team members in community homestays. The focus of the homestay is not 
about collecting ethnographic data or scoping out potential business opportunities. It is 
about building trust and rapport. As much as possible, the host individuals and 
families should reflect the cultural and socioeconomic diversity within the community. 
During the community homestay, each corporate member lives full-time, for at least 
one week, with a family or individual in the community and assists the host with daily 
chores and income-generating activities. 
 
Corporate team members need to be mindful that, in their zeal to learn from their hosts 
and participate in chores, they do not create an additional burden on their hosts. 
Appropriate compensation for the hosts should be decided by the local partner in 
consultation with community members. Following the homestays, the corporate team 
lives in or as close to the c community as possible to maximize informal relationship-
building opportunities and to reinforce the corporation’s commitment to working with 
the community. 
 
Project Team Development 
After the initial immersion, the corporate team’s focus turns to recruiting a 
representative group of people from the community who are committed to working 
together with the corporation to develop new business ideas that can benefit all parties. 
Real World Example 
Over the course of a 7-day homestay in two adjacent villages of Parvathagiri Mandal, 
three Solae team members participated in a range of work-related activities, including 
harvesting rice, manning a small kiosk selling “cool drinks,” operating a village pay 
phone, and preparing a mid-day meal for children at a government-run crèche. 
 
In Nairobi, SC Johnson team members cooked and sold “mandazi” (a Kenyan fried 
bread) by the roadside, collected trash and sorted recyclables with a youth group, and 
sold hand-stitched clothing from a small kiosk.  
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The corporate team and the recruited community members together form the Project 
Team.  
 
To begin the recruitment process, the corporate team works through the local partner’s 
social networks, holding intensive small-group meetings to share in greater depth the 
corporation’s partnership intentions while being sure to inquire into and highlight the 
community’s unique strengths and knowledge. The conversations need to emphasize 
the entrepreneurial nature of the effort. It requires striking a balance between inspiring 
and motivating people as to the unique business possibilities that a partnership holds,  
and tempering expectations that business success is certain and rapid. Given the open-
ended nature of the project and many BoP residents’ prior encounters with 
government officials and aid workers, the corporate team may also need to overcome 
distrust and expectations of largesse (e.g., grants, loans, jobs).  
 
To ensure that the corporate team isn’t creating a class of “gatekeepers,” the team uses 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques such as social and institutional 
mapping. The mapping, which is done at a time and place that encourages broad 
community participation, highlights the variability in the community across multiple 
dimensions, such as poverty, caste, occupation, access to resources, and age. Using the 
maps, the corporate team identifies additional individuals and groups to meet with and 
invite into the partnership. The team should recruit approximately 40 to 45 people into 
the Project Team to participate in the ensuing stages of the process, recognizing that 
not all of the initial participants will elect to continue as they gain a better 
understanding of what the project entails. During this time, the corporate team also 
uses Rapid Assessment Process (RAP) to explore issues and questions about the 















                                                
20 Rapid Assessment Process (RAP) is a methodology used to quickly develop a holistic understanding 
of a complex issue that lacks clearly defined boundaries. RAP relies on a diverse team composition and 
open-ended, semi- structured interviews to develop an “insider’s” perspective of the issue and to 
triangulate root cause/s of a problem. For more information, see James Beebe’s (2001) Rapid 
Assessment Process: An Introduction. 
Real World Example 
In Parvathagiri Mandal, women from the self-help groups that the Solae 
team met insisted initially that the team “was hiding something” and 
requested the team to “tell us the business you want us to do.” 
 
In Nairobi, members of numerous self-help youth groups responded to the 
SC Johnson team’s question as to the youth’s initial interest in forging a 
business partnership with the reply: “Absolutely — if you buy us a truck, 
we will wear t-shirts with your logo.”  
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Collective Entrepreneurship Development  
To harness the creative potential of the newly-formed Project Team (i.e., the corporate 
team together with the recruited community members), it is necessary to first build a 
shared business language and to develop the group’s ability to think and work together 
as entrepreneurs and business partners. Establishing trust and mutual respect is central 
to this task. This is accomplished through a series of daylong, participatory workshops 
that alternate between small, break-out group activity and full group analysis and 
reflection. The workshops adapt traditional PRA techniques, such as community 
transects and participatory photography, within an entrepreneurship framework. 
Through these sessions (which focus on topics such as “successful partnerships,” 
“unique customer value,” and “dimensions of a business concept”), the Project Team 
explores its joint resources and capabilities, as well as the potential needs and wants in 
the community.  
 
The emphasis should, at all times, be on shared commitment, joint effort, and mutual 
value. As a rule of thumb, the corporation should avoid paying community members 
for their attendance at the workshops, as this changes the nature of the budding 
relationship from one of “partner/colleague” to one of “client/employee.” However, 
costs incurred to attend the workshops, such as transportation, are typically 
reimbursed. As well, food is provided, depending on the length and time of day of the 
workshops. 
 
At the same time, it is important that the corporate members of the Project Team 
remain attuned to how the project’s demands on peoples’ time may differentially 
affect some community members (such as those reliant on intermittent day labor). 
Indeed, one of the central challenges during this period is to cultivate norms of 
punctuality and responsibility necessary for effective group performance while 
remaining flexible and adaptable to the diverse demands on the Project Team’s time. 
 
 
Business Concept Co-Creation 
The capstone activity of Phase I, business concept co-creation, begins by developing 
criteria for business success, both from the community’s and the corporation’s 
perspective. Using these criteria as general guides, the Project Team breaks into mixed 
breakout groups and brainstorms broad, actionable business concepts born of the 
Real World Example 
In Hyderabad, the Solae Project Team dispersed across different areas of the 
Hyderabad slum community in five mixed groups to photograph local community 
resources and reflect on their current uses. When the groups reconvened, the photos 
were projected onto the wall, and each group described the resource’s current use and 
brainstormed ways that it might be utilized to serve new purposes. One of the 
resources analyzed during this process — rooftops of homes and buildings — formed 
a vital dimension of the ultimate business concept that was co-created.  
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resources, wants, and needs of the various partners. The process moves between 
brainstorming and critical reflection and assessment, iterating over a period of several 
weeks until the groups can converge, ideally, on a single business concept with a 
unique and compelling value proposition. Focusing the Project Team on 
a single output encourages information sharing and critical and open analysis of each 
other’s ideas, thereby leading to a robust concept that has the commitment of the entire 
Project Team from its inception. In between iterations, RAP is used to 1) test out 
assumptions; 2) gain additional information relevant to the emerging business 
concept/s; and 3) engage the broader community in the business development process. 
 
While the business concept needs to be immediately actionable to maintain 
community interest and project momentum, it is also vital that it be sufficiently broad 
so as not to constrain the new business within a narrow band premised solely on 
current products, technologies, and resources. The intent of concept co-creation is not 
to be additive and to simply couple the resources of the corporation with those of the 
community (e.g., selling a current product through an existing self-help group 
network). Instead, the intent is to be generative and to develop a concept that exceeds 
what either the corporation or community members currently do. Focusing the Project 
Team on resource functionality and broad service themes rather than on specific 
products is one technique to build a “big umbrella concept.”  
 
Creating a “big umbrella” provides valuable flexibility to adapt and evolve the 
business model as the Project Team learns what does and does not work. It also 
establishes a strategic framework to guide the corporation’s longer-term product and 





PHASE II — BUILDING THE ECOSYSTEM 
 
Once the Project Team settles on an umbrella business concept that has the potential to 
generate value for all partners, the initiative enters Phase II, “Building the Ecosystem.” 
The objective of Phase II is to build an organizational foundation for the new business 
Real World Example 
In Hyderabad, the Solae Project Team converged on the concept of a “Culinary 
Park” that linked the expressed needs for local greenspaces, fresh and affordable 
produce, and healthy, high quality food options. The culinary park takes 
advantage of the availability of building rooftops in the slum that can be adapted 
for use as rooftop gardens. The exact nature of the food products and services to 
be offered are expected to evolve as the concept is put into action and will likely 
vary from one neighborhood to the next. 
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and to develop an initial product/service offering through an action learning process 
that deepens and extends the linkages among the Project Team, the broader 
community and other (potentially new) local partners. During this period, the Project 
Team gets “on the ground and into the field.” Working hands-on, the Team addresses 
the various practical issues involved in operationalizing the business concept and 
develops an initial business “prototype” through small-scale experimentation. This 
phase is about gradually enacting and evolving the business concept at a low-level of 
complexity, rather than hypothesizing and testing an ideal, full-blown business 
structure. 
 
Phase II also marks an important transition in the role of the local (CBO) partner and 
the community members on the Project Team. As the intent is to establish a new 
business that unites the community with the corporation, it is vital that the corporate 
and community members develop the capacity to work directly with each other. In this 
way, Project Team members learn to rely on and trust one another to overcome 
challenges and negotiate differences. 
 
While the local CBO partner was critical in providing an initial “bridge” and entry 
point into the community and facilitating the partnership, in Phase II the CBO and 
other partners shift into a behind the scenes” role where they function as project 
advisors and guides. Thus, while their degree of involvement may remain the same, 
the nature and the visibility of this involvement changes. Their evolving role allows 
the corporate and community team members to forge a more direct interdependence 
and to develop the necessary co-creation capabilities. As in Phase I, partners are 
compensated for their time and resources.  
 
During Phase II, the community members that comprise the Project Team transition 
into full-time roles as co-founders of the new business. Community team members 
have equal responsibility, along with the corporation, for starting the new business, as 
they will ultimately manage and direct it independently. They do not, however, have 
the same capacity to bear risk as the corporation. In addition to meeting their own 
daily needs, community team members will likely shoulder the responsibility of 
supporting and caring for their families. Weddings, illness, and weather-related crop 
failures can create financial shocks to the household. For this reason, it is critical that 
business prototyping activities are structured so that community team members can 
generate income and that the Project Team is organized in a manner that creates an 
insurance mechanism to respond to financial contingencies. 
 
Depending on the number of sites and the nature of the business concepts, total time 
needed to complete Phase II is approximately six months. To preserve project 
momentum and strengthen the fragile community trust, it is important to minimize the 
transition time from Phase I to Phase II to no more than 6 weeks.  
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Phase II begins with further project team development, then progresses to building 
shared commitment and new capability development. The outcome of Phase II is 





Project Team Development 
In Phase II, the Project Team begins the transition into a formal business organization. 
Community membership in the Project Team is comprised of those original 
participants who remain committed and motivated to invest time and “sweat equity” in 
building the new business. A community team size of approximately 20 members is 
optimal, as tasks can be efficiently divided up among sub-groups of 4-6 people, 
thereby allowing the business to progress faster.  Splitting up project work is 
particularly important at the beginning of Phase II, as community team members will 
be transitioning from their other livelihoods and will not be able to dedicate all of their 
time to the business. Significantly exceeding 20 members causes coordination strain. 
More importantly, it places tremendous revenue pressure on the business in Phase III, 
as the fledging business now has to support a large number of people. 
 
Depending on the nature of the business concept and the current team constitution, 
additional members from the community are recruited into the project to fill skill and 
experience gaps. These new recruits ensure representation from key segments of the 
community, including those that are the poorest. A team that represents the 
community’s diversity will help ensure the broadest level of support for the new 
business. All new members should undergo a thorough induction process to ensure a 
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common understanding of the project’s history, the Protocol approach, and the 
business concept. Members should also be fully aware that the venture will take time 
and hard work to bring about and that success is not guaranteed. Importantly, the 
community members themselves should articulate a set of norms and requirements for 
ongoing participation. 
 
Corporate membership in the Project Team is comprised of two to three people (per 
site), ideally drawn from the original corporate team to ensure continuity. Given the 
unique challenges of co-venturing, the corporate members should include an 
experienced person with demonstrated ability in entrepreneurship, as well as 
community facilitation and mobilization. Other corporate members, who may be of a 
more junior-level, need to possess an understanding of new business development and 
community facilitation principles and a deep commitment to a participatory ethic. 
These individuals are also chosen with an eye toward building the company’s 
capability to later replicate and extend the business to new communities and 
geographies. If the corporate members did not participate in Phase I, it is vital that the 
corporation include as part of its team one or more returning members from the local 
CBO partner to ensure continuity and to retain the personal relationships forged. As 
with new recruits to the community team, any new members joining the corporate 
team should complete a thorough induction process (including homestays) to ensure 
deep alignment with the Protocol process and business intent. 
 
 
Building Shared Commitment 
A sense of shared commitment to the new business and to each other is essential for 
weathering the challenges that confront all joint entrepreneurial undertakings and for 
building the new company’s base for sustainable competitive advantage. Creating 
shared commitment to the new business requires, first and foremost, that all members 
of the Project Team are in complete alignment as to the core business concept to be 
pursued and the value that each dimension or component of the business concept 
generates. Role playing and group field visits are powerful techniques by which all 
members can develop a rich, shared vision of the business and a deep sense of 
responsibility for its success. In addition, collectively drafting a “strategic brief” of the 
Real World Example 
In Parvathagiri Mandal, the Solae Project Team felt that, in order for the business to be 
successful, the Team would need to include some of the younger mothers and single 
women in the community, as well as representatives from the Scheduled Castes (members 
of the lowest caste groups). Over the course of an eight-week period, the Project Team 
reached out to approximately 10 more women, eventually inducting six of them. The 
induction process involved pairing each new member with a “sponsor” from the original 
team, who was tasked with teaching the new member about the project history and the 
business venture. A formal ceremony was held to recognize their entry onto the Team. 
The eventual size of the Project Team was 24.  
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initial business concept (translated in the local vernacular) and updating the 
description as the concept evolves over the course of Phase II provides a valuable 
reference point for the Project Team and helps maintain this alignment.  
 
Creating shared commitment among the corporate and community members of the 
Project Team requires deepening the personal relationship between the two partners 
and, ultimately, developing a new, shared organizational identity. While the co-
creation process itself is the primary mechanism for building this deep 
interdependency, a number of related actions and activities support its development. 
When possible, inviting the community team members to the corporation’s local 
facilities, and hosting periodic team meetings at the corporation’s office build a sense 
of reciprocity and help to personalize the company. Similarly, having senior members 
of the corporation travel periodically to the community to meet and work with the 
Project Team demonstrates the corporation’s commitment to the project.  
 
Additional actions that help foster a new, shared identity include the joint development 
of a “business credo;” securing a space within the community to serve as the Project 
Team’s “office” space; and selecting a provisional name for the Project Team that 
signifies an affiliation with the corporation. 
 
 
New Capability Development 
The Project Team needs to possess a common baseline knowledge regarding products 
and technologies to ensure consistency across all interactions with the broader 
community. In addition, to facilitate the development of an initial product/service 
offering, the Project Team must have an understanding of general business concepts 
(e.g., pricing, brand building) and the local business context (e.g., local market value 
chains). Knowledge and capability gaps among Project Team members are co-
identified and specific expertise is sourced from within the corporation, the local CBO 
partner, and the community as a way to further build mutual commitment and deepen 
Real World Example 
In Parvathagiri Mandal, the women community members on the Solae Project Team 
greeted a new member from the Solae Company visiting the project for the first time. 
When he introduced himself to the women and mentioned that “Solae” was pleased to 
be working with them, one of the women raised her hand and said: “We are pleased 
that you are able to join us, but...WE are Solae!” Clearly the Protocol process had 
instilled a deep sense of shared identity and commitment.  
 
In Nairobi, community team members translated SC Johnson’s corporate credo into 
the local Swahili dialect, Sheng, in the process of developing a set of jointly-developed 
business principles to guide the Project Team. A representative consolidation team 
eventually drafted a unified statement that reflected the full Project Team’s shared 
principles and values.  
  376 
community integration. All team members are thus both teachers and learners. 
Documenting and codifying key learnings helps to ensure consistency in the Project 
Teams’ understanding and provides a tool for inducting future members.  
 
Whenever possible, action learning techniques are used in place of classroom-style 
“lecturing.” Action learning — which involves addressing real, work-based problems 
in small groups — develops practical and relevant business skills and enhances the 
community and corporate team members’ ability to work together. In addition, it helps 
sustain the Project Team’s momentum and enthusiasm, as all “learning” is tied directly 
to important business outputs. Lastly, action learning highlights individuals’ talents 
and skills, thereby providing a basis for matching Project Team members to tasks and 




Business Prototype Co-Creation 
Once all Project Team members possess a deep, shared understanding of the business 
concept, focus turns toward developing an initial product/service offering and brand 
positioning. It is important to note that this activity does not involve conducting 
survey-based market research, which is then channeled into a detailed business plan 
with forecasts of product sales and revenue streams. Such a “planning and discovery” 
approach fuels expectations of rapid success among the Project Team, promotes 
politicking regarding anticipated revenue distribution, and prematurely freezes the 
value proposition.  
 
Instead, business prototype co-creation uses action learning and small, field-based 
experiments that interact with the broader community to develop a rudimentary 
“business prototype” that has passed through an initial “market screen.” By involving 
the wider community in the actual development and evolution of the business offering, 
market demand is self-generated, and the business is “built for success” from the 
beginning. Engagement with the broader community should begin with the community 
Real World Example 
In Nairobi, the Project Team was connected to SC Johnson’s corporate R&D staff to 
understand the potential health, safety, and environmental issues associated with 
providing “home health and cleaning services” to the mostly single-room mud homes of 
the slums. Over the course of these conversations, the Project Team and SCJ’s R&D 
staff felt that an effective cleaning service would need to incorporate Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM) techniques, an area in which the R&D staff had limited experience. 
Subsequently, to understand how to best integrate IPM into the business service, the 
Project Team provided free cleanings to the Team members’ families and neighbors in 
exchange for candid feedback. Importantly, SC Johnson’s own R&D staff had to 
broaden its scope, as well. 
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team’s immediate contacts and social networks, but gradually extend out to involve 
other community members who can provide more “objective” feedback and input. The 
strategic involvement of key community members can create powerful word-of-mouth 
“buzz” for the new business offering. It is valuable to frame the initial brand identity 
as broadly as possible (i.e., an “umbrella brand”) to have the necessary flexibility for 
refining and evolving the brand position.  
 
In choosing which business activities to begin with, it is useful to first map and 
prioritize the various components of the business concept according to their ease of 
implementation and anticipated level of importance to long-term business success. The 
Project Team needs to balance “quick wins” that can generate near-term income (and 
thereby sustain the Team’s motivation) with activities that require more time 
investment but hold greater potential for sustained sales and pervasive brand presence. 
Additionally, it is important to begin with activities that allow a relatively wide 
“margin of error” in execution, as it will take time and hands-on learning for the 
Project Team to evolve a high and consistent performance level. Even though the 
Team begins with a subset of the activities, there should be a clear understanding 




PHASE III — ENTERPRISE CREATION 
 
Once an initial business prototype is operational, the initiative enters Phase III, 
“Enterprise Creation.” The objective of Phase III is to establish both a committed 
market base, and a new organization capable of sustaining and growing the enterprise 
while evolving and expanding the initial prototype into a complete business model. 
Preserving organizational and business model flexibility at the early stages of 
Enterprise Creation is paramount. To work under such conditions of ambiguity, 
however, demands that the community and corporate team members have established, 
during Phase II, a deep sense of trust and commitment to each other, including the 
Real World Example 
In Nairobi, the “umbrella concept” centered on the idea of a Community Cleaning 
Service (CCS) involving some combination of home cleaning, sanitation, and pest 
control. After initial trials that included providing free applications in schools, 
mosques, and homes of friends and family, CCS’s initial suite of services included 
garbage collection, indoor cleaning, insect control, window screening, and wall 
repair and patching. CCS is branded as a partnership among SC Johnson, a 
coalition of slum youth groups, and CFK (the local CBO partner). The business 
tagline, “we identify with you,” is emblazoned on the back of the youth’s uniforms. 
Due to variation within and across the slums, the initial price of the service was left 
up to the individual youth groups.  
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capability for managing conflict and negotiating differences. To operate with 
confidence, corporate and community team members also need to have established 
strong trust and support from their respective “internal key stakeholders” (e.g., 
corporate leadership, family networks).  
 
During Phase III, the role of all external partners further recedes so that the Project 
Team emerges as entirely self-sufficient, possessing the skills necessary to manage the 
new business and to grow and replicate it in other communities and geographies. The 
time it takes for the new business to stabilize will vary depending on its complexity, 
though one year of operations should provide valuable insights into seasonal 
variations. Following Clay Christensen’s counsel for incubating disruptive 
technologies and businesses, an important rule of thumb during this period of 
development is to be “impatient for profit but patient for growth.”21  
 
The Phase III process begins with further new capability development, then 
progresses to building the market base and collective entrepreneurship 
development. The outcome of Phase III is a newly created business enterprise ready 
for scaling out.  
 
 
                                                
21 Clayton M. Christensen (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great 
Firms to Fail. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA. 
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New Capability Development 
To shift from start-up to a self-sustaining business requires that the community 
members of the Project Team develop the organizational systems and business 
management skills necessary for managing ongoing operations (e.g., accounting and 
book-keeping, planning, logistics) and for growing the enterprise locally (e.g., saving 
and re-investment, customer feedback). As during Phase II, these knowledge and 
capability gaps are co-identified and periodically re-assessed by the full Project Team 
and addressed through action learning scenarios tied to concrete needs of current 
business operations. Rather than holding a “training” session on cost accounting, for 
example, the community and corporate members of the Project Team together track 
the actual revenue flows and calculate profit from the business’ initial operations.  
 
As much as possible, all project management processes and decisions, including the 
management and allocation of project funds, are jointly administered to build the 
community team members’ practical management capacity. “Guest talks” by 
successful entrepreneurs and field visits to successful start-up ventures provide 
effective ways to both manage the community team’s expectations and to provide 
insights into the process of growing and running a new business. These activities can 
help demonstrate the importance of inculcating business practices and habits that have 
a less immediate and visible impact on profitability and operations, but that are vital to 
sustaining and growing the business (e.g., tracking customer satisfaction and 
community impact). Documenting and codifying key learnings and processes helps to 
institutionalize the learnings and provides a valuable mechanism for inducting future 
team members as the business grows.  
 
For the corporation, Phase III is also the time to begin building the necessary 
organizational capabilities to manage future replication and scale-out of the new 
business in other communities and geographies. This organizational foundation 
includes both a human resource dimension and a structural, business systems 
dimension. As many of the management skills and competencies necessary for co-
venturing are tacit in nature (e.g., community facilitation, deep dialogue, co- creation), 
the most effective way to develop future project managers in other geographies is by 
gradually immersing them in the current business site. This immersion begins with the 
new managers “shadowing” the current corporate members of the Project Team to 
understand the ethos of the process. “Shadowing” then transitions into more active 
involvement and co-direction in order to actively “practice” skills such as facilitation.  
 
The R&D White Space created to support the initial project needs to be formalized 
within the corporate structure. Corporate-level formalization of this “business model 
R&D” unit is important for ensuring a consistent flow of patient capital, the 
application of appropriate performance evaluation milestones, and for effectively 
leveraging learnings and resources among the initial project site and new geographies. 
Absent a separate organizational structure for housing and supporting these co-
venturing initiatives, the company’s “corporate antibodies” are likely to impose 
traditional business development practices and performance targets, thereby forcing 
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the new “BoP” business to migrate towards “middle of the pyramid” markets, and to 
revert back to a product/line extension business development approach (BoP 1.0).  
 
 
Building the Market Base 
In order to deepen trust and shared commitment with the wider community while 
ensuring that the new business’ products and services are in genuine demand, the 
Project Team engages the broader community in the evolution of the business 
prototype and development of the full business model. This process is not about 
“educating” and “convincing” potential customers of the products’ or services’ 
benefits — an approach that is effective in stimulating demand when introducing 
product extensions into a defined and established market segment. Rather, “Building 
the Market Base” creates a community-wide sense of membership in and shared vision 
of the business by extending the action learning process to include a diverse and 
influential segment of community members and opinion leaders. By deeply vesting the 
community in the business success, “pull-through” demand is generated, and 
competitive advantage is ensured through an indelible brand connection.  
 
Deep, personalized connections with the wider community are forged through 
homestays conducted by the Project Team in and around the community the business 
intends to serve. It is worth recalling that many slums and rural “counties” can have 
well in excess of 25,000 residents. Homestays allow the Project Team to share 
informally the business’ intent with key people and groups, while continuously 
learning from the lives of the people in the community in which the business operates. 
The high level of visibility afforded by homestays also has valuable “spillover” effects 
that help breed broad enthusiasm for the business.  
 
A “community advisory board” provides a formal mechanism for engaging the wider 
community. The advisory board is comprised of various opinion leaders (both formal 
and informal) in the community and those groups and individuals who have the 
greatest influence over the purchasing decisions of the community segment/s that the 
Real World Example 
In Hyderabad, the Project Team opened a Working Capital Account (seeded by 
Solae) that is jointly managed by Solae and the community team members. The 
Project Team collectively budgets for its activities and manages cash flows and 
receipts. In addition, a second Retained Earnings Account was created in which all 
income from the Project Team’s action learning and initial business operations is 
held. Solae is initially “seeding” this account to provide “bridge funding” for the 
women, all of whom are now working full-time on building the business. The 
Project Team collectively decides how these funds are distributed among the team 
(and potentially into new investments). In addition to learning how to manage the 
new business’ finances, the community team members have also expressed an 
increased sense of pride and self-esteem.  
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business intends to serve. To avoid the possibility of board members becoming 
gatekeepers, and to multiply the number of “touch-points” in the community, “terms” 
are fixed and membership periodically rotated to bring in new perspectives. All board 
members receive an abbreviated induction into the business to enhance their ability to 
effectively advise the Project Team and to ensure that they communicate a consistent 
message about the business to the community.  
 
Additional actions that build broad support for the new business by involving the 
community in a co-design process include holding “community contests” to determine 
aspects of the business offering (e.g., product configuration) or brand (e.g., the logo or 
tagline) and providing the business’ products or services pro-bono to a public 
organization (e.g., local school) or at a public event as part of an action learning 
experience in exchange for candid feedback.  
 
Lastly, the supply chain for the emerging business should be localized whenever 
possible. This involves sourcing available raw materials and services from 
community-based vendors, as well as working closely with them to continuously 
improve the quality of their products and services. It also entails enabling the creation 
of new community enterprises that can provide needed inputs that are currently 
unavailable. By localizing the supply chain, the business builds a valuable 
interdependence between its growth and development and that of the wider 
community. 
 
Collective Entrepreneurship Development 
To ensure the development of a robust business model, it is vital that the collective 
insights and capabilities of the full Project Team are utilized. Creatively responding to 
challenges and opportunities with the Team’s full range of resources requires that the 
full Team possess a deep, shared understanding of the evolving issues “in the field.” 
Getting the corporate team members out into the field and “doing the business 
Real World Example 
In Parvathagiri Mandal, which consists of some 40,000 residents within a 5-mile 
radius, the Solae Project Team dispatched 6 pairs of team members to six different 
areas of the county. Each pair of women stayed for two nights with friends or 
relatives of other Project Team members, learning about each others’ families and 
the similarities and differences between their own home areas, in addition to 
sharing about their business. Word quickly spread through networks of family and 
friends about the women and the business. During the day, as the women walked 
through the neighborhoods, they found themselves the center of attention, fielding 
inquiries about food and nutrition and about when the business would start selling 
its products and services. Being asked by men and women for their opinions and 
knowledge proved to be a transformative experience that boosted the women’s self-
esteem and confidence.  
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together” on a regular basis with the community team members builds this shared 
understanding and fosters creative solutions spurred by joint analysis. Conducting 
joint “sales calls” provides further insights into key issues surfaced through initial 
business operations. Importantly, working side-by-side in the field reinforces a shared 
organizational identity and further personalizes the relationship among the Project 
Team members and the wider community.  
 
While the Project Team begins small-scale commercial operations using the resources, 
technologies, and products immediately available, during Phase III attention turns to 
exploring and developing new products and “clean” technologies optimized for the 
emerging business model and customized to the community’s unique context (social 
and ecological) and needs. The emerging business, with its set of deep relationships in 
the community, can be viewed as a real-time “R&D site” in which new products and 
clean, “disruptive” technologies can be tested, incubated, and improved. Building 
direct links between the corporation’s R&D and technology departments and the 
Project Team is a vital first step in translating the Team’s deep, local understanding 
into new products and technologies. To ensure that technology and product 
development remain aligned with the realities and demands of the business and 
community, it is important to treat corporate R&D members as part of the Project 




Business Enterprise Co-Creation 
Working from the revenue prioritization map developed in Phase II, the Project Team 
gradually expands the scope and complexity of business operations. Each new 
addition to and expansion of the business is tested out and shaped through numerous 
small-scale “business experiments” intended to surface nuances in customer needs and 
wants, as well as unanticipated consequences. The rule here is to “fail small and learn 
big” so that problems can be avoided later during business expansion and scale-out. 
Given the uncertainty as to the ultimate shape of the business model and which 
Real World Example 
The Nairobi business was launched using SC Johnson’s current suite and 
configuration of products (e.g., cleaning agents and insecticides packaged in spray 
cans). These products were originally designed for purchase by end-consumers for in-
home use. After a short time in field, it became clear that, in order for SC Johnson’s 
products to be effective within the service-based business model of CCS, the products 
would need to be bulk-packed using a commercial application technology. Given the 
high cost and long time period for registering new product configurations in Kenya, 
CCS is simulating costing and pricing on the basis of bulk provisioning while the 
company explores this new option. In addition, presence in slum communities has 
opened a window on new product development using clean technology. 
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dimensions of the business will drive revenue growth, maintaining organizational 
flexibility is paramount. This flexibility is preserved by minimizing investments in 
fixed assets when phasing-in business activities, and by postponing binding decisions 
as to organizational structure (e.g., ownership and governance) and profit and revenue 
sharing. Instead, all revenue is best held in a common fund jointly managed by the 
Project Team until there is sufficient clarity and certainty as to the revenue model.  
 
During Phase III, it is important that the performance of the new business and Project 
Team be evaluated against milestones that emphasize learning and “failing forward,” 
thereby allowing the Team to experiment widely in evolving a profitable offering. 
Setting and reaching revenue targets that ensure a baseline level of income for 
community team members is needed for the business’ ongoing operation. However, 
milestones based on arbitrary revenue and product sales targets per “traditional” 
corporate growth expectations inadvertently “fix” the business model prematurely and 
lead the Project Team into a “push” mode of action. It is important that the corporation 
remain flexible and open as to its own revenue capture model vis a vis the emerging 
business and to not recede into a peripheral, “supplier” role based solely on the sale of 
its current product and technology set. Indeed, shifting into a “supplier mode” in 
which the corporation is not central to the business’ value proposition gradually erodes 
the deep interdependence between the community and the corporation. This type of 
erosion then creates a potentially weak competitive position when the new business is 




SCALING THE BOP PROTOCOL 
 
As we have seen, the BoP Protocol culminates in a new, “locally-embedded” business 
founded on trust and shared commitment between the corporation and the community. 
In order for the corporation to generate a level of value that justifies the time and 
commitment of an initial BoP Protocol initiative, the business model needs to be 
Real World Example 
In Nairobi, CCS’s service offering has evolved differently in the three slums. In Mathare, 
CCS is providing contract cleaning services to the multi-story, concrete apartment 
buildings constructed as part of the government’s slum redevelopment efforts. CCS cleans 
the common areas (e.g., bathrooms and toilets) found on each floor. In Kibera, the CCS 
service focuses on pest control (IPM approach), a significant problem in the mud-based 
dwellings. In addition, carpet and furniture cleaning has emerged as a valued service. This 
need, which has proven unique to Kibera, is driven in large part by the slum’s age. Kibera 
was first settled in the 1950s, and because families have lived there for multiple 
generations, over time they have accumulated assets. Mitumba, a recently settled slum area 
where homes are constructed of wood and tin and residents are generally poorer and more 
transient, CCS is experimenting with a basic pest control service. 
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efficiently transferred to and re-embedded in hundreds, if not thousands, of other 
communities in new geographies. To reinforce, rather than erode, the personal brand 
connections and shared commitment established by the initial business, the growth 
process must follow a path different from typical scaling strategies. While a full BoP 
Protocol scaling methodology has yet to be developed,22 our preliminary experience 
suggests that an effective replication process should follow an “open pollination 
model” that draws on both “creation” and “discovery” based business processes. In 
open pollination, plants propagate through the natural mixing of pollens from the 
wider population. This open form of crossing builds the plant’s genetic variability, 
thereby creating a robust platform that is highly adaptable across a wide range of local 
conditions. Scaling or “propagating” the BoP business would follow a three-phase 
process analogous to that of the BoP Protocol. 
 
The first phase of the scaling process involves Reaching Out to new communities 
through business ambassadors and planting a “seed” business concept using a 
“concept-specific” immersion. Through this process, representatives from the original 
parent or “pollinating” business effectively spread the core value proposition to a new 
community while simultaneously encouraging local adaptation and modification as 
appropriate. Rapid market appraisals can be effectively utilized ahead of the 
immersion to identify the geographies and communities where the business is most 




                                                
22 We are currently conducting the background work and pursuing funding to develop a “BoP Scale-Out 
Protocol.” 
Reaching Out 
Launch a business-specific 
immersion using business 
ambassadors to localize the 
core concept and create an 
extended Project Team 
Enterprise Re-Creation 
Diffuse and localize the brand 
while adapting the business 
model to create a network of 
interdependent business 
communities 
Linking the  
Ecosystem 
Formalize linkages between the 
parent business and the new 
Project Team to diffuse the 
organizational culture and guide 
business  
roll-out 
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In the second phase, Linking the Ecosystems, a formal organizational linkage is 
established between the new community and the parent business to accelerate the 
development of the initial business pilot model and the professionalization of a new 
Project Team. “Community exchanges” between the parent business and new Project 
Team allow key business and organizational skills to be rapidly and effectively 
disseminated through a train-the-trainer learning system. “Deep listening” approaches 
that adapt quick ethnography and PRA techniques to surface unique local needs and 
contingencies are used to customize the pilot’s initial product/service offering and to 
determine initial price points. 
 
Finally, the Enterprise Re-Creation phase uses small-scale business pilots to re-
embed the original business model within the unique context of the new community. 
Pilots are co-designed and co-managed by the new Project Team together with 
business liaisons from the parent business to ensure that prior learnings are reflected in 
the process and to transfer tacit business skills (e.g., sales and customer management). 
The new Project Team and business liaisons also employ homestays and joint sales 
calls, thereby leveraging the parent business’ brand credibility to accelerate the 
development of the local market and to ensure a consistent brand image across sites.  
 
This scaling process would be repeated for each round of “pollination” the business 
undergoes in every new community. Through this process, each new business venture, 
while customized to its local environment, maintains continuity with the greater 
network and adds its own unique learnings and insights to the network’s knowledge 
base. Importantly, as the size of the network grows, the faster the propagation process 
proceeds, as each newly-established business site can then serve as a parent business 
to guide a new community through the business propagation process (akin to a chain 
reaction). Our experience suggests that it will take three to five years before the BoP 
Protocol-generated business achieves “takeoff,” at which point the network of 
businesses grows exponentially. The scaling process is, therefore, best understood as 
one of “scaling out” rather than “scaling up.” 
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APPENDIX 1 
Designing the BoP Protocol 
 
The BoP Protocol Project was launched in 2003 as a partnership among Cornell 
University, 
University of Michigan, William Davidson Institute, World Resources Institute and 
Johnson 
Foundation with corporate partners DuPont, SC Johnson, Hewlett-Packard, and Tetra 
Pak. The 
Protocol Project emerged from the BoP Learning LabTM, a consortium of companies, 
NGOs and academics sharing knowledge and experiences about the opportunities and 
challenges that confront companies (in particular, multinational corporations) 
attempting to serve the BoP market. 
 
Beginning in 2002, several of the corporate members of the BoP Learning Lab began 
to articulate concerns that their firms’ current set of capabilities and methodologies for 
new business and product development were inadequate for the task of truly 
understanding and serving the needs of BoP communities. This sense of growing 
unease with the current corporate approach provided the impetus for starting the BoP 
Protocol Project. The Core Project Team (see below) began by exploring relevant 
work in related fields (including Anthropology, Social Work, Human Geography, 
Development Studies, and Design) and methodologies (including participatory rural 
appraisal, quick ethnography, rapid assessment process, asset-based community 
development, and empathy-based design).  
 
Following this research, a 4-1/2 day Protocol Design Workshop was held in October 
2004 at the Wingspread Conference Center in Racine, Wisconsin. The workshop 
convened a diverse group of academics, international development professionals, 
social entrepreneurs, market researchers, and corporate executives to craft this 
radically new business process (see participant list, page 46). Results of the design 
workshop were summarized in a report and placed in the public domain in March 
2005. A second workshop was held at the Wingspread Conference Center in October 
2005 to debrief the initial results of the pilot test in Kenya with SC Johnson and to 
revise the process based on those learnings. Participants of the second workshop are 
listed on page 47. 
 
BoP Protocol Core Project Team 
Stuart Hart, Cornell University 
Erik Simanis, Cornell University 
Gordon Enk, Partners for Strategic Change 
Duncan Duke, Cornell University 
Michael Gordon, University of Michigan 







Base of the Pyramid Protocol Design Workshop 
Wingspread Conference Center, October 2004 
Workshop Participants 
 
• Monika Aring, RTI International 
• Mohammed Bah Abba, MOBAH 
Rural Horizons, Nigeria 
• James Beebe, Gonzaga University, 
Leadership 
• Roland Bunch, World Neighbors 
• Nila Chatterjee, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
Anthropology 
• David Ellerman, The World Bank 
• Anne Marie Evans, Global 
Mosaic 
• William Flis, African Economic 
Development Initiative 
• Dee Gamble, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of 
Social Work 
• Kathy Gibson, Australian 
National University, Human 
Geography 
• Gita Gopal, Hewlett Packard 
• Michael Gordon, University of 
Michigan, Michigan Business 
School 
• Julie Graham, University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst, 
Geography 
• Stephen Gudeman, University of 
Minnesota, Anthropology 
• Nicolás Gutiérrez, EGADE - Tec 
de Monterrey, Mexico 
• Saradha Iyer, Third World 
Network 
• Scott Johnson, SC Johnson 
• Anjali Kelkar, Illinois Institute of 
Design, Chicago 
• Lloyd LePage, DuPont, Pioneer 
Hi-Bred 
• Ted London, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
Kenan-Flagler Business School 
• John Lott, DuPont 
• Dipika Matthias, PATH 
• Linda Mayoux, Women in 
Sustainable Development 
• Denise Miley, Tetra Pak 
• Mark Milstein, World 
Resources Institute 
• Kenneth Robinson, Cornell, 
Applied Economics 
• Prashant Sarin, Hewlett 
Packard Labs-India 
• Peter Schaefer, Institute for 
Liberty and Democracy 
• M. Shahjahan, Grameen Bank 
  388 
• Ajay Sharma, University of 
Michigan, William Davidson 
Institute 
• Sanjay Sharma, Wilfred 
Laurier University, Strategy 
• Kwaku Temeng, DuPont 
• Richard Wells, The Lexington 
Group 
• Bill Wiggenhorn, Consultant 
to RTI International 
• Faye Yoshihara, Consultant to 
SC Johnson 
• Anjali Alva, Wingspread 
Fellow 
 389 
Base of the Pyramid Protocol Workshop II 
Wingspread Conference Center, October 2005 
Workshop Participants 
• Anjali Alva, Wingspread Fellow 
• James Beebe, Gonzaga University, 
Leadership Studies 
• Catherine Burnett, Independent 
Consultant 
• Justin DeKoszmovszky, Cornell 
University, Johnson School of 
Management 
• Patrick Donohue, BRINQ 
• Dee Gamble, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of 
Social Work 
• Bradley Goodwin, SC Johnson 
• Julie Graham, University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst, 
Geography 
• Nicolás Gutiérrez, EGADE - Tec 
de Monterrey 
• Camilla Hägglund, Tetra Pak 
Research and Development AB 
• Molly Hemstreet, Center for 
Participatory Change 
• David Hewitt, The Solae Company 
• Sammy Iregie, Mathare 
Community Resource Center, 
Nairobi, Kenya 
• Farouk Jiwa, CARE Enterprise 
Partners (CARE Canada) 
• Scott Johnson, SC Johnson 
• Anjali Kelkar, Illinois Institute of 
Design, Chicago 
• Robert Kennedy, William 
Davidson Institute 
• Nyokabi Kiarie, University of 
Michigan, Michigan Business 
School  
• Arun Kumar, Development 
Alternatives 
• Daniel L. Lawson, SC Johnson 
• Delphine Lemee, Danone 
Vitapole 
• Lloyd LePage, DuPont, 
Pioneer Hi-Bred 
• Ted London, William 
Davidson Institute 
• John Lott, DuPont 
• Marion McNamara, Oregon 
State University 
• Denise Miley, Tetra Pak 
• Mark Milstein, World 
Resources Institute 
• Salim Mohammed, Carolina 
for Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya 
• Banoo Parpia, Cornell 
University, Nutritional Sciences 
• Luiz Carlos Ros, World 
Resources Institute 
• Stephanie Schmidt, Ashoka 
• Sanjay Sharma, Wilfred 
Laurier University, Strategy 
• KK Sridhar, SC Johnson 
• Tatiana Thieme, Cornell 
University Law School 
• Macharia Waruingi, Kenya 
Development Network 
• Richard Wells, The Lexington 
Group 
• Sheri Willoughby, Consultant 








• Suspend Disbelief – be willing to admit ignorance 
• Put the Last First – seek out the voices seldom heard 
• Show Respect and Humility – all parties have something important to contribute 
• Accept and Respect Divergent Views – there is no one best way 
• Recognize the Positive – people that live on $1 per day must be doing something 
right 
• Co-Develop Solutions – creating a new business takes mutual learning by all 
partners 
• Create Mutual Value – all parties must benefit in terms important to them 
• Start Small – begin with small pilot tests and scale out in modular fashion 
• Be Patient – it takes time to grow the ecosystem and win trust before the business 
takes off 
• Embrace Ambiguity – the greatest opportunities often arise from unplanned events 
and circumstances  
 
 
Code of Conduct 
• Design businesses that increase earning power, remove constraints, and build 
potential in the BoP 
• Ensure that wealth generated by the business is shared equitably with the local 
community 
• Use only the most appropriate – and sustainable – technologies 
• Promote the development of affected communities as broadly as possibly in ways 
defined by the local people themselves 
• Track the “triple bottom line” impacts associated with the entire BoP business 
system 
• Monitor and address any unintended negative impacts associated with the business 
model 
• Share best practices with local partners to the extent possible 
• Report transparently and involve key stakeholders in an on-going dialogue 
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT I:  
(RE)DISCOVERING MARKET CREATION 
 
I began this dissertation with the goal of advancing the understanding and 
practice of business development targeting low-income consumers. By definition, the 
working assumption behind this dissertation was that the BOP was so unique and 
different from mainstream markets that it required a new innovation practice and 
management skill set. Existing marketing and innovation frameworks were, it was 
believed, insufficient in cutting through the socio-cultural, institutional, and political 
complexity that marked this untapped segment. Radically localizing a business model 
to the community level of the BOP’s environmental context—what I perceived to be 
the central business challenge—required novel partnerships and tools, such as 
participatory rural appraisal, quick ethnography, and rapid assessment process.23 
Based on my four years of field experience in the India and Kenya business 
ventures, I am inclined to argue that this working assumption—that the BOP presents 
an entirely different challenge from mainstream markets—was off the mark. The core 
challenge that I confronted in the field turned out to be the same one experienced by 
entrepreneurs and corporations in mainstream Western contexts—building altogether 
new consumer markets for new product forms. By product form, I am referring to the 
broad product class—such as “automobile”—within which the various product 
offerings are viewed by consumers as substitutes for one another. The products within 
a product form provide the same core functionality and value and the same set of 
                                                
23 It is important to note that the inclusion of these development techniques into the BOP Protocol 
innovation approach was driven also by a desire to address issues of poverty and social exclusion by 
building local capacity.  
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consumer skills and behaviors in their use (Bang & Joshi, 2008; Lehman & Winer, 
2005). By this definition, a bicycle, a motorcycle, and an automobile are three 
different product forms.   
Though my core assumption was set aside, it comes with a silver lining. 
Market creation involving a new product form—the so-called “suicide quadrant”24 of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, as it presents the greatest degree of difficult given that it 
entails commercialization of a new product for a new consumer (Sarasvathy, 2003)—
remains a largely opaque management process that continues to bedevil entrepreneurs 
and managers, whether they target Indian slum dwellers or mainstream Western 
consumers. The fantastic launch and crash of Segway, an effort that attracted the 
adoration, funding, and guidance from the world’s leading venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs, including John Doerr, Bill Sahlman, Steve Jobs, and Jeff Bezos, serves 
as a memorable reminder of this harsh reality (Kemper, 2003). The learnings and 
insights from my field work in Kenya and India are applicable, therefore, not only to 
the BOP context but also to so-called “mainstream” business as well. 
This chapter aims to improve the theoretical understanding of firm-level 
market creation strategies in this suicide quadrant. As has been remarked, “this is the 
space within which great companies such as Edison’s General Electric, Apple 
Computers and Medtronics often emerge” (Sarasvathy, 2003). This chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first sets a few boundaries: the idea of market, the kinds of 
market creation I’m considering, and the consumer issue on which I want to direct 
focus. The second section steps through a market creation typology. The third offers a 
                                                
24 The suicide quadrant refers to a 2x2 matrix that delineates four possible business opportunity spaces. 
The one axis differentiates between opportunities based on existing products or that require new 
product development; the other axis differentiates between opportunities targeting an existing consumer 
market or an altogether new market. The quadrant requiring new product development for an altogether 
new market is labeled the suicide quadrant as it presents the highest level of difficulty.  
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theoretical explanation for the omission or strategic blind spot identified in section 
two.  
I ask the reader to treat the following not as “findings,” but rather as 
implications and extensions of my research results as reflected in the Kenya and India 
project work. While the frameworks presented and the direction outlined respond to 
the business challenges confronted in the field and are inspired by various methods 
used and the results witnessed, they remain best classified as “informed intuition.”  
 
Bounding the Strategic Market Creation Literature  
Defining “The Market” 
First of all, to speak of a “strategic market creation literature” is a creative act 
in and of itself, as it imposes an artificial boundary around a body of research and 
writing that arguably has no common, much less stable, foundation. As one review of 
the literature on markets notes, despite the taken-for-grantedness and ubiquitous 
presence of the concept of “markets” within economics—the discipline that gave birth 
to the concept—the market remains “the hollow core at the heart of economics with a 
scarce sentence in many an economic tome dedicated to what actually constitutes a 
market” (Lie, 1997). Another author echoes this sentiment, commenting that “if the 
entrepreneur is the forgotten man in mainstream economic theory, then the market is 
certainly the forgotten place” (Storr, 2008). Couple this construct ambiguity with the 
different theoretical lenses and levels of analysis that accompany the various 
disciplines that today address the topic of market, from sociology to innovation to 
anthropology, and things get murkier. What comprises a “market” for the marketing 
literature bears little resemblance to what a sociologist defines as a market.  
In light of this variation, I will briefly outline the range of definitions of 
“market” as a way of grounding my analysis of the market creation literature. 
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Consistent with Sarasvathy and Dew (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005), I suggest there are 
three broad definitions for the term “market” that predominate in the literature: market 
as demand, market as supply, and market as social field or arena. The marketing 
discipline generally reflects the “demand-side” perspective, where the demand-side 
consists of the amalgamation of people, their wants and desires, their behaviors, and 
their resources that together result in and enables their purchasing a good or service. In 
this case, “a market” consists of actual and potential buyers of a product (Bang & 
Joshi, 2008; Kotler, 2002). Kotler, for example, defines a market as “all the potential 
customers sharing a particular need or want and who might be willing and able to 
engage in exchange to satisfy that need or want” (Kotler, 2002). Using this definition, 
a market is measured in terms of volume/quantity of product consumed or the value of 
those products.  
A supply-side view of markets predominates in the strategic innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and economics literatures, where “market” is frequently used 
interchangeably with “industry.” “Supply-side” refers to the range of actors, 
technologies, resources, and processes that are coordinated to convert raw materials 
into a finished product and to then deliver that product to consumers at a place and at a 
price that is accessible, affordable, and profitable to all actors in that network. The 
“market” in this view refers to one or more entrepreneurs/companies that sell products 
that are substitutes for one another (Bala & Goyal, 1994; Porter, 1981). A substitute 
product is one that offers the same functionality and core utility as another product but 
comes in a different form (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). The market is comprised of 
competing companies and entrepreneurs and the business models and value chains 
through which they make products available to customers. A measure of the market 
would be the aggregate sales of companies competing against one another for the same 
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customer base. (Brooks, 1995) Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are one 
commonly used measure of a market’s boundaries.   
Anthropology and sociology literatures are focused on the broader web of 
societal actors and structures—the organizational field, as coined by Dimagio and 
Powell (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)—to which the supply side and demand side actors 
are connected and interact with directly and indirectly. In other words, this view of 
markets is highly relational (Fourcade, 2007). It emphasizes the “embeddedness” of 
consumers and producers within a social context as, minimally, a pre-condition of any 
producer-consumer transaction, and maximally, the very source and embodiment of 
the transaction (DiMaggio & Louch, 1998; Granovetter, 1985; Krippner & Alvarez, 
2007; Polanyi, 1957) (Swedberg, 1994) (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007). A market from 
this perspective would, thus, include not only companies and their customers, but so 
too the people, places, technologies, discourses, values, norms, and institutions that 
shape and are shaped by the actions of companies and their customers.  
 
A Firm-Level Market Creation Typology  
The concept of “market creation” reflects a similar range of meanings in the 
management literature. In all of them, something “new” is being created, but the 
location of the newness shifts, as does the kind of consumer targeted. My intent below 
is to organize the different firm-level treatments of market creation in the management 
literature in order to draw attention to the different management challenges they entail 
and to the suggested prescriptions. This will provide the necessary context to then 
consider in more depth the particular kind of market creation that equates to my field 
experiences—the creation and commercialization of an altogether new product form.   
The management literature speaks to four main types of market creation. These 
market creation types are delineated according to 1) what aspect of the supply is being 
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innovated and 2) which part of the consumer demand is targeted. Two main kinds of 
supply-side innovation are discussed. The first concerns the means of production—the 
pattern or particular combination of resources, capabilities, and technologies through 
which a product is created. The second concerns the ends of production—the product 
and service itself and the functionality it provides (Note: for brevity, from this point 
forward I will use the term “product” to refer to both products and services). On the 
demand side, the literature distinguishes two different kinds of targeted consumers: 
existing consumers of a product and its value proposition, and non-consumers of a 
product and value proposition.  These two axes combine to outline four different types 
of firm-level market creation efforts in the model below.   
Note this model differs from the one traditionally used to highlight the suicide 
quadrant, as my aim is to highlight different conceptualizations of market creation (the 
original framework highlighting the suicide quadrant was used to represent both 
market entry and market creation opportunities). That said, Quadrant IV in the model 
below—creating a market through a new product targeted at non-consumers—has the 
same parameters as the suicide quadrant and equates with the commercialization of a 
new product form.  
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FIGURE 8:  Firm-Level Market Creation Typology 
 
It is important to recognize that the literature distinguishes between corporate-
led and entrepreneur-led efforts at market creation. According to the literature, 
effectively managing the complexity and diversity presented by a large corporation 
requires establishing operational routines and norms; furthermore, competing 
successfully against competitors requires continual re-investment in a set of core 
competencies and technological capabilities (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990; Winter, 1987). These established routines and core competencies, 
however, combine to create an operational and socio-political order, what the literature 
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calls a dominant design (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Murmann, 1998), 
as well as a cognitive order or “dominant logic” (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1986) that keep pulling any attempts at innovation back within the 
organizational fold.  
There exists an extensive literature prescribing solutions to these 
organizational-level challenges, which go by the names of core rigidities, learning 
traps, and competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt 
& March, 1988; March, 1991). Among others, solutions include establishing new 
venture groups, cultivating dynamic capabilities, and technological experimentation 
and building the firm’s absorptive capacity (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Barringer & 
Bluedorn, 1999; Burgelman, 2002; Burgleman & Sayers, 1986; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003b; Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Hitt, Nixon, Hoskisson, & Kochar, 1999; 
Levinthal & March, 1993; Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994; Teece et al., 1998). 
However, as my aim in this chapter is to draw attention to the immediate innovation 
processes linked to the various forms of market creation—what might be called “field-
level processes”—I will set to one side this important issue of corporate structure.  
That said, I will highlight management prescriptions in which structure and market 
creation strategy are tightly coupled.  
 
The Question of the Consumer 
As I talk through these four quadrants of market creation activity and the firm-
level managerial implications, I draw the reader’s attention to the impact of the change 
on the broader industry (supply-side) and, more importantly, on the consumer 
(demand-side). While the management innovation literature is quite explicit of how 
firm-level market creation impacts on the broader industry and firm-level competition, 
and provides a rich analysis of necessary managerial skills and decision-making 
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logics, the literature is largely silent about personal-level consumer effects and 
implications. Importantly, I believe it is the unique personal-level consumer 
implications of market creation in the suicide quadrant that remain under-theorized in 
the strategic innovation, entrepreneurship, and marketing literatures and which, 
consequently, have led to management prescriptions that are largely indistinguishable 
from other forms of market creation.  
At the most basic level, Quadrant IV market creation strategies do not take into 
account the unique nature of the personal-level consumer learning (Alba & 
Hutchinson, 1987; Hutchinson & Alba, 1991) that comes into play with new product 
forms, both at a cognitive and behavioral level. To be clear, research in technology 
and innovation diffusion identifies consumer learning as an aspect of innovation 
adoption, but learning is considered in the aggregate (Hutchinson & Alba, 1991; 
Moreau, Lehmann, & Markman, 2001) and imputed after-the-fact to the product 
adoption process; product adoption is either modeled as a hazard function that 
characterize individuals post ante in terms of their time and order of adoption (Bass, 
1969; Dodson & Muller, 1978; Mahajan, Muller, & Srivastava, 1990; Norton & Bass, 
1987) or as a contingency-based process modeled on personal attributes (Chatterjee & 
Eliashberg, 1990; Midgley & Dowling, 1993; Tinmor & Katz-Navon, 2008; Wei & 
Zhang, 2008a).  
Cognitively, consumers presented with a new product form need to establish 
what institutional theory calls cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Sine & Lee, 
2009; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008)—a sense of normalcy around the product 
form and a taken-for-grantedness of its value and presence in their daily context.  Yet, 
as consumer marketing has noted, “to understand really new products, consumers face 
the challenge of constructing new knowledge structures rather than simply changing 
existing ones” (Moreau et al., 2001). New product forms present consumers with what 
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the marketing literatures calls high category uncertainty: fitting a new product form 
into a cognitive classification scheme and developing new category structures—
defined as “abstract images embodying features or attributes most commonly 
associated with members of the category” (Sujan, 1985)—presents a significant 
learning challenge (Hutchinson & Alba, 1991; Lajos, Katona, Chattopadhyay, & 
Sarvarty, 2008; Moreau et al., 2001; Rindova & Petkova, 2007; Sujan & Bettman, 
1989). And drawing on existing categories to understand a new product form has been 
shown to be counter-productive and cause consumers to mis-understand the product 
and mis-perceive its benefits (Moreau et al., 2001). The makers of the Segway—the 
Dean Kamen invention that sought to revolutionize urban mobility—struggled with 
this exact issue (Kemper, 2003).  Was it a kind of scooter? Bicycle? Wheelchair? Golf 
cart? Eco-transport? 
 Behaviorally, in order to use a new product form, consumers have to learn a new 
core pattern and set of skills, habits, and expertise that accompany that product form 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Alba & Hutchinson, 1987; Gourville, 2006; Martin, 2008; 
Ram, 1987). The innovation literature’s division of the production process into core 
and peripheral subsystems applies as well to the consumption process (Gatignon, 
Tushman, Smith, & Anderson, 2002; Tushman & Murmann, 1998). Core subsystems 
are those that drive the overall system and impact performance—failure in a core 
subsystem disrupts the entire system. In riding a bicycle, for example, a core 
consumption skill is the ability to balance on two wheels; without balance skill, a 
consumer cannot ride a bicycle. A peripheral consumption skill would be stamina; 
having stamina allows consumers to do more with the bicycle, but its absence does not 
preclude use of the bike. That said, even seemingly simple, peripheral motor-skills that 
comprise consumption processes of a new product form can prove inhibitory—this is 
made abundantly clear when you watch a first-time computer user struggling to 
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double-click a mouse, the same individual who in all likelihood drives without 
problem a several ton vehicle 55 miles per hour on winding roads in the dark.   
New product forms are also likely to require changes in a consumer’s existing 
consumption context (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Gatignon & Robertson, 1985; 
Laukkanen, Sinkkonen, Kivijarvi, & Laukkanen, 2007; Ram, 1987; Ram & Sheth, 
1989)—all of the external objects and relationships that comprise a person’s social 
environment. A consumption context is bounded by time, space, and means. Using a 
new product requires a re-allocation of financial resources, as all consumption requires 
an outlay of money. Furthermore, it requires a re-allocation of the consumer’s time, as 
the time invested in using the product takes time away from other consumption 
activities. Lastly, it requires a re-orientation and potentially a re-purposing of the other 
material objects in consumer’s lives, as any new product (or even a service) that a 
consumer uses enters into their current lives in some form or fashion. So the computer 
has to find a place to sit in the house, perhaps even a dedicated room so that the 
children can play games on it and not disturb the parents (alternatively, a parent may 
want the computer in the open so that they can monitor their children’s web surfing). 
Browsing the online newspaper at night might mean skipping a television program 
that is usually watched together with the family. The added cost of Internet service 
may mean having to cancel the daily paper.  
At a more fundamental level and a direction that I will outline in more detail 
later in this chapter and in the next, I believe the current suite of market creation 
strategies rests on an outdated conceptual model of the relationship between 
consumers and products and the role that products play in people’s lives. That 
conceptual model—one that economic historian Karl Polanyi characterized as 
“disembedded” (Polanyi, 1944)—imputes to consumers and products a functionalist 
decision logic, albeit “culturally situated,” in which consumers use products to execute 
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tasks, be they emotional, social, or functional. By that standard, getting the product 
design right—in both function and form (Rindova & Petkova, 2007)—is all that really 
matters; commercialization is no more than a question of consumer education and 
awareness building. As one researcher steeped in this functionality paradigm noted, 
“commercial success of new products depends on how well the market opportunity 
has been identified, analyzed, and incorporated into the product design” (Dougherty, 
1990).  
 Yet the past two decades have yielded a significant re-alignment of the theory 
and understanding behind the role of consumption and the relationship among people, 
objects, and the external environment more generally. Theoretical advances and 
findings from the fields of material culture studies (Clarke & Miller, 2002; Miller, 
2008), interpretive consumer research (Arnould & Thompson, 2005; Murray, 2002; 
Thompson & Haytko, 1997) (Belk, 1988, 1989), and neurobiology (Clark, 2008; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006) combine to paint a picture in which consumption and 
material objects are not merely expressions of our identities—a view well established 
in the relationship approach to brand marketing (Fournier, 1998)—they are literally 
what we make ourselves out of. Our ideas and emotions, our physical bodies and 
actions, our personal identities and categorizations, are inseparable from acts of 
consumption and the material objects with which we surround ourselves.  My goal 
over the course of this and the next chapter will be to look at the unique management 
implications for Quadrant IV market creation that such a re-theorization enables.  
Now I will summarize the four quadrants of the market typology. In discussing 
the consumer-level impacts, I will talk in terms of the “consumer lifestyle” built 
around the product, as it provides a useful short-term categorization by which to 
designate the inter-twined existence of people and products that I sketch out above. 
Furthermore, it is a term that is already part of the marketing lexicon (though anchored 
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in the view that consumers use products to express their identities) and, for that 
reason, hopefully more accessible to a business audience.  
 
Synthesis of the Market Creation Literature 
Quadrant I Market Creation 
Quadrant I—the creation of a new means for existing consumers—is the form 
of market creation that most closely reflects the Schumpeterian idea of creative 
destruction and the subsequent transformation of industries Schumpeter envisioned 
(Hart & Milstein, 1999; Schumpeter, 1942) (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Foster & 
Kaplan, 2001). The focus here is on architectural-level (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990) re-engineering of core business subsystems (Gatignon et 
al., 2002) through new combinations of technology, resources, and capabilities that 
ultimately lower the cost of production and/or improve product quality and 
consistency such that it out-competes the incumbent model.  
Central to Quadrant I market creation are discontinuous technologies that 
enable leapfrog performance and are based on completely new knowledge bases 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Christensen’s concept of “disruptive innovation” 
(Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Craig, & Hart, 2001), which considers how initially 
inferior technologies are incubated in niche markets until they improve sufficiently in 
performance to capture the mainstream mass market and transform the industry’s 
structure, also exemplifies this form of market creation.  
An example of this type of market creation is NovoNordisk, a Danish firm that 
transformed the insulin industry by creating a completely synthetic insulin product that 
was less expensive, more reliable, and caused fewer adverse reactions in patients than 
the traditional animal insulin product. Today, all insulin used in the US is synthetic.  
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So from the perspective of the firms that occupied the industry, the industry 
exists only in name. Structurally, it has experienced a transformation—the very basis 
of competition has shifted, as have needed organizational competencies (Hart & 
Milstein, 1999; Tripsas, 1997). So with Quadrant I, market creation is happening only 
from the perspective of the firm/s disrupting the established industry order, thereby 
capturing market share from incumbents.  
From the perspective of the consumer, however, very little has changed—same 
industry, same basic product, and same basic functionality. The consumer maintains 
the existing lifestyle they had already established around the product: it requires no 
learning or changing of the consumer’s conception of value (e.g., the synthetic insulin 
was still treating diabetes, though perhaps more effectively for some consumers); any 
changes to product consumption processes will be peripheral, if any (e.g., insulin 
dosages may have changed, but they were still injected and required consumers to test 
blood sugar levels); and the consumer’s consumption context will be affected 
minimally, if at all (e.g., insulin vials still needed to be kept in the refrigerator and the 
needles out of reach of children; a spouse or family member still needed to administer 
the injection).  
Due to the centrality of new technology to Quadrant I market creation, the 
management prescriptions point to increased R&D investments and experimentation 
(Rothaermel & Hill, 2005) (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) and 
building “industry foresight” through networking and stakeholder engagement 
strategies that import knowledge, even from engagement with the natural world 
(Benyus, 1997; Hamel, 2000; Hart & Milstein, 1999; Hart & Sharma, 2004; Leonard, 
1998; Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996; McDonough & Braungart, 1998). 
While complementary assets are widely acknowledged to play a role in the 
competitive process (Pisano & Teece, 2007; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005; Tripsas, 1997), 
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the inability to know a priori which assets will be complementary with a new 
technology make it a difficult issue to manage on a proactive basis. Rather, enhancing 
the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) has been noted as a potential 
way to deal with this issue (Tripsas, 1997), as well as through strategic collaborations 
(Teece, 1986). Foster and Kaplan argue that a portfolio-based corporate structure 
similar to a private equity firm allows the firm to best mimic market fluctuations. 
Christensen et al. (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003a) point to the need 
to establish skunk-work style units within the company that enable managers to 
operate outside of the organization’s norms and policies which invariably are designed 
to buffer the company from change rather than enable it. 
 
Quadrant II Market Creation 
Quadrant II—the creation of a new means for non-consumers—is a mass-
market strategy in which an established product used by a small group of consumers is 
made available to a much larger group. The focus here is on employing technology, 
capabilities, and processes to generate an order-of-magnitude gain in the efficiency of 
production and distribution such that it is affordable and accessible to a much wider 
base of consumers. In marketing terminology, it is a form of market expansion, as the 
demand for the whole product form increases (Bang & Joshi, 2008). Some elements of 
Christensen’s disruptive technologies would also appear here. 
As with Quadrant I, core business production subsystems are likely to change 
in attaining these gains, thereby making it difficult for the companies serving the 
original customer base to replicate quickly without disruption. Entrepreneurs are, 
therefore, as likely to drive Quadrant II market creation as are established firms. And 
while radical technological innovation plays a factor in Quadrant II, so too do process 
innovations and administrative innovations (Van de Ven, 1986) (Berry, Shankar, 
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Parish, Cadwallader, & Dotzel, 2006) (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). Alfred Chandler’s 
historical account of the birth and evolution of early 20th century mass consumer 
markets in tandem with corporate management structures demonstrates the important 
role of administrative innovation to the scale economies that drive Quadrant II market 
creation (Chandler, 1962; Chandler, 1990).  
An example of Quadrant II market creation is entrepreneur Henry Ford’s mass-
produced Model T automobile, which used an assembly-line manufacturing system to 
effect an order of magnitude decrease in manufacturing cost and the subsequent price 
of the automobile. The Nano, the $1,000 four-door car released by the Indian 
conglomerate Tata, is a modern-day equivalent of the Model T.  
From the perspective of the firms in the industry, the supply-side innovation 
has greatly expanded the size of the available consumer base for the product form. So 
the pie has grown in size for all. However, as suggested above, how that pie is divided 
up in the short term between the innovating firm and the other firms in the industry 
depends on the established firm’s ability to modify existing operational subsystems in 
a timely manner. 
 From a consumer perspective, the very same consumer lifestyle that was once 
limited to one set of consumers has now been brought into the lives of a much wider 
group of people. The important point here is that it is the very same product form 
offering the same functionality and understanding of value, with the same established 
set of required consumer routines and skills. So not only does cognitive legitimacy 
already exist at the consumer level, but there is also an existing public consumption 
field (Zukin & Maguire, 2004) that provides a reference point for the new consumers. 
The latter is an effect of the product’s existing societal legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Rao, 2009; Suchman, 1995). To return to the example 
of the Model T, non-consumers of earlier automobiles were well aware of the product. 
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Cars had become a part of normal part of everyday life—roads had been built, cars 
passed people as they walked or rode carriages, cars were parked in the town, 
organized car racing had become a popular sport (Rao, 2009).  
But the new consumers still have to do a kind of learning to bring the already 
institutionalized product form into their lives. The consumer skills associated with the 
product need to be mastered, and the product has to be brought into their personal 
consumption context.  The learning in this case is best viewed as a kind of lifestyle 
translation. Much as institutional theory considers how existing norms and codes are 
re-configured by new institutions through a translation process that localizes their 
symbolic meaning (Zilber, 2002, 2006 ), so too do new consumers have to translate 
the already visible consumer lifestyles into their personal context. The personal 
learning is, therefore, jump-started because of this existing social structure and 
consumption field—they act, in other words, as a ubiquitous community of practice 
(Brown & Duguid, 2000) operating at an almost sub-conscious level.  
Because technology and knowledge play a potentially important role in 
enabling the supply-side changes in Quadrant II market creation, many of the same 
management prescriptions for Quadrant I apply here, such as importing knowledge 
and maintaining industry foresight. Because of the added importance of process and 
administrative innovations in Quadrant II, additional management prescriptions deal 
with creating cross-functional teams and conducting joint problem solving that enable 
the necessary “creative abrasion” to discover unconventional solutions (Hamel, 2000; 
Leonard, 1998).  
The marketing discipline brings an added management factor to the table for 
Quadrant II. Another way to reduce the effective or perceived price of a product is to 
increase its perceived consumer value (Bang & Joshi, 2008). Strategies and 
approaches such as product advertising and word of mouth (Rosen, 2009; Sernovitz, 
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2009) that create awareness of the need/s addressed by the product (i.e., spreading 
cognitive legitimacy around the product), would serve as a complementary tactic to 
the supply-side innovation. These methods, I should note, would be part of the go-to-
market strategy, not the innovation process. A voluminous literature exists on the 
impact of awareness (measured as advertising and word of mouth) on innovation 
diffusion (Rogers, 1983) through a population (Bass, 1969; Chatterjee & Eliashberg, 
1990; Dodson & Muller, 1978; Gatignon & Robertson, 1985; Kalish, 1985; Wei & 
Zhang, 2008b).  
 
Quadrant III Market Creation 
Quadrant III—the creation of a new means for existing consumers—is best 
described as the “breakthrough products” quadrant. Quadrant III is where radical 
innovation intersects with a firm’s marketing and new product development platforms 
to deliver existing consumers an order-of magnitude improvement in current product 
functionality and value. In the literature, such an innovation would be deemed a 
radical, though sustaining, innovation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 
2003a). As with Quadrant II, entrepreneurs play an important role in this kind of 
market creation. The majority of the management innovation literature dealing with 
market creation falls in this quadrant.  
Breakthrough products can be subdivided into two main types: 1) those that 
establish a new benchmark and dominant design (Tushman & Murmann, 1998) for the 
product  through superior functionality (i.e., a “next-generation” product); and 2) those 
that are derivative of an existing product form and provide a subset of existing 
consumers with a more tailored solution, thereby establishing what marketing calls a 
new product category within the product form (Lehman & Winer, 2005). If we take 
the television as the product form, an example of a new dominant design was RCA’s 
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color television; a new product category within the television product form would be 
Sony’s portable mini-television.  
From the perspective of the existing firms in the industry, the innovation that 
takes place in Quadrant III has led to a diversification within the product form. In 
other words, a consumer has more options from which to choose. Whether that 
diversification leads to overall growth of the product form and the industry, rather than 
cannibalization of the current product sales and a partitioning of the existing resource 
base (Mezias & Mezias, 2000), is difficult to predict. On the one hand, it is possible 
that the additional consumer value created through the enhanced functionality may 
increase sales of the product form to existing consumers: an owner of a black and 
white television may choose to also purchase a portable television, whereas they 
would not purchase a second black and white television (Gatignon & Robertson, 
1985). On the other hand, the new product may become a substitute for the original 
one. For example, people purchase laptops to serve as both a portable and desktop 
computer. In such a case, the market creation is happening only from the perspective 
of the innovating firm—they are generating growth by hiving off customers from 
competing firms. In any event, even if overall consumption does increase of the 
product form, it will be incremental in nature, rather than at the significant level seen 
in Quadrant II.  
From the consumer’s perspective, both types of breakthrough products (i.e., 
new dominant design and new derivative design) improve and expand the range of 
functionality offered by the products within the product form. As such, they enable the 
consumer to enhance his/her current existing consumer lifestyle established around the 
product. So as in Quadrant I, there already exists cognitive legitimacy around the 
product form, the consumer has already mastered and learned the core skills involved 
in product use, and the consumer has already integrated the product into their 
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consumption context. If there is consumer-level learning that accompanies the 
breakout product, it will impact only on the peripheral consumer subsystems—so if 
additional skills are needed, they are non-core to the product’s use.  
For example, the consumer subsystems that come with the portable television 
are very much those that come with any television: plugging the television into an 
outlet, sitting and watching the same television programs and receiving the same 
enjoyment from the programs, fiddling with the antenna to improve reception (back in 
the days of the antenna), and turning knobs and dials to move among programs. Using 
the portable will potentially bring new consumer routines and habits to bear on the use 
of the television—such as purchasing and carrying an extension cord, finding a 
protective cover in which to carry it in case of rain, enjoying new programming that 
occurs during the day—but they would not “make or break” the consumer television 
experience. 
Once again, because technological advances can play an important factor in 
Quadrant III market creation, many of the same management prescriptions for 
Quadrant I apply here as well, such as importing knowledge from different value chain 
actors (Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007) and maintaining industry foresight. In addition, 
the use of cross-functional and joint-problem solving teams as in Quadrant II is 
recommended in Quadrant III—including different functional perspectives in new 
product development ensures the product design is optimized to the different 
constraints and considerations across the entire value chain.  
The key difference in the management prescription for Quadrant III is found in 
how the firm and entrepreneur engage with the demand-side. In Quadrants I and II, the 
quality of the company’s innovation output is judged by the company itself (recall, the 
change is on the supply-side; the product form and consumer offering remain 
relatively constant). In Quadrant III, the external consumer audience is the primary 
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judge of the quality of the innovation. As such, much of the management innovation 
literature is geared toward ensuring fit between the product design and consumers’ 
needs. The wide range of consumer engagement strategies outlined in the literature 
address both the initial consumer research phase and the product development phase. 
 For the consumer research phase, the goal is to catalyze the proverbial “out of 
the box thinking” and to help managers and entrepreneurs become attuned to unmet 
needs of current product customers and to discover novel solutions. There are two 
main schools of thought on consumer research. One is based on the adage “the 
customer knows best” and is designed to enable consumers to articulate their own 
needs and wants. This school of thought is considered a tonic for what are viewed as 
“technology-driven” solutions that end up being flatly rejected by consumers. The 
methods under this category range from clinical questionnaires and focus groups that 
establish consumer preferences for different attributes (Shocker & Srinivasan, 1974) to 
approaches that emphasize the importance of building trust and deep, ongoing 
relationships with customers as a pre-requisite for eliciting valuable information (Hart 
& Sharma, 2004; Letelier, Flores, & Spinosa; Vandermerwe, 2004). The rise of the 
Internet has also made possible “crowd-sourcing,” and “mass innovation” techniques 
that use blogs and other web-based interfaces to enable extensive consumer dialogue 
and input (Leadbetter, 2008; Li & Benroff, 2008).  
The second school of thought is based on the opposite belief: consumers are 
the least able to identify and articulate the new forms of functionality that can lead to 
breakthrough products. Not only do they lack the technical knowledge about “what’s 
possible,” they are also often unaware of the routines and habits they have adopted 
around a product’s use. Their habits have become automatic and sub-conscious. 
Ulwick is among the most explicit about this limitation of a “customer-driven 
approach.” His outcome-driven innovation methodology is based on teams identifying 
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the functional and emotional jobs customers are trying to get done, the outcomes they 
are trying to achieve, and the constraints they face in using a new product (Ulwick, 
2005). The focus on the “jobs” customers are trying to get done is cut from the same 
cloth as Christensen and colleague’s prescription, which starts with the assumption 
that customers “hire products” to get jobs done (Christensen, Anthony, Berstell, & 
Nitterhouse, 2007; Christensen & Raynor, 2003a). Much of the design-based 
innovation methodologies, including empathic design (Leonard & Rayport, 1997 ) and 
IDEO’s deep-dive method (Kelley, 2004), reflect this second school of thought. They 
emphasize watching “users” (consumers of a product) in their “natural environment” 
in order to glean the culturally-conditioned behavior patterns associated with the 
product or certain activity sets (Whitney & Kelkar, 2004; Whitney & Kumar, 2003).  
At the product development phase, the innovation literature emphasizes 
ongoing consumer involvement during prototyping and testing (Kelley, 2004; 
Leonard, 1998; Leonard & Rayport, 1997 ).  Such iterative “co-creation” of the 
product with consumers (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003; Prahalad, 2004; Prahalad, 2006; 
Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004) is argued to help ensure that the concrete product 
continues to match-up with consumer needs and that desired price and performance is 
consistent with production constraints. This co-creation thinking is also reflected in 
what is called a “service dominant logic” of marketing. Service dominant logic 
advocates building long-term, interactive relationships between the firm and the 
customer in recognition that the product value experienced by the customer comes 
from the handiwork of both the firm and the customer (Vargo & Lusch, 2004). 
Partnerships with social-sector organizations such as schools are suggested as a low-
cost, low-risk way to get “real-life” feedback on beta-versions (Moss-Kanter, 1999). 
Von Hippel’s concept of “lead user innovation” presents a more nuanced argument 
and approach to the co-creation concept (Von Hippel, 2005) (Lilien, Morrison, Searls, 
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Sonnack, & Von Hippel, 2002; Von Hippel, 1986, 1994). Drawing on Roger’s concept 
of lead users (Rogers, 1983),  a sub-group of the population that is cognitively and 
behaviorally disposed to being the first adopters of new technologies, Von Hippel and 
colleagues’ approach tries to tap into the lead user’s tacit knowledge and propensity 
for experimentation by creating “kits” that allow lead users to make modifications and 
adaptations to a product platform.  
The marketing function takes over at the point of commercialization. As in 
Quadrant II, the role of marketing is to engage with consumers in a manner that builds 
awareness of and desire for the product. In Quadrant III, however, the marketing 
function is faced with building awareness and desire for an enhanced or specialized 
product within the product form. In other words, the issue of product positioning and 
differentiation become salient components of the messaging and awareness building 
strategies. The creation of positioning and communication strategies reflects the same 
two-schools of thought on consumer engagement as the innovation literature. One 
school emphasizes “getting into consumers’ minds” and then communicating out the 
unique product benefits in a manner that corresponds with salient behavioral, 
psychological, (e.g., psychographics), and perceptual/sensorial dimensions of the 
targeted consumers (Levitt, 1983; Lindstrom, 2005; Novotorova & Mazzocco, 2009; 
Ries & Trout, 2001). As Theodore Levitt has argued, “If marketing is seminally about 
anything, it is about achieving customer-getting distinction by differentiating what you 
do and how you operate…To differentiate an offering effectively requires knowing 
what drives and attracts customers” (Levitt, 1983).  
Another school of thought, reflected in the service dominant logic of marketing 
noted above, emphasizes building ongoing dialogue and experiential channels of 
engagement with and among consumers such that consumers themselves become 
“evangelists” (McConnell & Huba, 2003) and “ambassadors” of the product, thereby 
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creating what are argued to be more authentic, meaningful, and trusted 
communications (Deacon, Forrester, & Cole, 2003; Kelly, 2007; Lenderman, 2006; Li 
& Benroff, 2008; Rosen, 2009; Sernovitz, 2009). The latter approach reflects a 
theoretical perspective akin to social movement theory, in which activists and issue 
champions build legitimacy around an issue (which can involve a new product) by 
creating a new, shared meaning and issue frame (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 
Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Weber et al., 2008). 
 
Quadrant IV Market Creation 
Quadrant IV—the creation of a new means for non-consumers—is the kind of 
market creation equated with the suicide quadrant of the entrepreneurial opportunity 
matrix noted earlier and the kind of market creation I confronted in the field. Whereas 
Quadrant III is the site of break-through products, Quadrant IV can be thought of as 
break-out products. Quadrant IV innovation establishes an altogether new product 
form—from the television and the computer, to the specialty coffee store and T.V. 
dinner— that becomes an accepted part of daily life. This is the space associated with 
the iconic entrepreneurs such as Thomas Edison and Steve Jobs.  
Breakout products can be divided into two main types. First, there are those 
that establish a new, stand-alone product form. Second, there are new, complementary 
product forms that enhance the consumer value of another product form and whose 
functionality is mediated through that other product form. The Apple personal 
computer and the television are examples of stand-alone breakout products. Examples 
of complementary breakout products include Google’s search engine and Sony’s 
VCR, the former being a complementor to the personal computer and the latter a 
complementor to the television.  
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With Quadrant IV market creation, it is not possible to talk about impacts on 
the industry—there is no group of firms providing the targeted functionality. Rather, 
from an “industry-perspective,” Quadrant IV innovation creates an altogether new 
industry and a new consumer base. At best, one can consider spill-over impacts on 
alternative industries, which would include “products and services that have different 
functions and forms but the same purpose” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). For example, 
one could have speculated with the introduction of the television about its impact on 
the industries that deal with entertainment, such as movie theatres, theatre, and even 
books. One could also consider the television as a part of the news industry (maybe 
less so today) and consider its impact on newspapers. But the important point is that 
market creation in Quadrant IV is not premised initially on taking away customers 
from another firm (though it may do so); rather it establishes a new pool of economic 
activity that generates value for the innovating entrepreneur/firm, and opens a new 
potential growth and diversification opportunity for established firms able to envision 
potential synergies.  
From the consumers’ perspective, breakout products introduce a completely 
new functionality into people’s lives. New product forms—just as new kinds of tools 
expand the range of things a carpenter can build and create—provide consumers with 
the means by which to create a new consumer experience for themselves, to create a 
new consumer lifestyle. But, as noted earlier, that newness is a double-edged sword 
that requires the consumer to establish cognitive legitimacy for the product form, to 
learn the core and peripheral skills that come with product use and consumption, and 
to re-configure their existing consumption space to make room financially, temporally, 
and spatially for the new product form.  
Many of the management publications cited in Quadrant III will tip their hat to 
the idea of creating break-out products serving non-consumers (Ulwick, 2005), but 
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then focus the analysis and prescriptions on creating break-through products for 
existing consumers. The few management innovation approaches that do position 
themselves specifically as targeting Quadrant IV market creation—blue ocean strategy 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1999 2005), new market disruptive innovation (Christensen, 
1997; Christensen et al., 2001; Christensen & Raynor, 2003b), and Base of the 
Pyramid strategy (Hart, 2005, 2007; Hart & Christensen, 2002; Prahalad, 2004; 
Prahalad & Hart, 2002)—outline essentially the same set of prescriptions as those 
noted for the other three quadrants.  
Blue ocean strategy frames the core management challenge as one of 
management foresight and “seeing outside the industry box”—the methods (e.g., 
creating a strategy canvas) and prescriptions (e.g., price minus pricing, looking across 
alternative industries) that make up their “re-constructionist” strategic logic are 
designed to help managers break through the dominant logics regarding value creation 
in their industry. The consumer challenges go unmentioned. 
In The Innovator’s Solution, the key method prescribed by authors Christensen 
and Raynor is a circumstance-based segmentation that is, as the authors themselves 
acknowledge, essentially identical to Ulwick’s jobs-based innovation approach noted 
in Quadrant III. Circumstance-based segmentation aims to isolate an initial target 
customer “by carefully observing what people seem to be trying to achieve for 
themselves, and to then ask them about it” (Christensen & Raynor, 2003b). This 
segmentation is followed with “strategies of rapid deployment and fast feedback” with 
the aim of “converging quickly upon a job that people are trying to get done” 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003b). The latter echoes the calls from Quadrant III for rapid 
prototyping and co-creation of the product with consumers.  
And as I detailed in Chapter 1, the main prescriptions outlined in the strategic 
BOP literature are based on fitting the business offering to the local socio-cultural 
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context and physical infrastructure. They include deep consumer engagement and 
dialogue, co-creation in the design and product development process (Hart, 2005, 
2007; Prahalad, 2004; Prahalad & Hart, 2002), and partnerships with local SMEs and 
non-traditional partners to access new (local) capabilities (London & Hart, 2004; 
Seelos & Johanna, 2007). At the commercialization stage, a number of authors 
highlight the importance of consumer education to raise consumer awareness of the 
need.  
In summary, none of the management innovation analyses offer a theoretical 
explanation of what makes Quadrant IV market creation different from that of 
Quadrant III. At best, the solution is to “double-down” on consumer research and 
consumer engagement, the implicit assumption being that a match between consumer 
need and product functionality will take care of the demand side of the equation.  
Different streams of research in the entrepreneurship literature also take on the 
question of Quadrant IV market creation. The branch of entrepreneurship literature 
known as the creation approach to opportunity formation (Alvarez & Barney, 2006, 
2007; Sarasvathy, 2001a, b, 2003; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005) is one of those streams. 
The first question rhetorically posed in a seminal paper on the topic was the following: 
“How do we make the pricing decision when the firm does not yet exist (i.e., no 
revenue functions or cost functions are given) or, even more interesting, when the 
market for the product/service does not yet exist (i.e., there is no demand function)” 
(Sarasvathy, 2001a)? Presented with Quadrant’s IV condition of Knightian uncertainty 
(i.e., a condition of unknowability) this theoretical position argues that causal 
reasoning and probabilistic techniques—which include the kinds of market research, 
segmentation, and positioning approaches recommended by the three management 
innovation perspectives above—are ineffective (Sarasvathy, 2001a). Such causation-
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based processes are tailored for Quadrant III market creation, where there are existing 
demand and supply functions against which to benchmark.  
A creation approach (or “effectual” approach, as Sarasvathy terms it 
(Sarasvathy, 2001a)) prescribes an enactment-based approach, in which entrepreneurs 
marshal available resources by establishing partnerships and securing stakeholder 
commitments based around a broad business aspiration, rather than trying to predict or 
deduce what the “right” offering should be. The new market space is created through 
the entrepreneur’s actions in dynamic interaction with the contingent commitments of 
stakeholders.  
Yet creation theory and the managerial prescriptions derived from it (e.g., 
affordable loss instead of expected returns, strategic alliances instead of competitive 
analysis, exploitation of contingencies instead of exploitation of preexisting 
knowledge) rests on a theoretical foundation concerning only the nature of the 
decision-making challenge confronted by the entrepreneur. It leaves un-addressed the 
equally important question of what consumers do when presented with an offering for 
which they too lack supply-side or demand-side benchmarks. By default, the consumer 
side of the equation is assumed to implicitly sort itself out, either validating or 
rejecting what the entrepreneur brings forth. The irony of this is that if the consumer 
side of the equation is acting in a rational (albeit culturally situated), value maximizing 
manner in this “sorting out” process, then the entrepreneur is in fact presented with a 
probabilistic decision-making condition—the demand-side function can be estimated 
through consumer research and rapid proto-typing with consumers. As such, the same 
customer research and product co-creation strategies outlined in Quadrant III would 
work for Quadrant IV.  
This blind spot or inconsistency in the creation and effectuation 
entrepreneurship literature is brought to the surface in a recently published extension 
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of effectual logic to the marketing function (Read, Dew, Sarasvathy, Song, & 
Wiltbank, 2009 ). In conditions of high uncertainty, the authors argue that the 
relational and co-creational actions that underpin an effectual decision-making process 
are more likely to be applied by expert marketers in establishing the marketing mix 
(i.e., product, price, place, promotion). The authors note that “by interacting with and 
‘listening in’ (Urban and Hauser 2004) to specific stakeholders, not only are 
companies in the initial stages of new market, product, and service development more 
likely to generate novel information, but the kind of information they generate is also 
more likely to be useful and valuable…Compared with traditional market research, 
this increases the likelihood of creating realistic new market opportunities because 
firms learn at every step what stakeholders will actually commit to and—just as 
important—what they will not commit to. This enables the firm to fail fast on poor 
product and service ideas and to bring good ideas to market sooner.”  
Here we see the consequences of the under-theorized consumer in the 
effectuation/creation framework. This excerpt explicitly argues that consumer 
engagement and co-creation do lead to more accurate information about what 
consumers really want. This brings us right back to the notion that markets are, in fact, 
latent and simply need to be uncovered or discovered, thereby undermining the very 
foundation on which effectuation sits. What seems to have been lost is that in an 
effectual world where there is no supply-side or demand-side function, product 
positioning—regardless if it is done through the traditional or through service logic of 
consumer dialogue—makes no more sense and provides no more value than 
developing a five-forces model of the industry. The concept of positioning—be it at 
the industry or consumer level—by definition is based on there being a probabilistic 
decision space. Absent a supply and a demand function, business development has to 
simultaneously address the condition of uncertainty faced by both producer and 
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consumer, thereby erasing the marketing function in its traditional manifestation as a 
positioning exercise.  
The evolutionary stream of research in entrepreneurship, a field that draws on 
both ecological and institutional theories, does occasionally bring to the surface the 
specific question of consumer cognitive legitimacy for a new product form (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994). However, organizational strategies to achieve cognitive legitimacy tend to 
lose their specificity and lump consumers together within a generic “stakeholder 
category” (Aldrich, 1999; Delmar & Shane, 2004; Shane, 2004). As a consequence, 
strategies for building cognitive legitimacy focus more on issue framing strategies, as 
per social movement theory, that aim to resonate with stakeholders and gain their 
support (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). But the personal-level learning processes by which 
consumers build cognitive legitimacy are not discussed. Because of this, the 
management implications from the evolutionary entrepreneurship would seem to lead 
one right back to same marketing positioning/communication strategies premised on 
segmentation. 
Research on Quadrant IV market creation undertaken from social movement 
theory perspective also speaks to the agency and importance of the consumer-side of 
the equation. Here too, the agency of consumers is directed toward the legitimacy and 
acceptance of the new product and its value (Burr, 2006; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; 
Rao, 2009; Sine & Hiatt, 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber et al., 2008) or, in some 
cases, its illegitimacy (Hiatt et al., 2009; Weber, Rao, & Thomas, 2009). The primary 
medium for generating legitimacy is discourse, with issue framing (Benford & Snow, 
2000; Snow et al., 1986) serving as the mechanism through which cultural codes are 
mobilized to build a collective meaning that legitimizes a new space of consumption. 
To be fair, social movement theory is not a firm-level strategy; rather it takes the 
social field as its unit of analysis. As a consequence of this level of analysis, 
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consumers are treated and represented as either a collective agent (The Consumer) 
(Burr, 2006) or as part of a broader stakeholder network (Sine & Lee, 2009; Weber et 
al., 2008). As such, the personal learning necessary to make sense of a new cultural 
code is imputed to have occurred.  
As with evolutionary entrepreneurship, in trying to bring the institutional social 
movement perspective with its emphasis on discourse-based collective meaning and 
shared frames down to a firm level strategy, the tendency is to move in the direction of 
a marketing positioning stance based on segmentation, communication and awareness 
building, and consumer education. As with the creation approach to entrepreneurship, 
this leads to an ironic outcome: the institutional economic and social movement 
literatures, as I read them, are premised on the social construction of markets and the 
notion that consumers (as much as entrepreneurs and companies) are powerful agents 
in the creation process. Yet, if there are indeed collective issue frames and codes 
whose resonance with the Consumer can be determined a priori and then used to 
mobilize them, the agency of the Consumer is fairly constrained. They become part of 
the “environmental givens” that managers simply need to understand; their agency is 
limited to one of potential “spoiler” in the event that managers get the framing wrong. 
Before concluding this synthesis of the market creation literature and turning 
attention to understanding the source of this theoretical gap, it is important I explain 
what may appear to be a significant omission from the analysis of Quadrant IV market 
creation strategies—the Crossing the Chasm strategy outlined by Geoffrey Moore 
(Moore, 1999). Moore’s chasm-crossing strategy, which is based on Rogers’ 
innovation diffusion model that segments a target population into five main categories 
(i.e., innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards) based on 
their amenability to new-product adoption, outlines a comprehensive methodology for 
commercializing what I’ve called “break-out” technologies. His method is based on 
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the assumption that each segment has a different risk-reward profile and that moving 
from the low-risk (innovators and early adopters) to high-risk (early and late majority) 
segments requires de-risking the product offering through a more comprehensive 
product offering (modeled on Levitt’s “whole product concept (Levitt, 1983)) and a 
communication strategy that builds confidence in the product’s reliability. But as 
Moore himself acknowledges, the chasm crossing strategy he outlines is based on a 
“business-to-business” (B2B) context—so selling new technologies to another 
company for use in its operational systems (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). 
Business-to-business market creation, I argue, presents an entirely different 
management challenge than a business-to-consumer effort. In a B2B context, buyers 
of a new technology are spending company funds, not their personal funds. Also, 
unlike end consumers, the criteria against which these technology buyers’ 
performances are evaluated is pre-established by the company and codified in a 
handful of performance targets and deliverables. Furthermore, the people who have to 
learn new routines and skills to utilize the new technologies are often not the buyers 
themselves (e.g., IT manager), but other employees in the company (e.g., sales force, 
shop floor managers, accounting office). Decision-making under such a context is a 
very different animal than when conducted by consumers paying out of their own 
pockets for a product that they themselves will have to value, master, and integrate 
into their personal lives and contexts. Chasm-crossing strategy has been omitted for 
this reason. 
 
The Missing Person of New Market Creation 
I began my introduction to the different schools of thought on markets with the 
quote, “If the entrepreneur is the forgotten man in mainstream economic theory, then 
the market is certainly the forgotten place.” As my analysis suggests, within the 
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strategic market creation literature, it appears that the individual consumer holds the 
dubious honor of having been forgotten. When consumers do appear in the literature, 
it is en masse as either a target segment reducible to an a priori shared psycho-
behavioral trait (e.g., Rogers’ visionary innovator segment) or need (e.g., the soccer 
mom mini-van segment), or as a unified Consumer body joined together by a shared 
thinking and set of norms as reflected by their use of a common product (e.g., the 
Patagonia yuppies). The idea of Consumer and its treatment in the literature is, 
arguably, a depersonalized one. Let me be clear, this is not meant as pejorative. I 
believe market creation efforts in Quadrants I, II, and III can succeed using this 
depersonalized Consumer logic because consumer learning can build on and 
benchmark off of existing consumer lifestyles established around a product form; in 
fact, it is arguably necessary from an efficiency standpoint. However, I believe it is the 
open-ended nature of consumer learning required in Quadrant IV—the site of breakout 
products—that depersonalized innovation strategies fail to address.  
Before moving on to Chapter 8 to discuss key parameters of a “personalized” 
innovation strategy for Quadrant IV, I want to outline theoretical reasons for the 
existence of this gap, as I believe the diagnosis and remedy are intertwined. To 
attribute this gap to “oversight” would be an oversight in and of itself. 
Entrepreneurship theory and strategic management theory have carved out a 
disciplinary space premised on the creative agency of the entrepreneur and the 
manager to counter-weight the structural determinism that underpinned early 
economic analyses of firm creation and performance. Why, then, does not this same 
creative agency reach down and out to individual consumers in theories of new market 
creation? Furthermore, as noted in my review, a momentum clearly exists around 
viewing and treating the consumer as an agent—a fact reflected in the frequency of the 
term co-creation in the innovation and marketing literature. But why does that 
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consumer only appear in aggregate and only as part of an abstract, collective voice, as 
in “Consumers want the product to be green” or “Consumers don’t like the term 
biotech.” I offer three inter-related arguments to explain this elision.  
First, there is what I would call the image of the “mindless consumer.” As 
Zukin and Maguire (Zukin & Maguire, 2004) note, the act and idea of consumption is 
often denigrated. Beginning with the 19th century critique of capitalism by Marx, 
consumption has been argued to be a means of manipulation of the masses (most 
notably by the Frankfurt School of philosophers such as Theodore Adorno), a path to 
cultural homogenization, personal escapism and social stratification, and a cause of 
environmental degradation (Storey, 1999). Today, the very concept of “the consumer” 
carries a pejorative connotation, as it is equated with a mindless kind of activity that 
requires no effort and no thought—consumers are couch potatoes, mall rats, 
automatons. Much today is written about consumer apathy and the need to make them 
more mindful. In this respect, one could argue that the lack of attention and focus on 
the personal consumer-learning dimension of Quadrant IV reflects the overarching 
societal view that 1) being a consumer doesn’t entail much personal effort or learning; 
and 2) that consumers are apathetic and will not adopt a product that requires learning. 
So the depersonalized Consumer logic we see in existing Quadrant IV market creation 
strategies is an extension of these broadly accepted social codes concerning 
consumption.   
 Second, and an argument that I briefly noted earlier, I believe today’s innovation 
strategies reflect what Karl Polanyi has termed a disembedded market logic25 (Polanyi, 
                                                
25 It is important to note that the concept of embeddedness associated with Karl Polanyi differs in 
important respects from that of sociologist Mark Granovetter, whose perspective has been taken up by 
management theorists. In The Great Transformation, Polanyi argues that the concept of “market” 
conceptually disembedded economy from society. In other words, “disembedded economy” was a 
representation of an ontological state. Granovetter’s work has approached the issue of embeddedness as 
an epistemological project, attempting to “prove” that the economy is shaped by and overlaps with the 
social. Ironically, in converting Polanyi’s ontological argument into an epistemological project, 
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1944), a way of theorizing, practicing, and intervening into “the economy” that arose 
in the late 19th century in conjunction with the industrial revolution and which is 
reflected in today’s dominant paradigm of innovation that I designate “structural 
innovation.” I have developed this idea in detail in recently published work based on 
my dissertation research (Simanis & Hart, 2009). In summary, Polanyi argued that the 
post 1850’s idea of economy known as the “market economy” was conceptually 
disembedded from other societal objectives and functions, creating the idea of a stand-
alone space consisting of consumers and their needs awaiting fulfillment by producers. 
This shift made possible and was further reinforced by the movement to adopt closed-
system principles of physics into the field of economy, thereby giving birth such 
economic concepts as equilibrium and elasticity, and supply and demand.  
 The critical implication of this disembedded market to the current discussion is 
that, in the language of cultural theory, it “reified” the idea of consumer, thereby 
giving it an existence of its own apart from the person. This consumer existence was 
dominated by the logic of functionalism—the point of consumption, in other words, 
was to satisfy material needs. Agency of the consumer subject was bounded within the 
space of satisfaction of needs and wants. As I noted, prior to this conceptual shift, 
“humans-as-consumers did not exists as a stand-alone identity or category of thought” 
(Simanis & Hart, 2009). Today, management and innovation practices implicitly 
reflect and continue to reproduce this stand-alone, value-maximizing Consumer 
through a structural paradigm of innovation. This paradigm consists of a belief that 
consumers have a perpetual stock of latent needs and wants awaiting a solution; that 
value is experienced and derived by the consumer through consumption of the 
product; and that the purpose of stakeholder engagement is to enable companies to 
                                                                                                                                       
Granovetter reaffirms the ontological separation of economy and society as separately identifiable, 
albeit overlapping, domains and constructs (see: Krippner, G. R., & Alvarez, A. S. 2007. Embeddedness 
and the Intellectual Projects of Economic Sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 33: 219-240.) 
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acquire the necessary knowledge and resources to bring “better, faster, cheaper” 
solutions to consumers (Simanis & Hart, 2009). 
 The emergence of many of the dialogue-based and co-creational approaches 
over the past decade, as well as the design-based methods that treat the Consumer as 
part of a cultural system, are clear efforts to try and re-embed the consumer 
(Granovetter, 1985). Paradoxically, these efforts to re-embed the consumer by 
considering additional factors that influence consumption inadvertently validate and 
keep alive the idea of the Consumer itself.  In other words, those approaches have 
added additional consumer research variables to the segmentation mix and broadened 
positioning strategies to including emotional and social as well as physical needs. But 
they have not pulled the field away from targeting and thinking about consumption as 
a separate space and separate human function governed by systemic regularities in 
behavior and thought. Consumer co-creation and consumer dialogue have simply 
intensified established innovation practice and marketing by harnessing this particular 
consumer agency; it has not changed the idea of consumption from this functionalist 
rendering. As such, the failure to integrate personal-level dynamics in Quadrant IV 
market creation strategies can be read as the continued influence of a structural 
innovation paradigm on management theory and practice. 
Third and related to the arguments above is the underlying idea of personhood 
embodied in the functionalist view of consumption and, more broadly, in the post-
enlightenment historical period. As neurobiologist Marco Iacoboni notes, Descarte’s 
cogito, ergo sum—I think therefore I am—defines the dominant Western 
understanding about the mind as an independent process and construct that establishes 
the basis of human free will. A person and the self is defined by the “solitary, private, 
individual act of thinking” (Iacoboni, 2008).  A person’s existence is influenced by, 
but not dependent on or derived from, other people, other things, and other ideas. 
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Rather, thought guides a person’s behaviors to use objects in the external environment 
and to reflect and execute wants and desires; they are inputs and resources through 
which a person makes meaning.  
This view leads to what anthropologist Daniel Miller calls a “depth 
ontology”—the belief that “a persons’ being—what they truly are—is located deep 
inside ourselves and is in direct opposition to the surface” (Miller, 2010). Together, 
these demarcate the two dualities that bracket Western thought: mind-body, and 
subject-object. The material point is that when one looks at a consumer from this 
perspective of personhood, the natural thing to do at the innovation stage is to first and 
foremost double-down on consumer research to truly understand what consumer’s 
want and need. Once that product has been created in the vision of the Consumer, 
commercializing it is a matter of speaking to Consumer’s cognition:  It doesn’t matter 
if it is a never-before-seen product or one as mundane as sliced bread—the goal is to 
get through to the consumer’s mind, and the consumer’s mind should take care of the 
rest (i.e., the behavior changes leading to purchase and use of the product). In 
summary, the default tendency in Quadrant IV market creation strategies to simply 
intensify the same cognitive-based consumer practices as used in Quadrants II and III 
is consistent with the dominant idea of personhood that exists today.  
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to delineate the unique managerial challenge 
posed by market creation for a new product form and to highlight and synthesize the 
theoretical and practical gaps in the management literature. My goal in the next and 
final chapter is to take an initial step toward addressing this gap by outlining the 
boundaries of a “market creation mix” and a broad strategic innovation process 
designed to bring about the necessary personal-level consumer learning.  




THEORY DEVELOPMENT II:  
TOWARD A MARKET CREATION STRATEGY 
 
To summarize where we are, I’ve argued that an effective strategy for creating 
a new market around an altogether new product form must take into account the 
condition of uncertainty faced by both the firm/entrepreneur and the consumer: the 
entrepreneur’s uncertainty in the creation and commercialization of a product without 
production benchmarks (e.g., supply-side and demand-side), and the consumer’s 
uncertainty in valuing and integrating a product that has no consumption benchmarks 
(e.g., personal-level and societal level).  
Current management innovation strategies for new product form market 
creation—including blue ocean strategy, new market disruptive innovation, and BOP 
strategy—are all production focused. Theoretically, they implicitly assume the 
existence of a latent market. Their prescriptions, as a consequence, are mainly 
intensifications of the same practices and approaches (i.e., management foresight, 
deep customer engagement) used for product innovation within an existing product 
form (i.e., Quadrant III of the typology). Effectuation and creation-based 
entrepreneurship theory, though they detail appropriate entrepreneurial logics and 
practices for managing the entrepreneur’s uncertainty, leave un-theorized and un-
addressed the issue of consumer uncertainty. I suggested that the omission of the 
consumer element was not an oversight, but a consequence of 1) a widespread societal 
sense that consumption is a mindless activity; 2) an innovation paradigm that treats the 
Consumer and his/her consumption needs as a standalone space; and 3) a dominant 
sense of personhood based on mind/body and subject/object dualities. 
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The goal of this chapter is to engage in greater depth the consumer side of the 
equation. I will start by considering the role and place of products in people’s lives, an 
analysis that will provide alternative perspectives—rebuttals if you will—to the three 
factors noted above that I believe are behind this consumer blind spot. I will then use 
that as a basis to frame out what it means to create a new consumer-product lifestyle, 
employing a theory base (i.e., performance theory) derived from the post-structuralist 
philosophy I introduced at the beginning of this dissertation. Lastly, I will consider the 
implications of these issues on both the content and process dimensions of a market 
creation strategy. As part of this analysis, I will introduce two theoretically-grounded 
management frameworks—a “Market Creation Mix” for the content dimension and 
“Performance Innovation” for the process dimension—that respond to the unique 
demand- side challenges of new market creation. For simplicity sake, for the 
remainder of this chapter I will use the term “market creation” to refer to the specific 
case of market creation for a new product form (Quadrant IV). 
 
People and Products 
As I suggested in my review of market creation strategies, there exists a 
functionalist assumption about people’s relationships to products. In other words, 
people use products in a conscious, deliberate manner to achieve ends and meet 
needs—so a milkshake is hired to fulfill the job of a providing a refreshing, mess-free 
breakfast that can be consumed in the car on the way to work (Christensen et al., 
2007). The ends and needs can go beyond basic utility, to include emotional and social 
functions. As Ulwick noted, “when purchasing an automobile, for example, a woman 
may want to be able to transport children from one location to another (functional job), 
but she may also want to feel successful (a personal job) and be perceived as attractive 
by others (social job)” (Ulwick, 2005). This functionalist assumption, I argued, is a 
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hang-over effect of what I term a “structural innovation paradigm,” which relegates 
consumption to a stand-alone category of human activity, together with a Cartesian 
logic of personhood that places cognition and mental processes as the locus of action 
and agency (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997; Thompson, Locander, & H., 1989).  
A far richer, more complex picture of the relationship between people and 
products has been proposed. Material culture studies and consumer culture theory are 
two research streams that have contributed to this more expansive view. In Evocative 
Objects, anthropologist Sherry Turkle explores how objects ranging from a 1964 Ford 
Falcon, a glucometer, to a silver Navajo bracelet act as “companions in life 
experience:” we think with and through objects, we feel through and because of 
objects (Turkle, 2007).  The act of writing with a pencil in your hand reshapes ideas 
and creates new ones, rather than simply reflecting out what is sitting in one’s head 
(Clark, 2008). 
Daniel Miller’s ethnographic accounts of people who live in the same block of 
South London similarly bring forth how relationships to objects—from McDonald 
Happy Meals to Ikea furniture to Christmas tree ornaments—are the means by which 
people create and express relationships with children, parents, friends, and family 
(Miller, 2008). Relationships, Miller notes, “flow constantly between persons and 
things.” The devotion to things and their accumulation is often inseparable from a 
devotion to persons. 
In a related vein, products and things also are how people establish their sense 
of self—their identities (Fournier, 1998; Thompson & Haytko, 1997; Walker, 2008). 
This can be understood at several levels. On one level, products are experienced as 
representations of oneself—people associate with their car, their home, their choice of 
beer, and surround themselves with objects that contribute to their image of 
themselves (Belk, 1988, 1989; Thompson & Hirschman, 1995). On a second level, 
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objects are experienced as literal extensions of oneself. So the loss of one’s home or a 
pet creates the same sense of loss and grieving as losing a limb (Belk, 1988). On a 
third level, products and material objects can be said to actually make a person. 
Miller’s ethnographic account of Indian women and their relationship to the traditional 
garb called a sari demonstrates this. As Miller describes of the learning process by 
which a woman “inhabits” a sari, “She must learn to move, drape, sit, fold, pleat and 
swirl the sari in an appropriate way…She can hardly sleep because she is so afraid that 
loss of consciousness will lead to her head or knees being uncovered, and as a result 
she feels stifled in the summer nights. For one woman her worry about the sari falling 
off leads her to tie her petticoat string so tightly that later on the doctor is convinced 
she will harm the baby now growing inside her” (Miller, 2010). The sari and the 
experiences it entails is part of what makes up the very idea and experience of being a 
woman in India.  
The concept of “embodiment” is central to many of these perspectives on the 
relationship between people and objects. On one level, embodiment—of emotion 
(Turkle, 2007), attitudes (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 
2005), imagination (Joy & Sherry, 2003), action (Farnell, 1999), memory (Belk, 
1988), and thought (Lock, 1993)—refers to the idea that the physical body in dynamic 
contact with objects and the external environment is a critical actor in cognitive (e.g., 
information processing) and emotional processes, rather than an empty vessel that 
simply responds to brain commands or relays information. The smell and feel of a coat 
triggers memories of a grandfather; music is played to fire-up a person and team 
before a big game; we go for a run to help think through an issue. 
On another level, embodiment refers to what sociologist Bourdieu calls 
“history turned to nature” or what Foucault calls a disciplining of the body (Foucault, 
1979 (1975))—the process by which people are shaped, figuratively and literally, by 
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cultural practices and the material objects they involve. Bourdieu’s term for this 
embodiment, the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977 (1972)), (a concept he extended from the 
work of Mauss (Mauss, 1979)) can be thought of as habits of thought, behavior, taste, 
and desire that people have internalized and learned through practice and daily 
routines linked to material objects. Just like the constant repetition of playing a sport 
changes a person’s body and turns them into a “basketball player” or a “football 
player,” so too are people molded through the performance of social routines. 
Growing up in a Trinidadian slum will leave one “marked” with a different aesthetic 
as to physical beauty and, therefore, a different relationship to clothing than someone 
growing up in rural Idaho (Miller, 2010). Retrieving water on a daily basis from a 
rural bore-hole and carrying the water back on one’s head, as women in India and 
elsewhere are apt to do, leave its imprint on the shape of a woman’s body and the very 
idea of womanhood. 
It is worth noting that while these shifts relating to personhood were driven by 
changes in the philosophical landscape—most notably by the arrival of 
phenomenology, post-structuralism, and feminist theory—recent discoveries and 
insights from neurobiology move the biological understanding of personhood in a 
similar direction (Connolly, 2002; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch). Specifically, the 
discovery of the mirror neuron system—premotor neurons that fire at the sight of other 
people doing and experiencing things, thereby allowing the viewer to share in the 
experience of another—has established a biological basis for this embodiment, as 
one’s “personal” emotions and feelings are, in fact, physiologically altered by those of 
others (Iacoboni, 2008; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006). These same neuron systems 
contribute toward explaining the often-noted chameleon effect (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999) and contagion effect (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) recognized in the 
social-psychological literature.  
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The important point is that the various forms of embodiment discussed in the 
literature “collapse the difference between subjective and objective, cognition and 
emotion, or mind and body” (Reischer & K., 2004; Van Wolputte, 2004). Products, 
from this angle, are part and parcel to being human, to living a life. They are part of 
the backdrop that conditions and structures how we think and feel and move; they are 
also part of the foreground that we pick up, manipulate, and mash-up in conjunction 
with other products and objects to create patterns of relationships with the people and 
environment around us. Consumption, through this lens, is not only a deeply mindful 
activity (in an embodied sense), but also an act of creation and a practice of 
interdependence.  
 
Product Use as Performance 
 The view of consumption as an embodied action is consistent with the core 
theoretical foundation of performance theory. Performance theory in its most general 
application treats human expression and communication, verbal and otherwise, as an 
embodied and contextualized social event that both draws on and transforms existing 
discourses and norms as they are used. Every performance event is an act of 
contextualization—it is both a creative act by the performer, but one that is dependent 
on pre-scripted elements given by social norms and forces (Bauman & Brigs, 1990). 
Furthermore, the meaning of every performance is not captured in the linguistic 
structure of words or in the dictionary-definition of those words, but emerges through 
the dynamic interaction of a person—as embodied agent—in a social interaction 
(Bauman & Brigs, 1990; Beeman, 1993).  
To “perform a product,” then, a person—much like the entrepreneur of 
creation theory—starts with a set of given resources and boundaries and then enacts 
the product meaning or consumer value. Value, in other words, doesn’t reside in the 
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product, but emerges from the particular pattern of relationships within which the 
product use occurs in that particular moment in time. Parking one’s new Mercedes on 
the curb for all to see is one kind of product performance that is set on a particular 
performance stage and which generates a particular kind of value; driving the same 
Mercedes along Highway 101 on a romantic get-away entails an entirely different 
performance stage, thereby affording a different form of consumer value. In 
performance theory terms, the person has decontextualized an element of the first 
performance—namely the car—and recontextualized (Bauman & Brigs, 1990) it in 
another performance. So just as creation theory’s entrepreneur can create an infinite 
number of businesses from the same starting point, so too can the same person create a 
diversity of consumer performances with the product.  
Thus, from a performance perspective, to say that a consumer lifestyle has 
been created around a product does not mean that a consumer has cut and pasted a 
product and it’s functionality into their environment. Rather, it means that a consumer 
possesses a performance capability around the product. That capability consists of 
both an embodied set of performance repertoires around the product and a capacity for 
contextualizing and recontextualizing the product. To use the language of 
organizational theory, a consumer product lifestyle is a person-level capacity for 
product exploitation (as reflected in a set of performance repertoires) and for product 
exploration (as reflected in the capacity to recontextualize the product) (March, 1991).  
A related theoretical implication that arises from the application of a 
performance theory lens to product consumption concerns the very status of what a 
“consumer market” is. Performance theory, which draws part of its intellectual 
foundation from post-structuralism which I discussed in the Introduction, would treat 
the concept of a “consumer market” as a kind of effect—an effect that creates the 
appearance of a common consumer experience in which a core set of functionality 
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inherent in the product matches up with common consumer needs and wants.26 This 
bears emphasizing: the general understanding among people that they have a clear 
need/want that requires resolution by a certain product form—basic parameters of our 
“market” definitions in the preceding chapter—is an effect that emerges once a 
dominant product discourse is established.  
A seemingly unified market emerges once a consumer lifestyle around the 
product has already been established, and both a wide range of product performance 
routines and a capability for product recontextualization exist within a target 
population. The ubiquity of the product’s presence and the performance routines turns 
the performance into a reflexive act, and the product’s value and necessity 
unquestioned.  They have become so much a part of a person’s habitus that the 
experience of value shifts into a subconscious level, thereby crowding out any other 
way of thinking about the product, its use, and the value it provides.  
Understanding consumption as an embodied consumer performance, therefore, 
crystallizes the challenge posed by new market creation and highlights the significant 
gaps in current new market innovation strategies. It highlights that in the absence of a 
dominant product discourse and already embodied product performance routines, the 
consumer need/product functionality couplet and the related product 
functionality/consumer outcome couplet are the wrong units of analysis. Innovation 
and marketing approaches that focus on these elements disembed and attempt to fix 
the value of the product outside of the contingencies of the contextualization process 
that underpins a consumer product performance. In Bourdieu’s terminology, these 
approaches “objectify” the performance and treat it as if it were a static, mechanical 
                                                
26 This characterization of a consumer market as a discursive effect is consistent with the performative 
view of markets and economics. Examples include: Callon, M. (2002) “Technology, Politics, and the 
Market: An Interview with Michel Callon,” Economic Sociology, 31: p 285-306 and MacKenzie, D. 
(2004) “The Big Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash, and the 
Performativity of Economics,” Economic Sociology, 33: p. 303-334. 
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process, rather than a contingent, embodied practice (Bourdieu, 1977 (1972)). Or as 
Thompson would argue, they confuse consumer behavior with consumer experience 
(Thompson et al., 1989). 
With new market creation, the appropriate unit of analysis is the product 
performance. As the pre-ceding discussion suggests, the unique demand-side 
challenge of new market creation is one of building people’s capability for 
contextualizing and re-contextualizing a product so as to enable a wide-range of 
product performances to emerge. Acquiring this capability allows a person to become 
a consumer of the product. Key to understanding this capability is the recognition that 
product performances are a form of embodied action, not cognitively driven behaviors 
that can be triggered through education and awareness building (Thompson et al., 
1989). The final section will begin to sketch out the contours of such a strategy.  
 
Toward a Market Creation Strategy 
Before addressing the theoretical structure for a market creation strategy, I 
want to take a moment to re-count an experience from my work in India with Solae, as 
it helps provide some concreteness to the strategic direction I outline. The reader will 
recall how in Nairobi, the launch of the Community Cleaning Services business was 
met with zero consumer demand, despite what seemed to be a very needed offering 
and the close engagement of community members in the process. On the heels of that, 
I had brought the insights of creation theory into the process and project framing in 
India, as the idea of “business enactment” provided a valuable language and 
framework for evolving the business concept into a full business model. But the way 
forward still seemed incomplete, as it provided no theoretical or practical basis for 
addressing the demand side of the equation. The proverbial “other shoe dropped” in 
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Phase II of the India project as we worked with the community business team to 
ensure alignment on the business concept following the three-month hiatus. 
One of the key elements of the Solae business concept was an in-home healthy 
cooking coaching service that would help families integrate soy protein into daily 
foods. It was critical, we believed, for the community team to understand the soy 
protein intimately in order to be effective cooking coaches. The recently-hired field 
lead was trained in popular education, a form of adult education (usually for people 
who are illiterate) pioneered by educators Paolo Freire and Myles Horton (Pyles, 
2009). The goal of popular education is to engage people in such a manner that they 
“take ownership” of concepts and infuse them with a meaning grounded in their daily 
lives and reality. In order to get the community business partners to appreciate and 
create their own understanding of Solae’s soy protein product, we instituted extensive 
action learning activities. After receiving basic information about the soy protein, each 
of the community business partners was given 100 grams of the protein per week with 
which to experiment at home for family meals. In addition to this at-home 
experimentation, the business partners cooked together in shifts on a daily basis from a 
recipe list that they themselves created. Every day, the business partners debriefed on 
what they cooked and what they noticed and/or learned. The degree of 
experimentation was surprising: soy protein was being put into every kind of dish they 
could conceive. One of the women succeeded in incorporating the soy protein into 
home-made yogurt (a staple food in India), something that Solae’s own food 
technicians had not been able to master (soy protein becomes clumpy in high acidity 
foods like yogurt).  
What was interesting to note is how, after just several weeks, the community 
business team had acquired extensive personal associations with and anecdotes about 
the soy protein. A husband of one team member, for example, would only eat 
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breakfast upma (a kind of porridge) if it contained the soy protein because of the 
superior taste. There was also a vocabulary and set of concepts tagged to the protein. 
For example, the raw protein was referred to as “the powder,” chapattis made with soy 
protein had a “silky” and “smooth” texture, puddings and milk were made “thick,” 
they talked of “higher energy levels;” “grams” and “serving size” became units of 
measurement. And their cooking habits and sensibilities had shifted to accommodate 
the protein: they became very attuned to food temperature and acidity (elements that 
impacted the soy protein’s performance); traditional recipes (such as yogurt) were 
altered. And a variety of objects revolved around the soy protein: some took the 
protein powder out of the bag in which it was provided and kept it in a saved container 
alongside spices; a particular spoon served as a measure in the home; an electronic 
scale in the office measured out the protein.  
Based on the results witnessed, we decided to extend the business team’s 
action learning to include the broader community. For example, the first such series of 
events were dubbed “neighbor cookery days,” as it entailed the community team 
reaching out to friends they considered expert cooks. These local gurus, as they were 
called, were explained the business concept that the team was creating and the need 
for the business team to acquire excellent cooking skills; as such they asked the friend, 
who she considered to be a role-model, if he/she would share the personal skills and 
secrets that made him/her such an excellent cook and to cook his/her specialty dish 
together while integrating Solae’s soy protein. The dish was cooked in the friend’s 
own home, using her utensils (the business team member paid for the ingredients); the 
recipe was recorded and compiled into a cookbook (which was to be part of the 
cooking consulting offering). Afterwards, an organized tasting session was held that 
brought together the neighbor’s family and friends and community leaders—some 80 
people at a time. The gurus themselves explained the dish to the guests. The event 
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itself was held on a rooftop where a rooftop garden was simulated, as a rooftop garden 
was among the elements of the business concept.  
After approximately three months of conducting these and other such 
community engagement events—all of which involved having people in the 
community come together to share their knowledge and help the community business 
team while cooking with the soy protein in their own homes—the community team 
began receiving daily requests to sell the soy protein (the business had yet to be 
launched formally). The difference in consumer demand between Kenya and India 
was astounding—and if anything, the “need” for soy protein was far less obvious than 
the need for the home cleaning service.  
Even in this retrospective account one can see that the community business 
team members and the broader community persons involved in the events were 
developing a performance capability around the soy protein—they were enacting 
several distinct performance routines (e.g., cooking different dishes in their home 
environment, cooking collectively at the office) and, through that process, were 
acquiring the capacity to re-contextualize the product in other performances. In 
retrospect, this was a critical step in moving toward a market creation strategy and a 
significant shift from Kenya in which we engaged the broader community in the 
traditional process of providing feedback on prototypes of the offering (e.g., entering 
into people’s homes to clean and treat for insects and asking them what they liked or 
didn’t like, how much they would pay, etc).  
There are two over-arching insights for a market creation strategy that I want 
to extract from this example. First, the process of creating an initial embodied 
performance routine around an altogether new product form is best viewed as a 
process of enacted sensemaking (Daft & Weick, 1984; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; 
Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Weick, 1979, 1988, 1996). Sensemaking is “a motivated, 
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continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people, places, and 
events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein, Moon, & 
Hoffman, 2006).  The term enactment emphasizes that “when people act, they bring 
events and structures into existence and set them in motion” (Weick, 1988).  Because 
the new product form is not part of any existing patterns of relationships with people, 
concepts, emotions, habits, routines, or other objects, there are no benchmarks or cues 
from which to initiate a performance. The new product form, as discussed above, 
holds no inherent, a priori meaning because it has not been implicated in a product 
discourse—rather, meaning or value can only emerge out of a product performance. 
This is consistent with the creation and effectuation theories’ characterization of the 
entrepreneurial decision making process. To create that initial performance so that 
meaning and value can be experienced, a person has to assemble, in a bricolage 
fashion (Baker & Nelson, 2005), an initial set of inter-connections and patterns of 
relationships.  
Second, the ability to recontextualize a product form within another 
performance routine does not spring automatically from having created an initial 
product performance. While related, it presents a unique challenge and requires a 
unique capacity. As noted earlier, before recontextualization can occur, some portion 
of the initial performance—in performance theory terms, a piece of “text” out of a 
larger script—has to be “rendered extractable” and “lifted out of its interactional 
setting” (Bauman & Brigs, 1990). This process of entextualization or decentering, 
however, will likely “incorporate aspects of context, such that the resultant text carries 
elements of its history of use within it” (Bauman & Brigs, 1990). Translating this into 
a product use situation, the implication is that the product alone is not what is 
“extracted” and recontextualized; rather, it is the product coupled with a subset of the 
product performance that is extracted. For example, when the community business 
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team members recontextualized their performance of the soy protein in the home of a 
guru, they likely brought with them not only the soy protein, but also a set of cooking 
habits and skills and an emotional commitment to the protein based on anecdotes and 
experiences with family and co-workers. Recontextualization, because of its 
contingent and ambiguous nature, is a form of tacit knowledge and skill (Winter, 
1987). Because tacit knowledge is difficult to codify and transmit, building a 
recontextualization capacity—much like constructing an initial performance—is best 
accomplished through hands-on, action learning (Polanyi, 1966). 
In a broad sense, then, a market creation strategy aims to jumpstart and 
facilitate the initial sense-making process around a product performance routine, as 
well as the additional hands-on learning required for subsequent recontextualization. 
Following, I will discuss implications of this on both the content and process 
dimensions of a market creation strategy. I will conclude with a discussion of the 
paradigmatic basis of this strategy.  
 
Strategy Content: The Market Creation Mix 
To help catalyze sense-making towards a product performance for an 
altogether new product form, the product offering needs to wrap the product within the 
wider range of elements that comprise a product performance—a Market Creation 
Mix, if you will. The goal is to seed an initial set of connections between the new 
product and a potential user’s context. The approach has grounding in complexity 
theory’s concept of autocatalysis, in which emergent properties (such as life) are more 
likely to occur as the diversity of molecules and their interconnections increase 
(Kauffman, 1995; Waldrop, 1992). In this case, the targeted emergent property is the 
consumer product performance.  
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To understand what kinds of elements need to be captured in a market creation 
mix, it is important to recall that a product performance is an embodied action. 
Embodied actions collapse the dualities of mind/body and subject/object (the two 
dualities that define modern, Cartesian logic), resulting in a complex pattern of 
relationships that weave together elements across all of these domains. These dualities, 
by extension, provide a means for organizing a market creation mix. Below I present a 
model derived from these two dualities. The mind/body duality is reflected in the 
FIGURE 9:  Market Creation Mix 
 
mental/physical axis; the subject/object duality is reflected in the personal/extra-
personal axis. Together, they delineate four kinds of “product props”—Codes, 
Customs, Cast, and Concretes—that can be mobilized in conjunction with the core 
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product in a performance routine. I draw from the Solae India soy protein case for 
examples of these product props. 
 “Codes” are intangible, conceptual props. They can be thought of as “buzz 
words” and conceptual categories that exist in a person’s social space and that can be 
linked to the product. Concepts like “powder,” “grams,” “high energy,” and “silky” 
that became tagged to the soy protein are examples of Codes. “Customs” are the 
bodily routines, habits, and behaviors that would be implicated in the use of the 
product. Examples of Customs include the practice of measuring the protein, assessing 
the food’s temperature, and joint/group cooking among neighbor housewives. “Cast” 
is another intangible, conceptual prop, though it consists specifically of different social 
roles and identities that can be connected to the product. Examples of a “Cast” include 
the identities of “cooking gurus,” “tasters,” and “husbands who prefer porridge with 
soy protein.” Concretes are the material artifacts with which the product interfaces. 
The plastic container used to store the soy protein among the spices and the dedicated 
protein-measuring spoon are examples of Concretes.  
Product props would be actively circulated around the product offering in all 
manner—in packaging, sampling, branding, messaging—so that all touch points with 
the customer and broader population base cement the association between the product 
and the props. Though they aren’t represented as part of the offering, props can even 
be included with a product, much like a measuring spoon is included in a container of 
GatorAid powder mix.    
Facilitating the sense-making process also requires addressing a second barrier: 
the absence of cognitive legitimacy around the new product form and the anxiety that 
is often experienced when a change in routines and cultural patterns is required. 
Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (Spinosa et al., 1997) argue that creating a sense of 
continuity with the past is necessary for bringing about change when it is occurring 
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outside of a top-down decree or imposition. They argue that for new practices to 
become important, they must feel familiar, rather than discontinuous with the past. 
“Continuity within change” is consistent with core tenets of community organizing 
theory as well, which recognizes that bringing new ideas and practices into a 
community causes anxiety, even fear. As community organizer Saul Alinsky argues, 
“People only understand things in terms of their experience, which means that you 
must get within their experience” (Alinsky, 1971). 
The props comprising the 4 Cs of Codes, Customs, Cast, and Concretes—
because they are sourced and drawn from the context of the targeted population—
contribute to establishing this continuity within change. To inject “continuity” into the 
core product offering, however, the core product should be augmented with “product 
anchors”—product add-ons that contain explicit links with the targeted population. 
Product anchors, unlike props, are part of the actual product offering and contribute to 
its functionality; they are viewed by the customer as part of what is being purchased. 
An example of a product anchor from the Solae case is the recipe book comprised of 
protein-fortified dishes developed by the gurus as part of the neighbor cookery day 
events. The recipe book, which identified the local cooking guru responsible for the 
recipe, was intended to be part of the set of products and services provided to 
housewives via the cooking coaching service. In theory, the effectiveness of the 
product anchor would increase with the granularity and specificity of the connection to 
the targeted population.  
The logic behind a market creation mix stands in direct contrast with the 
marketing concept of “whole product” (Levitt, 1983), a core element of Moore’s 
chasm-crossing strategy (Moore, 1999).  The idea of the whole product concept is that 
as one moves from early to late adopters, users require a progressively more complete 
functionality, as they are more risk adverse and less willing to invest “start-up” time in 
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its use. Therefore, by whole product, Levitt refers to the various elements that need to 
be in place for the core product’s functionality to be experienced with the least amount 
of effort on the part of the consumer. So Best Buy’s Geek Squad service—which will 
take the computer and monitor out of the box, plug them in and connect them up in a 
customer’s home, turn them on and run through the start-up menu—is an example of a 
whole product approach to a computer, as it makes the computer immediately usable 
for a consumer that otherwise has no experience or knowledge about using a 
computer.  
The market creation mix is not a whole product approach, as it does not 
attempt to provide more complete or more appropriate functionality. On the contrary, 
a market creation mix precisely avoids making assumptions as to what consumer value 
the product offers; rather, it aims to enable a “multiplicity” of value experiences by the 
consumer so as to allow for widespread product recontextualization. The web of 
product props, together with the product anchors, are designed to de-exoticize the new 
product form and to catalyze associations among the product and the context so as to 
established a sufficiently robust pattern of relationships as to make a range of product 
performances imaginable and realizable.  
 
Strategy Process: Performance Innovation  
The strategic innovation process for new market creation similarly needs to be 
structured to “get people to work on themselves” (Gibson-Graham, 2006) in order to 
trigger both the initial sensemaking process and, equally important, the next level of 
learning needed to develop and cement a new capacity for product recontextualization. 
As I discussed earlier, it is the latter which enables—by virtue of the product’s 
resulting ubiquity—the formation of a dominant product discourse that underpins the 
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growth of a mass market: the product and its value enter the realm of what philosopher 
Paul Rabinow calls a “social fact” (Rabinow, 1986a).  
As I’ve conveyed through my discussion of embodiment and performance, 
cementing the embodiment that both enables and constitutes a consumer performance 
routine and capability for recontextualization takes real work on the part of the would-
be consumer. The well-known difficulty of holding steady to one’s New Year’s diet 
and exercise resolutions brings this observation down to earth—performing an 
exercise routine for a month is one thing, making it an ingrained part of the self is 
another. And a sustainable business and market requires repeat customers and product 
users.  
Creating and sustaining commitment within the targeted population base, then, 
represents one of the defining demand-side challenges that a new market creation 
strategy must address. The Performance Innovation framework below outlines a 
theoretically-grounded approach to enabling this embodied commitment to a product 
performance routine within an initial target population. The framework consists of 
three activity platforms for engaging the target population that I’ve designated as 
Make, Model, and Marry. These activity platforms are centered around the 
establishment and growth of a “Performance Community,” a kind of community of 
practice (Brown & Duguid, 2000; Lave & Wenger, 1990) in which the shared practice 
in question is the use of the new product form. 
The “community of practice” concept, which brings into the field of learning 
the same underlying idea of embodied action as contained in performance theory, is 
premised on the idea that “learning to be” something—whether that something is an 
occupational position such as a teacher or lawyer, a hobbyist such as a cyclist or 
musician, a social role such as a husband or father, or a cultural identity such as a 
citizen of the US or Mexico—isn’t a question of information acquisition; rather it is a 
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process of enculturation that “requires developing the disposition, demeanor, and 
outlook of the practitioners” (Brown & Duguid, 2000). Practices, in this view, are 
forms of “situated knowledges” (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Brown & Duguid, 
2000; Cobb & Bowers, 1999; Haraway, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1990) that become 
embodied and acquire their meaning through what Lave and Wenger label “legitimate 
peripheral participation”—a largely unconscious, apprenticeship-like process that 
occurs by engaging with (from the inside) the “activities, identities, artifacts, and 
communities of knowledge” that make possible the practice (Lave & Wenger, 1990). 
 
FIGURE 10:  Performance Innovation 
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I should note that in my Performance Innovation framework, I do not apply 
Lave and Wenger’s “community of practice” concept in a pure fashion, as their intent 
was to provide an analytical framework to understand what they viewed as an organic, 
largely subconscious process. In other words, Lave and Wenger did not intend the 
concept as a pedagogical strategy: Communities of practice don’t “teach” people. 
Furthermore, their focus was on how “newcomers” come to learn an existing practice 
and become part of an existing socio-cultural community; they did not consider how a 
new community of practice is created, the issue that lies at the heart of new market 
creation. As such, in my appropriation of the community of practice concept into a 
practice of Performance Innovation, I will bend Lave and Wenger’s analytical 
framework to suit a somewhat different objective, including one that has an explicit 
pedagogical intent.  
In the Performance Innovation process, the Performance Community serves as 
both means and ends. From a means standpoint, the Make, Model, and Marry activity 
platforms are all conducted as communal activities with a consistent group of people 
from a target population. Importantly, here I am using the term “community” in a 
geographical/spatial sense, as a group of people that interact continually with one 
another at a physical, material level within a set of shared activities. The community, 
in this case, is constituted by virtue of what Gibson-Graham, drawing on the work of 
Luc Nancy, label “being in common” (Gibson-Graham, 2006). In other words, the 
shared quality among the members of the community is not an underlying trait or 
characteristic or even a shared meaning of an experience; rather it is the act of 
simultaneous and ongoing participation in an event, thereby establishing the grounds 
for interdependence.  
The kind of learning enabled through communal activities is of particular value 
to establishing a product performance routine, as well as a capability for 
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recontextualization. First, people working together on a task “give rise synergistically 
to insights and solutions that would not come about” (Brown et al., 1989). Collective 
action can lead to wider range of ways of using a product that an individual would 
arrive at on his/her own. Second, group activities put on display for all participants the 
wide range of roles, skills, and micro-practices that often comprise a practice and 
which no single person may possess in their entirety (Brown et al., 1989). As Brown 
and Duguid’s suggest, “knowledge, traveling on the back of practice, (is) readily 
shared” (Brown & Duguid, 2000). So in cooking a meal together, one person may 
demonstrate novel knife techniques, another excellent sautéing skills, and a third 
excellent plating skills—seeing the “best-practices” within the group can strengthen 
each individual’s performance capability around the meal preparation. Group activities 
also allow for “reflective narratives” (Brown et al., 1989) and discussions to occur, 
which intensify the embodiment by creating associations and meaning rooted in 
personal experience (Brown et al., 1989; Brown, 2006; Sen, 2003). Similarly, neuro-
science suggests that watching a practice, combined with doing a practice intensifies 
the learning experience, as it utilizes both mirror (pre-motor) neurons and motor 
neurons (Iacoboni, 2008). 
The creation of a Performance Community around a new product form is also 
the end goal of the innovation process. Here, I am using the term community in the 
spirit of Benedict Anderson’s post-structuralist based concept of “imagined 
community” (Anderson, 1983), in which community consists of a sense of shared 
traits and qualities—a common being in Nancy’s terminology (Gibson-Graham, 2006). 
Importantly, that sense of commonness is a discursive effect that is created and 
recreated through performance of a dominant community discourse. This view of 
community is consistent with that of Lave and Wenger. A Performance Community, 
then, is a group of people whose repetition of a diverse set of product performance 
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routines normalizes the product performance (i.e., establishes cognitive and social 
legitimacy) and sets the stage for the emergence of a dominant product discourse. This 
Performance Community becomes the community of practice around a product into 
which others can be apprenticed and enculturated. They are the seed from which a 
mass market can be grown.   
The three activity platforms in the Performance Innovation framework—Make, 
Model, and Marry—describe different pathways or mechanisms by which an 
embodied commitment to a product performance is established within the 
Performance Community. Each activity platform contributes to one of three main 
elements that are noted by the literature to enable commitment: 1) a sense of 
ownership of and personal identification to the issue or need (Alinsky, 1971; 
Chambers, 1983, 1997; Simanis & Hart, 2009);  2) habituation of one’s physical and 
social body to the routines and patterns of relationships entailed with a practice 
(Brown et al., 1989; Gibson-Graham, 2006; Martin, 2008); and 3) close affiliation and 
identification with a group of people sharing the same pursuit (Gibson-Graham, 2006; 
Yunus, 1998).  
To reiterate, each of the activity platforms are conducted as communal 
activities with a consistent group of people from a target population. While I’ll present 
the three activity platforms as independent efforts, they can all three be combined 
within a single event or engagement. While not a perfect example, the neighbor 
cooking guru activity in India by the Solae team combined elements of almost all three 
platforms.  
 The Make platform involves activities undertaken with the Performance 
Community that utilize their personal knowledge and skills to generate an output that 
will make up the business in some fashion. The output can be part of the core product 
offering or a product anchor, or it can address some other aspect or element of the 
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business’s operations, such as a logo design or brand name. The important issue is that 
the output must reflect and signal overtly the personal “authorship” by the 
Performance community members for this element. It is by keeping this authorship 
publicly visible that a sense of ownership—even responsibility—for the product 
offering is instilled and sustained. In the neighbor cooking guru event in India, the 
guru’s specialty dishes (with soy protein added) were captured and recorded in a 
cooking book that became part of the cooking coaching offering.  
The Model platform consists of activities that are undertaken repeatedly so that 
participants engage in the kinds of routines, habits, and behaviors that are entailed 
with the product’s use. The important factor here is that the habits and behaviors that 
are being modeled are done so in a non-reflective manner and are simply embedded 
with an activity that has, on the surface, an independent objective (Gibson-Graham, 
2006). The goal is for the core actions and behaviors that will later be called upon in a 
product performance to feel natural and normalized, for them to have already “taken 
pleasurable hold” over the embodied self (Gibson-Graham, 2006) and have become 
“part of our cell memory that will increasingly assert itself without resorting to 
conscious calling” (Gibson-Graham, 2006). By normalizing the behaviors ahead of 
enacting a product performance, it reduces the scope of change and conscious, 
reflective learning that a person associates with adoption of the product—so learning a 
product performance feels like less work. It bears emphasizing that this is not about 
product testing or getting consumer feedback on a prototype, activities that do require 
conscious, reflective engagement. In the cooking guru activity, for example, the object 
of the exercise was for the guru to share her cooking skills and prowess; to do so, she 
was asked to prepare her specialty dish, though incorporating the soy protein. In the 
process of sharing her knowledge, the cooking guru also modeled the routines 
associated with soy protein cooking.  
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The Marry platform consists of activities and outputs that establish material 
and symbolic connections among the members of the Performance Community that 
promote and enable sustained interaction among themselves outside of the organized 
events. Facilitating relationships among the Performance Community that spill over 
into their broader lives and routines carries two objectives. One, it expands their 
personal investment into each other’s lives, thereby creating a web of support that 
helps ensure each one’s ongoing participation in the Performance Community. As 
Gibson-Graham note, “the individual needs nourishment and encouragement from 
without to sustain acts of self-cultivation” (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Two, it helps to 
further naturalize the product performance by blurring the boundaries between the 
organized activities around the business/new product offering and their other life’s 
work: the value, enjoyment, and meaning they experience through “outside” 
interactions flows into the organized group activities. For example, in the cooking 
guru activity in India, we brought the various gurus and their family members together 
to meet with one another during the tasting of the dishes. Bringing the extended 
families together likely helped kickstart closer relationships among the gurus and 
created spillover effects. A more powerful “Marry” output from that same event would 
have been the creation of an informal phone tree among the gurus to be used for the 
purpose of borrowing each other’s pans and cook stoves for a large family social event 
like a wedding or holiday gathering (a common practice in the slums, given the limited 
space in the homes for cooking and storing food.)  
Somewhat paradoxically, getting people to dedicate time and effort into these 
activities would be done by asking for their help, rather than by inducing them through 
compensation.  People would be recruited from the target population—much like the 
cooking gurus in the Solae India project—under the auspices that the business depends 
on their unique personal knowledge and expertise. Structuring the engagement in this 
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manner—as a personal call-to-help—automatically positions people in a position of 
responsibility to the business’s success and contributes to their sense of personal 
ownership and commitment. While there is a “sub-plot,” this appeal and the 
engagement must be genuine and authentic (Alinsky, 1971).  This also helps maintain 
the credibility and perceived independence of the Performance Community in the eyes 
of the broader target population.    
 
Market Creation Logic: Embedded Innovation Paradigm 
To conclude this chapter and discussion of market creation strategy, I will 
move up a level of analysis and summarize the implications of the preceding 
discussion in terms of an innovation paradigm. As I discussed in Chapter 7, I believe 
one of the causes of the blind spot that blots out the “person in the consumer” is the 
prevalence of a structural paradigm of innovation (Simanis & Hart, 2009). This 
structural innovation paradigm (SIP), which I argued was an outgrowth of a late 19th 
century phenomenon that Karl Polanyi described as the conceptual disembedding of 
the economic sphere from broader society (Polanyi, 1944), consists of three 
reinforcing beliefs: 1) the role of companies is to address the always present stock of 
latent consumer needs and wants; 2) products are vessels of value generated by the 
company’s operations, which is then released by the consumer through the act of 
consumption; 3) the goal of stakeholder engagement, including consumer engagement, 
is to acquire the necessary knowledge in order to increase the value contained in the 
company’s products. This paradigm plays itself out in a range of innovation 
strategies—from design based innovation, blue ocean strategy, BOP strategy, and new 
market disruption—that are all shaped by a functionalist logic of consumerism.  
In this and the preceding chapter, I have argued that SIP “breaks down” in the 
case of new market creation, as new product forms present targeted consumers with a 
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condition of uncertainty. Introducing an altogether new product form into the 
complex, interdependent patterns of relationships between people and products that 
sustain and are sustained by a person cannot be addressed through the causal logic of 
structural innovation strategies. The strategies I’ve outlined are grounded in the view 
that bringing a new product into a person’s life is an emergent, contingent process. It 
is my belief that these strategies contain the elements of a new paradigm of 
innovation, one that re-embeds Polanyi’s 19th century consumer subject back into the 
person. For this reason, I have named this an “embedded innovation paradigm” (EIP). 
As I have already elaborated on this paradigm in recently published work based on my 
dissertation research (Simanis & Hart, 2009), following I will provide a brief summary 
of its core premise and dimensions.  
Whereas the end-game of SIP is the creation of new and improved “customer 
solutions”—i.e., products and services that are better, faster, and cheaper—the end-
goal of EIP is a new community of practice based around a product. Creating a new 
community of practice entails—to re-introduce a term discussed in my Introduction—
a new subjectivity based around the consumption and use of a product. “Subjectivity,” 
again, is a culturally-normed and socially-recognized discourse regarding a social role 
or identity that a person enacts; it consists of a pattern of relationships among people, 
objects, ideas, concepts, emotions, practices, and habits of thought. We are constantly, 
at every moment, enacting a subjectivity of one sort or another. To put it plainly, EIP 
is about creating a consumer, not serving a consumer.  
New subjectivities, including new consumer subjectivities, function as a kind 
of power that a person can use to shape and mold one’s life in a new direction. It 
opens up new ways of looking at the world and new ways of inhabiting the world. 
Feminist historians, for example, have argued that the creation of the department store 
and the supermarket (and the related subjectivity of “woman shopper”) opened up a 
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space of independence from male supervision, thereby enabling women to “leave the 
domestic space of the home and lay claim to the center of the city” (Zukin & Maguire, 
2004). To be sure, creating new consumer subjectivity also entails a form of 
coercion—there is an effort to influence a person’s behavior, desires, and wants and to 
subject them to a way of living. That said, all interventions to create new 
subjectivities, not just consumer subjectivities, are at their foundations, efforts to 
shape and influence people and the world in which we all live—from negative subject 
positions like “dead beat dad” and “welfare queen,” to positive subjectivities like 
“career woman,” “social entrepreneur,” and “democratic citizen” (Cruikshank, 1999).  
It bears noting that I am not suggesting that EIP is ethically superior to SIP, 
nor inherently more sustainable than SIP—EIP simply aims to intervene into and 
change a different aspect of customers’ lives. The effects of those changes, just as with 
SIP, will be multiple and conflicting, with its “goodness” or “badness” subject to the 
same processes of negotiation and settlement that are called into play with assessment 
of other business outputs and impacts. 
EIP, as I have explained, consists of three main dimensions that stand in 
opposition to SIP. First, the role of a company is not to fulfill latent consumer demand, 
but to be a source of economic diversity by harnessing the latent potential within 
economies. Stirring the economic pot creates “an ever-expanding range of 
opportunities for people to participate in economies on terms meaningful to them” 
(Simanis & Hart, 2009). Second, in place of a view that value is contained within the 
product, EIP is based on the view that value emerges from the pattern or community of 
relationships that a person joins and mobilizes when using a product. As discussed 
above, using a new product entails joining a new community of practice; and joining 
new communities present “opportunities to learn and grow and experience;” they 
“offer new ways of life, new adventures” (Simanis & Hart, 2009). Third, with EIP, 
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stakeholder engagement is not a transactional process of knowledge and information 
acquisition, but a transformational act that aims to “create new stakeholder behavior, 
habits, and identities” (Simanis & Hart, 2009). Rather, EIP is first-and-foremost a 
personal change process grounded in what Connolly calls an “ethos of engagement,” 
in which “subjects are made anew through engaging with each other” (Connolly, 
1999; Gibson-Graham, 2006). 
Competitive advantage under EIP is based on what I have termed “business 
intimacy.” Business intimacy is a relational state in which the company as an 
institution has become an indispensable element in the pattern of relationships that 
comprise a consumer performance and the community of practice around a product. In 
other words, the community of practice around a product is inseparable from the 
existence of the company. While fans of the Baltimore Colts football franchise could 
still watch football games, the community of practice around the Baltimore Colts 
football team withered when the franchise moved to Indianapolis. Similarly, the 
closure of Harley-Davidson would result in the demise of the current community of 
practice established around the “hogs” that no other motorcycle could fill. Business 
intimacy is, therefore, not about brand trust or social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Burt, 1997; Portes, 1998); it is about cementing the identity of the company into a 
community of practice such that consumers end up self-policing their own behaviors 
and guarding the market from new entrants.   
The kind of competitive advantage characterized by business intimacy rests on 
a theory of power that, as I discussed in the Introduction, differs significantly from 
that which underpins traditional theories of competitive advantage. Traditionally, 
competitive advantage is based on a “juridical” concept of power in which its very 
possession enables a company to impose its will over another company: power is a 
negative force that disables another actor’s agency. The power on which business 
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intimacy rests is what post-structuralist theory calls “productive power”—power that 
operates by virtue of enabling someone to act and do something. Creating a new 
community of practice in which the company plays a constitutive role exerts power to 
the extent that it enables a performance that wants to be repeatedly enacted. 
From a strategic management perspective, competing against productive 
power is enormously difficult, as there is no target, no power to be rested away from a 
competitor. Much as Antonio Gramsci has argued that the best way to counter a 
dominant ideology is by establishing what he calls a counter-hegemonic ideology 
(Gramsci, 1971), competing against a community of practice in which one’s 
competitor is an integral actor is best done by creating an altogether new community 
of practice.   
While not perfect, an example that I’ve used from the Solae project to indicate 
the early presence of business intimacy involved the visit of a senior Solae executive 
to the rural project site in Parvathagiri Mandal, approximately seven months after we 
launched. With the twenty-plus women partners from the community seated on the 
floor, the Solae executive introduced himself to the women, concluding his opening 
words with the comment that Solae was pleased to be working with them. After the 
translation was completed, a surprising silence fell over the group. After a pause, one 
of the women spoke up: “We are pleased that you are able to join us, but...WE are 
Solae!” (Simanis et al., 2008a). The community of practice the women were creating 
around the soy protein was inseparable from Solae’s identity. 
In conclusion, I want to highlight what I see as the complementary nature of 
this embedded innovation paradigm with the creation theory of opportunity. Without 
question, I have been walking down a path that was illuminated for me by the creation 
theory literature of opportunity formation; my journey was simply undertaken from 
the opposite end of the path. Creation theory problematized the underlying ontological 
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assumption in the management and entrepreneurship literature concerning the “supply-
side” of the market equation, namely that opportunities have a priori existence of 
entrepreneurial actions. My critique has aimed to illuminate the ontological 
assumptions about the demand-side of the market equation, namely that consumer 
needs have a priori existence of an embodied product performance.  In this respect, 
my dissertation and the embedded innovation paradigm it has spawned have helped 
“fill out” creation theory, contributing, in the end, to what I hope are more robust 
business strategies for bringing to life the markets of tomorrow. 





The preceding two chapters have highlighted a gap in management theory and 
practice regarding market creation for new product forms. This gap, I argued, is a 
direct consequence of an entrenched functionalist-view of consumption together with 
a Cartesian treatment of the individual and his/her agency. Using the lens of 
performance theory, I have attempted to re-frame the concept of personhood and the 
act of product consumption so as to open up new avenues for management 
intervention for addressing the unique challenges faced by consumers presented with a 
new product form.  
My aim with this concluding chapter is to bring my dissertation full-circle by 
reflecting on my findings in relation to the two-part goal that animated my research: to 
enable corporations to profitably serve the world’s lowest income communities while 
contributing to their broader development. The analysis and discussion is also 
intended to illuminate areas of future research opportunities with respect to the Base of 
the Pyramid. I will first discuss the applicability and relevance of my general 
theoretical arguments regarding market creation summarized above to the specific 
context of the base of the pyramid. There is reason to suspect that the issue of market 
creation around new product forms is central to corporations’ ability to tap into the 
purported growth opportunity represented by this socio-economic segment. The 
market creation challenges confronted during the SC Johnson and Solae projects on 
which my theoretical findings are based represent, I conclude, the norm for corporate 
ventures rather than outliers. 
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Next, I will consider my research experiences in relation to the second half of 
my initial goal—the alleviation of poverty and advancement of a human development 
agenda. In an effort to drill down on the unique business challenges presented by new 
market creation, my re-counting of the initial creation and implementation of the BOP 
Protocol downplays this equally important global development agenda and the central 
role it played in giving shape and form to the business development efforts in Kenya 
and India. Importantly, the effort to bridge business and development goals through 
the BOP Protocol holds significant implications for the very viability and survival of 
the BOP concept within the corporate sector. The BOP concept today, I believe, has 
reached a critical juncture and is at risk of becoming a passing management fad and/or 
a philanthropic activity under the auspices of company’s corporate social 
responsibility departments.  
 
The Link Between Market Creation and the Base of the Pyramid 
The initial “hook” for companies with regards to the Base of the Pyramid 
concept was that the world’s lowest tier of income earners held the promise of a new 
source of significant revenue growth. The argument in support of this assertion was 
two-fold. One, while individually the people in this segment had low incomes, the 
sheer number of people falling within this socio-economic classification—some two-
thirds of the world’s population—represented upwards of a trillion dollars of 
purchasing power in the aggregate. A critical second line of reasoning held that these 
official purchasing power statistics far understated the total economic value circulating 
within this segment. This was the case because a majority of the economic 
transactions within the low-income segment were “off the books”—informal, very 
small-scale transactions that took place outside of legally-recognized and sanctioned 
economic institutions and practices (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Furthermore, because the 
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low-income sector existed outside of formal legal institutions such as property rights 
regimes, a significant portion of asset value remained non-monetized (De Soto, 2000). 
It was, therefore, within the informal and non-monetized spheres of economy where 
corporations could uncover a hidden fortune at the bottom of the pyramid. The formal 
economy represented only the tip of the proverbial iceberg.   
Making the opportunity even more compelling was the fact that the Base of the 
Pyramid population contained an enormous range of fundamental needs, from clean 
water and nutrition to communications and electricity. And there was little to no 
existing competition serving these needs. Instead, non-consumption of goods and 
services presented the main barrier to be overcome (Hart & Christensen, 2002). In 
summary, the implication for corporations was that the BOP contained massive latent 
demand together with a far greater ability and willingness to pay than would otherwise 
meet the eye.  
I propose, however, that it is this very combination of factors— a high level 
of product non-consumption (and thus, an absence of competition) together with a 
high level of informal and non-monetized activity—that together suggest that the 
majority of business opportunities for corporations at the Base of the Pyramid will 
entail market creation of new product forms. I will speak to each of these factors 
separately.  
By definition, the commercialization of products for which there is no 
current consumption or current providers presents a market creation challenge. The 
absence of consumption and competitors signals the absence of the entire product 
form; they are two sides of the same coin. So, as with “mainstream” consumers 
confronted by a new product form like the Segway, BOP consumers presented with a 
never-before consumed or offered product will first need to establish basic cognitive 
legitimacy for the product form, learn new category structures and concepts, re-orient 
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consumption patterns, and develop new core product operational skills. Using the 
terminology and framework I developed in Chapter 8, consumers in the BOP adopting 
a product that addresses an unmet need are equally challenged to establish a new 
performance routine around that product in order for it to become an established part 
of their consumption context. 
It is important to note that there appears to be a particularly robust form of 
functionalism and Cartesian logic attached to the BOP space that implicitly assumes 
that because the unfulfilled needs being targeted are often fundamental or “basic” in 
nature (e.g., clean water, electricity, adequate nutrition), the challenge of product 
adoption should be less of an issue (provided that the product is designed and 
marketed in a culturally-appropriate manner). In other words, because the unfulfilled 
needs are ones thought to be essential to a normal and healthy life, getting BOP 
consumers to adopt such a product should be far more straightforward than convincing 
US customers to adopt a Segway: The prevention of illness and death through purified 
water would appear to be a much easier “sell” than the comfort and convenience of the 
Segway. This would explain the predilection within the BOP literature for educational 
and social marketing campaigns—the consumer challenge is viewed largely as one of 
simply educating a population and building awareness around a particular social issue 
related to the targeted need (e.g., the link between dirty water and diarrhea). Once 
awareness is created, the BOP consumer is assumed to have the necessary motivation 
and desire to adopt the product and make the necessary behavioral change (Hammond, 
2010). 
The failure of several rigorous corporate efforts to address basic needs such 
as Procter and Gamble’s PuR water purification product and Coke’s nutritional 
beverage—as well as my personal experience in Nairobi with SC Johnson’s 
Community Cleaning Service that aimed to improve home cleanliness and sanitation 
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(an offering that had clear health implications) and to rid homes of various insect pests 
that were carriers of disease—suggest that this assumption is tenuous. Creating a new 
consumer performance around, for example, a water purification product remains a 
formidable consumer-level challenge: The idea of handing over money for something 
called “pure water” must become normalized and accepted; new concepts such as 
“water borne disease” and “microbes” may need to be developed and understood; new 
water categories may need to be internalized, such as drinking water, cooking water, 
and bathing water; the established routines associated with different water-consuming 
activities such as cooking and bathing may be altered; money and time must be re-
allocated to allow for the purchase and use of the water purification product; personal 
space may need to be re-oriented for the use and storage of the technology, as well as 
for the storage of purified water; and core product operational skills will likely need to 
be developed around the operation and maintenance of the water purifying technology. 
Viewed in this light, the limitations of the functionalist, Cartesian assumptions that 
underpin most social marketing approaches to product adoption are clear.  
On the contrary, it is arguable that the consumer challenge of enacting a 
product performance around a new product form is inherently more difficult in a BOP 
context than in mainstream consumer segments. The reason for this is two-fold. If, as 
argued in Chapter 8, the likelihood of enacting a new product performance increases 
as the number of linkages and associations increase between the new product and 
existing products and commodities within the consumer’s field (akin to an improv 
actor being able to create a wider range of performances as the number of props he/she 
has at hand increase), then the relatively low level of existing commodities and 
products circulating in the lives of BOP consumers would limit their range of possible 
product performances. The product performances around a laptop computer, for 
example, are considerably greater and richer for a person living in a two-bedroom, 
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fully-furnished home with a library of DVD’s and CDs, a digital camera, a credit card, 
and a home internet connection than for a person living in sparsely furnished, one-
room mud house lacking electricity.   
A second reason to suspect that new product form adoption will be more 
challenging in a BOP context is derived from my argument that product 
consumption/performance is based on a tacit consumer capability developed through 
practice. A great example that underscores the view that product consumption is a 
kind of cultural competence can be seen in the documentary movie, God Grew Tired 
of Us: The Story of the Lost Boys of Sudan. The documentary details the lives of 
several young men resettled to the US from Sudan who were among the thousands of 
children dubbed the Lost Boys. The Lost Boys were male children who fled their 
villages during a protracted civil war to avoid conscription into the rebel armies. The 
young boys spent most of their childhood and young adult years together in an 
isolated, impoverished refugee camp near the Kenyan border while they waited for the 
war to end. The documentary contains moving footage showing the resettled Lost 
Boys’ introduction to the features of their new apartment and to a grocery store—
experiences that highlighted their hesitancy, discomfort, and somewhat humorous 
clumsiness in using and interacting with such basic objects as a light-switch. When 
product consumption/performance is viewed as an acquired consumer-level capability, 
then BOP consumers like the Lost Boys, because of their relatively low levels of 
experience with product consumption, will possess a lower capability level than their 
middle and upper-class counterparts for efficiently enacting an initial product 
performance and then learning to re-contextualize a product into a wide variety of 
performances.  
The second factor that I believe will shift corporate BOP efforts into a 
market creation situation is that the majority of goods and services at the BOP are 
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exchanged in informal, small-scale markets. At first, this seems to be a contradiction 
in terms. Why is market creation (of new product forms) necessary when a product 
market already exists, albeit small-scale and informal? To answer that, it is helpful to 
provide an example of what I mean by an informal market. Prior to the advent of 
micro-finance, a low-income person in a village or slum who was unable to meet the 
lending standards of banks (e.g., a formal credit and income history, available 
collateral) had no choice but to seek a loan from a local moneylender. Local 
moneylenders were people from the community who, by virtue of their close 
knowledge of and proximity to the borrower, were in a position to extend credit with 
confidence of repayment and the ability to locate and monitor closely the 
debtor/customer (thereby lowering the lender’s risk). Such an informal, highly 
localized market transaction was not one, however, that was amenable to 
standardization, aggregation, and scale, as it was premised on having intimate local 
knowledge and long-standing family relationships developed over, in many cases, 
decades of time. But without the possibility of standardization, aggregation, and 
scalability, such informal markets hold little opportunity and value for billion-dollar 
corporations.  
For corporations to intervene into and provide products and services currently 
offered and consumed in the informal sector, I believe that they will be forced to 
essentially transform the established business model and offering in order to make 
them sufficiently standardizable and, thus, scalable. This re-structuring will, in all 
likelihood, result in a product that, from the consumer’s perspective, looks and feels 
like a new product form—it will consist of a very different bundle of attributes and 
require an entirely different set of core consumption skills and capabilities than those 
associated with the informal sector product.  
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Consider Grameen Bank’s micro-finance model, one that has proven to be a 
scalable and replicable alternative to the moneylender model and has spawned an 
industry that today has entered into the mainstream (for example, Compartamos, the 
largest micro-finance institution in Mexico, raised $400 million in 2007 through an 
initial public offering). Central to the Grameen offering and business model (and to 
many micro-finance offerings) is the use of solidarity lending groups as a means of 
achieving the low risk and high repayment rates that local moneylenders achieve by 
virtue of their close relationship and physical proximity to the borrower. With the 
solidarity group model, a loan targeted to a single person is extended to a group of 
women borrowers of which the individual is a member; the group, rather than the 
individual, is accountable for repayment. Importantly, with the solidarity group, group 
formation entails a rigorous induction and socialization process, so that group 
members identify strongly with each other and provide each other with emotional and 
spiritual support in all aspects of their lives, in addition to business and technical 
support.  
If we step into the shoes of the borrower and compare the products provided by 
the local moneylender with the product of Grameen Bank, I believe we would come to 
the conclusion that—even though both provide access to capital—they are entirely 
different product forms, much like riding the bus and driving one’s own car both entail 
personal mobility but represent different product forms. It is this same kind of radical 
innovation of the business model and subsequent creation of new product forms that 
will likely be the inevitable outcome when large corporations attempt to formalize and 
aggregate any informal market, be it for finance capital or cook stoves.  
At this point, it is useful to recall that the radical localization strategy which I 
identified in Chapters 1 and 2 as the predominate framework in the BOP literature, as 
well as the foundation of the initial BOP Protocol, is designed for entering existing 
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product and consumer markets in which there exist what decision making theorists 
classify as a probabilistic decision environment: The supply and demand functions 
exist, thereby making targeted research and product innovation possible (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2007; Sarasvathy, 2001a; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005). I have furthered argued 
in Chapter 7 that, under such conditions, consumers similarly confront a probabilistic 
decision-making situation with regards to product adoption, as they have already 
integrated the product within their consumption context or can use other consumers of 
the product as reference points. That being the case, radical localization strategies 
would have very limited application at the BOP. Specifically, they would only by 
applicable for accessing the “tip of the BOP iceberg”—that is, the formal, 
institutionalized product markets in which low-income consumers already participate 
that are already aggregated and structured for scalability. The potential “blue ocean 
markets” around unmet BOP needs and the dis-aggregated, informal BOP markets that 
together contain the majority of potential economic value reflect conditions that 
require market creation strategies.  
In conclusion, this analysis explains why the majority of corporate efforts to 
serve the BOP have ended and will continue to end in failure, including my efforts 
with SC Johnson in Kenya and the previously mentioned effort by P&G with PuR. 
The market entry strategies being employed rarely encounter the conditions necessary 
for their success. On the flip side, I believe it is not a coincidence that the rare 
corporate success stories—such as Unilever India’s highly touted development and 
launch of its Wheel brand detergent for India’s urban BOP consumer and Danish 
multinational Arla’s successful introduction of its Power Cow brand of powdered milk 
for Nigeria’s urban BOP consumer—have occurred when corporations target formal, 
established product markets in which BOP consumers also participate (Simanis, 
2010). In both the Unilever and Arla cases, the companies were introducing an 
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improved product into an existing product market around which there existed formal 
supply chains and distribution networks. To tap into the potential fortune at the bottom 
of the economic pyramid, corporations will need to hone and develop market creation 
strategies effective for the commercialization of new product forms.   
  
The Base of the Pyramid Protocol: Balancing Business and Development  
As explained in the Introduction to this dissertation, the impetus for my 
research lay not only in how corporations could profitably reach the BOP, but also 
how corporate innovation and business development strategies could address the issue 
of poverty alleviation and global development. This idea of linking corporate profit 
generation with poverty alleviation was arguably the defining characteristic of “Base 
of the Pyramid” strategies and one that, I argue, accounted for its initial widespread 
appeal across business and development sectors. Without question, this objective 
played a critical role in shaping my own action research—it was fundamental to the 
very structure and logic of the BOP Protocol, and guided the innovation and business 
development techniques I employed in Kenya and India.  
Importantly, I believe the attempt to merge these two goals in the Protocol 
provides valuable insights for the very future of the broader BOP movement, as well 
as for related efforts to create fruitful dialogue between business and other disciplines, 
such as ecology and policy. For the BOP Protocol’ s effectiveness and utility as a 
business development tool was hamstrung not only by the blind spot regarding the 
unique consumer challenges of market creation, but also by losing sight of the core 
audience: the corporation. As I explain below, the Protocol emerged as a development 
tool in search of a business application. Given the importance of these learnings and 
their centrality to my research, following I provide background that highlights this 
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tension, as well as some concluding thoughts on how best to successfully bridge 
business and development objectives.  
When I began my action research in 2004, there was growing criticism of, and 
backlash against, the BOP concept (Karnani, 2007). The criticism was leveled at the 
claim that corporate efforts to serve the BOP represented a way to solve poverty. The 
general critique was that making and selling products to poor people had little to do 
with poverty alleviation and human development. In fact, simply selling products to 
poor people could leave them worse off.  
Working within this climate, the BOP Protocol Initiative turned out to be as 
much an exercise in finding common ground between the business and development 
sectors as it was creating a BOP-specific innovation tool for managers. The BOP 
Protocol Design Workshop organized in 2004 was an intervention aimed to provide a 
forum for differing perspectives on business and development and to develop a 
mutually agreed upon language and approach that addressed the concerns and 
objectives of both constituencies. I do think the effort succeeded in building this 
bridge to the development sector—a significant accomplishment in and of itself. For 
example, the concept of “mutual value creation,” which emerged from that workshop 
and was endorsed by all corporate and development sector participants, entered into 
the broader BOP lexicon as one of the central tenets to which a corporate BOP venture 
should adhere.   
Building that consensus, however, came at a price. Specifically, the effort to 
bridge business objectives with emerging perspectives on development theory and 
practice that argued for the deep inclusion of the poor in the creation of new models of 
economic activity set the Protocol (and BOP strategies more broadly as will explain) 
on a strategically-shaky business foundation. In trying to maintain intact the 
principles, practices, and language of development, the first draft of the BOP Protocol 
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resembled the proverbial camel: Development principles and tools had been 
aggregated with business principles and tools, rather than being integrated into a 
business strategy. In fact, I would argue the problem framing used in the Protocol, as 
well as the core innovation technique of business co-creation, resonated far more 
strongly with a development audience than a business audience. I will address each of 
these separately. 
At the level of problem framing, for example, the Protocol inadvertently 
adopted what I call a needs-based development logic. The central purpose of the 
business, in other words, was framed as addressing “needs” in the community (in the 
35 pages of the 1st Edition of the Protocol, the term “needs” appears no less than on 40 
occasions). Clearly, the term “needs” isn’t foreign to business: businesses frequently 
talk about meeting “customer needs” and “consumer needs.” But the term as used by 
managers is short-hand for the product and service enhancements that increase the 
customer’s experience of value throughout its various touch-points with a company 
and its product. So when a manager speaks of customer needs, the term carries this 
specificity and highly bounded context. To relate this to the preceding section, the 
existence of customer needs implies the existence of an established product market. 
The concept of “needs” as used in the Protocol, however, carried a decidedly 
development sector flavor, as in: “Working in cooperation with the broader 
community and using participatory techniques, the [Company’s] objective is to 
identify the various needs of the community” (Simanis et al., 2005). Needs in 
development speak referred inherently to things such as clean water, nutrition, 
sanitation, health care, and education—abstract categories of human activity that are 
imbued with a sense of biological and social necessity. These development-based 
needs, as I noted in the preceding section, represent potential “blue-ocean markets.”  
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While innocuous sounding, this development-based problem framing likely 
contributed to a growing misperception that these abstract, development needs 
presented a business challenge structurally equivalent to the highly contextualized and 
bounded customer needs to which companies and managers attended. By conflating 
these two meanings of the term “needs,” the Protocol validated the perception that the 
unmet needs of the BOP were tantamount to massive, product markets (Simanis, 2010; 
Simanis et al., 2008b). This, as I’ve explained in this dissertation and in recently 
published work (Simanis, 2009), was bound to lead to business failure, as the 
consumers targeted with these needs-based products (e.g., water purification products) 
were essentially faced with new product forms. A business approach to serving such 
abstract development needs required creating a new consumer market around that 
need—a challenge that required an innovation approach effective in managing the 
uncertainty faced both by managers on the supply side and by consumers on the 
demand side (Simanis, 2010). The initial Protocol, which was grounded in a market 
entry logic, was not equipped for addressing this challenge.  
At the level of business process, the “centerpiece” of the BOP Protocol’s 
innovation approach was “business co-creation”—the collective creation of an 
altogether new business entity by a company in close partnership with the community. 
With business co-creation, essentially every business activity was undertaken jointly 
with the community. The pre-fix “co,” which appears in the 1st Edition of the Protocol 
more than 70 times, is linked to everything from identification of needs, mapping of 
assets, generation of ideas and business plans, creation of metrics, evaluation of 
alternatives, and ownership of information and the business.  
Yet, as noted in my introduction to the 1st Edition of the Protocol in Chapter 3, 
the rationale for using co-creation throughout the entire business development process 
was driven largely by development goals and in pursuit of the fairly abstract vision of 
  475 
mutual value creation. Business co-creation was done primarily as a way of building 
capacity in the target communities, ensuring a more even distribution of value between 
the corporation and the community, and equalizing the power dynamics between 
corporations and communities so as to avoid “community capture.” The concept was, 
in many respects, an extension into the domain of business of what is called a 
“participatory theory of development.” In participatory development, participation is 
viewed as the core objective and ends of a development process rather than a means to 
an end (Chambers, 1983, 1997). Empowerment and creation of relationships of 
equality across socio-economic classes are the central goals of participatory 
development. 
From a business perspective, the primary justification for business co-creation 
was that it would create trust, thereby allowing companies to better hear the “voices of 
the poor” and to ensure the resulting business truly addressed the community’s needs. 
In simple terms, business co-creation was a way of ensuring the business and product 
offering was built on accurate information about the local context. As a tool for 
acquiring sophisticated local information and consumer knowledge, however, business 
co-creation was overkill—many of the collective decisions that are outlined in the 
Protocol had marginal to no impact on understanding the local context (co-creation of 
metrics; co-creation of business plans). Existing methods used by product designers 
and consumer insight specialists could provide equally valuable local understanding 
with far less complexity.  
Over the past several years, managers have commented that this extensive co-
creation process seemed to be a tedious, unnecessarily complex way of creating the 
business. Based on my years of work experience in the field, I agree with them: Co-
creating a business with a community opens up a whole set of organizational and 
interpersonal complexities to be managed, in addition to those that accompany any 
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business development effort. The incremental business benefits of taking on this added 
complexity were highly circumspect. In retrospect, business co-creation as we had 
envisioned and articulated it was a development tool in search of a business 
application.  
The predominance of this development-centric logic and the centrality of a 
development-based methodology in the BOP Protocol accounts for its relatively low 
uptake by corporations, even in its 2nd Edition incarnation. Despite the significant 
awareness of the BOP Protocol within the broader community of interest on Base of 
the Pyramid, as well as growing corporate attention to the BOP, there have been only 
two other applications of the BOP Protocol following the SC Johnson and Solae 
efforts.  
Perhaps most importantly, the development-driven strategic logic of the BOP 
Protocol has not proven effective in providing business teams with the necessary 
guidance for building an effective business. In one of the two recent applications of 
the Protocol—an effort in which the field team possessed excellent capacity and 
enjoyed tremendous corporate support and resourcing—the project was closed down 
after less than two year’s of operation, as the field team was so focused on “business 
co-creation” as an end in and of itself (a common interpretation of the Protocol) that 
the business was severely compromised. To use a Michael Porterism, because the 
BOP Protocol was positioned on the fence dividing business and development, it has 
been neither an effective tool for development nor business.    
 
The Future of the Base of the Pyramid Concept 
At a macro-level, the BOP Protocol experience serves as a bell whether for the 
broader BOP movement. As with the Protocol, the evolution over the past decade of 
the BOP concept has left it positioned precariously with respect to its initial 
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constituency—the corporate sector. While interest in “market-based approaches to 
poverty allevation” remains strong within development agencies (e.g., UNDP, IDB) 
and the non-profit sector, corporate interest and investment in BOP business intiatives 
are, in my estimation, waning. The BOP concept today is in jeopardy of following the 
very path of the industrial democracy movement of the 1950s and 1960s, which, 
despite tremendous interest at the time, failed to become institutionalized in core 
operations of corporations and has all but faded from popular consciousness.  
The BOP concept began as a fairly straightforward business argument: the four 
billion people on the planet with low per capita incomes presented a significant growth 
opportunity for corporations, provided that corporations shed a number of managerial 
and operational biases and innovated their revenue and business models. It is 
important to note that the development and poverty alleviation component of the 
original argument was a by-product of a business strategy—successfully making and 
commercializing products for this target demographic was the means by which the 
corporation could improve people’s lives and, thereby, claim to impact poverty.   
As I discussed earlier, the criticism against this initial argument came swiftly 
from the development sector, rightly chastising the simplicity of the BOP concept’s 
poverty alleviation argument. The initial BOP argument had reduced six decades of 
work by institutions and disciplines created specifically to address poverty to a 
consumer choice model. As the various criticisms noted, poverty alleviation 
encompassed issues far beyond that of access to basic needs such as health care, 
sanitation, and education to include ones of vulnerability, livelihood stability, gender 
equality, voice, economic development, and democratic accountability (Esteva, 1992; 
Rist, 2003; Simanis et al., 2008b).  
Looking back, the juncture at which this criticism was made opened up two 
paths forward. One path involved scaling back the grand claims of business’s power to 
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eradicate poverty and focusing on the more humble (though far from simple) 
challenge of creating affordable and desired product and services for the BOP 
demographic. The second path entailed upping the ante and taking the position that, 
even with this greatly expanded definition, corporations were potential engines of 
poverty eradication. The path chosen has clearly been the latter.  
Today, the very meaning of “doing BOP” encompasses the expansive meaning 
of poverty alleviation, including providing access to basic health and social services, 
enabling local income generation and livelihood creation, providing local skill and 
capacity development, and building self-esteem and empowering those most 
disaffected. “Doing BOP” has become tightly linked to new conceptualizations of 
capitalism altogether (e.g., inclusive capitalism, conscious capitalism), as well as 
democratic and participatory principles and practices of operation. Indicative of this 
escalation are the proliferation of “impact assessment” tools  (a term imported 
wholesale from the development sector) deemed necessary to determine whether a 
BOP venture can be called successful; sales and profits generated by the company play 
a relatively minor role in such impact assessments, with the preponderance of metrics 
focused on poverty.  
Thus, in the effort to up the ante and to make the BOP concept about poverty 
alleviation—a laudable and understandable goal—the BOP concept, like the BOP 
Protocol, has morphed into a development strategy in search of a business application. 
The BOP concept today is, first-and-foremost, a market-based approach to poverty 
alleviation. The goal and organizing framework, in other words, are poverty 
alleviation; business value is backed-out and derived from efforts to do poverty 
alleviation, rather than a poverty alleviation effect being the by-product of a business 
strategy. In short, the relationship between corporate growth and poverty alleviation 
has been completely inverted. 
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Ironically, what started out as a concept intended to help corporations grow 
their revenues has done more to grow the revenues of the non-profit sector. Indeed, in 
the ten years since the seminal working paper (Prahalad & Hart, 2002) outlining the 
BOP concept was circulated, significant corporate success stories remain elusive, 
whereas philanthropic and non-profit programs and enterprises based on a “BOP 
strategy” have mushroomed in number and size. For the non-profit sector, the fortune 
at the bottom of the pyramid has been very real. This is an observation, not a criticism.  
The above is not to say that the transformation of the BOP concept into a 
poverty alleviation strategy is bad or negative. The work being done by non-profits 
and social entrepreneurs under the BOP banner is tremendous and valuable. Rather, 
my aim is to point out that as long as the BOP concept asks that corporations 
repurpose themselves in pursuit of poverty alleviation—a goal whose very meaning, 
definition, and significance have been forged under an entirely different set of 
institutional parameters—BOP efforts will, by default, migrate to the periphery of 
corporate operations (i.e., the non-revenue side). I believe that trend is already 
underway today. Most of the high-profile, highly-publicized corporate BOP efforts—
from the Grameen-Danone partnership, the Goldman-Sachs 10,000 women initiative, 
Phillips’s rural cook stove project, to Procter & Gamble’s PUR water purification 
efforts—are all essentially philanthropic or social responsibility ventures.  
In order for the BOP concept to enter the core operations of a company and be 
treated as a strategic growth opportunity, we will have to move in the opposite 
direction: we will have to repurpose the idea of poverty alleviation in a way that its 
meaning, definition, and significance blend into and intertwine with the institutional 
parameters and discourse of the corporation. This is not simply a question of trying to 
“graft” poverty alleviation and BOP onto existing corporate activities, as concepts 
such as “inclusive supply chain,” “fair trade,” and “shared value” attempt to do. 
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Rather, we have to keep firmly in mind the development impacts and effects we want 
to achieve, but let go of the very concepts of BOP and poverty alleviation, recognizing 
that when they resurface inside the corporation they will be a shadow of their former 
selves. For those of us working in the so-called “BOP space,” getting corporations to 
turn their innovation and business acumen to creating products and services for the 
world’s low-income consumers will require a strategy of self-obsolescence.  
As an example of how this might look, I point to the total quality management 
(TQM) and just in time (JIT) management revolutions. I would wager that these 
management practices—ones today considered baseline skills for any respectable 
company—have had an order-of-magnitude greater impact on reducing firm’s 
environmental impacts than any company’s environmental management initiative have 
had. TQM and JIT have had, paradoxically, such profound environmental impact 
precisely because they were not undertaken for that purpose! Rather, the goals, 
practices, language, and metrics of TQM and JIT all were focused on enabling a 
company to grow and be more profitable. The profound environmental benefits were 
derivative of achieving a business objective. The same must happen with BOP.    
My decision to focus this dissertation on the issue of new market creation and 
the commercialization of new product forms—rather than business and poverty 
alleviation—was taken in pursuit of this goal. I have tried to return to more modest 
origins in which the BOP represents a potential growth market in an effort to re-frame 
the issue—as organizer Saul Alinksy has long counseled—in terms of the experiences 
and realities of my audience: corporate managers. While doing so will inevitably 
expose me to the now almost reflexive criticism that I am looking at the BOP only as 
consumers (and therefore failing the acid test of an inclusive, BOP business), I hope 
this framing helps corporations in their quest to bring the functionality of their 
products and services to the world’s low-income sector. 
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APPENDIX 1: 




Week 1: Business and Development - The Base of the Pyramid 
• Prahalad & Hart, “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid”, Business + 
Strategy. 
• Hart & Christensen, “The Great Leap”, Sloan Management. 
• Christensen, Craig & Hart, “The Great Disruption”, Foreign Affairs. 
 
Week 2: Critical Perspectives on the Business of Development  
• Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Chpt 1 (“Rural Poverty 
Unperceived”) 
• Chambers, Whose Reality Counts: Putting the First Last, Chpts 4 & 5 (“The 
Transfer of Reality” and “All Power Deceives”)  
• Simanis, “Entrepreneurship and Global Development: An Anti-Essentialist 
Critique and Extension” 
• Simanis, “Sustaining Our Un/common Futures: Innovation at the Borders of 
Thought”, part 1 
 
Week 3: Engaging the BoP Differently 
• Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Chpt 7 (“The New 
Professionalism: Putting the Last First”) 
• Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads, 2005, Part III: Chpts 7, 8 & 9 (“Broadening 
the Corporate Bandwidth”, “Developing Native Capability” and “Toward a 
Sustainable Global Enterprise”  
• London & Hart, 2004, “Reinventing Strategies for Emerging Markets: Beyond the 
Transnational Model”, Journal of International Business Studies. 
• Simanis, “The Practice and Politics of Stakeholder Engagement: Toward a Power-
Sensitive Theory of Stakeholder Interests”  
 
Week 4: Methods 1  
• Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Chpt 8 (“Practical Action”) 
• Chambers, Whose Reality Counts: Putting the First Last, Chpts 6 & 7 (“Learning 
to Learn” and “What Works and Why”) 
• Chambers, Participatory Workshops: A Sourcebook of 21 Sets of Ideas and 
Activities, 2002, Part V: Analysis and Learning, 109-164.  
• Krishna et al, “Pathways out of Poverty in Western Kenya and the Role of 
Livestock”, Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper No 14, 
International Livestock Research Institute. 




Week 5: Methods 2  
• Beebe, Rapid Assessment Process, Introduction and Chpts 1, 2, & 3 (“To RAP or 
not to RAP and the Basic Concepts”, “Data Collection: Triangulation and Getting 
the Insider’s Perspective” &  “Iterative Analysis and Additional Data Collection”) 
• De Jager, “Facilitated learning in soil fertility management: assessing potentials of 
low-external-input technologies in east African farming systems”, 2004, 
Agricultural Systems, 79, 205-223.  
 
Week 6: Kenya Ecological & Socio-Cultural I   
• Anderson, 2002, Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, 
Kenya 1890-1963, Introduction and Chapts 1-3.  
• Wandahwa et al, 1996, “Pyrethrum cultivation in West Kenya: origin, ecological 
conditions and management, Industrial Crops and Products, 5, 307-322. 
 
Week 7: Kenya Ecological & Socio-Cultural II 
• Anderson, 2002, Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, 
Kenya 1890-1963, Chpts. 4-6. 
• Ajulu, “Politicised Ethnicity, Competitive Politics and Conflict in Kenya: A 
Historical Perspective”, African Studies, 61 (2), 251-268. 
 
Week 8: Kenya Ecological & Socio-Cultural III 
• Anderson, 2002, Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, 
Kenya 1890-1963, Chpts 7-9 and Conclusion. 
• Amudavi & Mango, “Enhancing Community Based Research: The case of a 
participatory action research experience in a rural community in Kenya” 
• Nandwa et al, “Soil Fertility Regeneration in Kenya”  
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APPENDIX 5:  
SOLAE BOP PROTOCOL JOB DESCRIPTION 
 
Professional Internship Opportunity 
The Solae Company: Base of the Pyramid Business Development Intern 
 
Term & Reporting  
Temporary: April 1, 2006 – July 30, 2006  
Position reports to Solae’s Director of Global Accounts 
 
Position Description 
The Solae Company is an alliance between Dupont and Bunge Ltd to bring more great 
tasting, nutritious soy-foods to the marketplace.  
 
The Solae Company has initiated a project to develop sustainable businesses in India 
that serve the needs of poor individuals and communities that comprise the “base of 
the economic pyramid” (BoP).  For the first phase of this project, Solae seeks four 
interns to become members of a Solae BoP Protocol Team. The Team will include 
members from and be guided by a US-based group of leading BoP business 
professionals and academics affiliated with Cornell University’s Johnson School of 
Management who have directed the development of a BoP Protocol™. The BoP 
Protocol™ is a roadmap for engaging poor communities in co-developing business 
ideas that meet local needs and generate value for the company. 
 
The four-month position will begin with a 10-week, full time field immersion on April 
17, 2006. During the in-field immersion, the Solae Protocol Team – led by the US 
members – will use the BoP Protocol™ process to engage two communities in co-
developing business models and initiatives. During the immersion segment – which 
will take place in an urban slum and a rural village – the Protocol Team will use 
homestays and participatory methods to co-develop new business models and 
initiatives, as well as to build the foundation for a long-term relationship between 
Solae and the communities.  
 
Prior to the field-work, a part-time preparatory course (to be administered through 
weekly conference calls and a web discussion board) will be led by the US members 
of the Solae Protocol Team. The training is intended to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the BoP Protocol™ process and to provide the necessary skill sets 
and background knowledge to effectively implement this process. The course will 
cover theories and perspectives on BoP business development, participatory action 
learning and rural appraisal methodologies, and background information on food and 
development in India. 
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Position Responsibilities 
Due to the intensive nature of participatory business development, the intern will be 
expected to maintain a highly flexible work schedule, working when and as-needed to 
build trust and rapport with the community and other potential ecosystem partners.  
 
The Solae Protocol Team will be responsible for the following deliverables: 
1. Strategic Initiatives Plan that outlines near-term and longer-term 
business opportunities, as well as recommended courses of action, for 
serving these and other BoP communities sustainably.  
2. Business Co-Generation Report detailing the set of business ideas 
and models co-developed with the local communities through the BoP-
Protocol™ process.  
3. Immersion Report that provides in-depth documentation and analysis 
of the Team’s activities and key learnings in implementing the 
Protocol. The report will also detail the needs, aspirations, assets and 
resources co-identified with the community. 
 
Qualifications 
Solae is looking to hire creative people with a passion for engaging issues of poverty 
and sustainable development through enterprise. The ideal candidate is someone who 
works effectively in a team setting, yet is self-directed. The ability to work under 
conditions of high uncertainty and to adapt to the project’s needs is critical. The 
participatory basis of the project demands a high degree of humility and the ability to 
engage and learn as equals with people from varying educational and experiential 
backgrounds, formal and otherwise. 
 
Given the diverse set of skills demanded by the project, Solae is looking to hire interns 
that possess expertise in one or more of the following areas:  
  
 Business or Social Entrepreneur 
o Strong entrepreneurial skills and experience in starting new businesses 
o Strong business analytic skills (e.g., financial analysis, market analysis), 
project planning skills, and understanding of strategic frameworks 
o Work or volunteer experience in poor communities (in urban slum/rural 
villages), in particular working in partnership with poor communities to 
address local needs 
 
 Social Worker or Development Anthropologist 
o Experience in fostering community-based businesses and local income-
generating activities 
o Commitment to a participatory philosophy of development and experience 
in applying participatory techniques (in urban slum/rural villages) to 
address issues of poverty and marginality 
o Training and experience in managing issues of gender and development 
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o Strong group facilitation skills  
 Development Nutritionist 
o Training in nutritional sciences and various perspectives on nutrition and 
development 
o Commitment to a participatory philosophy of development and experience 
in applying participatory techniques (in urban slum/rural villages) to 
address issues of malnutrition 
o Training and experience in managing issues of gender and development as 
they relate to nutrition, health and well-being 
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APPENDIX 6: 
SOLAE BOP PROTOCOL PROJECT OVERVIEW DOCUMENT 
 
 
Solae BoP Protocol Project Overview 
 
The objective of the Solae BoP Project is to build a close relationship using the BoP 
Protocol™ process with a poor community in Hyderabad (in both a slum and nearby 
rural village) and, through that relationship, to co-develop new business ideas and 
models that benefit both the community and the company. Solae may choose to pilot 
test and further develop one or more of the identified business models if the company 
finds them to be attractive opportunities. 
 
The key assumptions of the BoP Protocol™ and this project are: 
1) A corporation alone cannot create a business that serves the needs of poor 
communities, as traditional company’s business systems and processes are 
geared to serve wealthy market segments. Instead, sustainable businesses that 
serve the poor have to be based on the existing resources and social structures 
within those communities. Thus, companies have to work in partnership with 
poor communities to build such businesses.   
2) Both communities and companies have unique resources, technologies and 
knowledge. By working together as equal partners and creatively combining 
these talents, these two groups can create businesses that neither one could 
create alone. So, through such partnerships, completely new possibilities 
emerge for meeting local needs through enterprise.  
 
As the BoP Protocol™ is based in a participatory philosophy of development, the co-
developed business models and ideas would be rooted in the needs of the community 
and the community’s own definition of “development”.  
 
The field-work phase in India would follow a timeline similar to the one below: 
 
1) April 1 – April 14:  
Protocol team meets with potential local community partners and begins to 
gain exposure to the community. This phase is best described as an 
introductory period during which the Protocol team spends time in the 
community and “learns the ropes”.  
 
2) April 15 – April 30: 
Protocol Team conducts a “deep immersion” in the community. This would 
entail homestays in the community by each of the team members. The 
purpose is for team members to build trust with the community and to gain 
some insight into what people value and how they live their lives.  
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3) May 1 – May 14: 
Protocol Team identifies people and groups within the community with 
whom to partner. This process involves selecting specific people or groups 
that will continue to work with the Protocol Team and Solae in identifying 
new business ideas and opportunities for collaboration. During this period, 
the Protocol team also reaches out to other institutions and organizations 
that could be potential collaborators with the community and/or Solae (for 
example, MFI institutions, technology-based NGOs, multilateral 
organizations, small or medium enterprises)  
  
4) May 15 – May 28:  
Protocol Team, working with the community groups, conducts local needs 
and asset analysis through participatory methods. This time is also used to 
train both community groups, as well as other Solae and Dupont company 
members, in how to think about partnering with each other. Again, neither 
group is used to working with the other – it is important that both come 
into this partnership with a different mindset.  
 
5) June 1 – June 10:  
Protocol Team conducts “Idea Generation Workshop” that brings together 
people from Solae, Dupont, the community groups with which it has 
worked, and other potential partners to think creatively about new business 
ideas. At the end of this period, a set of business ideas and rough business 
plans will have been outlined. The attention then turns to evaluating the 
opportunities and deciding if there are opportunities that various 
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APPENDIX 7: 
SOLAE BOP PROTOCOL TRAINING: CONCEPT SUMMARY 
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APPENDIX 9: 
SOLAE BOP PROTOCOL: WORKPLAN DESCRIPTION  
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APPENDIX 10: 
FIELD NOTES: SHG RECRUITMENT MEETING IN 
PARVATHAGIRI  
 
Group Name   :  Krishnaveni Group 
Date of Meeting :  19th May, 2006 
Members Present : 12 out of 15 
Names(L to R) : Kollur Rama, Sarojana (1st Leader), Pedapalli Uppalama 
(2nd Leader), Pedapalli Sujata, Kolluru Yadamma, Bagasapna, Gudela Venkatamma, 
Varalakshmi, MD Madharbi, Madhavi, Pedapalli Sarojana, Kolluru Ellama 
BOP Team  : Sonika, Paul, Srini, Patrick, Indira 
 
Observations of the group meeting 
 
• Group members were not informed about the project by their leader. The group 
had not met since David’s meeting. 
• The leaders who were present in David’s meeting did not recall the purpose of 
the project and were passive observers. 
• Indira started with the page on Who is Solae? This led to the conversation 
being company focused and we had to struggle to get them back on track of 
thinking about business, ideas and partnership. 
• They raised points about giving them work, telling them what to do and they 
will do it, us being educated and them being uneducated and hence we know 
better, them only farming and doing savings in the group only, categorizing 
tasks that they currently do as not involving any ideas. 
• We attempted to break the above myths by giving local examples, trying to 
show how each and every activity they do in farming or savings involve deep 
thinking, thoughts about profit and loss and involving ideas. 
• We gave example about children’s education and they said that they want their 
children to have a better future and position and not work on the fields as they 
are doing. We used it to tell them that this also involved better thinking and 
planning for future and they could do similar thinking in terms of business idea 
generation. 
• The group at the end started seeing our point of view but there were gaps in 
understanding and they were still not clear as to what the end result is and how 
they would contribute and benefit from it. They were of the opinion that we 
were hiding something and not clearly spelling out our purpose, the goal and 
result of the project. 
• However, the group displayed energy, warmth and in the end was energized 
about our presence and committed to come for the PRA exercise on Monday.  
• Toward the end, we got to know that each of them had their own caste-based 
business apart from agriculture like Pottery, Toddy, Fish. 
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• Vocal members of the group were Varalakshmi and Madhavi. Sarojana and 
Ellama also participated. The other group members were reserved but did add 
points to the discussion. 
 
Questions raised during the meeting 
 
• Is it the company or you doing the business? 
• Why don’t you tell us what to do and we will do it? 
• What are you hiding from us? Tell us clearly? 
• Take us to the SOLAE company and show us the company and what they do 
and how they work? 
• Is SOLAE giving us material and we will make it into different products? 
• We are housewifes, farmers, labourers. We have no time to spare for business. 
How can we do business? 
• We are uneducated and you are educated and have lots of ideas. You tell us 
and we will do it? 
• We will put some money and Solae will put some money and we will share the 
profit? Is it correct? 
 
Learnings from the meeting 
• Check whether they have been informed about the project by their leaders. 
• Introduction to be synchronized and sequenced. 
• Spend time on introduction and breaking the ice. Speak casually on what 
they do, how they plan for the future. Talk about their existing businesses, 
challenges, opportunities for growth etc. Then slowly build on what they 
say and introduce the BOP concept. 
• Avoid taking up Solae in the beginning. Talk about co-creation. 
Importance of partnering and strength of team/group work. 
• Try to use local examples to drive home the point about using own 
mind/judgment, idea generation and profit/loss. 
• Talk about partnership with MARI and that we are here for the community 
to benefit. This will help build trust and help them understand that we are 
here for the long-term and this effort would be sustainable. 
• Explain that money by itself does not grow, it’s only the coming together 
and collective efforts of people that makes it grow. 
• Create an example to differentiate creating a business vs holding a job 
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APPENDIX 11: 




RAP with BC Women (Goud community) under the tree 
 




1. Husbands are toddy tappers. They work from 6 am to 12 noon and from 4 to 8 
pm. 
2. Women are housewives. They manage the house, children and make plates 
with leaves, threading of flowers at home. 
3. The leaf plates are sold at Rs.30 for 100 plates. 
4. They eat all vegetables, eggs and also meat (Chicken, Mutton, Fish).  
5. Husbands come home to eat lunch and dinner.  
6. The favorite pastime for women is chatting with the neighbours as a group, 
watching television, cooking and sleeping. 
7. Children attend school, small kids go to Anganwaadi’s. 
8. The buy buffalo milk delivered home at Rs.10 per liter and all children drink 
milk. 
9. Their average daily income is Rs.30 per day. 
10. They do not go out to eat as it is very expensive costing almost Rs.50 for a 
family of four and hence prefer to spend Rs.10 and cook at home 
11. For recreation, all the community families get together and go on a temple visit 
(4 kms from Parvathagiri) once a year. It is a day trip. 
12. At the time of dusherra, all the women of the village gather at the maidan and 
perform Batkamma dance 
13. Toddy is sold at Rs 10 for 2 liter bottle. The customers are other caste people. 
Men and children normally drink toddy. Women drink but do not admit to it. 
14. The only time women eat at restaurant is when they go to Warangal for 
shopping or watching movies which is very rare. 
15. They said they are very happy when they meet each other. 
16. They normally socialize closely with people in the same street only. However 
they are aware of people in other streets and are friends with them. 
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APPENDIX 12: 
INITIAL BUSINESS CONCEPT PAPERS: PARVATHAGIRI 
 
Business Concept 1: 
Chetla Kindá Rural Bakery and Distributor: 
“The Goodness of Solae where Friends and Family Meet” 
 
 
Core Business Concept: 
A healthy-foods bakery that produces a line of soy protein-enriched sweets, snacks 
and beverages, as well as additional foods to meet unique dietary needs (e.g., sugar-
free, low fat). The bakery’s name – “chetla kinda”, which is Telegu for “under the 
tree” - reflects both the business’s brand, as well as the unique means of distributing 
the bakery’s products to other villages.  
• Brand: The bakery will offer a peaceful and relaxing environment that draws 
on the wholesomeness associated with nature (store décor to include plants, 
stones, indoor waterfall). The products and marketing messages would convey 
a message of health27 and goodness.  In-store nutrition information and 
education would reinforce this branding and provide additional value to the 
consumer. A separate seating area for women would be provided.  
• Distribution: The bakery’s foods would be distributed across villages via a 
“mobile bakery service” to a network of recognized “community tree” sites. A 
direct-to-consumer model is vital, due to the limited, un-hygienic, and cluttered 
shelf space of most village retail shops. In addition, people routinely meet and 
socialize under trees, and equate those sites with happiness, sharing, and 
peacefulness. Each village possesses several well-recognized tree sites where 
people gather to socialize. A vehicle bearing the Chetla Kinda name and brand 
image would establish a regular delivery/service schedule at several tree 
locations within each village. This Chetla Kinda Mobile Bakery would serve as 
a temporary storefront and remain at each tree site for a given period of time 
(e.g., 1 hour) serving freshly baked goods, sweets and drinks. As with the retail 
store, nutritional information and education would accompany the product 
offering.  
 
                                                
27 The business would pay high attention to sanitation and cleanliness and seek government 
certification.  
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Unmet Need & Business Opportunity:  
In Parvathagiri, almost all food is prepared at home and consumed at home.28 Local 
“hotels” or restaurants (there are three in Parvathagiri) serve mostly visitors or 
travelers, with men constituting the overwhelming majority of customers. The few 
prepared foods that are, however, routinely purchased and consumed by all members 
of the community include curd and bakery products. Bakery products include salty 
snacks (e.g., mixtures, puffs) and sweets (e.g., ladoo, baked goods). Women choose to 
purchase bakery goods because of their time-consuming and complex preparation, 
while children like the variety that a store provides. Bakery goods are  
consumed at home on a regular basis and are also purchased for special events (e.g., 
visiting neighbors, holiday festivities, and wedding celebrations).  There are no high-
quality bakeries in Parvathagiri29 or surrounding villages (Warangal, which is 
approximately 50 kilometers away, is the closest location).  
 
The Chetla Kinda Bakery addresses this baked-goods need gap while building off of a 
growing awareness around the importance of nutrition to learning, development and 
good health. Government-administered “Integrated Child Development Centers” 
(Anganwadi) have helped to communicate the impact of nutrition on child 
development. Yoga classes, which were made available over a 2-year period in 
Parvathagiri, have further raised awareness of the health and nutrition linkage. In 
general, there is a strong awareness of the health impacts of certain foods (e.g., meat 
for strength, curd for curing an upset stomach.)  
 
Core Products and Services 
• Food Products:  
o Line of soy protein-enriched sweets, snacks, and baked goods30 
o Soy-protein enriched juices and drinks  
o Sugar-free foods for diabetic patients 
• In-Store Services: 
o Peaceful, natural dining space with separate seating for women 
o Staff trained in nutrition and health 
o Nutrition and health-related educational and informational materials 
and events   
• Other Services: 
o Event catering (e.g., weddings)  
o Local delivery 
o Chetla Kinda Mobile Bakery Service to neighboring villages 
                                                
28 Farm workers, who constitute a large majority of the population, carry their lunch with them to the 
fields. Lunch typically consists of leftover rice and pickle. Bakery goods, such as sweets and snacks, 
and “cool drinks” are not consumed in the field but at home with the family.  
29 Although there is no bakery in Parvathagiri, some sweets and salty snacks are available through a 
retail store and push carts food businesses. However, quality (sanitation, taste) and variety are 
considered poor.  
30 The use of locally produced organic ingredients will be explored. 
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Business Concept 2: 
Growing Up Healthy Children’s Center: 
 
Core Business Concept: 
Growing up Healthy is a child day care center that provides protein-enriched food 
sources and professional medical care and oversight to children under the age of 5. In 
addition to enhancing the child’s welfare, the Center gives parents an opportunity to 
participate in income generating activities (eg, day labor).   
 
 
Unmet Need & Business Opportunity:  
Government provided day care services for poor families (Anganwadi) have highly 
variable quality and frequently are unable to meet the demand within the villages31. In 
Annaram Sharif, there is one anganwadi center, while in Parvathagiri there are three. 
In both cases, there is greater demand than the facilities can support. This demand 
comes from a) children that qualify for anganwadi admittance (poorest of the poor) b) 
children of families with greater means. Thus, it appears that there is significant latent 
demand for professional, high quality child day care.   
 
 
Core Products and Services 
• Food Products:  
o Infant health mix 
o Soy milk based health drink for kids 
o Uggu – Preparation with pulses 
o Protein enriched biscuits and sweets 




o Play material 
o Doctor and nurse 
o Health and nutrition counseling  
o Immunization facilities 
o Baby sitter 
 
                                                
31 The government establishes one anganwaadi center for every 1,000 residents. The anganwaadi, 
however, can only support 45 children of the “poorest of the poor”. Often, there are more than 45 
children per 1,000 residents that fall within this classification.  
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Business Concept 3: 
Solae Cooking Well Center 
“Coming together with Solae to make our families grow strong” 
 
Core Business Concept: 
A center where women come together to enjoy the experience of preparing healthy, 
tasty and protein-rich meals for their families.  The Cooking Well Center uses an 
innovatively designed space to promote higher cooking efficiency, collaborative 
cooking, and socializing between users. The Cooking Well Center is made up of the 
Solae Kitchen and a Well-Being space that supports the Kitchen and its users. 
Members pay a membership fee (much like an athletic facility) and pay bulk rates for 
use of Solae ingredients stocked in the kitchen. 
 
i. Solae Kitchen: 
An area with “high-end” kitchen equipment designed for multiple people using 
it simultaneously. Members can cook meals individually for their own families 
or learn to cook together for multiple families.  Members can also use the 
space to cook for “larger” events or to offer catering services. 
 
The Kitchen has a pantry stocked with Solae Protein ingredients for cooking, 
as well as local organic ingredients.32 The kitchen hosts classes on cooking 
healthy, nutritious, and tasty meals using Solae ingredients and act as a hub for 
sharing of nutrition related innovations from Solae, MARI, or other sister 
centers. 
 
ii. Well-Being Space: 
A multi-use space that hosts a variety of activities to support the Kitchen and 
its users. This space can be arranged by the Center’s users to meet their 
specific needs or opportunities. Some example uses are below: 
 
+ Recreation Space 
o For children while women are using the Kitchen 
o For women waiting to use the kitchen 
+ Training Space – for education not involving the Kitchen directly 
o Nutrition Classes 
o Yoga Classes 
o Nutrition & Beauty Tips 
o Dances 
+ Weekly Women’s Restaurant – A Women-only day, meals cooked 
in the Kitchen by members but open to non-members. 
+ Snack Store – to sell prepared healthy snacks or juices. 
                                                
32 The Solae Kitchen can potentially provide members with bulk rate purchases for other staple food 
items, thereby offsetting part of the membership fee. 
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Unmet Needs & Business Opportunities: 
In Parvathagiri demands on women’s time are strong.  Although women enjoy 
socializing, collaborating together, and learning new methods to support their families, 
there are limited opportunities for these activities due to the daily responsibilities of 
working, caring for children, and preparing meals.  Additionally, although women’s 
first priority is the health and happiness of their families, few women can afford higher 
end kitchen equipment such as refrigerators, gas ranges, or ovens that would allow for 
a wider variety of taste and nutrition options for their families.  Finally, although there 
is a strong awareness of the importance of nutrition, the knowledge of how to integrate 
better nutrition into meals is limited and few opportunities exist for women to develop 
that knowledge in a hands-on manner. 
 
The Cooking Well Center meets these needs by providing a “third place”33 for village 
women where they can come together to both socialize and prepare healthier and 
tastier meals for their families. The Center provides higher end kitchen equipment in a 
clean environment that is designed to promote collaboration, socializing, and 
efficiency of users.  The Center also acts as a hub to teach women how to integrate 
better nutrition into their families’ daily meals and becomes an ideal location to 
introduce new food concepts to village women, the chief decision makers for families’ 
nutrition and meals.  The Cooking Well Center also gives Solae a daily window into 
the food needs and wants of local families.  Finally, the Cooking Well Center allows 
women to collaborate both for their daily cooking as well as income generation 
opportunities (catered events such as festivals or weddings, meals for travelers, school 
contracts, etc.) 
 
Core Products and Services: 
+ Cooking & Nutrition Services 
o High end kitchen facilities 
o Hands on healthy cooking classes 
o Solae Tips & Recipes 
 
+ Food Products 
o Solae Ingredients for use in preparing meals 
o Prepared soy foods, juices and snacks 
 
+ Women’s Collaboration & Socializing 




                                                
33 First place being the home, second being the field or shop.  Starbucks created a “third place” in the 
U.S. via its coffee shops designed to be another place Americans can go to outside of work or home. 
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Business Concept 1: 
Solae Sunrise Tiffin Delivery Service 
“Waking Up to the Goodness of Solae” 
 
Core Business Concept: 
A direct-to-home breakfast delivery service that provides a branded line of healthy, 
Solae protein-enriched breakfast tiffins34 to the slum’s large population of laborers, 
auto drivers, and maids who customarily eat breakfast outside of the home. Customers 
would subscribe to the service for a designated period of time (e.g., one month) and 
order in advance35 from a menu of tiffin items. The tiffins would be prepared at one or 
more joint cooking sites36 distributed throughout the slum and would be delivered hot 
to customers’ homes at a specified time in the morning. The presentation of the food 
and the dress and appearance of the delivery people would emphasize neatness, health, 
& well-being. Distribution would either piggyback onto or emulate the daily AM 
home delivery of milk by the company Vijay Milk. Currently, Vijay Milk provides 
home milk delivery to approximately 50 homes in the slum through college-age youth.   
Home delivery of locally-prepared tiffins overcomes the limited reach, high cost, and 
location-dependence of a restaurant facility.  Furthermore, the creation of a home-
based breakfast delivery service opens future opportunities to introduce Solae 
ingredients into the dinner meal, a meal that is almost without exception prepared and 
consumed at home. This could be accomplished through product sampling and sales at 
the time of the AM tiffin delivery37 or through additional services provided at dinner 
time. For example, given that dinner is frequently eaten while watching television, a 
complementary “TV tiffin” service could be explored.          
                                                
34 “Tiffin” is a word used to describe lighter meals and foods eaten for breakfast and throughout the 
day. It includes a wide variety of foods such as dosa, idli, and upma. 
35 In one model, the business could offer all customers the same set schedule of rotating tiffin items 
(e.g., Monday’s dosa, Tuesday’s idli). Alternatively, the business could give customers the flexibility to 
create their own meal schedule.  
36 We are currently exploring whether cooking facilities can be sited within women’s homes across the 
slum to simultaneously reduce costs and make home delivery more efficient. However, the women have 
stated the desire to have joint cooking facilities for socialization purposes.   
37 For example, a small sample of a Solae-based dinner food could be provided with the tiffin along 
with a recipe.   
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Unmet Need & Business Opportunity:  
Of the estimated 40,000 adults who live in Indirama Nagar and Krishna Nagar slums, 
approximately 80% work outside of the slum doing physically-demanding tasks. 
These occupations include laborers, rickshaw pullers, auto drivers, and maids. Almost 
all of these people purchase and eat breakfast – and, to a lesser extent, lunch - outside 
of the home en route to work. Due to the lack of clean hotels and tiffin food outlets 
inside the slum,38 these workers purchase breakfast foods in neighboring Prakash 
Nagar or at food establishments convenient to work.  Given this context, we believe 
that nutritious, hot breakfast foods provided in a convenient and easily accessible 
manner inside the slum represents a significant business opportunity.  
Core Products and Services 
• Branded line of Solae soy protein-enriched tiffin products 
• Subscription-based service for direct-to-home AM delivery of tiffins  
• Solae protein-based dinner recipes and ingredient sales 
o Dinner “TV-Tiffin” Service 
 
 
Business Concept 2: 
Women’s Co-Op Family Bakery & Tiffins Center 
“Families and Workers Grow Strong with Solae” 
 
Core Business Concept 
 
A healthy foods bakery that provides a family focused going out experience at night 
and tiffins for day laborers via a convenient distribution system that delivers pre-
ordered meals to workers while on their way to work. 
 
Evening & Sunday Family Bakery: 
The Bakery provides a family-focused “night out” experience in the community.  A 
variety of meals based on Solae ingredients are provided, as well as spaces catered to 
different members of the family: a dining space for adults, a play space for children 
(so adults can eat in peace), and a garden space for the whole family.  There is a 
counter for pickup and a kitchen where women prepare the items for the Bakery and 
for the Tiffin Center.  The entire space is designed to provide a sense of “going out” of 
the community while still in the community. 
 
Tiffins for Workers: 
Nutritious tasty tiffins targeted at day laborers who leave the community for work.  
The tiffins can either be for breakfast or for lunch. Tiffins are made using Solae 
Ingredients and are marketed with a motif of increasing users’ strength while they 
work: “Eat Well to Grow Strong While You Work.” 
                                                
38 When asked why there were no tiffin facilities available in the community, the women responded that 
it was due to the low level of development in the slum and the lack of clean drinking water.   
  511 
 
Lunch Tiffins are pre-ordered, prepared, and then delivered to community exit points, 
common points where laborers exit the community on their way to work.  Day 
laborers can pick which exit point is most convenient for them and pick up their lunch 
tiffin while on the way to work.  The tiffins are packaged in branded hot boxes that 
help keep the food warm and spur word of  
mouth advertising for the bakery at workplaces. The tiffins can also be picked up 
directly at the center. 
 
Women’s Co-Op 
Tiffins and Bakery items are prepared by women in the community, who can earn 
some money while there children are allowed to play onsite with them.  The women 
also become familiar with how to use Solae ingredients in their own cooking.  Solae 
ingredients and “ready to cook” Solae meals are also sold on site. The Co-Op’s 
women are encouraged to demonstrate to other women how to use Solae ingredients in 
their daily cooking (solae Tupperware parties?)  
 
Un-Meet Needs & Business Opportunity 
Bakery: A lack of family-focused space in Rasul Pura means that when a family wants 
a night out they need to leave the community: a costly and complex operation.  “When 
we go out only two people get to eat, but if we take out the whole family gets to eat.”  
Families currently look to parks or other convenient and low-cost recreational areas in 
the city to fulfill the need for “going out”.  Families also limit their outings to about 
once a month, often due to the cost and inconvenience of going out. The Family 
Bakery provides a family friendly “going out” experience inside the community.   
 
Tiffins: A large majority of Rasul Pura residents engage in labor outside the 
community.  For their meals, workers either take left-overs from the previous night as 
their lunch, or they buy lunches outside the community. Although many residents 
work in physically demanding jobs, their lunches do not provide them with adequate 
nutrition to grow strong through their work.  The Tiffin Center provides protein-rich 
and tasty food to workers in a convenient way, by making them available on their way 
to work and using pre-orders to speed pick up times. 
  
 
Business Concept 3: 
Children’s Holistic Education and Development Center 
Core Business concept – An education center for Children that help children in 
studies, provides nutritious food, entertainment and counseling. This center can also 
provide classes in Poem recitation, story telling, moral science and public speaking. 
Customers-Children in age group 5-10  
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Brand –This center will provide tuitions to children in a friendly and entertaining way. 
Good teacher is the critical components that will affect the brand image. Teacher has 
to be properly trained. 
Decentralized Tutoring centers- People send their children to tutoring centers so that 
children can get individual attention of tutors. There can not be one big tutoring 
center. In each center, there should not be more that 10-15 children. There have to be 
multiple centers within the community. Cost will be high if there are multiple centers 
providing all the facilities. 
Unmet needs and Business opportunity 
This community does not have tutors, who teach inside the slum. Children have to go 
outside the slum for tuitions. There is no center/service in the slum that provides 
services for holistic development of children like story telling, public speaking and 
poem recitation. People are not price sensitive for education of their children. When 
asked “will you send your child to a tuition center providing food , but charging higher 
fee as compared to other tuition center they said that even if  teachers are equally good 
but  food/snacks are nutritious in this center , they will send their child. But we have to 
figure out the price differential at which they are sensitive. 
Children take their lunch after coming from school at around 2’o clock. Tutoring is 
provided for 3 hours. Three hour is long time for children and they will like to have to 
have some nutritious and tasty snacks before dinner. Snacks should be light as the 
mothers would like children to have dinner after coming home. 
Core products and services 
• Tutoring for children in the age group 5-10 years. 
• Nutritious food 
Additional Services 
• Additional classes in Poem recitation, story telling, moral science and public 
speaking 
• Counseling services - Counseling for children and for mothers in issues related 
to child’s performance and development. 
Other services 
• Creche Facility 
• Small play area having some toys 
• Small library having comics and story books for children 
Unique value-    There is no such business that provides all these services under one 
umbrella. 
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APPENDIX 18: 
RAP RESULTS: RASUL PURA, JULY 2006 
 
Rooftop  
• Rooftop is perceived to be serene. 
• Men, Women, Children visit rooftop  
• Elderly people find it difficult to climb the stair cases  
• They use rooftop for following purposes: 
o Chatting with friends, to chat with guest who come from 
outside 
o To see aeroplanes, birds eye view of community  
o Sleeping during the summer season 
o Drying Clothes 
o Drying Pickles and other edible items 
o Playing 
o To put Water tank for drinking purpose 
o Drinking & smoking  for youths 
 
Going out 
• The People do go out of the community to enjoy with the family 
this may be on a monthly basis. 
• Maybe 6-12 times per year 
• Some people go outside the slum when there is festival. (Gondulu) 
is taken an example which is being celebrated this month. 
• They go outside the slum for clean and healthy environment. One 
of the lady commented that it is quite congested inside the slum. 
They go to parks, green areas, temples, cinema, Shammerpet (has 
lot of trees - mandal headquarters) Osmania university (about 10-15 
km – mostly youth attending – can be chased away if stay too long) 
which is the premier University with a large campus and has a lot of 
vacant space and has greenery (lots of trees)  ad they go there with 
their with their family . 
• Many women form a group and go for shopping together. Children 
go outside the slum with their mothers only. 
• Sometimes 4-5 families hire a vehicle and go together for picnics. 
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Green space 
• Most of the places they visit have green space. Places they visit are 
park, tank bund, Shammeerpet (has lot of trees). Inside the slum, 
there are a few trees but no place where there is lot of greenery  
o Krishnanagar slum has 1 tree open to public 
o Danger of growing trees is lack of water and goats 
o They value shade and, cool breeze. In addition, they value 
availability of water near the trees. Children like the place 
because they can play there. 
Food /culture  
• When they go outside, they eat Chinese food like Noodles, Manchurian 
and other variety of food that may or may or may not be cooked at 
home. They try new food when they hear about it from their friends. 
They learn to cook new recipes from their neighbors and friends  
• TV cooking shows are also a medium to learn new recipes. 
o Mainly Indian foods demonstrated – there are 2-3 shows 
popular throughout India; there is also a Telegu show – has 
guests; shown every day  
• There are few women like Rekha , Ishwaramma who do catering for 
festivals and  for functions  
Organic Farming  
• They are not aware of term “organic foods.” They don’t know the 
term but one of the woman commented that only recently they have 
started using fertilizers and pesticides. Previously they used organic 
manure and traditional methods.  
• For different vegetables, there are different criteria for freshness. 
• They don’t enquire whether vegetable is organic or inorganic while 
buying vegetables. 
• Organic vegetables can be found in Banjara hills and jubilee hills 
(around 20 Km from Begumpet). 
• There are some people who grow flowers.  
• There is person who grows a vegetable “Dhondakai” in the slum. 
It’s a creeper. Vegetable grows in bunches. He sells the fresh 
vegetable at about 50% premium. Women don’t get fresh 
vegetables inside the slum. The reason for this is that they are either 
eaten by predators (goats etc) or stolen by young children. 
• Vegetables which they buy inside the slum are more expensive than 
what they buy from outside slum. 
• Women are willing to pay 50% more than what they are currently 
paying for fresh vegetables. 
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• If they buy vegetable outside the slum, they have to buy in bulk and 
may lead to wastage.  
• One of the fruit sellers earns margins of more than 400% on his 
sale.  
• Slum dwellers are aware of health benefits of vegetable. They eat 
“bitter gourd” because it is good for maintaining blood pressure and 
for heart problems. They eat another vegetable "kandha" because it 
is good for gall bladder and stones.  
• They don’t grow plants mainly because of shortage of space and 
water. Most of the houses (IM) are standard 18 * 18 feet houses. In 
KN, where the government builds, the homes are larger. 
Government does not allow them to build any floor other than 
ground floor. Moreover, sometimes children pluck the flower 
before it blooms. Sometimes goat eats the plant  
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APPENDIX 19: 
STRATEGIC BRIEF FOR RASUL PURA BUSINESS CONCEPT: 
AUGUST 2006 
 
Solae’s Living-Well Culinary Park Network39 
A Taste of the World in Your Own Community 
 
 
I. Key Un-Met Community Needs  
Though the slum communities of Rasul Pura Slum Cluster form part of Hyderabad’s 
6-million resident metropolis, the slum’s residents are often unable to access 
affordably many of the city’s services and amenities. Key un-met needs expressed by 
the community members include: 
  
• An absence of open, green spaces and family-friendly sites within the slum  
o Consequence: Residents travel into the city in search of affordable 
recreational opportunities and park spaces. However, transportation 
expenses to local park sites are prohibitively expensive for multiple-
member families, thereby reducing significantly the frequency with 
which families can enjoy such outings.  
• A lack of diversity in meal options beyond the Indian staple of rice, lentils and 
assorted tiffins within the slum 
o Consequence: Residents are limited to traditional food choices or leave 
the community (thus incurring transportation costs) in search of new 
food varieties.    
• Poor quality and selection of affordable, fresh produce within the slum 
o Consequence: Families consume few vegetables, as women are forced 
either to purchase the poor quality vegetables sold in the community or 
to travel outside the slum (thus incurring transportation costs) in search 
of higher quality, less expensive produce. Diets of families in the slum 
are generally considered deficient in vegetables.     
 
 
II. Business Concept Solution: The Solae Living-Well Culinary Park Network  
“A slum-based Culinary Park Network that provides an ‘out-of-community’ culinary 
and cultural experience, in addition to a peaceful, family-focused green space in an 
otherwise densely inhabited urban area.” 
                                                
39 We use “Living Well” instead of “Better Living”, as the latter may be viewed as pejorative of their 
current living situation.  
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The Solae Living-Well Culinary Park Network is comprised of three groups of service 
providers anchored around a highly-visible and publicly accessible rooftop “culinary 
garden” space (see exhibit 1 below). Together, this Culinary Park Network provides a 
unique food-based recreational experience inside the slum while laying a foundation 
for addressing the food security and nutrition challenges faced by the community.   
The four components of the Solae Living-Well Culinary Park are described below:  
 
Exhibit 1 






1) The Solae Living-Well Rooftop Culinary Garden transforms a slum rooftop 
into a public park space, combining green-space recreation with a food motif. 
Key components of the rooftop culinary garden include:  
• Organically and/or hydroponically-grown produce (vegetables and 
fruits), herbs (flavoring and medicinal), and ornamental flowers and 
shrubs from around the world40  
• Naturalized children’s play areas (eg, sand boxes, sodden/grassed 
areas) and interactive educational games (e.g., grey water filtration 
by plants – a “living machine”), as well as benches and seating 
areas for adults 
                                                
40 A garden could reflect the types of international foods prepared and sold in the park.  
  519 
• Health and nutrition-focused live cooking demonstrations and 
sampling of foods from around the world,41 in addition to other 
activities that help people  
• integrate Solae ingredients into their home cooking (e.g., TV 
playing cooking shows) 
• Food stand sales of both Solae ingredients and prepared soy-based 
health snacks42 & drinks that utilize roof-top grown produce and 
herbs  
 




2) The Solae Living-Well Grower’s Network consists of a group of “farmers” 
living in the slum who produce pesticide-free produce and herbs using 
modified roof-top farming systems43 found in the Rooftop Culinary Park. The 
business would train people in the community in using the hydroponics 
systems and in organic techniques. The food produced44 would be purchased 
by the Solae Living-Well Cooks Group (see below) for use in the prepared 
foods sold in the Culinary Park and through push-cart sales45 in the slum. The 
Solae Growers network increases the availability of affordable, fresh produce 
in the slums and, by proliferating more rooftop gardens, extends the reach of 
the Park’s “greening” effect throughout the community.   
                                                
41 These can be taped and used by the Protégé group during their home cooking demonstrations. The 
Culinary Park can be thought of as a live “cooking set.”  
42 Primary cooking would be conducted in an off-site kitchen or possibly in the Chefs’ homes. 
43 Technologies may include hydroponics systems or more traditional container-based planting systems. 
44 Or a portion of it. Some of the food may be used for personal consumption, depending on the 
grower’s needs. The important thing is that a part of their output is guaranteed to be bought at a certain 
price, thereby reducing their risk. Also, this may form the basis of a financing model, as the growing 
technologies could be provided freely in exchange for a certain quantity of produce.  
45 Again, the push cart method of sales is only a placeholder. The eventual method for extending sales 
into the community will be best decided through a pilot test. 
  520 
 
3) The Solae Living-Well Chefs Group provides the community with a unique 
variety of nutritious and great-tasting meal options in the slum, while also 
acting as community trainers and advocates for better daily nutrition through 
Solae. They have two main tasks: 
 
o They serve as a “Solae Culinary Laboratory” by constantly creating 
new and unique soy-based food items for sale in the Culinary Park/s 
(via food stands) and throughout the community (potentially using push 
carts as mentioned above). The Chefs Group would also oversee the 
sale of these foods.  
o They provide “Solae Healthy Cooking” training courses46 to women 
and others in the slum. The training would teach people to produce a 
menu of the unique Solae-based foods made available in the Culinary 
Park, as well as provide knowledge in food nutrition and food 
preparation hygiene.  
  
4) The Solae Living-Well Protégé Group consists of people in the slum who 
have graduated from the Solae Healthy Cooking course and are selected to sell 
Solae ingredients direct to the home. The group acts as a grassroots outreach 
into the community that transforms women’s daily cooking.  
 
The Protégé Group would use live cooking demonstrations to small groups of 
women in the women’s own homes to showcase the Solae products and menus. 
They would then take customer orders (and manage ongoing re-orders), 
repackage bulk ingredients stored with the Chefs Group, and then deliver 
direct to homes.  
 
Graduates are under no obligation to join the Protégé Group. Indeed, the 
business could actively seek employment positions for graduates (i.e., as cooks 
in households, restaurants, hotels, etc) as an additional benefit provided by the 
Healthy Cooking training course. Protégé Group members and course 
graduates could also receive periodic skill updates and training in the latest 
menu of items sold in the Culinary Park. Exceptional members of the Protégé 
Group may be later asked to join the Chef’s Group as the business expands. 
Because many wealthier families outside the slums employ these women as 
maids and cooks, the Protégé group also extends the adoption of Solae 
ingredients to families in wealthier communities. 
 
 
                                                
46 The Chefs Group could possibly charge a fee for this service. The cost to the students could be offset 
somewhat by providing the students with Solae ingredients to be used at home and with other food 
ingredients. This would be a way to encourage their personal adoption of Solae ingredients into home 
cooking. Or the training could be provided free of charge (or for minimal amount or contingent on the 
graduate getting employment in cooking) and considered a marketing and HR development cost.  
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III. Mutual Value Creation 
The Solae Living-Well Culinary Park generates value on multiple levels, both within 
the community and Solae.  
 
 Community Value Solae Business Value 
Solae Rooftop 
Culinary Garden 
• Locally-based and 
publicly accessible 
green space and 
family recreation site 
• Unique cultural and 
culinary experience in 
the community 
• “High” Brand & 
Business  Visibility  
• Sense of Shared 
Commitment & Mutual 
Value 
• Food Product “Beta 
Site” 
Solae Chefs Group 
• Income stream to 
group members 
• Local availability of 
unique food types and 
varieties 
• Enhanced skills for 
employment in food 
industry 
• Incremental Product 
Sales 
• Shape community 
cooking habits via 
graduates of Solae 
Certification course  
• Influence “up-market” 
cooking habits through 
cadre of trained cooks 







• Local & affordable 
fresh produce 
• Aesthetic value 
• Pervasive community 
presence  
• Sense of Shared 
Commitment/Mutual 
Value 
• Potentially Lower 
Ingredient Costs 
Solae Protégé Group 
• Income-stream to 
group members 
• In-home socialization 
opportunities for 
women 
• Incremental Product 
Sales 
• Shape community 
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IV. Strategic Business Context Factors 
The Culinary Park Network concept responds to several key environmental constraints 
posed by the slum.  
• One, it removes dependence on a business’ physical location. Given the near 
absence of available real-estate (land or buildings) in most slums, particularly 
among the “main roads”, an appropriate business model should detach the 
product or service from a fixed site. The Culinary Park Network achieves this 
by utilizing a “hidden asset” – rooftops – and by providing direct-to-home 
cooking demonstrations (akin to the “Tupperware party concept) through the 
Protégé group. 
• Two, it overcomes the challenge posed by “visual congestion” within the slum. 
A business that competes at “ground level” is hampered by the density of home 
and building construction and intensive advertising and signage. The rooftop 
garden opens up a new real estate zone within the slum – the rooftops – where 
there is no current competition. The rooftop would also garner significant 
community interest due to its novelty. As well, the Culinary Park Network’s 
three service groups provide deep reach throughout the community, including 
direct to home. Together, they reinforce a brand message that bypasses the 
visual noise throughout the slum.      
• Three, it address the constraints on women’s time and freedom of movement. 
Women in the slum frequently work outside the slum as home cleaners and 
cooks until mid-day and then return home to clean, cook and care for children. 
There is little time for activities that don’t contribute to the woman’s 
productiveness. As well, there are cultural – gender and religious – limits on 
women’s mobility. To successfully reach women, the business needs to 
contribute to their productivity while doing so within the comfort of their 
homes or when in the company of their husbands and family. The business 
achieves this both through the Culinary Garden – which provides a family 
recreational setting at which women can be educated and made aware of Solae 
menus – and through the Protégé Group, which provides in-home cooking 
demonstrations to individuals or groups of women.  
 
V. Sustainability of Competitive Position 
Sustainability of Solae’s position in this value network is dependent primarily upon 
building a sense of shared commitment among the broader community, the business 
partners themselves and Solae. To develop this shared commitment, the community 
and business partners must see and experience Solae as a long-term, dedicated 
member of the community whose presence provides value to the community. The 
proposed business model achieves this commitment through the following 
mechanisms: 
 
  523 
1) Solae Community Rooftop Garden – The rooftop gardens, by being 
publicly available, provide a highly visible contribution to the community’s 
welfare.    
2) Solae Cooking Certification – The Cooking Certification program would 
provide valuable job training and, potentially, job placement, for slum 
residents.  
3) Solae Grower’s Group – By training community members to grow 
vegetables for their own consumption as well as potential sale, the business 
would be seen as contributing to the community’s food security and well-
being. In addition, the expansion of home-based gardening systems would 
provide aesthetic benefits that would, likewise, be associated with the 
business.  
 
In addition, the sustainability of the business model in the community is, in part, aided 
by the fact that there are limited rooftops in the slum large enough to function as a 
high-profile community park. As such, Solae Living-Well Culinary Park Network has 
a strong first-mover advantage that provides access to a scarce and non-divisible 
resource. 
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APPENDIX 20: 
STRATEGIC BRIEF FOR PARVATHAGIRI BUSINESS 
CONCEPT: AUGUST 2006 
 
 
Solae Cooking Well Center 
“Sharing the Goodness of Solae” 
 
 
I. Key Un-Met Community Needs  
In the villages of Parvathagiri mandal, a woman’s time is filled with the daily 
responsibilities of working, caring for children, maintaining the household, and 
preparing meals. The benefits of learning about new products or services are, 
therefore, measured against these daily demands on time. Within this context, the 
women identified the following unmet needs: 
 
• Limited nutrition and meal variety in daily cooking: 
o Women are aware of the importance of nutrition, but have limited 
knowledge of how to integrate better nutrition into their meals and few 
accessible opportunities to develop that knowledge in a hands-on 
manner. The cost and time to travel to Warangal – the nearest major 
city which is over an hour bus-ride away – significantly reduces 
exposure and access to a greater variety of meal ingredients. 
• Socializing with and learning from other women: 
o Women’s socialization opportunities are limited to women on their own 
street due to time and work constraints. This occurs despite knowing 
many of the other women in the village and a stated desire to interact 
with and learn from women across the village. Through the experience 
of women’s self help groups, woman have learned to come together to 
form savings groups, but are still lacking ways and places in which they 
can work with one another, especially in the areas of cooking and 
catering.  
• Kitchen dreams and culinary skills: 
o A woman’s kitchen and culinary skills are both important sources of 
pride. However, women in Parvathagiri often lack the time and/or 
income to formally learn and improve their cooking skills. In addition, 
their current kitchen equipment – which consists of an external clay 
cooking vessel and, in the better-off families, a gas burner - limits the 
varieties of meals and foods a woman can cook. Furthermore, the 
existing kitchen equipment limits women’s ability to handle large 
events and other potential income-generating cooking opportunities.   
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II. Business Concept Solution: Solae Cook Well Centers  
“A network of aspirational kitchen centers that enables women to generate 
income while learning to incorporate nutritious and great tasting Solae 
ingredients in their daily cooking habits.” 
The Cooking Well Center meets the above needs by providing a “third place”47 for 
village women where they can come together to work, socialize, and learn how to 
prepare healthier and unique meals for their families. The Center, which provides 
high-end kitchen equipment48 and a stocked Solae pantry49 in a clean environment, 
acts as a hub to teach women how to integrate better nutrition into their families’ daily 
meals. As such, it becomes an ideal location to introduce new food concepts to village 
women, the chief decision makers for families’ nutrition and meals.  
The Cooking Well Center has three main dimensions (see Exhibit 1 below): a training 
component, kitchen rental, and sales of prepared foods.  
 
Exhibit 1 
The Solae Cooking Well Center 
 
 
o Training: The Cooking Well Center would provide hands-on cooking and 
food nutrition classes to women in the village. The Teaching Center uses 
an innovatively designed space to promote collaborative cooking and 
                                                
47 First place being the home, second being the field or shop.  Starbucks created a “third place” in the 
U.S. via its coffee shops designed to be another place Americans can go to outside of work or home. 
48 Ovens, gas ranges, refrigerators, and running water constitute “high-end” equipment as compared to 
open wood fire or kerosene stoves.  
49 It was suggested that the Solae Pantry can be stocked with organic produce grown by local farmers. 
There is an expanding organic movement underway in the villages, driven in part by the local NGO, 
MARI.  
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interaction between users, thereby providing a sociable group environment 
within which to learn about unique Solae menus and food items. The 
Center would attract women in the village through  
o new “course offerings.” Course participants would also be able to purchase 
the Solae ingredients through the Center.  
o Kitchen Rental: The Cooking Well Center would rent its facilities to 
women in the village and, potentially, to visitors. Users would pay either a 
one-time fee or a membership fee (much like an athletic facility) for access 
to the higher-end kitchen equipment and Solae pantry ingredients. The 
Center would provide hands-on instruction in using the equipment and 
provide meal and nutrition suggestions as requested. In this manner, the 
Center facilitates family’s ability to cook for special events requiring 
greater kitchen capacity.  
o Prepared Food Sales: The Cooking Well Center provides a platform for 
diverse income-generating activities through preparation and sale of Solae 
food items. These include catering for local events such as weddings, 
supplying local Child Care Centers (Anganwadi) with nutritionally-
appropriate food for children and mothers, and distributing baked goods 
through a “Chetla Kinda50” distribution model. Lastly, the Center could 
host a “Weekly Women’s Restaurant” - a women-only event where 
participants can socialize, try new foods, and learn cooking tips. 
 
 
                                                
50 The Chetla Kinda (Telegu for “under the tree”) model involves distributing products to community 
“tree sites”, places in the community where people naturally gather to socialize and relax. This was 
another business model developed with community members in Parvathagiri. It has been incorporated 
into the Cooking Well Model as an income-generating activity.  
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III. Mutual Value Creation 
The Solae Cooking Well Center generates value on multiple levels, both within the 
community and Solae.  
 Community Value Solae Business Value 
Solae Cooking Well 
Training Courses 
• Expanded meal variety 
for families  
• Access to a “third 
place” (outside of the 
home and the field) 
where women can 
socialize while meeting 
responsibilities of meal 
preparation 
• Expanded sharing of 
culinary and nutrition 
knowledge among the 
community’s women  
 
• Integration of Solae 
ingredients into home 
cooking habits 
• Grassroots innovation in 
and incubation of Solae 
food items 
• Incremental sale of 
Solae ingredients 
• Relationships with 
major decision makers 
in the home for food 
preparation & 
consumption  
• Solae Brand Expansion 
around women’s well-
being and family 
nutrition  
Solae Cooking-Well  
Kitchen Rental 
• Affordable access to 
high-capacity, high-end 
kitchen facilities: 
“meeting your kitchen 
dreams” 
• Grassroots innovation in 
the integration of Solae 
ingredients into rural 
meals Integration of 
Solae ingredients into 
home cooking habit 
• Incremental sales of 
Solae ingredients 
• Expanded brand 
awareness  
Prepared Food Sales 
• Income generation 
• Improvement in health 
and nutrition of 
community 
• Incremental Solae 
ingredient sales 
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IV. Strategic Business Context Factors 
Unlike slums, villages have highly accessible “main streets”, and the arrival of a new 
business is readily detected. Community members are attuned to and can easily 
monitor changes in their community.  As such, an enterprise like the Cooking Well 
Center – which would require a fixed, physical presence - can easily draw attention to 
the business and Solae. Given this, the external appearance of the facility needs to be 
carefully planned out as it will significantly shape people’s view of the brand and the 
business. 
 
Secondly, rural India has significantly lower population densities than urban 
environments and villages are highly distributed across the country. Coupled with the 
above-noted importance of a physical presence in the community, it is therefore 
critical that the business be “right-sized” to cost-effectively serve the thousands of 
“mini-markets” across India. Diversifying a business’ revenue streams better ensures 
that a fixed asset is maximized. The Cooking Well Center accomplishes this through 
its three-pronged service strategy.  
 
Third, given the demands on women’s time, introduction of new products and services 
needs to be balanced with a woman’s responsibility to be productive. By providing 
income generating opportunities as well as training opportunities, the Cooking Well 
Center provides a productive manner in which local women can learn about and 
integrate Solae ingredients into their families’ lives.  
 
 
V. Sustainability of Competitive Position 
 
Sustainability of Solae’s position in this value network is dependent primarily upon 
building the shared belief that the Cooking Well Centers create value for the broader 
community, the business partners themselves and Solae. In essence, the business needs 
to locally develop Solae’s brand as  
a long-term, dedicated member of the community, rather than as an outsider only 
looking to insert foreign goods or extract local value. The proposed business model 
develops Solae’s local brand via the following mechanisms: 
 
4) Improving Community’s Nutrition and Health– The Cooking Well Center 
doesn’t just focus on the sale of a product, but the actual integration of 
nutritious products into daily lives.   
5) Complementing Women’s Kitchens – The Cooking Well Center helps 
women meet their aspirations of providing greater variety and more 
nutritious meals to their families, becoming a much valued and necessary 
“addition” to a woman’s kitchen.   
6) A Third Place for Women – Because the Cooking Well Center is run by 
women and many of its activities are women focused, local women start 
seeing the Center as an integral place for women to come together to 
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socialize, work, and share. The work of community partners MARI and 
SERP have led to a strong local belief in the importance of women’s 
groups and the groups’ ability to generate local value.  The Cooking Well 
Center provides another investment and collaboration opportunity for these 
women’s groups.  
7) Local Innovation – In addition to providing the best nutrition and meal 
preparation of Solae, the Cooking Well Center celebrates, shares, and 
rewards local women for their own innovation.   
8) Local Income Generation – The Cooking Well Center increases the income 
earning potential of community members.  
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APPENDIX 24: 
SOLAE INDIA WORKPLAN: PHASE II 
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APPENDIX 25: 




Product Development Steps through Cooking Days with the Solae 
Communities 
 
The Solae Cooking Days are a set of in-community cooking activities designed to 1) 
Develop hands-on knowledge of Solae ingredients and capabilities, 2) Foster the 
brainstorming of product & service offerings for the urban and rural businesses, 3) 
Explore the dining and taste preferences in the communities, 4) Initiate dialogue 
around a brand concept for Solae and the businesses in the communities, and 5) Offer 
a concrete set of physical activities to foster a sense of forward progress for the teams 
and their communities. 
 
This document describes the first three of a set of cooking days, essentially the ones 
that can be accomplished during the current Transition phase; we do not expect to 
fully meet all of the above objectives in these first three sessions (e.g. a full suite of 
product and services will not be completed by the end of these three sessions, but the 
teams will be better positioned to discuss such a suite).   Solae Cooking Days will 
continue to be run in the lead up to each business pilot and we expect to run at least a 
dozen of them. In the long term, Solae Cooking Days could become an important part 
of each of the business models as an in-community tool to continually develop skills, 
demonstrate nutrition and ingredients, introduce new meal types, promote adoption, 
and gather market feedback. 
 
Each Solae Cooking Day is broken down into three phases: 1) The orientation phase - 
where new ingredients, recipes, or expertise are presented to the Solae Community 
teams, 2) The cooking phase – where the Solae Community Teams cook what was 
provided in the orientation phase, 3) the eating & demonstration phase – where the 
results are shared with family members or members of the community, either free or 
(when the business matures) at a price-per-plate event.  The demonstration phase can 
also include actual demonstrations to attendees on how to cook the dishes, sale of the 
necessary Solae ingredients, and a description of the nutritional value. 
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APPENDIX 26: 
SOLAE DEBRIEF MEETING, MARCH 8, 2007: BOP PROTOCOL 
PHASE I  
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APPENDIX 27: 
SOLAE DEBRIEF MEETING, MARCH 8, 2007: BOP PROTOCOL  
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APPENDIX 28: 
SOLAE DEBRIEF MEETING, MARCH 8, 2007: REVISED 
BUSINESS CONCEPTS  
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APPENDIX 30: 
SALES MAPPING EXERCISE TO DETERMINE INITIAL 
PRODUCT OFFERING 
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APPENDIX 32: 
PROJECT TRANSITION LETTER  
 
 





It is with genuine excitement that we write to you about the Solae Base of the Pyramid 
business initiatives in Andhra Pradesh and Mumbai, in which all of you have played important 
roles and made valuable contributions over the course of the year. In meeting the natural 
challenges arising from the creation of any new venture, as well as supporting important 
transitions within Solae to effectively carry forward the initiatives, we have not found 
occasion to provide everyone with a needed update on the projects. This letter is written in the 
spirit of both thanking you all for the tremendous work, and for providing that update. 
 
As you all know, Cornell University operated as the “face of Solae” during the initial phase of 
this very unique business initiative, as the project was grounded in our “BoP Protocol” co-
venturing process that brings companies together with “BoP” communities to co-create new 
businesses that serve the community and generate value for the company. This was entirely 
new territory for Solae. As such, while the initial Solae BoP Protocol team in Andhra Pradesh 
was a Solae team in spirit, the team was in fact led by Cornell and included 6 members drawn 
largely from partners Aide et Action and the Indian School of Business. In addition, this core 
team’s work was facilitated in the communities through the tremendous support of our NGO 
partners MARI and SIDUR.  
 
Between March and July of ’06, this “immersion” team succeeded in building the foundation 
for a business partnership between Solae and the communities in Hyderabad and Warangal 
District and in co-creating business concepts that linked Solae’s capabilities and strategic 
objectives with those of the communities. Importantly, this initial four months of work and 
learnings also allowed Solae as a company to gain a greater understanding of the BoP Protocol 
co-venturing process and of how to manage and grow these types of ventures within Solae’s 
corporate structure. They at last had some tangible experiences to draw on and to relate to 
their current operations. Beginning in late August and following extensive debriefs with 
Cornell and discussions among Solae’s top management team, Solae entered a significant 
transition period. Central to this transition was the creation of a BoP-focused global business 
platform called Nutrition for Sustainable Development (NfSD) to be led by XXXXX. 
Following his relocation from South Africa to Solae India’s offices in Delhi in December ’06, 
XXX appointed senior Solae manager XXX, who many of you have met previously, to lead 
NfSD’s efforts in South Asia.   
 
Over the course of the past 6 months, while these corporate-level changes were taking place, 
Cornell helped manage the in-field team transition so that Solae would assume direct and full 
responsibility for the co-created businesses and the relationships with the communities. Under 
Cornell’s guidance, a new Solae BoP team was created. Former BoP Protocol team member 
XXX was appointed on behalf of Solae to lead the AP initiatives, as well as a related Solae 
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BoP initiative in Mumbai where the company’s core project partner is SP Jain. Two recent 
MBA graduates came aboard the AP project sites in a Solae capacity: XXX was stationed in 
Hyderabad, and XXX in Warangal District. MARI and SIDUR continued to provide valuable 
insight and support, with each organization lending a full time and a part-time person to the 
Solae team. Throughout the period, this Solae team benefited from the guidance and insights 
of numerous other individuals to help think through and further develop the business models.  
 
By the conclusion of the transition phase, the new Solae Team had significantly advanced the 
businesses on the ground through the Protocol co-venturing process while building a powerful 
bond and deep business partnership between Solae and the community teams. The “Solae 
Champions Network” in Warangal District and the “Solae Culinary Park Network” in 
Hyderabad are both on track to become full-fledged businesses. And the tremendous level of 
commitment from the community teams and their sense of identification with and belief in 
Solae are clear signs to us that the process is working. Indeed, in XXX’s first few occasions to 
be in-field with the communities, he recalled being delighted, as well as humbled, by the 
spirit, intensity, and genuine business savvy the community teams demonstrated.  
 
Moving forward, this new Solae team of XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, and XXX has humbly 
assumed project leadership in both AP and Mumbai, and is simultaneously putting in place a 
foundation that can support the growth and expansion of these businesses beyond their 
founding communities. In Hyderabad and Warangal District, the team is supported in-field by 
an additional person on a one-year secondment to Solae from MARI and SIDUR. We at 
Cornell have shifted into an advisory and linkage role, drawing upon project learnings and 
insights from BoP Protocol efforts in Kenya and connecting the Solae team to a broader group 
of managers and entrepreneurs working in the BoP. MARI, SIDUR, and SP Jain have 
similarly shifted into advisory roles and have generously made available to Solae their 
tremendous bases of knowledge and experience in addressing the unique challenges presented 
by this co-venturing process. Indeed, our collective efforts have facilitated Solae’s and the 
communities’ ability to walk together as true business partners – now, it is incumbent upon 
Solae and the communities’ to learn to run on their own. 
 
And with that, we wish to extend our thanks to you all for the various contributions each of 
you has made in bringing this project to fruition – from the initial identification of team 
members, partners, and community sites, to the eventual facilitation and execution of the co-
venturing process. We are confident that this great work you all have helped to set in motion 
will indeed lead to a successful and sustainable business and will set a benchmark for 
corporate and community business partnerships in India and globally. Thank you.  We look 
forward to staying in contact with you all and will endeavor to keep you abreast of the 
project’s progress.  
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APPENDIX 34: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF DUPONT PROPOSAL FOR 
SUPPORT FOR 2008 
 
To profitably and sustainably serve the “Base of the Pyramid” – the four billion people globally 
who earn less than $4 per day (ppp) but whose aggregate market potential has been conservatively 
valued at $7 trillion - DuPont and The Solae Company have led the development of a 
fundamentally new go-to-market process. This process, which is called the Base of the Pyramid 
Protocol, forges a deep partnership between a company and a BoP community to co-create an 
entirely new business that serves that very community. 
 
Since January 2006, Solae has worked closely with Cornell University to implement the BoP 
Protocol in three project sites in India: one in a Mumbai slum (Santosh Nagar), a second in a 
Hyderabad slum (Rasul Pura), and a third in a rural village cluster outside Hyderabad (Parvathagiri 
Mandal). The objective of Solae’s BoP initiative has been to:  
1) validate a BoP business model capable of reaching India’s 800 million urban & rural poor  
2) gain the managerial skills and capabilities needed to effectively implement a BoP Protocol 
process across India and other regions of the world  
 
In each site, Solae field teams work closely with 21-23 women to launch the business. Currently, 
all three sites are on target to begin the third and final phase of the BoP Protocol by December 
2007. In Phase III, the three community business teams will expand their recently-launched 
business prototypes and develop the full business model co-created with Solae in Phase I (April – 
July, 2006). All three sites have strong momentum and are being coordinated to share best 
practices and maximize efficiency. Confidence is very high, as revenue generated during recent 
action learning and outreach activities confirm that the broader community’s expressed desire for 
Solae-based foods and protein will be converted into actual sales.  
 
Solae’s recently launched global restructuring effort designed to raise near-term profitability has 
eliminated funding for this initiative effective January 1, 2008. Absent working capital funds and 
continued business support by the Solae field teams, it is unlikely that the initiatives can survive, 
given the community teams’ lack of financial resources (many live hand-to-mouth) and 
inexperience in business development.  
 
To fully capture the value and learning generated over the past two years of effort and to preserve 
the option-potential of the three businesses, Solae asks that DuPont provide financial support to 
this initiative in the amount of $XXX for the year 2008. We believe that funding this initiative 
provides DuPont with three primary sources of near-term and long-term value that strongly justify 
this investment: 
1. Extensive Media Exposure & Strong PR Value 
2. A DuPont “BoP Center of Excellence” 
3. An Option to Pursue Scale-Out 
 
Each of these sources of value creation is predicated on the ongoing operation of the three 
businesses. Therefore, capturing this value requires that Solae complete the Protocol process it 
began, thereby ensuring that the three business sites are self-sustaining. This will only be possible 
through an infusion of patient capital for year 2008.  
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APPENDIX 35: 
FRANCHISE-BASED SCALING STRUCTURE FOR SOLAE’S 
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